WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW1305.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1305 2007-03-26 09:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #1305/01 0850902
P 260902Z MAR 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001305 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2017 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d). 
1.  (C)  Summary: In a wide-ranging meeting with the 
Ambassador on March 23, Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak noted 
that a visit by U/S Edelman was delayed by the replacement of 
his counterpart and GOR concerns that the format did not 
address overarching Russian concerns over US strategic 
intentions.  Kislyak argued for a high-level strategic 
dialogue, which also could help refine the Presidents' 
bilateral agenda and produce a positive declaration (along 
the lines of Bratislava) for release at the June G8 Summit. 
In that context, he urged a visit by the Secretary.  Kislyak 
welcomed the Carnegie-Lukin human rights dialogue, and noted 
enthusiastic GOR support for the proposed Kissinger-Primakov 
"wise men" discussion.  He noted full GOR support for the 
UNSC sanctions resolution, with Iran still refusing to engage 
on a freeze-for-freeze proposal.  In response to the 
Ambassador's protests, Kislyak insisted that OSCE HOM O'Neill 
may have committed a criminal offense, which was still being 
"digested" by the GOR.  He reviewed GOR complaints over the 
Kuznetsov case.  Kislyak expressed appreciation for the 
Secretary's condolences on the mining disaster.  End Summary 
2.  (C)  Visitors:  In a March 23 meeting, the Ambassador 
briefed Kislyak on the status of the visit of Secretary 
Gutierrez (April 2-4); Duma International Relations Committee 
Chairman Kosachev's travel to Washington and mid-May meeting 
with Chairman Lantos, followed by a June 21 delegation visit 
with the House International Relations Committee; the 
dispatch of a Reliable Replacement Warhead briefing team, 
pending GOR dates; possibility of a SecDef visit later in the 
year in response to Russia's invitation; and the efforts to 
arrange for a near-term visit by Under Secretary of Defense 
Edelman, to discuss a wide range of security issues, 
including missile defense, which was delayed due to the 
transfer of his counterpart, General Mazurkevich. 
3.  (C)  MD Consultations not sufficient:  Kislyak confirmed 
Mazurkevich's departure, and said the GOR would need more 
time before it could respond to the Edelman offer.  At issue 
was the GOR's conviction that a wider discussion, and not 
just another briefing on missile defense deployment areas or 
conventional warheads, was required.  Instead, the GOR was 
preoccupied by the "whole spectrum" of issues, which needed 
to be taken up together.  While the US maintained that ABM 
was not anti-Russian, the GOR had its own graphs, and its own 
trajectories and assessments.  If Russia sought to pursue the 
stated US goals, it would deploy differently; therefore, it 
concluded that decisions to base in the Czech Republic and 
Poland had a strong political flavor.  That led the GOR to 
develop a theory behind the US strategy, which pieced 
together the Alaska deployment, the new generation 
interceptors, and the silos in question, as well as 
intentions to expand the US program into the Caucasus and the 
UK, and throughout the world through the Aegis.  The GOR 
concerns were not about two sites, but about ultimate US 
4.  (C)  High-level strategic dialogue required:  Stressing 
again that US briefings were not convincing, Kislyak argued 
for "something higher," a dialogue that would include Chief 
of Staff Baluyevskiy, other agency representatives and 
himself.  The Ambassador responded that the US had its own 
issues to raise, including Russian threats to walk away from 
the INF, and said he would convey the MFA's views on the need 
to elevate the structure, which echoed remarks that Security 
Council Secretary Igor Ivanov had made to NSA Hadley. 
