Monthly Archives: September 2006

06MOSCOW10842, GOR ENFORCES NGO REGISTRATION DEADLINE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10842 2006-09-27 05:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1328
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0842/01 2700502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270502Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3020
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 010842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID PREF KDEM PREL RS
SUBJECT: GOR ENFORCES NGO REGISTRATION DEADLINE 
 
REF: MOSCOW 9565 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS.  REASONS:  1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) Russian Federal Registration Service officials have 
clarified that foreign NGOs that have not been re-registered 
by October 18 will have to stop their external activities, 
but will be able to continue "internal operations."  NGOs are 
hurrying to submit their paperwork, but according to 
registration service data and our own informal poll, very few 
have done so.  Although some have benefitted from individual 
consultations with the Federal Registration Service, NGO 
representatives complain that they are being forced to 
prepare huge packages of "unnecessary documents," which can 
be filed only once a week. Those that have submitted 
successfully have usually had to correct minor technical 
problems identified by the registration service before 
applications are formally accepted. Ambassador continue to 
press senior officials to avoid any suspension of NGO 
external activities, given the complexities of the 
registration process. We are also urging US-based NGOs to 
submit their applications before the end of September.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
September 20 Meeting with Zhafyarov 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) In a September 20 meeting with the Mission, Federal 
Registration Service (FRS) Chief of the Directorate of 
Political Parties, Non-Governmental, Regional, and Other 
Organizations Aleksey Zhafyarov clarified comments made by 
FRS Director Movchan in an August 30 meeting with Ambassador 
(reftel).  (In that meeting, Movchan had said those NGOs that 
make a good-faith effort to be registered by October 18 would 
be issued a voucher that would allow them to continue to 
operate beyond October 18 while their registration process 
continued.  According to Zhafyarov, those NGOs not registered 
by October 18 would only be permitted to conduct "internal 
activities" until all of the registration requirements of the 
NGO law were met.  By "internal activities," he meant 
operations necessary to keep the office running, like paying 
electricity bills and keeping staff on the payroll. 
 
3. (C) Zhafyarov suggested that "no one in the Russian 
government" would actively attempt to shutter or close bank 
accounts of unregistered NGOs that continue operating after 
the October 18 deadline, but the FRS was in no position to 
offer written assurance to that effect.  Zhafyarov added 
that, "of course," it was possible that landlords and banks 
might be uncomfortable working with unregistered NGOs.  We 
note that Zhafyarov had initially announced that NGOs would 
have to suspend activities at an AmCham forum September 14. 
His deputy Anatoliy Panchenko made similar statements in a 
separate public session with NGOs on September 19. 
 
4.  (C) Zhafyarov said he wanted to debunk the "myths" that 
if documents were rejected twice it would not be possible to 
apply again, and that no documents would be accepted after 
October 18. Neither are true, he said.  The FRS will continue 
to accept applications after the October 18 deadline and has 
one month to check the documents and include the organization 
into the Registry but he said, in practice, within 2-7 days 
the organization could expect a call from the FRS to discuss 
the application documents. 
 
5.  (C) Zhafyarov mentioned that each foreign NGO was 
entitled to register one and only one branch or 
representative office in Russia, insisting that this is what 
the new NGO law requires, and challenged any applicant to 
raise the issue in court.  He expressed his assurance that 
any court would side with the FRS interpretation, but would 
abide by any court decision to the contrary.  According to 
Zhafyarov, representative offices and branches are allowed to 
open "small offices" in the regions, and with a power of 
attorney, sign lease agreements and be able to function in 
the regions, but they need to register with the local tax 
service as "special branch offices." 
 
6.  (C) Zhafyarov said a working group will be meeting next 
week to develop instructions on what kind of information has 
to be included in the annual/quarterly and periodic reports 
required under the new law.  The working group will consist 
of representatives from the Public Chamber, Ella Pamfilov's 
Presidential Commission on Human Rights and Civil Society, 
 
MOSCOW 00010842  002 OF 003 
 
 
and the Tax Service.  He said their recommendations would be 
in place by mid- to late October. 
 
7.  (C) We reviewed Zhafyarov the process by which NGOs are 
registered in the U.S.  Zhafyarov seemed satisfied with the 
information, and agreed that the FRS would, as part of its 
effort to clarify the registration process, begin to post on 
its website authorita
tive answers to questions it was 
receiving from NGOs.  He stressed that it would be a good 
idea to put English translations of the NGO law, regulations, 
and forms on the FRS website to avoid confusion.  Zhafyarov 
urged interested U.S. organizations to collect questions from 
NGO representatives and e-mail them to the FRS website. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
September 21 One-On-One Sessions At FRS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) FRS has made some efforts to address NGO concerns 
about the difficulty in obtaining authoritative information. 
FRS now offers consultations three days a week and has also 
made staff available for Q&A sessions organized by others, 
such as AmCham. AmCham staff told us that only eight NGOs 
participated in the one-on-one sessions it organized at the 
FRS.  They were somewhat disappointed at the 
lower-than-expected turnout. 
 
9. (C) IRI told us on September 20 that it had planned to 
attend the session, but having received the application 
documents from their headquarters in the U.S., noticed a 
mistake and decided to fix it before submitting its 
application on September 25. 
 
------------- 
The Scorecard 
------------- 
 
10.  (C) As of September 19, only 28 foreign NGOs had been 
re-registered out of approximately 500, and 98 had applied. 
NGOs such as Ford Foundation, AmCham, Human Rights Watch, 
Carnegie Center, Amnesty International, and Doctors Without 
Borders still had not submitted their applications but expect 
to submit them shortly.  Although some have benefitted from 
individual consultations with the Federal Registration 
Service, NGO representatives continue to complain that they 
are being forced to prepare huge packages of "unnecessary 
documents." 
 
11.  (C) The FRS's "clarification" that foreign NGOs would 
have to be registered by the deadline or suspend their 
programs caught many off guard.  Several we have spoken to 
had been advised by FRS personnel that as long as their 
applications had been accepted by the deadline, they could 
continue working; therefore they assumed they could submit up 
until October 18.  Those NGOs are now scrambling to submit 
their applications as soon as possible, since the FRS can 
take up to 30 days to render its decision.  In canvassing 38 
U.S.-based NGOs receiving USG funding, we found two -- 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Project Harmony -- 
whose applications have been accepted by the Federal 
Registration Service.  Another 12 implementing 
U.S.Government-funded projects, among them NDI, IRI, 
ACDI/VOCA and World Vision, intend to submit their 
applications by the end of September, as do AmCham, Ford 
Foundation, Carnegie Center, and Human Rights Watch.  A 
handful of others expected to apply in October, closer to the 
deadline, when they received the documents from their 
headquarters necessary to complete their applications. 
 
12.  (C) Although the registration service has taken steps to 
be more transparent and helpful, such as agreeing to the 
one-on-one sessions, NGO representatives told us that 
frustrations with the FRS bureaucracy continued.  Despite the 
expanded consultation hours, the FRS continues to accept 
applications only on Wednesdays during a three-hour period. 
IRC Country Director Amir Omanovich said IRC's application 
was meticulously reviewed by FRS staff when it was submitted; 
then returned for minor wording changes.  These changes 
required the packet to be sent to IRC's New York headquarters 
via courier so it could be corrected, re-notarized and 
re-apostilled before being re-submitted.  Kharborovsk-based 
Winrock International submitted its documents to the FRS via 
courier on September 13.  A week later, the FRS called, 
saying the packet needed corrections and recommended that 
someone from Winrock make the seven-hour flight to Moscow to 
pick it up and then fly back to Moscow to re-submit it once 
corrections were made. 
 
13. (C) Carnegie's Rose Gottemoeller told us that the 
Center's staff was confident their documents package would be 
 
MOSCOW 00010842  003 OF 003 
 
 
approved, based on consultations with the FRS over the last 
several weeks.  Carnegie will submit its documents this week, 
after finding and notarizing founding documents from the N.Y. 
archives, certifying death certificates of original board 
members, and proving that Carnegie has a D.C.-based parent 
organization.  Gottemoeller was unaware of the possibility of 
a suspension of programming after October 18 which, she said 
would be a major blow to her organization. She noted that a 
consulting company "4 Business" was advertising assistance in 
completing the registration process for ten thousand Euros. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (C)  Zhafyarov's interpretation of the law, which was 
buttressed by an "informational communique" issued by the FRS 
September 20, is less compromising than that offered the 
Ambassador by Movchan and would leave those foreign NGOs not 
registered by October 18 unable to continue with programs 
underway until formally registered by the FRS. (The 
communique also explicitly prohibits funding from 
non-registered foreign NGOs to Russian NGOs.)  The FRS's 
timing of its clarification is less than ideal. With the FRS 
allowed up to thirty days to review applications, NGOs that 
did not apply by September 19 face a greater likelihood of 
having to suspend their activities an FRS decision is not 
made by October 18, or if the FRS finds significant problems 
with the application during its review.  As noted (septel), 
Ambassador raised this looming problem with Human Rights 
Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin September 22, underscoring that 
western reaction would view this as further GOR suppression 
of civil society.  Lukin agreed to intervene if his office 
received a formal, written complaint from the affected NGOs 
which they may be unwilling to do, as they are leery of 
potential GOR attention to their individual cases. 
Ambassador will bring the FRS's interpretation to the 
attention of Presidential Commission on Human Rights and 
Civil Society Director Pamfilova and DFM Yakovenko the week 
of September 25 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW10839, RUSSIA REMAINS OPPOSED TO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10839 2006-09-26 14:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0839 2691443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261443Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3019
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0043

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 010839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA REMAINS OPPOSED TO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 
ON BURMA 
 
REF: STATE 155034 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons: 1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C) We shared reftel points September 25 with Vladimir 
Safronkov, Chief of the UN Political Affairs Section in the 
MFA's IO Department, asking that Russia work with other 
Security Council members to form a consensus on the need for 
the Burmese regime to undertake democratic reforms. 
Safronkov stressed that Moscow does not consider the UN 
Security Council to be an appropriate place to discuss 
democratization in Burma.  In Russia's view, the situation 
does not pose a threat to international peace and security. 
 
2.  (C)  Safronkov said that Russia supported U/SYG Gambari's 
discussions with the Burmese regime, but would not favor a 
resolution on Burma.  At the least, the Security Council 
should wait on the outcome of the next round of discussions 
before weighing whether any next steps were appropriate.  If 
Gambari needed further credibility, Safronkov suggested, then 
he should meet with the President of the Security Council and 
interested members before engaging again with the Burmese 
leadership. 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW10777, RUSSIAN ENERGY:CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10777 2006-09-26 04:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9982
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0777/01 2690404
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260404Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2922
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS WARLICK, HOLMAN, AND GUHA 
DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK 
DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR GRAHAM AND MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ENERGY:CASPIAN PIPELINE CONSORTIUM UPDATE 
 
 
Classified By: Econ M/C Pamela Quanrud.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  This fall the Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
(CPC) faces both its long-awaited expansion decision and a 
serious tax case being brought against the CPC's Russian 
(CPC-R) operations.  Expansion will once again be on the 
agenda of the September 27-28 shareholders meeting, where 
western shareholders are expected to react to a GOR/GOK MOU 
signed in July that lays out one possible way forward for 
expansion.  The tax case, which threatens to cost the 
consortium's Russian operations $700-800 million in back 
taxes and penalties, has already made it through its first 
test in court, and CPC-R's appeal will be heard in November. 
 
2. (C) New CPC General Director, Vladimir Razdukhov told us 
September 19 that he is hopeful he can find a way to 
synthesize Russian and Western shareholder interests to allow 
the expansion to proceed before the technical studies done 
two years ago in preparation for the expansion expire at 
year's end.  Ian MacDonald, Razdukhov's predecessor and new 
head of Chevron (please protect) is also quietly optimistic 
that a way forward can be found on expansion, which would 
pave the way for Chevron to participate in the 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis (BA) Bosporus bypass pipeline.  End 
Summary. 
. 
Expansion Plans 
Still in Play 
--------------- 
. 
3. (C) In separate conversations with Razdukhov and 
MacDonald, both said much is hanging on the reaction of 
western shareholders this coming week to a July 1 MOU signed 
between the GOR and GOK (Energy Ministers Khristenko and 
Bakhtvkhoza), which outlines the conditions under which both 
governments are prepared to move forward with CPC expansion. 
Razdukhov characterized the MOU as a breakthrough in the 
GOR's policy toward CPC expansion, but realistically assessed 
that western shareholders would unlikely accept the terms of 
the MOU without amendment.  MacDonald expressed a similar 
confidence that a reasonable way forward could be found based 
on the MOU, but was unsure if ExxonMobil, in particular, 
wanted the deal badly enough at this point in time.  We have 
not seen the MOU, but both Razdukhov and MacDonald tell us it 
addresses the underlying financial structure of the 
consortium, something the GOR has sought for years, and 
MacDonald's comments suggest that the MOU could be the basis 
for a way forward -- at least for Chevron. 
 
4. (C) Timing is also an issue, as the technical study which 
lays the groundwork for the expansion is set to expire at the 
end of this year.  Should the shareholders not find a way 
forward by then, the consortium would be forced to decide 
whether to commission and pay for a new study, something both 
Razdukhov and MacDonald hoped could be avoided. 
. 
The Tax Issue 
------------- 
. 
5. (C) Razdukhov and MacDonald outlined for us as well a new 
issue facing the Russian operations of the consortium -- a 
tax case which alleges that CPC-R has been improperly 
claiming a deduction for interest on its debt payments. 
CPC-R received assurances in writing from Deputy Finance 
Minister Sergey Shatalov in 1996 that the interest payments 
were legal, and subsequent changes to the tax code would seem 
to confirm that opinion.  Nevertheless, CPC-R lost an appeal 
in administrative court two weeks ago, and has begun to make 
installment payments on some $175 million in back taxes for 
2002 and 2003.  Cases are being opened for tax years 2004 and 
2005 right now, based on the same allegations.  All told, if 
the court rules consistently against CPC-R, the consortium 
will owe some $700-800 million in back taxes and penalties, 
and will face an annual increase in it tax obligation in 
excess of $100 million. MacDonald, as the head of CPC-R 
during this period, is worried that criminal charges could be 
brought against him as well. (Note: the magnitude of the tax 
claim against CPC-R could automatically throw the case into 
criminal court, but this has not happened as yet.) 
 
6. (C) CPC-R lost its first trial in the case two weeks ago. 
The appeal will be heard in November.  According to 
MacDonald, CPC has always won these types of cases on appeal 
 
MOSCOW 00010777  002 OF 002 
 
 
in the past, but he was hesitant to predict victory this 
time.  Razdukhov was more hopeful that the consortium would 
win on appeal.  Should the appeal be unsuccessful, then the 
case will go to the Court of Cassation in March.  If, in the 
end, the case goes against CPC, MacDonald predicted Chevron's 
senior management would lose its appetite for CPC expansion. 
. 
The BA Bypass Pipeline 
-----------
----------- 
. 
7. (C) When asked to comment on Chevron's interest in BA, 
MacDonald stated simply, "If CPC is expanded we will 
participate; if it isn't, we won't.  We've told the Russians 
that."  He also confirmed Chevron's position that the Greek 
and Bulgarian governments should not get a stake in the 
consortium was just an opening negotiating position. 
However, while not giving us a firm number, he did indicate 
that his company would not agree to Greece's and Bulgaria's 
push for a one-third stake. 
. 
Comment 
------- 
. 
8. (C) The quest for CPC expansion continues, and much of 
what we report here is similar to previous turning points: a 
three-month deadline; tension between the western and Russian 
shareholders and between the two major western shareholders; 
and external pressure being brought to bear -- this time in 
the form of a tax case.  What may be different this time is 
Razdukhov, who brings a Russian accent to CPC's front office 
and with it longtime relationships within the GOR -- 
including with PM Fradkov, who was Minister for Foreign 
Economic Relations (MFER) during Razdukhov's stint as MFER 
Deputy Minister.  Razdukhov talked about two possible paths 
forward for CPC: either find a way forward amicably on 
expansion, or take the consortium into bankruptcy, which 
would put it in international arbitration.  MacDonald had 
always shied away from the latter option as head of CPC, but 
Razdukhov seems willing to put it more clearly on the table. 
This will certainly change the dynamics in the room, but in 
ways which Razdukhov himself admits will be unpredictable. 
However, he did not, he tells us, take over CPC to watch over 
its demise.  This week's shareholder meeting will be the 
first test of whether he has the skills to keep the 
consortium together. 
. 
9. (C) On the tax problem, the Ambassador will raise this 
issue when he meets later this week with Finance Minister 
Kudrin.  Regarding BA, neither MacDonald previously nor any 
other Chevron official we have spoken to has been as blunt as 
this regarding Chevron's stance on BA.  Without Chevron's 
oil, BA's economics deteriorate but we suspect that, if the 
GOR wants BA enough, they will find a way to get enough 
Russian oil into the pipeline. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10720, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: VF COMPANY,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10720 2006-09-25 10:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0720/01 2681057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251057Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2860
RHFJUSC/HQS US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 010720 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/DMUSLU 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: VF COMPANY, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D363051 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 04895 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Vtoroy 
Front Company (VF Company), Moscow, Russia. The 
company is listed on BIS license application D363051 
as the ultimate consignee of holographic sighting 
device used as uni-powered optical sight for 
consumer/tactical, firearms applications. These items 
are controlled for foreign policy reasons under ECCN 
OA987. The licensee is L-3 Communications, 1215 South 
Clark st., Suite 1004, Arlington, VA 22202. 
 
3. On September 13, 2006, Export Control Attache 
Donald Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested pre-license check at the offices of VF 
Company, 9/2 Gen. Glagoleva st., Moscow, Russia. The 
export control team met with Anton Linkvist, 
President. 
 
4. VF Company was founded in 1995 by Mr. Linkvist and 
his brother, and continues to be a family run 
business. "Vtorny Front" is Russian for "Second 
Front," and is an homage to the U.S. forces who opened 
up the western front during Second World War, a move 
seen as critical to the success of the Red Army on the 
eastern front.  VF specializes in tactical clothing 
and accessories, and is a primary contractor for 
Government of Russia (GOR) military and law 
enforcement special operations units such as the 
Federal Security Service (Russian abbreviation FSB) 
"ALPHA" unit, the Minsitry of Internal Affairs 
(Russian Abbrviaion MVD) "OMON" (Special Purpose 
Detachment of Militsia) groups, and Ministry of 
Defense "SPETSNAZ" (Special Forces) groups. VF has 
been supplying the special operations community in 
Russia since 1995.  VF also runs two hunting stores 
for clients from the general public, with hunting 
accessories and clothing.  The company employs nine, 
and is headquartered at the General Glagoleva St. 
location in an office and showroom in an inner 
courtyard of a multiple-use building.  The company has 
a low profile exterior appearance, with only a small 
sign marked "ARMY" next to the doorbell. 
 
5. The company partners with suppliers based on the 
quality of the goods to be sold.  VF prides itself on 
presenting only the highest quality products for 
tactical and/or hunting use.  Major brands in stock 
include US companies such as Bianchi and Alpha 
Industries.  The company participates in the annual 
"Shot Show" held in Las Vegas, Nevada, where it scouts 
new items for the market and makes contacts with U.S. 
exporters. 
 
6. VF plans to market the sights noted in reftel 
primarally to the law enforcement and military market, 
with possible sales to hunters. Mr. Linkvist is 
looking to start with an initial order of 30 sights, 
as he already has an order for 10-15 sights from the 
FSB ALPHA unit.  The primary role of ALPHA is 
counterterrorism, and the unit would deploy the sights 
for use in close-quarters battle situations.  NOTE: 
ALPHA is 
 
7. Mr. Linkvist is familiar with export controls.  VF 
has been asked to procure U.S. Munitions List items in 
the past for GOR units, and is currently researching 
the possibility of obtaining night vision scopes for 
GOR end-users.  Mr. Linkvist stressed the company 
policy of dealing only with the actual end user, and 
not "middle-men" or "wrong-looking" organizations. 
The company does no third party sales, insisting that 
the actual end user be the recipient of any 
consignment from VF. Security at the headquarters 
location consists of an electronic alarm system, with 
cameras and door/window sensors.  The doors are 
reinforced steel with a remote electronic lock/passkey 
system.  All stock is kept in a locked storeroom with 
a steel door. 
 
8. Recommendations: Post recommends Vtoroy Front 
Company (VF Company), Moscow, Russia, as reliable 
recipients of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. It is 
 
requested that post be notified of final disposition 
of the application, and of any shipments for this 
organization in order to conduct appropriate FCS 
follow-up and statistical reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10719, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: (A) VNESH OPT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10719 2006-09-25 10:56 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0719/01 2681056
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251056Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2858
RHFJUSC/HQS US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 010719 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/DMUSLU 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: (A) VNESH OPT 
TORG AND (B) FSUE SCIENTIFIC AND TECH. ATLAS, MOSCOW, 
RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D360499 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 04045 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, (A) 
Vnesh Opt Torg and (B) FSUE Scientific and Tech. 
Atlas, Moscow, Russia. The companies are listed on BIS 
license application D360499 as the ultimate consignee 
of titanium coils, model S-3-W, ST3. These items are 
controlled for chemical or biological warfare reasons 
under ECCN 2B350. The licensee is Serfilco Ltd., 2900 
Macarthur Blvd., Northbrook, IL 60062. 
 
3. On September 12, 2006 Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested pre-license check at the offices of Vnesh 
Opt Torg (VOT). The team met with Yekaterina Grachova, 
Accountant. 
 
4. VOT is a new company, founded in May 2006 as an 
"external economic activities" organization.  The 
company specializes in procurement and importation of 
foreign produced goods for Russian end users, as well 
as freight forwarding services for Russian clients. 
The company has a wide variety of clients in many 
sectors.  The company is familiar with export controls 
as it has dealt with U.S. companies before, and is 
well versed in the import and export regulations of 
the Russian Federation. The company will not be an end 
user of the product, and has no additional information 
on the end use and end user. 
 
5. On September 15, 2006, Export Control Attache 
Donald Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested pre-license check at the offices of Federal 
State Unitary Enterprise - Scientific and Technical 
Center Atlas, Moscow, Russia. The export control team 
met with Vyachyeslav Polikarpov, Chief. 
 
6. Atlas was founded in 1951 to research and develop 
products for use in electronic communications, and 
branched into new technologies throughout its history. 
The organization employs over 1000, and is currently 
focused on telecommunications, information technology 
systems, mobile telephone security systems, and other 
communications electronics research.  In addition, 
Atlas has been tasked with production of security 
devices for identification products such as passports, 
visas and other identity documents.  Atlas is 
currently working on the chip technology for use in 
biometric identity documents such as the new Russian 
passport. 
 
7. The Holographic Department was founded in 1992 to 
produce security features for official documents.  The 
company has a full production facility, from design of 
the emblem or logo to mass production of holograms. 
The Holographic Department has little interaction with 
other parts of the company, as it is a specialized 
operation.  End users of the holograms are various 
government and private sector end users. Certain 
holograms are also produced for commercial use, 
advertising and the like. 
 
8. The coils in reftel will be used in the electrolyte 
bath used in the production of holograms.  Currently 
the line is using equipment purchased in 1993, which 
is slowly being phased out as Atlas procures new 
devices.  The coils will be used to maintain a 
constant temperature in the electrolyte bath, a 
critical element in producing holograms.  Two or three 
specialists will utilize the systems to produce 
holograms.  The coils will be incorporated into the 
baths of the rotary plate and ordinary plate systems. 
The systems are in a limited access facility with a 
high security regime. 
 
9. Recommendations: Post recommends (A) Vnesh Opt Torg 
and (B) Federal State Unitary Enterprise - Scientific 
and Technical Center Atlas, Moscow, Russia, as 
reliable recipients of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. It is requested that post be notified of 
final disposition of the application, and of any 
shipments for this organization in order to conduct 
 
 
appropriate FCS follow-up and statistical reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10704, HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN LUKIN ON NGO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10704 2006-09-25 09:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO8670
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0704/01 2680925
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250925Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2846
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN LUKIN ON NGO 
RE-REGISTRATION, DEMOCRACY ROUNDTABLE 
 
REF: MOSCOW 9565 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In a September 22 meeting with the Ambassador, Human 
Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin endorsed moving forward on 
the proposed U.S.-Russian roundtable on democracy and human 
rights, and said he was prepared to discuss modalities when 
in Washington October 10-12. Lukin offered to intercede on 
behalf of NGOs worried about excessive red tape in the 
re-registration process mandated by the new NGO law and 
concerned that they may have to cease program activities if 
not fully re-registered by October 18.  The problem of 
corruption in Russia was best broached by the two presidents. 
 The antidotes to corruption in Russia, Lukin thought, were 
good anti-trust legislation, a government willing to enforce 
the law, and political will.  Lukin also mentioned recent 
ethnic violence in Kondopoga (Karelia) as a by-product of 
globalization, societal factors, and inaction by the local 
authorities. 
 
------------------------------------- 
U.S.- Russian Roundtable on Democracy 
and Human Rights:  A Good Idea 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Lukin told Ambassador that Presidential Advisor 
Prikhodko had agreed for the Administration to an 
expert-level, non-governmental roundtable on democracy and 
human rights.  Lukin was prepared to travel to the U.S. 
October 10-12 to develop the idea further.  He thought he 
might have an opportunity to discuss the roundtable with 
President Putin in early October. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
NGO Re-registration:  Lukin Willing to Intercede 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador summarized for Lukin Federal 
Registration Service (FRS) Director Movchan's August 30 
assertion (reftel) that NGOs, which had submitted their 
documents but were not re-registered by the October 18 
deadline, would be allowed to continue operations.  Since 
that meeting, some NGOs had been told by the FRS that they 
would have to suspend all but internal operations after 
October 18 until re-registered by the FRS. (Note:  In a 
September 19 meeting with Embassy representatives and a 
private-sector lawyer, FRS Director of Registration of 
Political Parties, NGOs, and Other Organizations Zhafyarov 
contended that NGOs not registered by October 18 would indeed 
have to halt all but internal operations, and produced a 
two-page document, which he said had just been posted on the 
FRS website, to buttress his claim.) 
 
4. (C)  Lukin said that several Russian human rights NGOs had 
expressed similar concerns.  His office was soliciting input 
on the re-registration process in the regions. Lukin noted 
several potential stumbling blocks in the process:  confusion 
about the October 18 deadline, an excessively bureaucratic 
process which "sometimes looks as if someone is asking for a 
bribe" and, "frankly," the "absence of order in the approach 
of some organizations" to the re-certification process. 
Lukin asked that the affected NGOs make their complaint to 
his office in writing, and he would endeavor to intercede 
with the FRS. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Corruption: USG Should Broach Subject 
at the Highest Levels 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Lukin agreed with Ambassador that corruption was a 
serious problem, and suggested that the solution lay in good 
anti-trust legislation administered by an "impartial" 
government possessing the requisite political will to tackle 
the problem.  The best way for the USG to approach the GOR, 
Lukin thought, would be if the two presidents engaged in a 
"constructive, practical" exchange of opinions. Much depended 
on the leadership, Lukin thought, noting that corruption in 
the Soviet Union was less widespread when Andropov --"a 
personally modest man"-- was General Secretary, then had been 
the case under other Soviet leaders. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Local, Global Factors Contribute to 
 
MOSCOW 00010704  002 OF 002 
 
 
Ethnic Violence in Russia 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) In a September 22 conversation with Ambassador, Human 
Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin sourced recent ethnic unrest 
in the town of Kondopoga (Karelia) both to "deeper, societal 
causes" and to failures by the local police and the Kondopoga 
city administration. (Note:  A mid-September barroom brawl 
resulting in several deaths in Kondopoga was portrayed in the 
press and by rightist, anti-immigrant groups as the 
by-product of tensions between Slavs and "outsiders" from the 
Caucasus.) Lukin, who had traveled to Kondopoga to 
investigate in the wake of the September  violence, described 
to Ambassador the sequence of events as he understood them 
and noted with approval th
at four criminal cases had been 
opened there, including one against the local police force, 
which had "done nothing" to stop the violence.  Lukin traced 
the incident to "the weakness of the police and of the local 
administration" in Kondopoga, but added that a relatively 
high local unemployment rate (5.2 percent) may have added 
fuel to the fire. 
 
7. (C) In response to questions from the Ambassador, Lukin 
admitted that extremism of all kinds is increasing.  He 
thought the media played a role in fanning the flames but, 
noting similar incidents in other countries, suggested that 
globalization and migration were contributing factors.  Lukin 
believed that President Putin was worried about the problem, 
and was looking to "civilized patriotism" as an antidote to 
extremism.  Some in Russia, Lukin noted parenthetically, saw 
extremism as the inevitable by-product of a "refusal to adopt 
international values." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) It was clear in his conversation with the Ambassador 
that Lukin understood the importance of allowing NGOs not 
successful in clearing all hurdles to re-registration before 
October 18 to remain in business. Ambassador has brought NGO 
uncertainties about the re-registration process to the 
attention of Duma Speaker Gryzlov and Duma Chairman of the 
International Relations Committee Kosachev.  He plans within 
the next week to reinforce NGO concerns with Chairwoman of 
the Presidential Council for Human Rights Panfilova and 
Deputy Foreign Minister Yakovenko. Embassy has brought its 
concerns about the varying interpretations of the October 18 
deadline directly to the attention of the FRS, and is 
currently working through the American Chamber of Commerce to 
have NGOs petition Lukin's office. (Septel will offer a 
scorecard of the current state-of-play among re-registering 
international NGOs.) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10692, ODIHR DIRECTOR STROHAL’S VISIT: OSCE “REFORM” AND

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10692 2006-09-22 15:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7356
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0692/01 2651509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221509Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2832
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010692 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE RS
SUBJECT: ODIHR DIRECTOR STROHAL'S VISIT:  OSCE "REFORM" AND 
RUSSIA'S 2008 ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells. 
  Reasons: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  During a September 19 meeting with OSCE 
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
Director Strohal, DFM Grushko emphasized once again Russia's 
desire for OSCE "reform."  However, ODIHR's harshest critic 
had much softened his tone, according to Strohal, while still 
pushing for specific changes to ODIHR election monitoring in 
time for the Brussels Ministerial.  Strohal also met with 
Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin to discuss the NGO 
registration process.  Central Elections Commissioner 
Aleksandr Veshnyakov told Strohal that Russia planned to 
invite an ODIHR team to observe Russian elections, but the 
MFA was less certain, asserting that Moscow wanted progress 
on OSCE reform before making a decision.  End Summary. 
. 
BANGING ON THE REFORM DRUM 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Strohal told guests at a working lunch hosted by the 
Belgians that his discussions with DFM Grushko had been 
constructive and that Grushko had been pragmatic.  Grushko 
had reiterated standard GOR complaints that OSCE placed 
excessive emphasis on the human dimension and that ODIHR was 
focused too much on east-of-Vienna monitoring.  In a later 
conversation with ODIHR Russia Desk Officer Holly Ruthrauff 
(please protect), she told us that despite the usual barrage 
of criticism about ODIHR methodology, Grushko had been more 
conciliatory than expected.  Grushko did argue that the ODIHR 
handbook was not an OSCE document because it had never been 
formally endorsed by the OSCE Permanent Council (PC).  He 
warned that Moscow believed there was much work to be done 
with ODIHR before the Brussels Ministerial in December. 
 
3.  (C)  In a follow-up with the MFA Acting OSCE Desk 
Director, Vladimir Yanin asserted that that the GOR's 
objections to OSCE methodology were not political but "purely 
of a technical nature."  However, the "technical" changes 
Russia would like to see would give Moscow a veto over 
monitoring missions.  Yanin said Russia wanted ODIHR to 
produce an annual list of elections which would be presented 
to the Permanent Council for its decision as to which 
countries ODIHR would send its monitoring teams.  Moscow also 
wanted the election monitoring Heads of Mission to be 
selected by the Permanent Council, that the role of 
short-term election observers be more clearly specified, and 
that OSCE official languages other than English also be used 
in monitoring. 
. 
NGO REGISTRATION 
---------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Strohal told his lunch guests that he had pitched 
Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin on a joint program on 
human rights in the military; Lukin was interested but 
noncommittal.  Lukin discussed the NGO registration process 
with Strohal, explaining that he was gathering information 
from the regions and would then make a decision on whether 
concerns needed be raised with the GOR.  Strohal met 
separately with local NGOs, who noted their concerns over 
implementation of the NGO laws and uncertainty about their 
legal requirements. 
. 
RUSSIAN ELECTIONS 
----------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Central Election Commissioner Aleksandr Veshnyakov 
made clear in his meeting with Strohal that Russia plans to 
invite an ODIHR team to observe Russian elections, according 
to ODIHR's Ruthrauff.  Only after ODIHR's needs assessment -- 
which ODIHR plans as early as next June -- would the scope of 
monitoring be clarified. Ruthrauff told us later that that 
there were fears that no matter how early the needs 
assessment was conducted, all important "deals" would have 
been made in advance and the elections would become a pro 
forma exercise.  If "early voting" was used in the upcoming 
elections, monitoring would become even messier and more 
complicated.  Ruthrauff concluded that even if Russia was not 
satisfied with ODIHR's methodology, it would still be too 
damaging not to invite ODIHR to observe the 2008 elections. 
In poloff's discussions at the MFA, Acting Director Yanin 
would not discuss GOR plans vis-a-vis OSCE monitoring of 
2007/2008 elections.  Despite Veshnyakov's informal promise 
to Strohal to "invite" ODIHR, Yanin said that no clear 
decision had been made and that Moscow would review the 
situation after the Brussels Ministerial. 
 
6.  (C)  In his meeting with NGO representatives, Strohal 
heard concerns about the use of electronic balloting, which 
will be first tested in Novgorod in October regional 
elections.  Strohal raised this issue with Commissioner 
 
MOSCOW 00010692  002 OF 002 
 
 
Veshnyakov, who noted that a decision to move forward with 
electronic ballots would be implemented gradually and be 
informed by the results of testing. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C)  While Strohal attempted to spin the results of his 
visit in a positive fashion, it seems clear that in the 
run-up to Brussels we will hear increasing
calls by the GOR 
for institutional changes that would limit monitoring mission 
autonomy. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10689, RUSSIA: PUBLIC CHAMBER MEMBER ON PRESS FREEDOM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10689 2006-09-22 13:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7236
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0689/01 2651337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221337Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2827
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: PUBLIC CHAMBER MEMBER ON PRESS FREEDOM 
 
REF: MOSCOW 10605 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Russell: Reasons:  1.4(D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Pavel Gusev, owner and editor-in-chief of 
Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK) and member of the Public Chamber, 
described a "media vertical" of direct government ownership 
and indirect corporate persuasion that has left the majority 
of Russians with a limited range of viewpoints and most 
opposition figures with limited media access.  Gusev warned 
that the Kremlin has in reserve a draft law that would 
curtail internet and other press freedoms.  Ekho Moskvy chief 
editor has expressed concern over being squeezed out of the 
market.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) We met with Pavel Gusev in his Moskovsky Komsomolets 
office.  Since his paper is "100% independent and 
self-financed," Gusev maintained that he enjoyed greater 
latitude on what he could publish compared to other media 
outlets.  Gusev has been editor since 1983, and purchased the 
paper in the wave of privatizations following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. By virtue of his long tenure, he is 
Chairman of the Moscow Journalists Union.  At the last 
moment, Gusev explained, he was appointed a member of the 
Public Chamber, when Administration officials withdrew a 
Kremlin media representative who lacked credibility.  In the 
Public Chamber, Gusev has promoted the concept of public 
television stations, independent of federal or regional 
ownership. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
ALTERNATIVES TO CENSORSHIP - OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (C) Gusev briefly recounted the changes in the media over 
the last 15 years, from the liberal atmosphere of the early 
1990's to the increasing irascibility of the Yeltsin 
government (inversely proportional to the former President's 
popularity), leading to the systematic neutralization of 
opinions unfavorable to the Administration under Putin's 
Kremlin.  During Yeltsin's decline, Gusev's newspaper faced 
constant run-ins with the tax police, with 153 cases lodged 
against MK in one year.  At that time, however, a lively mass 
media flourished, with many political programs, live 
broadcasts, and debates on television.  Gusev lamented that 
now there was a "media vertical" controlled by the Kremlin. 
To buttress that contention, he produced a list of newspapers 
and television stations itemized by their corporate 
ownership, and argued that except for MK, Vedomosti, and the 
English-language Moscow Times, all national papers were 
vulnerable to corporate persuasion, whether through direct or 
indirect ownership, control of distribution networks, or 
influence over sales outlets.  The situation was worse at the 
regional level, he asserted, with "90 percent" of the media 
under the direct and indirect control of governors and mayors. 
 
4.  (C)  Control under Putin, he explained, was more subtle 
but certain.  There were fewer tax cases, but more "guidance 
and instructions."  It was not a question of a story being 
forbidden; instead, the Administration asked "why" do you 
want to draw attention to this issue.  The quiet 
conversations usually do the trick, he noted, but when they 
don't, the Administration rarely approaches the offending 
press directly, but talks to their financiers and corporate 
owners (reftel).  A few redlines have emerged: Putin's family 
and personal life are off-limits, except to deliberately 
placed stories (with one impertinent article by MK on the 
first daughters' social life drawing an explicit threat 
against Gusev), as are critical articles on the government's 
strategy towards Chechnya and on corruption within the 
Kremlin inner circle. 
 
 
5. (C) Gusev said that the Kremlin was actively considering 
new media restrictions.  While the internet media remained 
unregulated, and many on-line newspapers, including MK, have 
a "free for all" section where anybody can post their views, 
Gusev warned that the Administration was actively evaluating 
means to restrict internet coverage and had already drafted a 
law that it held in reserve.  He predicted that the draft 
would be introduced and passed sometime after the upcoming 
Duma elections.  While railing against speculation over a 
successor ("democracies do not have successors; they have 
candidates"), Gusev said that, after a series of 
conversations with the First Deputy Prime Minister, he was 
convinced that Medvedev was less suspicious of the media and 
would tolerate an atmosphere of greater media freedom. 
 
----------------------- 
OPPOSITION MEDIA ACCESS 
----------------------- 
 
 
MOSCOW 00010689  002 OF 002 
 
 
6. (C) Gusev, who described himself as a Yabloko party man, 
reiterated that opposition politicians, with limited access 
to television audiences and a reliance on radio and print, 
were denied a meaningful opportunity to compete in elections. 
 Somebody like Yabloko's Yavlinsky, Gusev explained, could 
get interviewed in MK, air-time on Echo Moskvy, and coverage &#x00
0A;on a few other radio stations, but that was it. Opposition 
politicians "simply don't have access." SPS leader Nikita 
Belikh told us that with the forced cancellation of 
previously popular political talk shows, there was little 
scope for appearing in prime time.  The few times he was 
invited, he noted, was as a representative of a distinctly 
unpopular point-of-view (e.g. defending jury trials), whereas 
he characterized the television coverage of United Russia 
politicians and purported succession candidates to Putin as 
relentlessly positive. 
 
7.  (C)  While Golos director Lilia Shebanova was less dire 
in her analysis to us, noting that some opposition-controlled 
papers still existed in the regions, with Internet an egress 
to the well-educated and more affluent city voters, there was 
general consensus that certain figures were off-limits. 
Irina Yasina, director of the now-defunct "Open Russia" (an 
NGO founded by disgraced and imprisoned oligarch Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky), now finds herself a persona non grata.  Since 
Khodorkovsky's arrest in 2003, she told us that she has 
received two invitations to appear on television -- once on a 
minor station, another on a late night show.  In both 
instances, her appearance was subjected to rigorous editing; 
as a result, Yasina (like her well-known reformer-economist 
father) has sworn off television. 
 
8.  (C)  Ekho Moskvy Chief Editor Aleksey Vennediktov 
expressed concern to us that the Administration's new tactic 
of funding competitor stations and foreclosing regional 
outlets could prove effective in making his liberal radio 
station unprofitable.  The station, he noted, was under 
"tremendous pressure," having lost out on eight regional bids 
and increasingly restricted in its ability to expand its 
service.  A year ago, Moscow had 40 radio stations, 36 of 
which were of the popular (and more profitable) music 
variety; this year, there are 45 stations, only 33 of which 
are music channels.  Vennediktov's corporate boss, Gazprom, 
has funded a rival station, whose sound quality, Vennediktov 
conceded, was twice as good as that of Ekho Moskvy's.  If 
Ekho Moskvy failed to secure ratings, Vennediktov noted, 
there would be ready grounds for his dismissal.  Deputy Head 
of the Presidential Administration Surkov, Vennediktov 
related, openly gloated that the Kremlin was after Ekho 
Moskvy's bottom line. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) The walls and shelves of Gusev's office are adorned 
with Communist heroes, including a larger-than-life portrait 
of Stalin, as reminders, he said, of the figures who shaped 
modern Russia.  The irony of Gusev complaining about 
restricted press freedom while surrounded by the Marxist 
pantheon was not lost on us, but his experience and long-term 
perspective should not be dismissed.  Gusev's comments 
distill the strong concerns of election watchdogs and 
opposition politicians over the pre-election day impediments 
to participating in parliamentary and presidential elections. 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10665, THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE IN MOSCOW, PART TWO

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW10665.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10665 2006-09-22 13:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO7230
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0665/01 2651327
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221327Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2802
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM RS
SUBJECT: THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE IN MOSCOW, PART TWO 
 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice Wells. Reasons: 1.4(B/D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. This is part two of a two-part series on the 
typical experiences of immigrants in Moscow.  The first cable 
described the experiences of a partly disabled Chechen male 
who has lived on and off in Moscow for the past 20 years. The 
current cable relates the experiences of a Kazakh female who 
is a newcomer to Moscow.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The subject of this cable, Dinara, is a highly 
educated Muskie alumnus from Kazakhstan.  She moved to Moscow 
with her 11-year-old son in the fall of 2005 to be closer to 
her mother and brother and his family, all of whom are 
Kazakhs who have held Russian citizenship for many years. 
 
