WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW1809.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1809 2007-04-19 13:14 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #1809/01 1091314
O 191314Z APR 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001809 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 
REF: A. MOSCOW 1478 
     B. MOSCOW 1552 
Classified By: Pol/Min Alice G. Wells.  Reasons: 1,4(B/D). 
1.  (C) Since the early-April start of the Ukrainian 
government crisis, the GOR has consistently maintained that 
it is an internal Ukrainian affair and not amenable to 
Russia's overt involvement.  The Ukrainian FM Yatsenyuk's 
April 16 visit was portrayed as "business as usual," during 
which the two countries agreed on a roadmap for bilateral 
relations over the next two years.  Except for sharp 
criticism leveled against Yulia Tymoshenko's recent articles 
about containing Russia, the GOR continued its wait-and-see 
policy.  Both official and expert circles hope for compromise 
or a return to the status quo as the most positive outcome to 
the current impasse.  End summary. 
Waiting for Compromise 
2.  (C)  Victor Sorokin, Director of the MFA Second CIS 
Department (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova), told us that 
Russia was not pleased with the continuing political crisis 
in Ukraine but confirmed that the bilateral relationship had 
not so far been affected.  He added that neither Yushchenko 
nor Yanukovich had requested Russia's assistance.  Sorokin 
emphasized what we have heard repeatedly:  that the current 
crisis stems from the 2004 divide, which had not been 
properly mended.  He thought that any attempt to patch up the 
problem hurriedly -- such as "illegitimate" early elections 
-- would only lead to problems re-surfacing later.  The 
recent visit by a group of Russian Duma members to Kyiv "was 
a private visit" by the group.  Sorokin welcomed the start of 
the Constitutional Court's hearings and the willingness of 
both parties to honor the Court's decision. 
Meeting and Greeting the New FM 
3.  (C) Sorokin said that FM Yatsenyuk did not seem to be 
tied to any particular faction in Ukraine.  Sorokin saw 
Yatsenyuk as a pragmatist, who had the ability to listen.  In 
"business as usual" discussions, Lavrov and Yatsenyuk 
reviewed the full range of bilateral issues and agreed to 
meet again in June in Moscow.  Myroslava Shcherbatyuk, 
Political Counselor at the Ukrainian Embassy, told us that 
the significance of the otherwise routine visit was that 
initial contact between Yatsenyuk and his counterpart had 
been established.  According to her, the visit was a positive 
and "necessary step" forward.  Both Sorokin and Shcherbatyuk 
said that a roadmap for the next two years is ready for the 
two presidents to sign, and Sorokin hinted at the possibility 
of a June summit. 
"Whomever" Wrote Tymosheko's Articles . . . 
4.  (C) Sorokin said he did not believe for a second that 
Tymoshenko had authored the Foreign Affairs and International 
Herald Tribune articles regarding Ukraine and Russia.  On 
April 17, the MFA website carried a long rebuttal to 
Tymoshenko's Foreign Affairs article, accusing the author of 
attempting to re-draw dividing lines in Europe and 
resurrecting the Cold War.  Sorokin claimed that the MFA's 
charges were directed at the "force" behind these articles, 
"which is trying to marginalize Russia and re-create the 
unipolar world."  He argued that as an experienced 
politician, Tymoshenko should understand the need for 
balance.  The Yushchenko-Yanukovich equilibrium was better 
when Tymoshenko was not added to the equation. 
Experts: Moscow Will Lay Low 
5.  (C) Moscow's Ukraine experts have argued that Russia was 
right to be concerned about political turmoil in a 
neighboring state, but have advocated it take a far less 
emotional approach than it did in 2004.  Dmitriy Furman, a 
scholar at the Academy of Science's Center for Europe, 
repeated claims that the GOR was calmer this time around 
because of lessons learned in 2004 about the costs of overt 
involvement and by its disappointment with Yanukovich. 
According to Furman, the 2004 event was painful because 
MOSCOW 00001809  002 OF 002 
Russia understood it could no longer control Ukraine. 
Yanukovich's readiness for Euro-Atlantic integration (if not 
NATO membership) deeply disenchanted many Russian officials. 
He believed that the Orange Revolution was a great historical 
event, which Russia had good reason to fear because of its 
potential to become an example for other ex-Soviet countries. 
6.  (C) Furman maintained that Ukraine's political trajectory 
was likely to be quite different from Russia's.  If Russia 
had a strong center with weaker regions, Ukraine historically 
tends to foster strong regions with a weaker center.  The two 
countries are like siblings raised in different homes; they 
seemingly have much in common but in reality their political 
cultures were very different.  Furman
 thought Ukraine's 
Cossack roots meant it would prefer a "free-spirited" 
democracy, which "naturally breeds chaos."  To Furman, 
Ukraine will be always be more democratic than Russia but it 
may also have more confusion and disorder.  Unlike the 
Russians, he posited, Ukrainians will find ways to co-exist 
without annihilating opposing forces. 
7.  (C) Even at the semi-governmental CIS Institute, whose 
Director, Konstantin Zatulin, is a United Russia Duma member, 
experts agreed that Russia should stand aside.  Kiril Frolov, 
a Ukraine expert at the Institute, claimed that both 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were nationalists, not democrats, 
and that the Orange Revolution was nothing but an attempt to 
break Ukraine away from Russia. "Moral solidarity" with 
Yanukovich, however, was Russia's only option, Frolov 
thought, given the failures in 2004. 
8.  (C)  Wait-and-see adequately characterizes Russia's 
approach to this latest crisis.  The business-like meetings 
between Lavrov and Yatsenyuk underline that while Moscow is 
concerned about political turmoil in its southern neighbor, 
there are not many openings for its active involvement.  In 
the meantime, Russia wants to make sure that the elaborate 
consultative machinery that governs bilateral ties continues 
to grind on.  Any major decisions, of course, will need to be 
postponed until the dust settles in Kyiv. 


Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: