07MOSCOW754, IRAN: SANCTIONS DECREE SUBJECT OF INTERAGENCY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW754 2007-02-21 13:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3092
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #0754 0521303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211303Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7623
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000754 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR COLLEEN EDDY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP EFIN ETTC KTFN IR RS
SUBJECT: IRAN:  SANCTIONS DECREE SUBJECT OF INTERAGENCY 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 14071 
 
     B. STATE 16917 
 
Classified By: Pol/Min Counselor Alice G. Wells.  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (C) We discussed reftel requests regarding implementation 
of UNSCR 1737 (Iran) with Vladimir Safronkov, Chief of the UN 
Political Affairs Section in the MFA's International 
Organizations Department.  Safronkov told us that a draft 
presidential decree necessary to implement the sanctions 
regime was still being discussed in the Russian interagency, 
but reassured us that "we're getting closer" to an agreed 
text. 
 
2.  (C)  Safronkov told us that the primary stumbling block 
was obtaining interagency agreement on language to implement 
proliferation finance measures.  The MFA believed that the 
President already had sufficient legal authority to implement 
UN resolutions, but this legal interpretation had not been 
shared by other agencies responsible for implementation, 
including the Financial Monitoring Service and Central Bank. 
These agencies had insisted on clear legal authority akin to 
that provided by laws to combat terrorism finance.  On 
January 10, President Putin signed into law a bill on special 
economic measures that had been passed by the State Duma at 
the end of 2006.  This law provided the necessary legal basis 
to combat proliferation financing.  Interagency drafters of 
the presidential decrees (on Iran and the DPRK) were now 
consulting with State Duma members to ensure compliance with 
the legislation's intent. 
 
3.  (C)  After reviewing the drawn out negotiations in the 
Security Council over the text of UNSCR 1737, Safronkov 
cautioned that the GOR would use a "strict interpretation" to 
determine what was permitted or excluded by the resolution. 
He underlined that appeals for implementation based on "the 
spirit of the resolution" were not likely to gain much 
traction in Moscow.  Russia had been very clear about what it 
could accept in the resolution text and intended to fully 
live up to its obligations to implement those provisions. 
 
4.  (C)  Comment:  While the delays in implementing UNSCR 
1737 are disappointing, our MFA interlocutors went out of 
their way to insist that Russia was committed to implementing 
UNSCR 1737 as soon as it was legally possible to do so.  That 
said, even in the absence of serious policy differences, the 
Russian interagency process can move at a snail's pace.  At 
the same time, we have seen over the past week increasing 
signs of Russian exasperation with Iran's failure to respond 
to the "time out" proposal launched by IAEA DG Baradei and 
supported by Russia.  Visiting Congressman Tom Lantos heard 
from both FM Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Ivanov 
(septels) that the GOR was frustrated with Iranian 
"arrogance."  The Russians are claiming publicly that work 
cannot be completed on the Bushehr reactor because of delays 
in payment, but privately, Ivanov told Lantos that Russia 
would condition fuel delivery to Bushehr based on political 
considerations. 
BURNS

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