06MOSCOW7118, RUSSIAN DFM ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW7118 2006-07-06 07:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #7118 1870731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060731Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8513
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2600
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0254

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 007118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM UNSC KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES 
 
REF: STATE 111132 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C)  The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche July 6 to 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Alekseyev. 
Alekseyev said he was in absolute agreement that it was very 
important to send the North Koreans a strong and clear signal 
of the unacceptability of their missile launches.  He had 
delivered that message clearly himself the day before to DPRK 
Ambassador Pak.  Moscow had, however, "some reservations" 
about imposing sanctions on the DPRK, a view Alekseyev said 
Foreign Minister Lavrov had conveyed directly to the 
Secretary when they spoke the previous day.  Russia did not 
 
SIPDIS 
oppose sanctions in principle, Alekseyev stressed, but he 
said Moscow doubted they would have the desired practical 
effect. 
 
2. (C)  Alekseyev said he has been in close touch with both 
the Chinese and the South Koreans and had stressed to both 
the critical role they would have in delivering the message 
to the DPRK.  He said both he and Lavrov have urged the 
Chinese to be direct with the North Koreans: to tell them 
that actions they believe give them tactical advantage 
actually have precisely the reverse effect.  Alekseyev 
acknowledged the difficulty of dealing with the North 
Koreans' "different psychology," which caused them to react 
inappropriately when they felt they were being ignored.  He 
was pleased to hear that EAP A/S Hill would be in the region 
and hoped A/S Hill would be able to reinforce directly with 
the Chinese the "critical role" they have in delivering the 
message to the DPRK.  Alekseyev said Russia did not have much 
leverage with the North Koreans, but China and the ROK both 
did. 
 
3. (C)  The Ambassador reviewed with Alekseyev the dates of 
A/S Hill's proposed travel to Moscow.  Alekseyev said he 
would be very happy to receive A/S Hill, but would be 
traveling to Mongolia on July 11-12 for the 800th anniversary 
events.  He said he would be available in Moscow all day on 
July 13, but would depart again that evening for St. 
Petersburg for G-8 Summit preparations. 
BURNS

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