07MOSCOW4118, U.S. NON-PAPER ON CFE DELIVERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4118 2007-08-22 15:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0035
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4118/01 2341516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221516Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3148
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/17 
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO OSCE RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON CFE DELIVERED 
 
REF: (A) STATE 116196 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  Russian MFA Officials expressed appreciation 
for the non-paper (timeline) on Adapted CFE ratification and 
fulfilling the Istanbul commitments (reftel), and agreed to 
review it carefully and prepare a response for the September 
11 meeting between EUR A/S Fried and DFM Kislyak.  They noted 
their desire to continue consultations to resolve the 
differences over A/CFE.  Russian CFE negotiator Vadim 
Solomenko, however, reiterated that the Istanbul commitments 
were not directly related to the A/CFE and flank restrictions 
were unacceptable, argued that inspection and transfer of 
Gudauta to Georgia would be impossible to achieve due to 
Abkhazian opposition, and suggested NATO actions lacked 
specificity.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) PolMinCouns delivered ref A demarche and non-paper on 
August 22 to Andrei Vorobiev, Principal Counsellor in the 
Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs of the MFA, 
and Vadim Solomenko, Russian Arms Control Advisor and 
long-time CFE negotiator.  PolMinCouns went through reftel 
points, stressing that we shared Russia's desire to see the 
A/CFE Treaty enter into force, and that the non-paper was a 
serious effort to move the process forward jointly and to 
achieve Russia's fulfillment of its remaining Istanbul 
commitments and ratification of A/CFE by NATO Allies.  She 
emphasized that the timeline envisioned meeting Russia's 
desire for the Treaty to come into force by summer 2008.  She 
added that we had begun consultations with NATO allies on the 
details of the plan, including with the Baltic States and 
Slovenia.  Using reftel points, PolMinCouns also responded to 
DFM Kislyak's four additional issues raised during the July 
31 meeting between DFM Kislyak and A/S Fried in Washington. 
 
3. (C) Vorobiev said the non-paper appeared to develop and 
even go beyond the ideas discussed in Washington.  He said 
the GOR would study the proposal carefully and discuss it 
with other Russian government agencies and prepare a response 
for the September 11 meeting.  He asked whether we envisioned 
holding a meeting at the Director level before then.  He said 
that Russia had not yet consulted with other Treaty members, 
but would begin to do so at the beginning of September. 
 
4. (C) Solomenko then offered his "initial" impressions of 
the non-paper.  He said that he immediately saw several weak 
points: 
 
-- First, the plan tried to connect the Istanbul commitments 
with the A/CFE treaty.  From Russia's perspective, the 
substance of Russia's commitments in Moldova and Georgia are 
not linked to the Treaty itself, including, for example, on 
the withdrawal of munitions from Moldova.  He reiterated that 
Russia's presence in Moldova was regulated by treaty, and a 
decision to remove peacekeepers would be a function of 
Moldovan-Transnistrian relations. 
 
-- Second, even if a fact-finding team were to go to Gudauta 
and confirm the absence of Russian forces, the Georgians 
would not accept the conclusions of the team, because the 
Abkhazians would not permit the GoG to participate in the 
fact-finding team, and there was no mechanism to effect a 
"formal transfer" of the facility to Georgian authorities. 
 
-- Third, Solomenko criticized the lack of specificity with 
respect to NATO actions, asking how many NATO Allies would be 
willing to start the ratification process?  When would the US 
ratification process begin?  He suggested NATO could agree to 
a new mechanism enabling all NATO members to decide 
individually when to begin the ratification process. 
 
-- Fourth, Solomenko raised GOR opposition to the flank 
restrictions, but did not argue the point that western allies 
were receptive to addressing specific GOR concerns after 
A/CFE came into force. 
 
Finally, Solomenko said that the non-paper seemed not to 
include any of the proposals Russia had outlined at the 
Extraordinary Conference in June, and noted some members' 
interest in holding another Extraordinary Conference before 
the end of the year.  He acknowledged, however, that the GOR 
would study the proposals carefully.  Vorobiev added that the 
GOR was in favor of continuing consultations and seeking a 
way forward. 
 
5. (C) PolMinCouns reiterated that the non-paper was not an 
effort to revisit disagreements over the links between the 
Istanbul commitments and the A/CFE Treaty, but to move 
forward the process to find a solution.  The non-paper 
demonstrated a serious effort by Washington to resolve the 
differences between us and to achieve the entry into force of 
the A/CFE Treaty, as well as to respond to Kislyak's request 
for a fleshed-out proposal.  On the issue of Gudauta, she 
emphasized that the U.S. and Russia could play an important 
role in facilitating an acceptable solution (together with 
the Friends of the Secretary-General).  On ratification by 
Allies and the U.S., she underscored t
hat we continued to 
gather information on the individual ratification processes 
in CFE member states, but that some Allies would be able to 
ratify more quickly than others.  The U.S. specifically 
sought to provide the GOR, as suggested by Kislyak, with 
early evidence of NATO members' intent to ratify; at the same 
time, as specified in the Timeline, the U.S. would begin 
consultations with the Senate, which was the normal process 
for ratification of treaties. 
 
6. (C) Vorobiev undertook to pass the reftel package to 
Kislyak, who is currently on summer leave. 
Melville

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