07MOSCOW2437, IRAN AND DPRK: IMPLEMENTING UN SANCTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW2437 2007-05-24 14:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2437 1441407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241407Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0574
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC UNSC IR KN RS
SUBJECT: IRAN AND DPRK:  IMPLEMENTING UN SANCTIONS 
RESOLUTIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 67462 
     B. MOSCOW 1535 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons:  1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C)  We discussed Russia's implementation of UNSCR 1737 
and 1747 on May 24 with Vladimir Safronkov, Chief of the 
MFA's UN Political Affairs Section.  Drawing from ref A, we 
urged that Russia take a broad definition of OP 5 of UNSCR 
1747 regarding "arms and related materiel."  Safronkov noted 
that the presidential decree implementing UNSCR 1737 and 1747 
was still being considered in the GOR interagency, but noted 
that the definition of arms provided by the Wassenaar 
Arrangement Munitions List was a useful interpretive device. 
He said Moscow agreed that Iranian participation in arms 
fairs or trade shows to promote Iranian arms sales was 
inconsistent with UNSCR 1747. 
 
2.  (C) Turning to the status of decrees implementing the 
DPRK and Iran sanctions resolutions, Safronkov said that the 
DPRK sanctions decree had made it through the interagency and 
was heading to the President's desk for signature "very 
soon."  The Iran sanctions decree remained stuck in the 
interagency because of differences between the MFA and the 
Finance Ministry and Central Bank over language regarding 
asset freezes of proliferators.  Safronkov explained that the 
draft DPRK sanctions decree included a "conceptual 
instruction" to the Russian interagency to resolve the 
proliferation financing issue quickly.  He thought that the 
language from the DPRK sanctions decree might be incorporated 
in the Iran sanctions decree, but conceded that the Finance 
Ministry had not signed off on this compromise.  The 
financial agencies remained concerned about enforcement 
procedures under Russian law and the legal implications for 
Russian banks and companies doing business with Iran. 
 
3.  (C)  Noting that this was a "delicate" issue, Safronkov 
said that consultations between representatives of the U.S. 
Treasury Department and the Russian Federal Financial 
Monitoring Service and Central Bank on proliferation finance 
had been useful in clarifying the challenges posed by the 
proliferation finance issues.  He hoped these exchanges would 
continue because it helped focus GOR attention on the issue 
and could encourage the financial agencies to move forward in 
ways that helped Russia meet the obligations of the DPRK and 
Iran sanctions resolutions. 
BURNS

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