5.  (C)  Preparing for Bilateral at June G8 Summit:  Kislyak 
stressed that positive developments in the bilateral 
relationship could set the stage for a presidential 
announcement in June, patterned on Bratislava.  The building 
blocks were the Presidents' commitment to the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership, an initialing of a "123" agreement, the 
deepening of the Antonov/DeSutter dialogue on the post-Start 
stewardship of nuclear weapons, progress in WTO, and the 
success of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 
 Kislyak noted that a high-level strategic dialogue could 
also help generate the focus needed to keep the initiatives 
on track for the Presidents to review in June.  The 
Ambassador agreed that progress was being made in strategic 
areas, and reviewed next steps on "123" and anti-dumping 
negotiations.  Kislyak added that a visit by the Secretary in 
advance of the June summit, in addition to a new, high-level 
security dialogue, would help define a positive agenda. 
6.  (C)  Unofficial dialogue structures:  The Ambassador 
pointed to progress by Carnegie and GOR Human Rights 
Ombudsman Lukin to initiate an unofficial human rights 
dialogue, and the on-going discussions by former Secretary of 
State Kissinger and former Prime Minister Pri
makov to create 
a "wise men" group on US-Russian relations, as positive steps 
MOSCOW 00001305  002 OF 002 
in focusing attention on the bilateral relationship.  Kislyak 
agreed, noting that the GOR was very supportive and pleased 
by the caliber of US members being discussed for this group, 
expected that a first meeting could take place in Russia by 
the beginning of May. 
7.  (C)  Iran:  Kislyak reviewed the last impediments to 
finalizing the second sanctions package against Iran, arguing 
that a proposed amendment sought by Indonesia and the one-day 
delay needed by the South Africans were a reasonable price to 
pay for a unanimous resolution.  Kislyak underscored that the 
GOR was satisfied both with the text and the statement.  The 
Ambassador stressed the value of getting the resolution 
passed this weekend, and expressed appreciation for the 
spirit in which the negotiations were concluded, and noted 
that it remained to be seen how Iran would react.  Kislyak 
noted that the Iranians were focused on a "new meeting," but 
had declined to elaborate, perhaps because it was linked to 
Ahmedinejad's visit to New York, which was still unconfirmed. 
 Kislyak noted that he had raised the freeze-for-freeze 
proposal and briefed on the scope of the upcoming UNSC 
statement with the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, but heard 
nothing new in response. 
8.  (C)  OSCE HOM Lou O'Neill:  The Ambassador raised the 
unusual and unwelcome public focus by the GOR on O'Neill, in 
the wake of what appeared to be an innocent customs 
violation.  Noting that the U.S. did not have detailed 
information on what violations were being alleged, the 
Ambassador expressed concern over the public campaign, and 
the prospect that this would be transformed into a bilateral 
issue.  The Ambassador made clear that O'Neill enjoyed the 
full support of the U.S., and that it was essential that 
Moscow stop creating impediments to O'Neill doing his job. 
The Ambassador underscored that this type of campaign served 
no one's interests, including Moscow,s.  Kislyak responded 
that legal issues were involved, and that this may be a 
criminal offense under Russian law.  While O'Neill was an 
international civil servant, he did not enjoy diplomatic 
immunity in Russia.  Kislyak said he was pleased that the 
authorities had allowed O'Neill to leave, but "law 
enforcement has its own views."  The GOR needed to "digest 
the implications" and was waiting for a legal analysis of 
O'Neill's case.  Kislyak said O'Neill should have known that 
such historical collections could not be removed from Russia. 
9.  (C)  Kuznetsov:  Kislyak, noting Lavrov's recent letter 
to the Secretary and conversation about the status of the 
Russian diplomat convicted in the oil-for-food investigation, 
renewed GOR criticism over the revocation of Kuznetsov's 
immunity, the impartiality of the judicial process, and the 
GOR's conviction that the Department could have resolved the 
case before the trial.  The Ambassador stressed that, in the 
wake of the verdict, it was too late to second-guess the 
process and the GOR should consider next steps in light of 
the sentencing expected by the end of June.  Kislyak 
reiterated the sensitivity of this case to the GOR. 
10.  (C)  Condolence letter:  The Ambassador delivered the 
Secretary's letter of condolence on the mining accident in 
Ulyanovskaya, which Kislyak expressed appreciation for and 
undertook to pass directly to FM Lavrov. 


Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: