Monthly Archives: February 1990

90MOSCOW5966,

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #90MOSCOW5966.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
90MOSCOW5966 1990-02-21 09:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

O 210927Z FEB 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7741
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY


Wikileaks

90MOSCOW5204, MUTED SOVIET REACTION TO MANDELA’S RELEASE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #90MOSCOW5204.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
90MOSCOW5204 1990-02-13 16:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

R 131626Z FEB 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6874
INFO/RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1186
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
AMEMBASSY HARARE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 05204 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PREL UR SF
SUBJECT:  MUTED SOVIET REACTION TO MANDELA'S RELEASE 
 
1.    CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.    FOR ALL THE ATTENTION THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE 
PAID TO NELSON MANDELA'S RELEASE FEBRUARY 12, HE 
MIGHT AS WELL STILL BE IN PRISON.  "SEVEN DAYS", THE 
USSR'S MAJOR SUNDAY EVENING NEWS AND WEEK-IN-REVIEW 
PROGRAM, DEVOTED ALL OF THIRTY SECONDS TO THE EVENT, 
AND BURIED IT SOME FORTY MINUTES INTO THE PROGRAM -- 
AFTER SUCH HIGHLIGHTS AS UPCOMING LOCAL ELECTIONS IN 
SVERDLOVSK.  "PRAVDA" (FEB. 12) LIKEWISE DEVOTED 
SCANT COVERAGE TO THE RELEASE, AND CARRIED ONLY A BIO 
SKETCH OF MANDELA, NEXT TO THE FAMILIAR 27-YEAR OLD 
PHOTO OF THE ANC LEADER WHEN HE WAS JAILED. 
 
3.    AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW FEBRUARY 12, 
FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YULIY VORONTSOV WAS 
ASKED ABOUT MANDELA'S RELEASE AND WHETHER THIS WOULD 
PROMPT THE USSR TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH 
SOUTH AFRICA.  VORONTSOV RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET 
UNION WELCOMED MANDELA'S RELEASE BY THE SAG.  "IT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF HE HAD NOT BEEN IMPRISONED 
FOR 27 YEARS," VORONTSOV SAID IN THE ONLY FORCEFUL 
COMMENT WE HAVE HEARD ON THIS SUBJECT.  MANDELA'S 
RELEASE DID NOT YET MEAN THE SAG HAD DISMANTLED 
APARTHEID, HOWEVER.  UNTIL THIS OCCURRED, THE WHOLE 
CIVILIZED WORLD -- INCLUDING THE USSR -- WOULD REFUSE 
TO HAVE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, VORONTSOV 
SAID. 
 
4.  THE SINCERITY OF VORONTSOV'S COMMENTS WAS 
UNDERMINED BY THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION WAS 
OBVIOUSLY "PLANTED."  THE PRESS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN 
CALLED TO DISCUSS AN ENTIRELY SEPARATE SUBJECT 
RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST.  THE PERSON WHO ASKED 
THE QUESTION -- RADIO MOSCOW AFRICA SERVICE OFFICIAL 
ALEKSEY BATOGOV -- WAS CLEARLY BEWILDERED BY HIS 
PRESENCE THERE AND EVEN ASKED AN EMBOFF IN ATTENDANCE 
WHAT THE PROCEDURE WAS FOR POSING QUESTIONS. 
 
5.  IF THIS RELATIVE LACK OF ATTENTION TO AN 
HISTORIC EVENT HAS SURPRISED US, IT HAS NO DOUBT 
INFURIATED SOME AFRICAN DIPLOMATS.  NEVERTHELESS, 
THIS TREATMENT CONFIRMS THE LOW PRIORITY WHICH 
AFRICAN AFFAIRS OCCUPIES IN A SOVIET SOCIETY WHICH IS 
ABSORBED IN DOMESTIC ISSUES.  MATLOCK 
 
 
NNNN

Wikileaks

90MOSCOW4292, RADICAL POLITICAL REFORM ON TAP AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #90MOSCOW4292.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
90MOSCOW4292 1990-02-05 10:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

O 051016Z FEB 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5925
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 04292 
 
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PGOV PINR UR
SUBJECT:  RADICAL POLITICAL REFORM ON TAP AT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  WE ASSUME ADDRESSEES HAVE SEEN THE FBIS TEXT OF 
GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH MINERS AT THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 2.  THE TEXT WAS CARRIED IN THE 
CENTRAL PRESS FEBRUARY 5.  EMBASSY PRELIMINARY 
ANALYSIS FOLLOWS. 
 
