06MOSCOW12838, RUSSIA WANTS “PREDICTABILITY” IN POST-START

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12838 2006-12-07 14:16 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9076
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2838 3411416
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071416Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5737
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T MOSCOW 012838 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 
TAGS: PARM MCAP PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS "PREDICTABILITY" IN POST-START 
ARRANGEMENT 
 
REF: STATE 169770 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells. 
 Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (S) Russia will insist on predictability in any 
arrangement that follows expiration of the START Treaty in 
2009, according to Vasiliy Boryak, Chief of the START Office 
in the Foreign Ministry's Department for Disarmament and 
Security Affairs.  First and foremost, Boryak told us 
December 7, was Russia's desire to retain a specific list of 
limitations in the new accord, with subsequent negotiation of 
numerical ceilings on warheads.  In this respect, Boryak 
noted that Russia's position had not changed significantly 
since it presented a set of START review proposals last 
summer. 
 
2.  (S) Boryak underlined that predictability remained a 
fundamental tenet of U.S.-Russia arms control relations; at a 
minimum, Moscow needed to be assured of future trend lines on 
numerical ceilings, which was not clear in reftel letter to 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak from U/S Joseph.  Boryak also 
emphasized our respective obligations under Article 6 of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Both Russia and the U.S. would 
likely come under increasing pressure to reduce further the 
level of nuclear weapons. 
 
3.  (S) Boryak said DFM Kislyak would respond formally to U/S 
Joseph's letter when they meet December 8.  In addition to 
insisting on limitations on launch platforms and warheads, 
Kislyak will note that: 
 
-- Moscow is not opposed to visits to operational sites but 
would insist that the purpose be clearly defined.  In this 
respect, Boryak foresaw tough negotiations on specific 
locations and on defining strategic weapons. 
 
-- Site visits at nuclear test facilities would not be 
appropriate. 
 
-- There should be a verification mechanism, though it could 
be less burdensome than existing provisions in the START 
Treaty. 
 
-- There should be no deployment of nuclear weapons outside 
respective national territory. 
 
4.  (S) None of these was an insurmountable obstacle, in 
Boryak's view.  Differences in approach have always 
characterized U.S.-Russia arms control relations.  Kislyak, 
Boryak noted, was confident that both sides would be able to 
establish a level of trust necessary to reach agreement. 
Boryak added that Kislyak valued his relationship with U/S 
Joseph. 
BURNS

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