06MOSCOW11169, POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11169 2006-10-04 14:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9594
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1169 2771422
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041422Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3436
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0650
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0152
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0389
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2002
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0155

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 011169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN RS
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST 
 
REF: STATE 166404 
 
Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns.  For Reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  DFM Alekseyev told the Ambassador October 
4 that Russia recognized the seriousness of the situation 
following the DPRK's announcement and understood U.S. 
concerns.  Alekseyev urged that the Security Council move 
deliberately to craft a response, but was lukewarm about a 
potential Five Plus Five meeting.  In an October 3 statement, 
the MFA called on Pyongyang to exercise restraint and make 
the "right choice."  Colleagues from other Embassies are also 
set to approach the MFA to urge a unified response.  End 
Summary. 
. 
MFA Press Statement 
------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  The MFA responded immediately on October 3 to the 
DPRK MFA announcement of North Korea's intention to conduct a 
nuclear test by expressing "deep concern" and calling on 
Pyongyang to show restraint.  While noting the DPRK's 
concerns for its security, the MFA urged that a resolution to 
the problem must be sought through the Six Party Talks and 
called on North Korea to make "the right choice." 
. 
DFM Alekseyev 
------------- 
 
3.  (C)  The Ambassador raised reftel points with Alekseyev 
October 4 and urged Russia to cooperate with the U.S. and 
other concerned partners in the UN Security Council and in 
the Five Plus Five process.  Alekseyev said U.S. concerns 
were understandable and that the DPRK announcement had 
created a serious problem.  He said the announcement had been 
unexpected and that Moscow had already begun consultations 
with Beijing given the latter's relatively good understanding 
of DPRK intentions and leverage with Pyongyang.  Alekseyev 
noted that he planned to accompany PM Fradkov on his October 
16 visit to Seoul and might go on to Beijing.  He had no 
intention of going to Pyongyang. 
 
4.  (C)  Turning to the issue of possible UN Security Council 
action, Alekseyev acknowledged that the DPRK's expressed 
intention posed a very serious challenge to the Council's 
authority.  He stated that the Council should move 
deliberately on next steps, keeping in mind that the regime's 
reactions were often abnormal ("close to craziness") and that 
the Council should not take steps that might lead to 
counterproductive results.  Caution was particularly called 
for in advance of any testing -- the Council would not profit 
from taking action that prompted the DPRK to do the very 
thing we all opposed. 
 
5.  (C)  The Ambassador underlined the usefulness of the Five 
Plus Five in working out a regional solution to North Korea's 
threatening behavior.  Alekseyev was lukewarm about the 
process, but suggested that the U.S. provide specific 
proposals in New York or Washington about activating the 
process.  Alekseyev said that Russia wanted to approach this 
serious situation "carefully," and would likely keep a close 
eye on Beijing's reaction in formulating Russian policy. 
. 
Third Party Diplomacy 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Our Japanese, French and Australian colleagues all 
have been instructed to go in to the MFA on the tests, but 
have faced some problems in getting access.  The South Korean 
Political Counselor told us October 4 that he was still 
awaiting instructions. 
BURNS

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