2.  A SEEMINGLY CONFIDENT GORBACHEV TOLD THE MINERS 
THAT THE PLENUM WOULD ADOPT A SET OF RADICAL 
POLITICAL REFORMS, HINTING THAT APPROVAL OF A 
MULTIPARTY SYSTEM AND DRASTIC REVISION, PERHAPS 
REPEAL, OF ARTICLE SIX OF THE USSR CONSTITUTION (ON 
THE PARTY'S PRIMACY) WERE IN THE OFFING.  ALTHOUGH HE 
ARGUED THAT THE POSTS OF PARTY AND STATE LEADER 
SHOULD BE COMBINED DURING THE "TRANSITION PERIOD," HE 
SAID HE SUPPORTED THEIR ULTIMATE SEPARATION.  THE 
PARTY CONGRESS WOULD DECIDE THE ISSUE, HE NOTED.  HE 
CALLED FOR DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS TO THE 28TH PARTY 
CONGRESS, PREDICTING THE PLENUM WOULD APPROVE AN 
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING PARTY RULES TO PERMIT THAT. 
GORBACHEV, HOWEVER, WAS SILENT ON WHETHER THE 
CONGRESS WOULD BE ADVANCED TO THIS SPRING, AS MANY 
PARTY MEMBERS HAVE DEMANDED, BUT NOTED THAT THE 
CONGRESS WAS NECESSARY TO "RENEW" BOTH THE POLITBURO 
AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 
 
3.  AFTER A WEEK IN WHICH THE CENTRAL PRESS WAS 
FILLED WITH ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS OF INTELLECTUALS 
CALLING FOR ENHANCING THE POWER OF THE CHAIRMAN OF 
THE SUPREME SOVIET (I.E., GORBACHEV), THE MEETING 
WITH MINERS WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE 
GORBACHEV HAS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FROM THE WORKING 
CLASS AS WELL.  AT THE MEETING, GORBACHEV EXTENDED AN 
INVITATION TO THE MINERS TO SEND A TEN-MAN DELEGATION 
TO THE PLENUM ITSELF AND SUGGESTED ITS MEMBERS MIGHT 
BE ALLOWED TO SPEAK.  THAT TOO WAS AN OBVIOUS PLOY TO 
WIN FAVOR WITH WORKERS AND TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION 
THAT THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE WOULD BE HEARD AT THE 
PLENUM.  OVERALL, MEDIA REPORTING OF THE PAST WEEK 
AND THE HUGE DEMONSTRATION IN MOSCOW IN SUPPORT OF 
RADICAL POLITICAL REFORM FEBRUARY 4 (REPORTED SEPTEL) 
HAVE CREATED THAT IMPRESSION THAT GORBACHEV IS IN 
CHARGE AND PREPARED TO PUSH THROUGH A SET OF RADICAL 
PARTY REFORMS THAT WOULD HAVE SEEMED IMPOSSIBLE JUST 
A FEW MONTHS AGO. 
 
 
LAST RUMORS 
/---------- 
 
4.  ACCORDING TO A DEPARTMENT HEAD AT THE INSTITUTE 
OF STATE AND LAW (STRICTLY PROTECT), TWO KEY ITEMS ON 
THE PLENUM AGENDA WILL BE THE TIMING OF THE 28TH 
PARTY CONGRESS AND THE METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES 
TO IT.  OUR SOURCE SAID THE PLENUM WOULD DECIDE TO 
ADVANCE THE DATE OF THE CONGRESS FROM OCTOBER TO 
PERHAPS AS EARLY AS APRIL OR MAY.  HE BELIEVED THE 
PLENUM WOULD APPROVE DIRECT SELECTION OF DELEGATES BY 
THE PARTY RANK AND FILE. 
 
