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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW4265 2006-04-21 06:47 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow


DE RUEHMO #4265/01 1110647
P 210647Z APR 06

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004265 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reasons 1.4 (a/b/d/f/h) 
1. (C)  SUMMARY.  In an April 12 meeting with Anatoliy 
Antonov, Director of the MFA's Department for Disarmament and 
Security Affairs, ISN Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker 
explained that U.S. concerns about Russian treaty compliance 
were the main obstacles to U.S. support for Russian 
membership in the Australia Group.  A/S Rademaker also 
reiterated that the U.S would like to move forward to 
negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty without a 
verification regime.  He informed Antonov that the U.S. is 
not interested in pursuing an agreement for the Prevention of 
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).  Antonov said the GOR 
would like to extend the mandate of the Security Council 
Committee established by UNSCR 1540 for two more years, and 
added that the GOR would like to get consensus for the 
Committee's activities during the course of these two years. 
Antonov said the GOR does not agree with the U.S. proposal to 
restrict anti-vehicle mines within the framework of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons.  Rademaker requested that 
the GOR not block consensus on the U.S. proposal, but Antonov 
rejected that request, noting that Russia would equally like 
the U.S. to stand aside and not block others negotiating a 
PAROS agreement in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). 
Rademaker and Antonov agreed that we need to find ways to 
attract more countries to participate in the Hague Code of 
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.  Rademaker 
said the U.S. is committed to making pre-launch notifications 
for missile launches, and suggested that the Joint Defense 
Exchange Center (JDEC) would be the best way to do that. 
Antonov said that we could move forward again on the JDEC. 
Antonov reported that the joint U.S.-Russian proposal to 
launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is 
still within the Russian interagency clearance process. 
Discussion on Iran was covered reftel.  END SUMMARY. 
2. (C)  Antonov raised U.S. opposition to Russian membership 
in the Australia Group (AG).  He said the U.S. list of 
conditions that Russia must first meet before being able to 
join the AG failed to reflect the many changes that had taken 
place in the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship over the past 
decade and our cooperation in the BW and CW framework and on 
export controls.  The two sides continued, of course, to have 
differences, "but that's normal."  Pointing to the February 
22 and March 31 U.S. non-papers detailing those conditions, 
Antonov said U.S. accusations that Russia may be maintaining 
an offensive biological weapons program in violation of the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) were particularly 
upsetting.  If one were to judge by those non-papers, "We're 
still enemies."  According to Antonov, a number of European 
states have stated that they could agree to Russia joining 
the AG, but the U.S. was acting as if the Cold War were still 
on.  Antonov also protested about stated U.S. concerns over 
the accuracy of Russia's declaration of chemical weapons 
stocks under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  He said 
U.S. concerns over Russia's compliance with the BWC and CWC 
were unfounded and should not be raised in the context of the 
Australia Group.  Antonov said that if the U.S. really 
considered Russia to be in violation of the BWC and CWC, the 
GOR would have to rethink its cooperation with the U.S. in 
those two spheres. 
3. (C) Antonov added that U.S. demands for Russian officials 
to be fired and for non-reciprocal short-notice access to 
certain sensitive military facilities in Russia as a 
condition for membership in the Australia Group were 
insulting.  U.S. officials who thought Russia might agree to 
such demands simply were demonstrating their lack of 
understanding of Russia.  How could they think that sending 
such papers to the GOR would improve relations between the 
two countries?  The U.S. should not waste its time with this 
request, as it would not be met.  "Russia is a different 
country in 2006" from what it was a decade ago, "but you talk 
to us as if we were less important than Iraq or Iran.  You're 
treating us like Russia were Mali or Burundi." 
4. (C)  Antonov asked how Russia and the U.S. could continue 
to cooperate in the Global Partnership or bilaterally on, 
e.g., bio-terrorism, if the U.S. really thought Russia was 
violating the BWC and CWC?  How could the U.S. imagine that 
Russia would accept the U.S. conditions just to join the AG? 
"We will continue to live without it, and we will survive." 
Many people in Moscow had wanted Russia to press on U.S. 
vulnerabilities in the BW area, but Antonov had previously 
blocked that.  Now he had not even reported the latest U.S. 
non-paper to his superior (Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak) 
or to the Russian inter-agency, which would press for Russia 
to take up an actively anti-U.S. position, and that would 
benefit Iran, India, and "some Europeans who dislike 
U.S.-Russia cooperation."  He added that the GOR would be 
willing to discuss U.S. concerns about Russian CW and &#x
000A;biological programs within the framework of general 
U.S.-Russian cooperation and cited specifically the 
willingness to discuss the DPRK cases raised in the nonpaper. 
 Antonov then passed a nonpaper to A/S Rademaker responding 
to the two U.S. papers. 
5. (C)  Rademaker acknowledged that the USG had concerns 
about Russian CWC and BWC programs, and is required by law to 
voice those concerns in an annual compliance report to 
Congress.  He added that in 1992 then-President Yeltsin 
admitted that Soviet officials had lied about the USSR's BW 
program.  Rademaker said the U.S. believed Russia's 1992 BWC 
declaration to the United Nations was misleading. 
