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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1579 2007-04-09 14:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #1579/01 0991442
P 091442Z APR 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001579 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reason:  1.4 (b, d) 
1. (C) EUR DAS David Kramer held talks on 
Transnistria/Moldova in Moscow April 6 at the MFA with DFM 
Grigoriy Karasin, Ambassador-at-Large Valeriy Kenyaikin, 
Ambassador-at-Large Valeriy Nesterushkin; at the Security 
Council with Andrey Kuzin; and at the Duma with Andrey 
Kokoshin.  Kramer stressed to all interlocutors that the 
Transnistria conflict is an area in which the U.S. and Russia 
can cooperate to achieve a resumption of negotiations in the 
5 plus 2 format on the basis of the Moldovan draft.  He 
called for international pressure on Transnistria to 
negotiate in good faith.  He said that internationalizing the 
peacekeeping force would also help lead to U.S. ratification 
of the adapted CFE Treaty.  Kramer's Russian interlocutors 
stressed the need for direct talks between Moldovan President 
Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov as equal parties to 
the negotiations.   Only when those two came to an agreement 
should the international community get involved.  The 
Russians considered Kosovo to be an inevitable precedent. 
They were willing to think about internationalization of the 
PKF, but only as a result of the peace process.  End Summary. 
2. (C) EUR DAS Kramer met on April 6 with Ambassador-at-Large 
for the Transnistria conflict Nesterushkin and with 
Kenyaikin, who supervises the Ambassadors-at-Large for all 
the frozen conflicts.  The meeting was later joined on the 
Russian side by DFM Karasin and on the U.S. side by 
Ambassador Burns. 
3. (C) Kramer led off by recalling that Karasin had called 
Transnistria a conflict that the U.S. and Russia can work 
together to resolve, recognizing the interests of other 
parties as well.  The meetings in the 5 plus 2 and 3 plus 2 
formats have not been productive.  We need to revive the 
process, using as a basis the plan that Moldovan negotiators 
Sova and Tkaciuk have presented to the Russians, which has 
Voronin's support.  Working together, Russia and the U.S. can 
induce the international community to pressure Transnistria, 
whose leaders are satisfied with the status quo.  Russia and 
the U.S. can also work to internationalize the PKF; in 
addition to its influence on the conflict, this (along with 
withdrawal of munitions from Colbasna and agreement on the 
Gudauta base in Georgia) could also lead to U.S. ratification 
of the Adapted CFE Treaty. 
4. (C) Kenyaikin started his reply by saying that the 
treatment of Kosovo would be an inevitable precedent for 
Transnistria and other frozen conflicts.  Two elements of 
Kosovo are applicable to the other conflicts.  First, no one 
gave the international community the right to violate the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia without the 
latter's agreement.  Second, a solution to the Kosovo 
conflict can only be achieved through negotiation.  Kenyaikin 
clarified that Russia's recognition that Kosovo will be a 
precedent does not mean that Russia favors a particular 
result to the peace process. 
5. (C) Kenyaikin stated that an agreement must be worked out 
between the parties, on the basis that both are equal 
negotiating partners; and then taken up in the 5 plus 2 
process.  The Moldovan view is opposite:  that the two 
parties are Moldova and the international community; that 
these two must come to an agreement; and that the 
international community must impose this agreement on 
Transnistria.  Russia does not share that approach.  With 
regard to the PKF, Kenyaikin said Russia is willing to 
discuss internationalization, but as a result of political 
agreement, not at the beginning of the process. 
Internationalization first would not be acceptable to 
Transnistria, which sees the Russian PKF as guarantor of the 
6. (C) In reply, Kramer outlined the U.S. position on why 
Kosovo is not a precedent.  In the case of Transnistria, he 
said, Kosovo is only the latest in a long line of excuses for 
the lack of progress.  Kramer said Voronin will not meet with 
Smirnov, and the history of the negotiations makes that 
attitude understandable.  With regard to internationalizing 
the PKF, obviously that needs to be part of and in parallel 
with the peace process, not a separate decision. 
7. (C) When Karasin joined the meeting, he repeated many of 
Kenyaikin's positions.  He stressed the need for a common 
document which the two sides could agree would be the basis 
for negotiations.  Kramer responded that the Moldovan package 
MOSCOW 00001579  002 OF 002 
provided the basis for discussions.  He also noted that the 
Transnistrians seem to have no interest in moving forward. 
Karasin agreed that this may have been the case two years 
ago, but now the Transnistrians are very unhappy with the 
status quo.  There needs to be a dialogue between the 
parties, and it is not clear who on the Moldovan side, below 
the level of Vo
ronin, has a clear mandate to engage in such 
Security Council 
8. (C) At the Security Council, Kramer made the same points, 
and Kuzin's response was almost identical to the MFA's.  He 
noted that Russia has good relations with both the Moldovans 
and the Transnistrians, and urged the U.S. to widen its 
direct contacts with the Transnistrian de facto authorities. 
He believed internationalizing the PKF should not be a first 
step, but part of a long process of dialogue and CBMs. 
Moscow does not dream of a permanent military presence, and 
has never rejected the Istanbul commitments, burdensome as 
they are.  Economic CBMs should take precedence, including 
"freeing Transnistria from the measures taken by Ukraine" 
(i.e., the Customs regime). 
9. (C) Kramer thanked Kuzin for raising the Istanbul 
commitments, and repeated that internationalizing the PKF 
could help lead to U.S. ratification of the Adapted CFE. 
With regard to widening U.S. contacts, in recent days the 
Transnistrian de facto authorities have barred U.S. diplomats 
from Embassy Chisinau from entering Transnistria.  Kramer 
reiterated that the Transnistrians seem to have no interest 
in progress to resolve the conflict.  Internationalizing the 
PKF would signal the international community's commitment not 
to accept that the status quo is permanent. 
10. (C) Kokoshin listened to Kramer's presentation and said 
there was "some logic" in what Kramer had to say.  He 
promised to think about the issue and to be prepared to 
discuss it further when Kramer returns to Russia. 
11. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this message. 


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