5.  ACCORDING TO A BRITISH DIPLOMAT CITING A 
CONVERSATION LATE LAST WEEK WITH ARKADIY VAKSBERG 
(PROTECT), A POLITICAL COMMENTATOR FOR "LITERATURNAYA 
GAZETA," LIGACHEV AND VOROTNIKOV WILL RETIRE AT THE 
PLENUM AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY MANAYENKOV 
WILL BE ELEVATED TO THE POLITBURO. 
 
6.  LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
MATLOCK

Wikileaks

90MOSCOW4215, IMPRESSIONS OF POLITICAL SITUATION IN ROMANIA

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #90MOSCOW4215.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
90MOSCOW4215 1990-02-03 14:46 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

O 031446Z FEB 90 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5818
INFO AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04215 
 
FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY FROM HA A/S SCHIFTER 
 
E.O. 12356:  DECL:  OADR 
TAGS: PREL US RO
SUBJECT:  IMPRESSIONS OF POLITICAL SITUATION IN ROMANIA 
 
1.  (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.) 
 
2.  DURING MY SHORT ST...

Wikileaks

90MOSCOW4161, U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #90MOSCOW4161.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
90MOSCOW4161 1990-02-02 19:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

R 021927Z FEB 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5736
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04161 
 
E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR 
TAGS: PREL UR JA US
SUBJECT:  U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
2.  SUMMARY: THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE'S TOP JAPAN 
EXPERT, CONSTANTIN SARKISOV, THINKS UNCERTAINTY IN 
THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE AND WILL 
EVENTUALLY FORCE A STRUCTURAL 'REMODELLING" OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP.  THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THE 
INEVITABILITY OF JAPAN'S BECOMING THE WORLD'S LEADING 
ECONOMIC POWER.  THE CHANGES IN U.S.- JAPAN RELATIONS 
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. AND SOVIETS TO 
COOPERATE IN CHANNELING JAPAN INTO PRODUCTIVE 
ENDEAVORS AND MAKING SURE JAPAN DOES NOT GET "OUT 
FRONT" POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY.  SINCE THE SOVIETS 
HAVE LITTLE ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN THE REGION, THE 
U.S. WILL NEED TO TAKE THE LEAD IN FINDING AN 
ECONOMIC ROLE FOR JAPAN THAT WILL KEEP IT HAPPY. 
"DON'T ASK THEM," HE ADVISED. "PUSH THEM."  THE 
COROLLARY, SARKISOV SUGGESTED, IS THAT IT IS IN 
SOVIET INTERESTS TO MOVE THINGS ALONG IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION MILITARILY, BY ACTING TO FURTHER DIMINISH 
THE ALREADY SHRINKING PERCEPTION IN JAPAN OF THE 
"SOVIET THREAT."  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMIC POWER 
/   ------------------------------ 
 
CONSTANTIN SARKISOV, THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE'S LEADING 
JAPAN EXPERT, PROVIDED POLOFF WITH HIS VIEWS ON U.S. 
- JAPAN RELATIONS AND ON HOW THE U.S. AND SOVIET 
UNION COULD COOPERATE IN THE FUTURE ON JAPAN POLICY. 
IN A JANUARY 19 MEETING WITH POLOFF, SARKISOV SAID HE 
SAW CONSIDERABLE TENSION IN U.S. - JAPAN RELATIONS. 
CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES ON BOTH SIDES WOULD EVENTUALLY 
FORCE A "REMODELLING" OF THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP, 
WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS OUTDATED.  THE U.S. NEEDED TO 
COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT IN THE NEXT CENTURY 
JAPAN WOULD BE THE WORLD'S LEADING ECONOMIC POWER. 
IN TEN YEARS, JAPAN'S GNP WOULD BE 75 PERCENT OF U.S. 
GNP--OR MORE, HE SAID. 
 
4.  A MODEL RELATIONSHIP 
/   -------------------- 
 
SARKISOV SAID THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO 
POWERS WOULD CONTINUE AND THE U.S. - JAPAN 
RELATIONSHIP SHOULD PROVE TO BE A MODEL OF FUTURE 
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE WORLD.  THERE WOULD BE FRICTION 
IN THE PROCESS BUT THE RELATIONSHIP WOULD SURVIVE 
INTACT ALBEIT WITH ALTERED SECURITY AND ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS.  THE U.S. WOULD NEED TO ACTIVELY SEEK OUT 
A LEADING ROLE FOR JAPAN ECONOMICALLY--NOT AS A BILL 
PAYER OR DISCOUNT BANK BUT AS THE PREDOMINANT 
FINANCER AND DECISIONMAKER IN MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC 
PROJECTS.  SARKISOV SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT 
NEGOTIATE THIS WITH JAPAN, BUT SHOULD PUSH JAPAN INTO 
THE ROLE, WHICH HE FELT WOULD SATISFY THE JAPANESE 
"EGO" AND KEEP TOKYO FROM CONCENTRATING ON POLITICAL 
OR STRATEGIC ISSUES. 
 
5.  THE SOVIETS, SARKISOV SAID, DID NOT SEE AN 
ECONOMIC THREAT FROM JAPAN.  THERE WAS AN ECONOMIC 
MISMATCH.  THE SOVIETS DID, HOWEVER, FEAR A MILITARY 
THREAT FROM JAPAN SHOULD JAPANESE MILITARY POWER 
CONTINUE TO GROW.  IT HAS NOT IN SOVIET OR U.S. 
INTERESTS TO SEE JAPAN BECOME A WORLD POLITICAL OR 
STRATEGIC POWER.  TOGETHER, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION 
COULD WORK TO ENSURE THIS DID NOT HAPPEN.  MANY 
SOVIETS CONSIDERED THE U.S. PRESENCE IN JAPAN AN 
ANCHOR RESTRAINING JAPANESE MILITARY POWER, SAID 
SARKISOV, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT CONTINUE 
INDEFINITELY.  BUT THE SIZE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE 
NEEDED TO BE REDUCED.  U.S. REDUCTIONS--OR EVEN U.S. 
WILLINGNESS TO TALK SERIOUSLY ABOUT REDUCTIONS--COULD 
OPEN THE WAY FOR SOVIET MILITARY REDUCTIONS IN THE 
REGION.  SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE 
PERCEPTION IN JAPAN OF A SOVIET THREAT.  EVEN NOW, 
PEOPLE IN JAPAN DID NOT FEEL AS THREATENED BY THE 
SOVIET UNION AS THEY HAD TWO YEARS AGO, SARKISOV 
SAID. 
 
 
6.  COMMENT:  SARKISOV'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE 
COMMONALITY OF U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS 
JAPAN ARE PART OF A BROADER SOVIET ARGUMENT WE HAVE 
BEEN HEARING MUCH OF RECENTLY IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET 
ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES.  THE BASIC THRUST IS THAT, 
TO OPEN THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL 
COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA IN WHICH THE U.S., 
JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION ALL PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE 
ROLES, THE U.S. NEEDS TO BEGIN THE ARMS CONTROL 
PROCESS.  THE RIGHT U.S. GESTURE WOULD OPEN THE WAY 
FOR SOVIET FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD LESSEN 
JAPANESE (AND KOREAN) SECURITY CONCERNS.  A CONTINUED 
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN IS ALSO PART OF THE 
ARGUMENT.  OFFICIAL SOVIETS ARE CLAIMING THAT THE 
SOVIET UNION HAS DONE WHAT IT CAN TO INITIATE THE 
PROCESS AND CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE LARGE UNILATERAL 
REDUCTIONS. 
 
