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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW2205 2007-05-14 03:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #2205/01 1340319
O 140319Z MAY 07

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002205 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons 1,4 (B/D). 
1.  (C) Summary.  In a May 10 meeting with the Ambassador, 
DFM Losyukov promised "no surprises" at the Bishkek Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization summit--no membership enlargement, 
nor any demand for U.S. base withdrawal from the region.  He 
predicted an SCO proposal for engagement in Afghanistan, and 
said a Russian decision to forgive  Afghanistan's debt will 
require a few more months.  Losyukov expressed displeasure 
with the Six-Party Talks' slow progress and the U.S. 
"negotiating style."  He suggested a more transparency and 
parity in the process.  Losyukov reported little progress in 
the Russia-Japan territorial issues, but noted more congenial 
tone in the two foreign ministers' May 3 meeting.  He 
previewed his travel to Iran next week and said that he did 
not plan to engage in nuclear issues.  End summary. 
2.  (C) In a May 10 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov 
assured the Ambassador that enlargement would not be on the 
agenda at the August Bishkek SCO summit.  Although the 
organization should remain open to further expansion, the GOR 
is "not enthusiastic" about enlargement at this point. 
Losyukov assured the Ambassador that nothing on the order of 
the surprise 2005 summit statement calling for the closure of 
U.S. bases in Central Asia was on the agenda this time 
around.  The GOR hopes to energize the organization when it 
takes over the chairmanship in 2009.  Despite some concern 
about political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, the summit will 
proceed in Bishkek as planned. 
3.  (C) DFM Losyukov said that Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) members are concerned with the 
deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and are likely to 
propose SCO engagement during the Bishkek summit.  The 
Ambassador emphasized the need for more U.S.- Russia 
cooperation in Afghanistan, particularly in counter-narcotics 
efforts.  Losyukov agreed on the need for more U.S.-Russia 
cooperation, but noted that coalition countries had failed to 
create stability in Afghanistan and it was now time for other 
countries, such as Russia, China and India, to get involved. 
He thought that instability in Afghanistan would have a 
direct impact on Central Asia and, ultimately, Russia.  The 
GOR understands the Afghan leadership's close relationship 
with the U.S. but there are other potentially useful forces, 
he said. 
4.  (C) Losyukov noted, as a hopeful sign, that Afghanistan 
is on the agenda at a series of high-level meetings --the 
June G8 summit and the early-July Italian Ministerial, and 
promised to urge FM Lavrov's participation in the latter to 
which, the Ambassador noted, the Secretary is already 
committed.  The Ambassador urged Russia to move forward on 
the Afghan debt forgiveness, and to encourage more Russian 
economic and commercial engagement in Afghanistan.  Losyukov 
understood that the debt issue was an impediment to Russian 
businesses in Afghanistan and complained of the deliberate 
pace of the Finance Ministry.  He thought debt forgiveness 
would be resolved in "a few more months." 
Six-Party Talks 
5.  (C) Losyukov told the Ambassador that the GOR is waiting 
for the resolution of the financial dispute between the U.S. 
and North Korea.  He was personally irritated by the lack of 
full cooperation among the Six-Party countries and the lack 
of parity among the members.  He was unhappy with the U.S.'s 
negotiating style, which he characterized as dealing only 
with North Korea, until the U.S. hits a roadblock, then 
appealing for help to Russia.  The GOR was particularly 
displeased to learn from the North Koreans about secret 
bilateral contacts, not from the U.S. The GOR cannot 
cooperate if it does not know what is going on, he said.  The 
Ambassador expressed displeasure at Losyukov's public 
criticism of the U.S., which he said does not exactly 
encourage closer coordination, Losyukov blamed the media.  He 
alleged that even the Chinese who, according to him, had been 
always more enthusiastic than their Russian counterparts, 
have begun to sound a note of disappointment with the 
negotiations. According to Losyukov, one or two Russian banks 
are willing to be a conduit for the "tainted" money, but the 
GOR has warned them not to get involved without a U.S. 
guarantee of no future retaliation. 
MOSCOW 00002205  002 OF 002 
6.  (C) The GOR agrees with China that if the current 
financial dispute is resolved, Six-Party participating 
countries should give North Korea a chance to meet its 
obligations instead of convening another round right away. 
In the same vein, a Ministers' meeting should be called only 
after the North has fulfilled its
February 13 obligations in 
order to avoid a "pointless" meeting where the ministers 
would try to solve the same problems that have dogged the 
plenary sessions. 
7.  (C) According to Losyukov, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Aso's May 3 visit was too brief to produce substantive 
results.  There was no meeting with President Putin and only 
a short session with Foreign Minister Lavrov.  The only 
notable change was the tension-free, friendly tone between 
the two foreign ministers.  Losyukov termed the 
Russo-Japanese relationship "good," although colored, as 
always, by the territorial issue.  He thought that the public 
mood in both countries, not conducive to a swift resolution, 
would only prolong the issue.  Prime Minister Abe, whom the 
GOR considers more reasonable than his predecessor Koisumi, 
is scheduled to meet with President Putin on the margins of 
the June G8 Summit. 
8.  (C) Losyukov is scheduled to visit Iran May 13 - 16.  He 
told the Ambassador he would not discuss the nuclear issue, 
which is DFM Kislyak's purview.  The trip would be largely to 
"test the mood" in Teheran on Russian-Iranian bilateral 


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