-------------------- 
Registration Hassles 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) When Dinara moved to Moscow, she traveled by train, as 
many Kazakhs and other Central Asians do to save money.  She 
explained that to stay in Moscow legally, a Kazakh citizen 
has to receive temporary registration within five days after 
crossing the Russian border.  Traveling by train takes almost 
two days, so by the time she got to Moscow, only three days 
remained for her to get registered.  In those three days, she 
had to have her application approved by her landlord, by the 
building administration, and by a district police officer, 
and then submitted -- together with a copy of her passport 
page, a receipt confirming she had paid the fee, and her 
Migrant Card (MC), which she received when she crossed the 
border -- to the district branch of the Federal Migration 
Service (FMS).  Each of the three offices -- building 
administration, police station, and FMS -- have different 
working hours, are not located near each other, and usually 
have very long lines.  She said even if a person didn't have 
any other commitments their first few days in Moscow and knew 
exactly which papers are required and where all the offices 
are located, being able to make the deadline would be quite a 
challenge.  She joked that if she had known all this before 
she arrived in Moscow, she would have taken a plane. 
 
4. (C) The registration itself is a stamp that an FMS officer 
puts on the MC.  However, it is not done on the spot, but 
takes three working days (i.e., another week since the FMS is 
only open three days per week) to get the MC back.  Even 
then, it might take one or two more days because the lines 
are so long that the FMS sometimes closes before a person can 
reach the head of the line.  People usually begin queuing two 
to three hours before the office opens. The temporary 
registration is only good for 90 calendar days.  After that, 
one has to leave and re-enter the country in order to receive 
a new MC and start the registration process all over again. 
There is a website forum (www.nelegalov.net) where people 
discuss the closest and most convenient places to cross the 
border, as well as many other immigration issues. 
 
5. (C) Dinara's temporary registration expired before she had 
the chance to cross the border to get a new one.  If you are 
caught leaving the country with an expired temporary 
registration, the consequences can be harsh: either a large 
ruble fine or a several-year ban from re-entering Russia. 
However, most border guards do not levy the fine, but pocket 
a bribe instead.  Dinara tucked 1500 rubles into her passport 
in case the border guards stopped her.  Luckily, they did 
not.  Dinara thought Uzbeks and Tajiks are singled out for 
closer scrutiny than Kazakhs.  Her current temporary 
registration expires on November 5, and she is in the process 
of figuring out when and where to go to renew it.  For many 
blue-collar immigrants, repeating this procedure every three 
months is prohibitively expensive and the time away from work 
required could cost them their jobs, so they let the 
registration expire and take their chances with the police. 
 
----------------------------------- 
"Simplified" Citizenship Procedures 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Since Dinara came to Russia intending to settle 
permanently, instead of seeking temporary residency and work 
permits, she decided to immediately apply for citizenship. 
Kazakhstanis, as former citizens of the Soviet Union, are 
permitted to apply for citizenship under a "simplified" 
procedure.  She said that, in theory, it does sound simple: 
one needs to submit an MC with a valid registration stamp, 
proof of registration with the Kazakh Consulate in Moscow, a 
birth certificate, and several other documents, and then wait 
for up to three months until the application is considered 
and a decision is made.  Ideally, citizenship could be 
awarded within the 90-day temporary registration period, 
without having to worry about leaving the country to get a 
new MC and re-register.  However, the reality, she said, is 
 
MOSCOW 00010665  002 OF 002 
 
 
quite different. 
 
7. (C) The first real challenge was that a complete list of 
docume
nts required for the citizen application package is 
only obtainable from an authorized officer at the local FMS 
office.  In Dinara's local FMS branch, there was only one 
such officer, and that officer had left for a month-long 
vacation shortly before Dinara tried to apply.  Dinara said 
she argued fiercely with the deputy chief of the FMS office 
and, in the end, was able to briefly meet with the officer in 
the middle of her vacation to obtain the list of documents. 
(Dinara said that most immigrants would not dare stand up to 
the bureaucracy like that for fear of repercussions.)  Dinara 
spent the rest of the officer's vacation preparing the 
documents for submission on the only weekday (Tuesday) that 
they were accepted.  After waiting in line until 6 p.m., she 
submitted her documents, but was told she would have to wait 
six months, even though the law explicitly states "no longer 
than three months."  However, she was happy just to have 
completed the process and decided not object.   As a 
sidenote, she mentioned that by the end of the day, a few of 
the FMS officials were clearly inebriated and noticeably more 
friendly and helpful. 
 
------------------------- 
Discrimination In Society 
------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Dinara's impression is that men get stopped more 
frequently than women (she has only been stopped once), 
especially those who look like construction workers.  She 
said her brother hasn't been stopped by the police in several 
years, but that is because he has his own car and rarely uses 
the metro.  Even if he used the metro regularly, she said he 
wouldn't be stopped because the police don't often stop 
people who are dressed professionally.  Uzbek workers 
renovating her apartment told her that it usually cost them 
100 or 200 rubles to bribe a policeman.  However, once, one 
of them was carrying several thousand rubles and the police 
noticed.  They demanded 2000 rubles from him and when he 
refused they detained him, did not allow him to make any 
phone calls, and only released him six or seven hours later 
when he gave up and handed over the money. 
 
9. (C) Dinara maintained that the law governing immigration 
violations was written in such a way that it almost 
encourages bribery: the police cannot fine either Russian 
citizens or foreigners for registration and immigration 
status violations, but they can stop anyone and detain them 
for up to 48 hours solely on suspicion of commission of a 
crime or an immigration violation.  This is why most illegals 
willingly pay a bribe on the spot. Otherwise, they would be 
placed in detention and have to pay the bribe in any case. 
 
10. (C) Dinara said that her son has not faced any 
discrimination in school from teachers or other students. 
She ascribes that partly to the fact that he looks more 
Russian than Kazakh (his father is Russian).  However, the 
administrators were reluctant to enroll him at his first 
school, saying he would lag behind because of the 
"differences in curriculum between Russia and Kazakhstan." 
She said their attitude was condescending and borderline 
prejudiced, so she enrolled him in a school farther away from 
their apartment, but with a much warmer and welcoming 
administration. 
 