6. (C)  Rademaker said the U.S. also had concerns about a 
lack of Russian transparency about its CW stockpile.  The 
U.S. side has been asking without success for information 
about Russia's CW stockpile and possible non-declared CW 
production facilities.  Rademaker added that Russia had 
back-tracked on an agreement and refused a U.S. request for 
access to documents on its CW program the GOR had previously 
shown to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW).  Russian officials had claimed the documents 
had been "destroyed."  Rademaker said the USG did not take 
the Russian reply seriously, and cited it as an example of 
Russian non-cooperation regarding CW issues. 
7. (C)  Rademaker explained that since membership in the 
Australia Group requires a party to be in compliance with the 
BWC and CWC and the USG continues to have concerns about 
Russia's compliance with these Conventions, the U.S. could 
not support Russia's membership until U.S. concerns are 
addressed.  The U.S. remained ready to engage with Russia to 
resolve the issue. 
8. (C)  Antonov asked Rademaker to cite even one drawback for 
the U.S. that would result from Russian participation in the 
AG.  Rademaker said the basis for the U.S. position was as 
set out in para 7 above, but he added that in a meeting that 
had just taken place in Washington, Antonov's deputy Mashkov 
had objected to updating MTCR control lists to take technical 
developments into account, on the grounds that doing so would 
be too difficult bureaucratically within the GOR.  The same 
need for updating existed within the AG, and it appeared 
Russia would not agree to such revisions for the same 
reasons.  Antonov replied that either Mashkov had been 
misunderstood in Washington or he had not accurately 
represented the GOR position.  Russia was not opposed to 
revising MTCR control lists -- what it opposed was changing 
the MTCR Guidelines.  Russia also had some reservations about 
expanding participation in the MTCR, especially with regard 
to the EU, which thought that the fact that a country (e.g., 
Slovenia) had joined the EU meant that it automatically 
qualified to join the MTCR. 
9. (C)  Antonov returned to the BW area, citing a passage 
from the U.S. non-paper about a lack of Russian "openness 
about the Soviet biological weapons program."  There was "no 
framework" for such a U.S. question, he said.  "We are a P-5 
country.  What if I wanted an answer about the U.S. BW 
program?  You still have the capability to have an offensive 
program.  You rejected continuing discussions in the BWC 
framework about verification  -- that may mean that you are 
continuing an offensive BW program."  He added, "We are ready 
to cooperate, but you have to decide whether we are partners, 
or whether you're a superpower and we're from Africa."  The 
GOR was compiling a list of all CW and BW programs where the 
two sides were cooperating, and "we may need to stop them if 
there is no trust.  We are not students, and you are not 
professors.  We are equals." 
10. (C)  A/S Rademaker said the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) is going into its ninth year with no real work 
accomplished.  The U.S. would like to reinvigorate the CD and 
was considering submitting a draft Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty (FMCT).  There would not be any surprises in the draft 
text.  Since the U.S. believed, it would be difficult to 
negotiate a verification regime and verification in any case 
could not be very effective, such a draft would not propose 
any verification provisions, but would instead leave it up to 
individual states to use their own national means and methods 
to assess compliance.  The U.S. remained opposed to the 
Shannon Mandate because of its presumption that an FMCT 
Treaty must include a verification regime.  Antonov said the 
Shannon Mandate was so vague on verification that even the 
U.S. should be able to accept it.  Rademaker repeated that 
the Shannon Mandate clearly foresaw a verification regime. 
11. (C)  Rademaker said if the U.S. put forward a draft 
Treaty text, a main obstacle would be political linkages to 
other CD proposals that countries have attached to the FMCT. 
The USG believes FMCT negotiations should be able to begin 
even if there is no movement on related CD issues.  He asked 
whether the GOR would be willing to de-link the FMCT from 
agreement on discussions concerning the Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space (PAROS).  The FMCT, which enjoys 
consensus in principle within the CD, was being held hostage 
to PAROS, which does not enjoy consensus.  Antonov said 
Russia was willing to start negotiations on an FMCT and would 
not block consensus, but it would not actively support the 
U.S. in forming such a consensus.  He indeed doubted that a 
consensus for FMCT negotiations could be achieved without at 
least discussions on PAROS.  If the U.S. tabled an FMCT 
draft, there would be no real discussion of it, because there 
would be no decision to form an ad hoc discussion group.  He 
noted that when Russia took over the CD chair, it would have 
to take NAM views more strongly into account. 
12. (C)  Antonov said that Russian Ambassador Loshchinin had 
said Russia would need U.S. help during its presidency on 
PAROS and on radiological weapons.  He planned to organize a 
discussion on PAROS and hoped the U.S. would send experts to 
discuss that issue.  In any event, Antonov said he wanted a 
U.S.-Russia bilateral dialogue on outer space to continue. 
Rademaker said he would be surprised if the U.S. sent experts 
to Geneva to discuss PAROS, but he said bilateral discussions 
of outer space could continue. 
