07MOSCOW78, ISKANDER-E MISSILE FOR LIBYA: RUSSIA HEDGES ON

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW78.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW78 2007-01-11 14:56 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5676
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #0078 0111456
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111456Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6303
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1921
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL MCAP KNNP LY UK RS
SUBJECT: ISKANDER-E MISSILE FOR LIBYA: RUSSIA HEDGES ON 
TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING (C) 
 
REF: STATE 2381 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells. 
  Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (S) On January 11 we conveyed to the MFA U.S interest 
(ref) in a technical experts meeting in Moscow before January 
29 to discuss issues relating to Libya's possible purchase of 
the Iskander-E missile.  Sergey Petlyakov, Chief of the Arms 
Technology and Transfer Division of the Foreign Ministry's 
Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, told us that 
it would be difficult to arrange such a meeting before the 
end of the month. 
 
2.  (S) In addition to the short time-frame, Petlyakov said 
it was his understanding that only 3-4 experts at the 
Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashinostroyeniya (KBM) had access to 
the technology required to modify the Iskander-E missile 
because of the firm's strict compartmentalization policy. 
KBM management might be reluctant to have its experts engage 
in such "risky" discussions due to the possibility of 
inadvertent disclosure of classified data.  We noted that we 
were only asking Russia to provide the same level of 
transparency that we provided to it when Russia raised 
similar concerns about the U.S. ATACMS system exported in 
1996. 
 
3.  (C) Petlyakov promised to raise our request with DFM 
Kislyak and other senior officials and get us a reply by next 
week. 
 
4.  (U) Minimize considered. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

Advertisements
Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: