07MOSCOW1257, TRANSNISTRIA: RUSSIAN MFA NEGOTIATOR ON INCIDENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1257 2007-03-23 10:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3492
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1257 0821022
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231022Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8519
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MD RS
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA:  RUSSIAN MFA NEGOTIATOR ON INCIDENTS 
INVOLVING AMERICANS 
 
Classified By: PolMilCouns Alice G. Wells.  Reason:  1.4 (b, d) 
 
1. (C) On March 23 we raised with Russian MFA 
Ambassador-at-large Nesterushkin the March 16 refusal of 
Transnistrian authorities to allow diplomats from Amembassy 
Chisinau into the separatist region.  We handed Nesterushkin 
a copy of Ambassador Finley's March 21 intervention at the 
OSCE Permanent Council. 
 
2. (C) Nesterushkin said he would repeat what he had told EUR 
DAS Kramer in Vienna:  express U.S. indignation directly to 
the Transnistrian authorities.  We replied that we would 
certainly make our views known.  But Nesterushkin had told us 
the U.S. should "listen" to the Transnistrians; it was clear 
from this incident that the Transnistrians are not interested 
in talking with us.  Nesterushkin said the diplomats had not 
planned to meet with the Tiraspol authorities, but rather 
were engaged in "diplomatic tourism" to "find out which roads 
are closed."  We replied that Tiraspol cannot dictate how we 
listen to them; either they want the U.S. to have information 
on Transnistria or they don't.  We said we were approaching 
Russia because its peacekeepers were charged with 
guaranteeing freedom of movement.  Nesterushkin said there 
were too few peacekeepers to guarantee that; were we 
suggesting an increase in their numbers?  No, we answered; 
their presence just means Russia is involved.  Nesterushkin 
repeated that we should take the matter up with Tiraspol. 
 
3. (C) We raised concerns that the March 16 Russian Customs 
confiscation of posters from OSCE Moldova Head of Mission 
O'Neill, and the subsequent widespread publicity of the 
affair, were part of a campaign to undermine him. 
Nesterushkin suggested that this was a paranoid response. 
U.S. customs had once confiscated 500 grams of caviar from 
him, and he did not think it was part of a campaign.  We 
assured Nesterushkin that the O'Neill affair was being 
interpreted in Washington as we described, given the 
publicity by both the MFA and Russian media; and that it was 
clear O'Neill's actions as HOM did not suit Russia.  We 
suggested that Russia should let the matter disappear and get 
back to working with O'Neill on the issue at hand:  resolving 
the Transnistria conflict.  Nesterushkin agreed, and said he 
admired the U.S. defense of its diplomats in international 
organizations. 
BURNS

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