06MOSCOW6131, RUSSIAN MFA DEMARCHED ON TRANSNISTRIA MAY PROTOCOLS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW6131 2006-06-07 12:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0040
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #6131 1581231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071231Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7302
INFO RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0664
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 1007
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 8895
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6721
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2340

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006131 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016 
TAGS: OSCE PBTS PREL MS RS UP
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA DEMARCHED ON TRANSNISTRIA MAY PROTOCOLS 
 
REF: STATE 90492 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C)  With Ambassador-at-Large Nesterushkin on vacation 
until the end of the week, poloff delivered reftel demarche 
June 7 to Mikhail Yalkin, Moldova Section Chief, MFA Second 
CIS Department.  Yalkin said that there was no change 
whatsoever in Russian policy or approach to Transnistria.  He 
characterized the protocol issued following the May 23 
meeting between Deputy PM Zhukov and Transnistrian 
"president" Smirnov as simply a summary of the discussion 
they had had.  Despite the fact that some in the media had 
portrayed the protocol as a new agreement or understanding, 
Yalkin insisted it was nothing of the kind.  He resisted even 
calling the protocol a "plan of action," emphasizing that 
Moscow remains guided by the 1997 Moscow Memorandum as the 
basis for its dealings with Transnistria.  Nevertheless, 
Yalkin added that practical cooperation had to and would 
continue to exist between Russia and Russian citizens, first 
and foremost, in Transnistria. 
 
2. (C)  Regarding the draft "Protocol on Transit" that 
Nesterushkin distributed in Brussels May 24, Yalkin said it 
was merely the latest iteration of a draft protocol Russia 
put forward at the April 19 "three-plus-two" meeting in 
Moscow.  He claimed all partners had been invited to comment 
on the draft.  The May 24 version incorporated those 
suggestions, including those, Yalkin said, from OSCE 
Ambassador Hill.  He added that Nesterushkin and Hill had 
discussed the draft.  Moscow had no intention of moving the 
draft forward, Yalkin continued, unless all sides agreed to 
it, since the parties all had a stake in it.  He was vague 
about when further comments were expected and emphasized that 
the idea of a transit protocol was fully in line with the 
Moscow Memorandum. 
 
3. (C)  Yalkin offered numerous complaints about Chisinau's 
approach to a settlement.  He said Moldova should focus on 
building social links with Transnistria, such as exist in the 
realms of sports and religion, instead of expecting 
intractable political questions to be solved first.  He 
warned that Chisinau was getting close to alienating the next 
generation in Transnistria, upon whom the responsibility for 
a final settlement will lie; he thought Chisinau was losing a 
real opportunity by refusing to talk with new Transnistrian 
parliament speaker (and Russian citizen) Shevchuk.  He 
complained that many businesses had registered with Molodovan 
authorities, but Chisinau's new licensing requirements were 
making it more difficult for companies to comply.  He added 
that Moscow found "weak" Chisinau's justification that it was 
implementing WTO standards. 
 
4. (C)  Yalkin said Moscow had no influence on a possible 
early-fall independence referendum.  He called the 
possibility more "psychological" than practical, and asserted 
the outcome of the vote was no foregone conclusion. 
BURNS

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