06MOSCOW11280, PREPARING THE GROUND FOR UNSC ACTION ON DPRK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11280 2006-10-06 15:08 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0029
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1280/01 2791508
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061508Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3588
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4110
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0651
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1919
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1857
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2003
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1682
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2621
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4036
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0272

S E C R E T MOSCOW 011280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2016 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP UNSC KN RS
SUBJECT: PREPARING THE GROUND FOR UNSC ACTION ON DPRK 
 
REF: A. STATE 168337 
     B. MOSCOW 11169 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d/h). 
 
1.  (S)  Summary:  DFM Alekseyev told the Ambassador October 
6 that Russia found a DPRK nuclear test to be "absolutely 
unacceptable" and stressed that the North Korean regime had 
received this message from Russia in clear and unmistakable 
terms.  Responding to the Ambassador's urging that Russia 
support action in the Security Council, Alekseyev said that a 
Presidential Statement would likely be adopted on October 6 
and that Russia was ready to consider strong measures in the 
event North Korea tested.  An MFA North Korean expert 
separately conveyed to us that Russia had convoked the North 
Korean Ambassador in Moscow and had delivered a strong 
message in Pyongyang.  He said that the DPRK was under 
economic pressure and had few alternatives left to strike 
out.  Another MFA North Korean expert told us that Russian 
experts believed it was possible that Pakistan had supplied 
the DPRK with the technical assistance necessary to test a 
nuclear device.  End Summary. 
. 
DFM Alekseyev 
------------- 
 
2.  (C)  The Ambassador raised reftel points with Deputy 
Foreign Minister Alekseyev October 6 and urged Russia to 
support a UN Security Council Presidential Statement to be 
issued later that day.  The Ambassador reviewed U.S. 
expectations that a Chapter VII resolution would be adopted 
in the event of a North Korean nuclear test and highlighted 
the desired elements of the resolution.  Alekseyev responded 
by underlining that Russia considered a DPRK nuclear test to 
be "absolutely unacceptable."  He said the Russians had given 
the North Koreans the strongest possible advice not to 
proceed with a test and that Pyongyang had received the 
clearest possible signal on this account from Russia as well 
as other members of the Six Party talks. 
 
3.  (C)  Reviewing action in the UN Security Council, 
Alekseyev said a Presidential Statement would likely be 
adopted on Friday.  In the event North Korea conducts a 
nuclear test, Russia would be "100 percent willing" to 
consider strong action by the Council.  Reiterating his 
October 4 comments, he noted that the Council would need to 
act carefully and again pointed to the key role China would 
play in Council consideration of Chapter VII measures.  The 
Ambassador noted Russia's support for the Presidential 
Statement. 
. 
MFA Korean Experts 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C)  In a separate Embassy meeting with the MFA 
Ambassador-at-large on the DPRK, Valeriy Sukhinin made the 
following points: 
 
-- It was difficult for the GOR to gauge the seriousness of 
the DPRK threat.  There was no outward manifestation 
of preparations for a nuclear test and the country did not 
appear to be on a different alert footing; however, that was 
also the case during the July missile tests. 
 
-- The MFA had already convoked the North Korean Ambassador, 
who said that the DPRK was being forced by U.S. pressure to 
move toward a nuclear test and that the regime did not want 
to take this step.  The DPRK sought "sincere 
denuclearization," but was being confronted with the 
one-sided destruction of its economy.  U.S. economic 
sanctions, the DPRK Ambassador maintained, represented a 
"direct threat to the higher interests of the country."  The 
Russian Ambassador in Pyongyang had met with a Deputy Foreign 
Minister on October 3, underscoring strong Russian concerns 
over the DPRK threat to test.  Sukhinin pointed to the 
Russian MFA statement, and reiterated that the GOR shared the 
U.S. conviction that the DPRK posed a grave threat to the NPT 
and international nonproliferation norms. 
 
-- Sukhinin (who had served 17 years in North Korea) offered 
a variety of motives for the timing of the DPRK threat. 
First, the "Eastern mentality" was accustomed to quiet 
diplomacy and the public affront of the economic sanctions 
and the closure of accounts in the Macao bank could have 
prompted the DPRK to lash out.  Second, it was a combination 
of both the economic pressure that the DPRK was under, as 
well as a tactic to attract the attention of the 
international community.  The DPRK had exhausted political 
statements, had launched missiles, and now was left with the 
threat of a nuclear test to make its mark. 
 
-- While there was no meaningful opposition in the DPRK, the 
GOR does gauge that there is dissatisfaction with the 
economic situation and differences of opinion over the 
leadership; however, the "threat" of the United States has 
unified the elite and consolidated the Great Leader,s 
position. 
 
5.  (S)  In another meeting with MFA Nor
th Korea watcher 
Maksim Volkov, we were told that Russia not only saw a 
nuclear test as an "unacceptable" threat to the 
nonproliferation regime, but also saw testing as a threat to 
Russian territory because of the possible release of 
radioactive material.  Volkov said that Russian "experts" 
(not otherwise identified) believed that it would have taken 
years and substantial technical skill to prepare and test a 
nuclear device.  He speculated without offering any evidence 
that the DPRK lacked an indigenous capability to carry out a 
test and had received technical assistance from Pakistan in 
order to do so.  Volkov said a test could occur with little 
advance notice. 
BURNS

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