11. (C) COMMENT. An August 2006 poll by the Levada Center 
found that 17% thought the idea of "Russia for Russians" 
should have been implemented long ago, while another 37% 
supported that idea "within sensible limits." Just 28% 
rejected the idea, branding it as "fascism."  Dinara worries 
about the future for her son when she sees these kind of 
polls, and is not overly optimistic that problems will be 
resolved in the near or medium term.  While her case is less 
dramatic than Adam's, it nevertheless highlights the 
widespread corruption and discrimination immigrants face when 
they come to Russia. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW10620, RUSSIA: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH ANATOLIY CHUBAYS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10620 2006-09-22 08:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0620/01 2650826
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220826Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2738
INFO RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 1012
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 010620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC GRAHAM/MCKIBBON, EUR FRIED/KRAMER/MWARLICK/AHOLMAN, 
USTR/SCHWAB, DOE, COMMERCE/BROUGHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016 
TAGS: AF ECON ENRG IAEA KNNP PGOV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA:  AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH ANATOLIY CHUBAYS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  In a September 19 meeting with the 
Ambassador, UES CEO Chubays was very upbeat about UES reform 
and the liberalization of electricity prices.  He confidently 
predicted that strategic investors and IPOs in London and 
Moscow would raise the investment UES needs to meet its five 
year target.  While clearly distraught about the Kozlov 
assassination, Cubays nonetheless was cautiously optimistic 
that banking reform would continue.  End Summary. 
 
PASAT CASE 
---------- 
 
2.  (C)  Chubays thanked the Ambassador for USG assistance on 
the Pasat case. (the former Moldovan Defense Minister who was 
charged with embezzlement involving the sale of Mig-29s to 
the U.S.).  Chubays had learned that U.S. authorities 
assisted by providing affidavits in the case. 
 
KOZLOV ASSASSINATION 
-------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Chubays expressed doubt that the perpetrators of 
deputy Central Bank chair Kozlov's murder would ever be 
found.  Nonetheless, he had spoken with the Central Bank 
chair Sergey Ignatiev, and he was cautiously optimistic that 
Kozlov's murder would not slow down the Central Bank's 
efforts to increase supervision over the banking system. 
Chubays agreed that Kozlov would be difficult to replace 
because of his knowledge, experience, and reputation. 
 
 
UES REFORMS 
 
SIPDIS 
----------- 
 
4.  (C)  On UES reform, Chubays boasted that no one had 
thought it would be possible to accomplish market 
liberalization and private investment in the electricity 
sector.  Without Putin's support, the reforms would be 
impossible.  No one expected such difficult decisions, such 
as the liberalization of electricity prices, could be made so 
close to the elections.  He described the Russian model as 
the &best (designed) market in the world8 because it 
included no price caps, and the best software and legal 
foundation. 
 
5.  (C)  Chubays said his road show through Western capitals 
had been a success and UES would have no problem getting 
investors to fulfill its 5-year investment target of $81 
billion.  He predicted that IPOs planned for next year in 
Moscow and London would raise up to $17.5 billion.  The real 
test will be the upcoming winter.  Last winter consumption 
unexpectedly grew by 5 percent instead of 2 percent.  He is 
expecting to impose usage restrictions in 16 regions (in 
contrast to 3 regions last year).  Chubays admitted, given 
expected shortages, reform could actually pose some risks, 
but market signals, by differentiating between peak and 
non-peak hours, would create a powerful instrument for the 
industry. 
 
ELECTION CYCLE POLICIES INSTEAD OF REFORMS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C)  On the economy, Chubays said that he did not support 
many of the policies being enacted.  Referring to the state's 
growing footprint in the energy and automobile sectors, he 
cited Gazprom, Gazprombank, and Avtovaz as examples of 
policies that he could not support. Avtovaz was a mistake and 
it would soon be obvious.  He predicted that the government 
would realize its mistake and reverse its decisions after a 
few years.  Chubays expressed his frustration that nothing 
was happening with reforms in the pension, health, education, 
and housing sectors, as Russia was entering into another 
political cycle.  It would be difficult to do anything until 
after the elections. 
 
 
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  When asked about the merger of Federation Council 
Speaker Mironov's Party of Life, Rodina, and Party of 
Pensioners, Chubays said that while not a fan of Mironov, the 
merger of the parties on the left was &pragmatic8 and 
&reasonable8 because it increased the chance that the 
 
combined party will make the 7 percent cutoff for seats in 
the Duma.  The current consolidation of parties reminded him 
of a similar tactic during the Yeltsin years.  Rodina was 
very dangerous, but under Mironov (even with all his faults) 
Rodina could become &civilized.8  Chubays repeated the 
refrain that the parties on the right have to unite (to 
become a viable political force). 
 
 
8. (C)  About the outcome of the presidential elections, 
Chubays remarked that &it is determined.  Whoever Putin 
chooses to be the candidate will win.8  The &traditional 
way8 would be to select a successor no earlier than one to 
one and a half years prior to the elections and install them 
as the Prime Minister.  In that scenario, whoever holds the 
Prime
 Minister position at the end of 2006 might well become 
the next president. 
 
U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
--------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  When asked about the current state of U.S.-Russia 
relations, Chubays spoke in broad terms about the post 9-11 
missed opportunity when international support was strong.  He 
warned that anti-American sentiment is growing in Russia and 
U.S. moral authority, which is a key component of the 
relationship, is slipping.  Those who criticize the U.S. 
argue that rhetoric on democracy building and actions in Iraq 
do not coincide.  These arguments are resonating with the 
population and could bring U.S. critics to power.  Chubays 
cited Vice President Cheney's speech in Lithuania as an 
example of what negatively affects our relationship.  Chubays 
agreed with the Ambassador that there was nothing new in the 
speech, but repeated that it was a mistake, and claimed that 
such rhetoric is counter productive. 
 
10.  (C)  On economic relations, Chubays said he was very 
upset when the WTO bilateral talks during the July G-8 
meetings did not result in an agreement on Russian accession. 
 He had an &emotional talk8 with Economic Minister Gref 
lamenting the failure to close the deal.  He emphasized that 
both sides needed to find the political will to conclude 
negotiations.  Further delay would seriously undermine the 
relationship, handicap the process of economic modernization 
in Russia, and play into the hands of the domestic opponents 
of modernization. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11.  (C)  UES restructuring is one of a small handful of 
positive developments in Putin's second term reform agenda, 
but progress will come with its own challenges and 
opportunities.  As Chubays himself acknowledged, price 
liberalization is fraught with political risks, but, the 
Kremlin's attention to politically sensitive issues like 
inflation will probably mean that any increases will happen 
gradually.  The Kremlin,s role in the selection of strategic 
investors for UES assets will also be a key indicator to 
follow.  Kozlov's death has made a strong impact on Chubays; 
he was clearly distraught at Kozlov's wake. 
BURNS

Wikileaks