07MOSCOW1026, FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHE TO RUSSIA ON ARMS COOPERATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1026 2007-03-12 13:00 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1026 0711300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121300Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8142

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC RS SY SU IR
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHE TO RUSSIA ON ARMS COOPERATION 
WITH SYRIA, SUDAN, AND IRAN 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 977 
     B. STATE 26466 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice Wells. Re 
asons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (S) Sergey Petlyakov, Director of the Foreign Ministry's 
Arms Technology and Transfer Policy Section in the Department 
for Disarmament and Security Affairs, told us March 9 that he 
would raise Ref B information within the GOR's interagency 
community and get back to us on Russian arms cooperation with 
Syria, Sudan, and Iran if anything substantive surfaced.  He 
would also coordinate with North America Department Director 
Neverov (Ref A).  Petlyakov reiterated the GOR position that 
neither Russian assistance to Syria for overhauling aircraft 
nor the transfer of Russian anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) 
violated current UN sanctions or other international legal 
obligations.  From Russia's perspective, such transactions 
were legal and did not undermine regional security. 
 
2.  (S) Petlyakov responded to our concern about reports that 
ATGMs were continuing to find their way to Hizballah by 
noting that Moscow had tightened up its end-user checks on 
such transfers and did not have any evidence of diversion. 
He reiterated that he would get back to us if the GOR 
interagency developed any information to the contrary. 
 
3.  (S) On reports of negotiations between Tehran and the 
Sukhoy Experimental Design Bureau to upgrade Iranian combat 
aircraft, Petlyakov replied that he was unaware of such 
discussions.  Moscow, the US, and other major powers were 
continuing to cooperate closely on Iran.  This, along with 
the GOR's positive reaction to the US decision to terminate 
sanctions against Sukhoy in November, made it unlikely that 
Sukhoy would engage in something so "stupid" now.  Petlyakov 
added that Russia was well aware that current UN sanctions 
against Iran had grandfathered contracts approved prior to 
the imposition of those sanctions.  Moscow intended to follow 
through on previously negotiated contracts (he pointed to the 
delivery of the Tor-M1 missile system to Iran last December) 
but would respect current and future UN sanction regimes. 
 
4.  (S) In response to our concerns about lethal military 
equipment being used by the Sudanese military in Darfur, 
Petlyakov said he was not aware that any Russian arms or 
spare parts had been used in Darfur for at least the past 
year.  He said Russia did not simply "sell and forget" about 
weapons systems transferred to other countries.  Russian 
specialists continued to check on their end-use, including in 
Sudan, where they seek to ensure that Russian equipment was 
not deployed in Darfur or otherwise in violation of UN 
sanctions or international obligations.  In response to our 
concerns that recently delivered Mi-171 helicopters not be 
used in Darfur, Petlyakov emphasized that Moscow would 
conduct proper end-use checks. 
BURNS

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