7.  NORTHERN TERRITORIES 
/  -------------------- 
 
SARKISOV NOTED THAT MOSCOW WAS TRYING TO ESTABLISH 
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS.  THE JAPANESE WERE 
THINKING ABOUT IT BUT WERE STILL HESITANT "BECAUSE 
THEY WANT TO DO IT ONLY WITH YOU--AND WITHOUT YOUR OK 
THEY WON'T."  SARKISOV THOUGHT A MOMENT, THEN ADDED, 
"ALSO, THEY WANT A CONCESSION ON THE NORTHERN 
TERRITORIES."  BUT THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS ON THE 
NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WHEN SHEVARDNADZE GOES TO 
TOKYO IN MARCH, SARKISOV PREDICTED.  GROWING 
NATIONALISM MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO 
CONCEDE ON ETOROFU AND KUNASHIRI.  THE EMERGENCE OF 
THE SUPREME SOVIET FURTHER COMPLICATED THE ISSUE. 
AZERBAYDZHAN AND THE BALTICS WERE TOO CLOSELY 
CONNECTED TO THE N
ORTHERN TERRITORIES AND IT WOULD 
THEREFORE BE "ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE" TO GET A DEAL 
THROUGH THE SUPREME SOVIET.  MOSCOW WAS PREPARED TO 
OFFER JOINT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND NO-VISA TRAVEL TO 
THE ISLANDS.  THE IDEA OF SELLING THEM TO JAPAN WAS A 
NON-STARTER.  FOR MOSCOW, IT WAS SIMPLY SAFER TO HOLD 
ON TO THE ISLANDS THAN TO OPEN POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE 
NEGOTIATIONS OR SELL THEM.  SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT, 
HOWEVER, REFORMULATE THE ISSUE IN MARCH SO THAT 
MOSCOW RECOGNIZED THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES 
SPECIFICALLY AS AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM BETWEEN THE 
TWO COUNTRIES. 
 
8.  COMMENT:  ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, RECENT 
COMMENTS MADE BY A NUMBER OF SOVIETS, INCLUDING 
GORBACHEV HIMSELF, ARE BEGINNING TO DEVELOP INTO A 
VAGUE PATTERN CENTERED ON SOVIET AIR POWER IN THE 
NORTHERN TERRITORIES.  ORIENTAL INSTITUTE ACTING 
DIRECTOR CHUFRIN POINTEDLY TOLD VISITING SENATOR 
WIRTH RECENTLY THAT U.S. WILLINGNESS TO START TALKING 
ABOUT ARMS CONTROL WOULD PROMPT SOVIET AIR FORCE 
REDUCTIONS IN THE REGION.  GORBACHEV TOLD ABE THAT 
JAPANESE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MAKE GRAVE VISITS TO 
ETOROFU IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 
THERE, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD "SEE WHAT THEY 
COULD DO" ABOUT THE PROBLEM.  IMEMO JAPAN EXPERT 
KUNADZE TOLD POLOFF GORBACHEV COULD NOT AFFORD AN 
UNSUCCESSFUL FOREIGN TRIP.  WE DO NOT THINK ANY 
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON HOW TO MOVE THE NORTHERN 
TERRITORIES PROBLEM FORWARD, OR EVEN WHETHER IT 
SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED AS A BILATERAL PROBLEM 
OR AS AN EAST-WEST ISSUE.  SOVIET DOMESTIC CONCERNS 
WOULD ARGUE FOR A CONTINUED BILATERAL APPROACH, WHILE 
SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES COULD CLEARLY BENEFIT 
FROM ITS TREATMENT AS AN EAST-WEST ISSUE.  WE KNOW 
THAT HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION IS NOT FOCUSED ON THE 
NORTHERN TERRITORIES.  BUT IT WILL INCREASE AS THE 
TIME FOR GORBACHEV'S VISIT NEARS, AND THOSE TO WHOM 
THE LEADERSHIP TURNS FOR ANSWERS AT THAT TIME ARE NOW 
IN THE PROCESS OF SEEING WHAT WILL FLY--AND WHAT 
WON'T. 
 
MATLOCK 
 
 
NNNN

Wikileaks