06MOSCOW5951, DEMARCHING RUSSIA ON A BURMA RESOLUTION

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW5951.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW5951 2006-06-05 12:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7840
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHMO #5951 1561208
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051208Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7067
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0232

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHING RUSSIA ON A BURMA RESOLUTION 
 
REF: STATE 88973 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C)  Poloff made reftel demarche June 5 to Petr Ilichev, 
UN Political Affairs Senior Counselor, MFA International 
Organizations Department.  Ilichev said that Burma did not 
represent a threat to international peace and security, or to 
security in the region, and thus was not an appropriate 
subject for a UN Security Council resolution.  He thought 
that any UNSC action on Burma at all would be problematic, 
because the General Assembly would likely consider it to be 
outside the UNSC's mandate.  Ilichev said Moscow had not 
decided yet whether it would block a UNSCR on Burma. 
 
2. (C)  Ilichev argued for constuctive engagement with the 
Burmese regime, saying attempts to pressure or isolate it 
were counterproductive.  He pointed to U/SYG Gambari's visit 
as evidence that the Burmese leadership would not shun 
engagement.  Ilichev acknowledged concerns with the decision 
to extend the term of Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest, but 
called it an internal matter and implied that the regime had 
legitimate interest in keeping her from "incitement," noting 
her activities during her last period of freedom in 2002.  He 
was encouraged that Gambari had been allowed to visit with 
her. 
 
3. (C)  Ilichev also argued with several more of our points, 
noting that the Burmese had promised Gambari that problems 
with UN agency access would be addressed, that Burma had a 
national program for dealing with infectious diseases, and 
that Moscow's information indicated the number of Burmese 
refugees in Bangladesh had dropped from 250,000 to 20,000, 
with many returning home from Thailand as well. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

Advertisements
Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: