06MOSCOW12752, RUSSIAN POSITION ON CFE, ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12752 2006-12-01 15:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4019
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2752 3351502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011502Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5616
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 
TAGS: MARR OSCE PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN POSITION ON CFE, ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS 
UNCHANGED 
 
REF: USOSCE 481 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (C) The Chief of the Conventional Arms Control Division 
in the Foreign Ministry's Department of Security Affairs and 
Disarmament, Anton Mazur, told us 28 November that we could 
expect "little or no change" in the GOR's approach to 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) issues at next week's 
OSCE Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels.  The veteran 
Mazur, with almost 20 years experience on conventional arms 
control issues, said Moscow's position would reflect 
essentially the same position it took at the Third CFE review 
conference in June. In particular, Mazur echoed recent public 
statements by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko and 
other senior officials that Russia had already met all of its 
1999 Istanbul commitments. 
 
2.  (C) Mazur questioned the relevance of CFE, which he said 
no longer served Russia's interests, adding that Moscow was 
currently assessing the Treaty's role within a broader 
analysis of the OSCE.  He declined to say when the official 
review would be completed and disputed media reports that 
Moscow might withdraw from the Treaty.  Nonetheless, Mazur 
characterized the future of CFE as "gloomy." 
 
3.  (C) With respect to two confidence- and security-building 
measures (CSBMs) papers on transit and deployment of forces, 
which Russia had initially proposed in the OSCE Forum for 
Security Cooperation, Mazur complained that other States 
Parties (mainly NATO Allies) had not responded more 
positively to these overtures.  The two CSBMs were designed 
to mitigate political concerns and were neither overly 
intrusive nor aimed at undermining the operational security 
of troop movements.  He brushed aside arguments that, if 
approved, the proposals would have granted benefits 
associated with the unratified Adapted CFE Treaty.  Mazur 
said it was unfortunate that NATO had been asked to comment 
on the papers since "some" of the Allies tended to take a 
harsher view of Russian intentions. 
 
4.  (C) On broader OSCE issues, Mazur said there was little 
chance that Moscow would be able to agree to language on the 
situations in Georgia and Moldova, making the possibility of 
issuing a Ministerial Declaration "highly unlikely." 
 
5.  (C) COMMENT:  Mazur's comments are not new and, as he 
told us at the outset of our conversation, "we know your 
position, and you know ours."  Although his arms control 
brief covers only a portion of the OSCE agenda, his remarks 
on Russia's Istanbul commitments and the situation in Georgia 
and Moldova suggest that Russia will not be in a compromising 
mood at next week's ministerial. 
BURNS

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