13. (C) Antonov asked whether the U.S. was still opposed to 
discussions on PAROS, adding that it was a top priority for 
Russia within the CD.  He added that the GOR would be willing 
to be flexible to reach some sort of agreement on PAROS. 
Rademaker replied that the CD works on consensus, and the 
U.S. is not interested in PAROS.  He added that he would 
think that Russia would share with the U.S. an interest in 
China being limited by an FMCT.  Antonov said he regarded 
PAROS as a higher priority than FMCT. &#
UNSCR 1540 
14. (C)  Antonov said the GOR would like to extend the 
mandate of the Security Council Committee established by 
UNSCR 1540 for two more years.  He added that the GOR would 
like to get consensus on a relatively simple text for the 
Committee's activities during the course of these two years. 
He said that Russia would introduce a draft text to do that, 
but was also willing to work on the basis of the UK draft. 
15. (C)  A/S Rademaker said the U.S. also wanted to extend 
the Committee's mandate and would like to include specific 
language that deals with proliferation-related financing. 
Antonov said that 1540 had required a "delicate compromise" 
that should not be overturned.  The GOR did not feel it 
appropriate to single out proliferation financing as an issue 
that merited more attention than other issues (e.,g., export 
controls, prevention) in the framework of 1540.  Russia was 
ready for a compromise, and urged the U.S. to find a 
formulation that drew only on existing 1540 language.  He 
noted that Russia would also like to draw on 1540 language to 
include in G-8 documents at the St. Petersburg summit, and 
would look for a U.S. proposal. 
16. (C)  Antonov began the discussion by passing over a 
nonpaper replying to the U.S. proposal to restrict 
anti-vehicle mines within the framework of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW).  He said the majority of 
non-aligned countries do not support the U.S. proposal for a 
Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOPATOM) Protocol, and 
added  that such mines have legitimate uses.  He said China 
and Pakistan would not negotiate the issue.  If the U.S. 
would like to start a process of negotiating agreement on 
MOPATOM outside the framework of the CCW, Russia would not 
17. (C) A/S Rademaker requested that the GOR not block 
consensus of the U.S. proposal within the CCW Group of 
Experts.  He added that the U.S. and Russia have a lot in 
common regarding their stand on anti-vehicle mines.  Antonov 
noted that the Russia would not stand aside and let others 
pursue the issue within the CD, just as the U.S. would not 
stand aside and let PAROS negotiations proceed.  Moreover, 
there was no statistical data confirming that anti-vehicle 
mines are a humanitarian problem.  Russia had also been 
seeking clarity on what kind of an instrument the U.S. 
wanted, and how it would affect the Russian army.  The U.S. 
still had not clarified those issues.  Rademaker said he 
would take the Russian non-paper to Washington for it to be 
18. (C)  Rademaker raised the issue of making it a binding 
principle in the IAEA that a country under investigation for 
possible violations of its obligations should not be in a 
position to act in the Board of Governors or the new Special 
Committee on Safeguards and Verification when its own case 
was being considered.  Antonov turned to his deputy Oleg 
Rozhkov for a response.  Rozhkov said that the issue could 
not be resolved without changes to the IAEA Statute and to 
its Rules of Procedure.  Such changes would require 
ratification and would take decades, and in any case the NAM 
did not support making such changes.  Rademaker suggested 
that the principle in question, which had been accepted by 
the G-8 at Sea Island, could be reiterated in St. Petersburg. 
 Antonov said he was not sure, but would be willing to look 
at an American proposal. 
19. (C)  Antonov raised the issue of the Hague Code of 
Conduct (HCOC), wondering whether Russia should continue to 
submit annual declarations when the U.S. was failing to do 
so.  Rademaker responded that the U.S. was committed to 
making pre-launch notifications for vehicle launches and test 
flights.  We had expected, however, to be able to make the 
same notifications to HCOC as we made to the bilateral Joint 
Defense Exchange Center (JDEC), but agreement on the JDEC had 
become stalled over the liability issue.  Now that liability 
was close to resolution, it should be possible to move 
forward with the JDEC and that would resolve our problem with 
the HCOC.  Antonov said he did not understand the U.S. 
position.  The U.S. had accepted a multilateral obligation to 
provide HCOC notifications, and it was not meeting that 
obligation.  The bilateral JDEC issue was a separate issue. 
Did the U.S. think Russia should also not be making HCOC 
notifications?  The Russian military was very reluctant to 
make such notifications when the U.S. was refusing to do so. 
If Russia stopped, Antonov said, the majority of other HCOC 
countries would also not comply with HCOC obligations. 
20. (C)  Rademaker and Antonov agreed that ways should be 
found to attract more countries to participate in the HCOC. 
Rademaker said the U.S. appreciated Russia's intentions in 
proposing amendments designed to make the HCOC more 
attractive to other countries, but the majority of countries 
were not yet prepared to support changes to the HCOC. 
Antonov said the GOR's main concern was to bring China and 
India into the regime. 
21. (C)  Antonov reported that the joint U.S.-Russian 
proposal to launch the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism was still in the Russian interagency clearing 
22. (U)  A/S Rademaker has cleared this cable. 


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