06MOSCOW5264, RUSSIANS AGAINST DELISTING MONIB

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW5264 2006-05-18 12:00 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5264 1381200
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181200Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5978
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0394

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER KTFN UN AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIANS AGAINST DELISTING MONIB 
 
REF: STATE 70950 
 
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reasons: 1.4(B/D). 
 
1. (C)  On May 12 poloff delivered reftel demarche to MFA 
Afghanistan Section Chief Yuriy Khokhlov, and followed up on 
the issue with him in a May 15 discussion.  On May 17 econoff 
double-tracked the demarche with Aleksandr Ubilava and 
Nikolay Ostrokhov from the MFA New Threats and Challenges 
Department.  Khokhlov termed Monib a "bad guy" who had been 
involved in military training camps in Chechnya and 
Kazakhstan, according to GOR intelligence.  While Monib was 
not known to have been guilty of "war crimes," Khokhlov 
insisted that Karzai's characterization of Monib as 
rehabilitated was not accurate.  Khokhlov provided us a 
written response suggesting there was insufficient evidence 
to delist Monib and asking the USG to provide more detailed 
arguments in support of that action.  That response has been 
faxed to EUR/RUS.  An informal Embassy translation follows in 
paragraph 3. 
 
2. (C)  New Threats and Challenge's Ubilava acknowledged 
Monib's case deserved particular attention, but also said the 
GOR needed more detailed evidence that: a) Monib had truly 
renounced all ties to terrorism and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan; b) he was cooperating actively with the GOA and 
international community on counterterrorism; and c) he had 
not been involved in serious terrorist activity while a 
supporter of the Taliban.  (According to Ubilava, the GOR had 
used a similar integrity test in granting amnesty to certain 
Chechens and regarded that standard as reasonable to apply 
here.)  Ubilava added that the MFA had shared the U.S. 
delisting request with the Federal Security Service (FSB), 
and the GOR could provide additional background on Monib 
through separate channels. 
 
3. (U)  An informal Embassy translation of the Russian 
nonpaper follows below: 
 
Begin Text: 
 
Thank you for the appeal of the U.S. side with respect to 
removing mulavi Abdul Hakim Monib from the UNSC 1267 
Committee's sanction list that you sent to us by fax. 
 
I would like to note that the arguments set out in this 
appeal certainly deserve the closest attention and clearly 
indicate how much the United States is interested in a 
peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan and in the 
earliest possible stabilization of this long-suffering 
country. 
 
At the same time, as we have repeatedly told our colleagues, 
the arguments in favor of A.H. Monib's delisting presented to 
the 1267 Committee by the Afghan side are not sufficiently 
substantive or concrete.  We believe that A.H. Monib's oath 
of allegiance to the Government of Afghanistan, reports about 
his participation in the Loya Jirga, as well as reference to 
the fact that A.H. Monib has gone through a national 
reconciliation program and provided information that helped 
to capture undisclosed terrorists are absolutely insufficient 
for us to take a decision to remove him from the sanctions 
list.  We are very interested in detailed information about 
A.H. Monib's functional responsibilities as deputy minister 
for borders and tribes for the Taliban regime, his 
participation or non-participation in the war crimes of that 
terrorist organization, and his political activities since 
December 2001, including his role in the split of the Taliban 
Movement and his contacts with present high-ranking Taliban 
functionaries.  In addition, we need substantially more 
concrete details, possibly through special services channels, 
about the value of the information provided by A.H. Monib for 
the capture of terrorists and the prevention of terrorist 
attacks. 
 
Unfortunately, the information available to us about A.H. 
Monib does not allow us to draw an unambiguous conclusion in 
favor of his delisting.  This relates primarily to his work 
in the Taliban Administration, his involvement in attracting 
new recruits to the Taliban Movement, and his involvement in 
the organization of training camps for fighters, including 
foreign fighters, in the Afghan-Pakistani border area. 
 
In this connection we would appreciate if the U.S. side would 
provide more detailed argumentation in favor of A.H. Monib's 
delisting.  The above undoubtedly applies equally to any 
future appeals with respect to former and active members of 
terrorist groups in Afghanistan.  End Text. 
 
BURNS

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