07MOSCOW3979, DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAMS: GOR REACTION TO NON-PAPER

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW3979.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW3979 2007-08-14 16:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9938
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #3979 2261646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141646Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2919
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0497

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 
TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS CH JP RS
SUBJECT: DPRK NUCLEAR PROGRAMS: GOR REACTION TO NON-PAPER 
 
REF: STATE 105500 
 
Classified By: A/POL Colin Cleary.  Reasons 1.4(B/D) 
 
1.  (C) Grigoriy Berdennikov, the GOR's representative to the 
Six-Party First Working Group -- Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula -- told us that the GOR, in principle, 
agrees with reftel non-paper.  However, Berdennikov 
underlined that the paper should serve not as the starting 
point, but as the end product of the Working Group (WG)'s 
long negotiations.  Berdennikov, who spent seven years in 
Vienna as the GOR's envoy to the IAEA and UN, predicted that 
if the paper were presented at the WG meeting in Shenyang, 
August 16-17, "the show would stop immediately." 
 
2.  (C) At the July Beijing Plenary, the DPRK chief 
negotiator for the Six-Party Talks rejected a proposal that 
the North be obliged to declare all nuclear weapon programs 
as part of the February 13 agreement.  According to 
Berdennikov, a demand for the immediate and complete 
transparency on all programs would be unrealistic.  The GOR's 
position is a stage-by-stage approach covering simple to more 
"intrusive" areas. 
 
3.  (C) Berdennikov noted that the August 16-17 session will 
be, in fact, the first with any substance.  He recalled that, 
with the Six-Party process stalemated and the DPRK refusing 
to discuss its nuclear programs, the first WG session in 
Beijing in February had "amounted to nothing."  For this 
reason, Berdennikov thought, nobody knows how the session 
should progress.  He noted that the U.S. paper was the only 
document that the GOR received on the WG. 
 
4.  (C) According to Berdennikov, the WG session should try 
to build on the momentum created by a series of "good events" 
-- including the IAEA team's visit to the North, the closure 
of the five DPRK nuclear facilities and the imminent 
South-North Korean summit.  For this session, the GOR hopes 
to achieve an agreement on "what needs to be declared," and 
some level of understanding on "disablement."  He noted that 
the "strategic ambiguity" introduced by the new term, 
"disablement," rather than the conventional "dismantlement," 
may give the North more bargaining room.  "Irreversible" 
disablement, he said, will predictably lead to the North's 
demand for a light water reactor. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

Advertisements
Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: