06MOSCOW11372, RUSSIA-ABKHAZIA: SEEKING A DEAL AT THE UNSC

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW11372.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW11372 2006-10-10 15:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4535
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1372/01 2831508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101508Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3696
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0275

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-ABKHAZIA:  SEEKING A DEAL AT THE UNSC 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS.  Reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) DFM Karasin convoked Ambassador October 10.  He hoped 
for "a more constructive and flexible" U.S. approach to the 
Russian draft UNSCR on UNOMIG mandate renewal and said the 
Europeans are willing to be flexible.  If the resolution 
included a "blunt message" to Tbilisi on its Kodori 
operation, other basic elements of UNSCR could remain. 
Ambassador replied that the U.S. will not be flexible on 
condemning the Kodori operation, but would accept 
highlighting violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement.  We 
have delivered a blunt message to Tbilisi privately; the 
international forum should complement that message, not 
repeat it.  A visa for Abkhaz "Foreign Minster" Shamba could 
potentially be part of a package.  Both the U.S. and Russia 
need to be blunt with the Abkhaz on the unacceptability of 
the use of force.  Karasin said this approach is "smart," but 
continued to push for condemnation of the Kodori operation; 
Ambassador reiterated this is unacceptable.  Ambassador 
pressed Karasin on harassment of Georgians.  Karasin said 
"rough edges" will be smoothed out, but limitations will 
remain on relations with Georgia.  End Summary. 
 
UNSC State of Play -- Russian View 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin convoked the Ambassador October 
10.  He said the U.S. is blocking progress on a UNSCR 
renewing UNOMIG's mandate.  Russian negotiators say there are 
hints that the Europeans are willing to be flexible, and 
there has been some movement forward.  The Russian bottom 
line is that the UNSCR must contain: 
 
-- a "qualification" of Georgia's action in the Kodori Gorge; 
-- condemnation of violations of the Moscow ceasefire 
agreement (1994); 
-- restatement of the obligation not to put armed forces in 
the Kodori Gorge; 
-- assurance that joint UNOMIG-PKF patrols in Kodori will be 
regular. 
 
With those elements, other major elements of UNSCR 1666 can 
remain.  Karasin passed the Ambassador a non-paper (faxed to 
EUR-RUS) and draft resolution. 
 
3. (C) Karasin continued that the U.S. is being tough in 
proposing alternatives unacceptable to Russia.  U.S. language 
on status "breaks the spirit" of UNSCR 1666.  U.S. language 
does not include expressions on the role of the CIS PLF, and 
hints that it should leave.  Without a more cooperative U.S. 
attitude, Karasin said, he did not see how we could agree on 
a resolution to renew UNOMIG's mandate for another six 
months.  He asked the Ambassador to convey Russia's concern 
to Washington. 
 
No U.S. Flexibility on Kodori 
----------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Ambassador agreed that the negotiations are difficult. 
 Russia should not expect the U.S. to show flexibility on 
condemning the Kodori operation per se.  However, there is a 
willingness on our side to highlight violations of the 1994 
Moscow Agreement.  Russia should bear the distinction in 
mind.  Karasin responded that "if we fail to send Tbilisi a 
clear signal, we will be de facto promoting its militaristic 
stance." 
 
5. (C) Ambassador replied that we are very clear with the 
Georgians on the use of force.  Our Ambassador in Tbilisi 
delivered a blunt demarche on this to President Saakashvili 
October 9.  The Georgian leadership is in no doubt of the 
U.S. position.  With regard to the UNSCR, however, there will 
be no flexibility.  Karasin said he appreciated the U.S. 
bluntness to the Georgians, but the message must come from 
the U.S., Russia and the Europeans together.  Ambassador 
replied that our private bilateral channel to the Georgians 
is the appropriate one for the message.  The message from New 
York should be different but complement it.  It could 
potentially be coupled with a visa issuance for Abkhaz 
"Foreign Minister" Shamba to visit New York to meet with UNSC 
members in the Aria forum.  This would inter alia allow the 
U.S. to reinforce the message to the Abkhaz of the 
unacceptability of the use of force.  That is part of the 
package -- another element is a blunt Russian message to the 
Abkhaz not to use force, a message we assume the Russians are 
sending.  Karasin said the package approach is "smart." 
Still, he hoped for U.S. flexibility on the resolution, which 
could help calm the situation. 
 
MOSCOW 00011372  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Harassment of Georgians 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C) Ambassador mentioned mounting concern in Washington on 
Russian actions against individual Georgians in Russia.  The 
actions promote a negative image for Russia.  Ambassador was 
glad to learn that the Russians have stopped combing school 
records for information on Georgian parents.  However, 
deportations (totaling 300 on October 10) and intensified 
document checks continue, and Georgian-linked businesses and 
restaurants continue t
o close. 
 
7. (C) Karasin replied that "sometimes, decisions in Russia 
are strong, not elegant, but gradually we put away the 
extremes."  He hoped there would be no more screaming from 
schools and universities.  "But certain elements of 
limitation on our relations with Georgia will continue -- 
without the rougher forms, perhaps, but they will continue" 
as a message to Saakashvili.  Karasin pushed again on the 
UNSCR, saying it would promote a better atmosphere for 
normalizing relations with Georgia.  Ambassador hoped that 
some of these pieces will come together for a workable 
resolution.  He reiterated that Russia needs to work, too, by 
pressing the Abkhaz not to use force. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) Karasin, confident that the Europeans are ready to 
abandon the U.S. position, was trying to see where the limits 
of a deal might lie.  Russia very much wants a resolution 
that will show Georgia that its major allies, especially the 
U.S., are angry with it and have reached the limit of their 
support.  The Russians have fixed upon condemnation of the 
Kodori operation as the vehicle.  The Ambassador gave Karasin 
no comfort on this, but the Russians are likely to keep 
trying before accepting a fallback of condemning ceasefire 
violations. 
 
9. (C) Karasin took the point that the Shamba visa is in play 
as part of the package.  We should try to get a decision as 
early as possible -- by COB October 10 would be important -- 
as a catalyst for moving negotiations on the resolution. 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

Advertisements
Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: