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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW13022.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06MOSCOW13022 | 2006-12-21 14:22 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO1394 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #3022 3551422 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211422Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6002 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4141 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2636 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4076 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 013022 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS WARLICK, HOLMAN, AND GUHA DEPT FOR EB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GARVERICK DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF/PISCITELLI DOC FOR 4321/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER NSC FOR GRAHAM AND MCKIBBON E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET PREL RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA ENERGY: GAZPROM SET TO ACQUIRE CONTROLLING STAKE IN SAKHALIN-2 REF: MOSCOW 12930 Classified By: Econ M/C Pamela Quanrud. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The British Economic M/C in Moscow confirmed December 20 his understanding that agreement is likely by the end of this week between Sakhalin Energy's partners and Gazprom on the terms of Gazprom's cash acquisition of a controlling stake in Sakhalin-2. Agreement would bring to a close negotiations complicated by Sakhalin Energy's announcement last summer of significant cost overruns, and capped by recent GOR threats of huge environmental damage claims. While the final price Gazprom will pay is unknown, and will likely be on the low side of Shell's target range, it must in the end be a price Shell shareholders can live with. End summary. ¶2. (C) British Economic M/C in Moscow confirmed December 20 that Sakhalin Energy and Gazprom are poised to announce a deal, perhaps still this week, giving Gazprom a controlling 50 percent stake in Russia's first liquefied natural gas (LNG) project. According to the press, Gazprom will acquire one half of each current partner's stake -- 27.5 percent from Shell, 12.5 percent from Mitsui, and 10 percent from Mitsubishi -- in exchange for cash payments. While the price is unknown, it will certainly be higher than the $2.6 billion offered by Gazprom and rejected out of hand by Sakhalin Energy last week (ref). Authorities publicly confirmed December 20 that the pending deal would not involve any of the asset swaps that had been at the heart of the previous Gazprom/Sakhalin Energy deal scuttled by Gazprom in summer 2005 after Sakhalin Energy's announcement of significant cost overruns. All indications are that Shell will retain operational control over the project. ¶3. (C) Comment: Shell undoubtedly obtained a price it can present to shareholders with a straight face. Still, the final amount will probably be in the lower range of Shell's target price, reflecting a position weakened by Kremlin ire over project cost overruns and threatened environmental claims assessed by the Natural Resources Ministry at $10 billion. Loss of shares will negatively impact Shell more than its Japanese partners. While the Japanese are mainly concerned with securing energy supplies, the loss of Shell's Sakhalin reserves will affect the company's long-term value, particularly on top of recent revelations of inflated reserve estimates. Our British interlocutor's request that third parties embrace the final deal represents an attempt to shine the best light on a forced hand. End comment. RUSSELL
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