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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10607 2006-09-21 16:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #0607/01 2641603
O 211603Z SEP 06

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010607 
MOSCOW 10366, MOSCOW 10439 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell: 1.4 (b, d). 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Convoking the Friends of Georgia on 
September 21, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin 
expressed concern over the deteriorating status of 
Georgian-Abkhazian relations, passed draft language on an 
UNOMIG resolution that condemns -- sharply and at length -- 
GOG operations in the Kodori gorge (see para. 9 for full 
text), detailed undemocratic actions by the GOG, reiterated 
that Russia would maintain its peacekeeping commitments and 
added that without CIS peacekeeping forces there is no 
justification for UNOMIG.  Separately, Karasin told the 
Ambassador that the resolution text was open to negotiation 
and Russia simply wanted to circulate a draft before FM 
Lavrov's upcoming meetings in New York.  End Summary 
2.  (C)  On September 21, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Grigory Karasin convoked the representatives of the Friends 
of Georgia, noting that the importance of the topic made it 
imperative to meet; in particular, the deterioration in the 
status of Georgian-Abkhaz relations.  According to UNOMIG 
data, Karasin stated, the GOG had refused to fully withdraw 
its troops and treaty-limited equipment from the Kodori 
gorge, as stipulated by the Moscow Agreement, and the GOG had 
impeded the free movement of the CIS peacekeeping and UNOMIG 
observers.  Karasin added that 2000 Georgian military forces 
were present in the upper gorge area and UNOMIG had recorded 
16 violations by the GOG of the Moscow Agreement.  The GOR 
was concerned by the on-going efforts of the GOG military, 
engineering, and police forces to build infrastructure for a 
3.  (C)  With a nod to President Saakashvili's upcoming 
address at UNGA, Karasin commented that the GOR had "serious 
grounds" to believe that he would demand the withdrawal of 
CIS peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia and assign blame to 
Russia for the ineffectiveness of these forces.  Karasin said 
that he did not intend to repeat the contents of the MFA's 
September 14 statement on developments in Georgia (reftel), 
but would only underscore that the GOR, as before, remained 
committed to its multilateral and bilateral commitments.  "We 
will carry them out in full." 
4.  (C)  In response to events on the ground, Karasin 
explained, the GOR would introduce new language for the 
UNOMIG resolution, and was offering a draft in advance to 
allow its partners to carefully study the GOR proposals and 
make comments and counter-proposals.  A number of the 
elements, he noted upfront, contained language that directly 
blamed the GOG for events in the Kodori gorge.  Karasin 
reaffirmed that the CIS peacekeepers were inextricably linked 
to UNOMIG's mission  and the protection of UN personnel.  The 
international community had an obligation to react, he 
argued, when agreements were violated.  GOG actions created a 
threat to regional security that were "absolutely 
inadmissible."  In order to normalize the situation, Karasin 
said, it was helpful to have a "frank and direct" assessment. 
 The violations recorded by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeepers 
complicated GOG efforts to blame the GOR. 
5.  (C)  Karasin urged the FOG members to carefully study the 
proposals for discussion in New York and by the special 
representatives in Berlin on September 28.  Karasin summed up 
that he was "absolutely convinced" that all the Friends 
understood the importance of a unified approach to resolving 
this conflict, and hoped for a substantive response in 
Berlin.  Karasin closed by noting the GOR's satisfaction with 
FOG gatherings in Moscow, as a venue for conveying 
6.  (C)  Karasin also delivered a separate critique of 
Georgia's democratic credentials, noting with concern the 
trend in Georgia to diminish freedoms and basic rights.  He 
expressed concern over the security forces' attacks on the 
opposition and the shrinking number of independent media 
outlets, including the closure of three television stations 
and ten newspapers.  Recently, he added, the management of 
another television station had been replaced.  There had been 
 mass arrests of influential opposition figures, charged with 
coup plotting, but no evidence provided of their complicity. 
7.  (C)  Separately, Karasin made clear to the Ambassador 
that the draft resolution text was being distributed now to 
open the door for meaningful discussion in New York during 
Lavrov's visit.  Karasin emphasized that the text was open 
for negotiation.  He reiterated his concern about 
Saakashvili's UNGA speech and that the situation was 
spiraling out of control, noting that NATO's extension of 
Intensified Dialogue to Georgia was not a welcome development 
MOSCOW 00010607  002 OF 002 
and Saakashvili would draw the wrong message from it. 
8.  (C)  Comment:  In Security Council Secretary Ivanov's 
comments to the Ambassador (ref B) a
nd in subsequent meetings 
with MFA officials, the GOR has made clear that it finds 
Georgian efforts to internationalize the disputes, through 
expanding the negotiating formats, putting frozen conflicts 
on the UNGA agenda with its GUAM partners, and courting NATO 
membership, unacceptable.  The "frank and open" language of 
the Russian draft resolution appears to be a tit-for-tat 
response to the GOG's "Basic Principles" that offended the 
GOR.  The tenor of the debate may further intensify depending 
on the tone and direction of the Georgian President's UNGA 
Text of Russian Draft Resolution 
9.  (U)  Text of "Elements to the Security Council Resolution 
on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict settlement": 
"The Security Council,... 
-- Expresses its deep concern with regard to the actions of 
the Georgian side in the Kodori valley in July 2006 in 
violation of provisions of the relevant Security Council 
resolutions containing, in particular, an appeal to the sides 
to refrain from any action that might impede the peace 
process, as well as of the Moscow agreement on cease fire and 
separation of forces of 14 May 1994, and other 
Georgian-Abkhaz agreements concerning the Kodori valley; 
-- Urges the Georgian side to withdraw its troops and other 
armed formations from the Kodori valley and not to undertake 
any new additional steps aimed at destabilization of 
situation in the Kodori valley; 
-- Also urged the Georgian side to return to the status quo 
available before the entry of its units in the Kodori valley 
and, in particular, to abandon the plans of installing the 
"the government of autonomous republic of Abkhazia as well as 
other actions capable of complicating the peace process of 
Georgian-Abkhaz settlement; 
-- Demands from the Georgian side to fully adhere to its 
international legal obligations, in particular regarding the 
urgent resumption of regular monitoring of the situation in 
the upper Kodori valley by joint UNOMIG and CIS peacekeeping 
force patrols and the provision in this regard of effective 
security guarantees; 
-- Reaffirms the important role of the CIS peacekeeping force 
in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, deplores the actions of 
the Georgian side aimed at the termination of its activities, 
and stresses that such a development would lead to a further 
aggravation of the situation in the zone of conflict with 
unpredictable consequences; 
-- Recalls the direct inter-connection of the UNOMIG and the 
CIS peacekeeping force mandates; 
-- Urges the Georgian side once again to address seriously 
legitimate Abkhaz security concerns, to avoid steps which 
could be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant 
-- Calls on both parties to finalize without delay the 
document on the non-resumption of hostilities and the 
international guarantees of security, and to sign it; 
-- Underlines that is the primary responsibility of both 
sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure the 
freedom of movement of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and 
other international personnel and calls on both sides to 
fulfill their obligations in this regard; 
-- Calls on both parties to continue participation in 
quadripartite meetings on safety issues in Chuburhindzhi on a 
regular basis in order to be able to reaction promptly to the 
mutual security concerns or threats in the security sphere 
and to this end to develop, agree and endorse the rules of 
procedure o such quadripartite meetings; 
-- Requests the Secretary General to include the detailed 
information on the Kodori valley in the next report on the 
situation in Abkhazia, Georgia." 
End Text 


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