Daily Archives: June 4, 2008

08MOSCOW1587, DFM BORODAVKIN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1587 2008-06-04 11:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0897
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1587/01 1561159
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041159Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8413
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 2048
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4393
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2483
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0527

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OREP CH PK TX RS AF
SUBJECT: DFM BORODAVKIN DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND 
CHINA WITH CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In a May 31 meeting, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Borodavkin was pleased Congressman Rohrabacher 
valued Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, but explained that 
Russia was disappointed in the response received so far to 
its offers of assistance.  Borodavkin and Rohrabacher agreed 
on the need to eradicate the Afghan drug trade that financed 
extremists, and discussed a potential project to rehabilitate 
a Soviet-constructed aqueduct system as a means to provide an 
agricultural alternative to growing poppies.  Borodavkin 
expressed concern over attempts to integrate the Taliban into 
local governments, arguing that this simply concealed the 
re-Talibanization of Afghanistan.  He cautioned against 
placing too much confidence in the ability of the new 
Pakistani government to deal with extremists and reiterated 
Russian concern that authorities maintain control of the 
nation's nuclear weapons.  Borodavkin disagreed with 
Rohrabacher's assessment of the threat China presented to 
Russia and said that the GOR sought closer ties with both 
China and the U.S.  Borodavkin questioned Turkmenistan's 
capacity to provide gas for the proposed Trans-Afghanistan 
Pipeline and expressed irritation at pipelines intended to 
avoid Russian territory at "any cost."  End summary. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a May 31 meeting with Congressman Rohrabacher and 
the Charge, DFM Borodavkin stated that Russia was willing to 
share with the U.S. and NATO its considerable experience in 
Afghanistan, presenting an opportunity for Russia-U.S. 
cooperation.  Borodavkin said, however, that the GOR was not 
always "satisfied" with the response given to its offers of 
assistance, particularly its proposal for the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to cooperate with NATO. 
He also cited NATO allies supplying Afghanistan with 
unlicensed, Russian-designed weapons as an irritant for 
Moscow.  Borodavkin stressed, however, that the GOR placed 
such importance upon stabilizing Afghanistan that it hoped to 
continue assistance efforts already undertaken.  He cited the 
GOR's willingness to forgive Afghanistan's $10 billion Soviet 
era debt, the provision of Russian military assistance worth 
$200 million in 2002-5, $30 million provided for humanitarian 
aid, and an upcoming $4 million donation to the World Bank 
trust fund for Afghan healthcare and education. 
 
3. (SBU) Rohrabacher explained that he supported increased 
U.S.-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan, and explained that he 
and other Members of Congress were examining the prospect of 
obtaining U.S. funding for rehabilitating Soviet-constructed 
aqueducts in Afghanistan, which were necessary to expand 
non-poppy agricultural production.  Rohrabacher suggested 
that the GOR lend its technical experience to help restore 
this crucial irrigation system.  This project could help draw 
Afghans away from the poppy trade and demonstrate to the 
world that Russians and Americans were involved in 
"reconstruction, not destruction."  Borodavkin said that the 
GOR would study the idea of a joint project to restore the 
aqueduct system, while noting that Russian firms were already 
involved in a handful of Afghan infrastructure projects. 
Concern for security was, however, the greatest hindrance to 
further Russian activity. 
 
4. (SBU) Borodavkin said that the GOR did not share 
Rohrabacher's favorable assessment of developments in 
Afghanistan, and reiterated Russian concern over local 
governments "merging" with the Taliban in an attempt to 
co-opt Talib supporters.  Borodavkin argued that this simply 
"concealed" the Taliban's return to power and more closely 
connected local governments with the narcotics traffickers 
financing Afghan insurgents.  Rohrabacher told Borodavkin of 
the plan he advocated to have the Afghan government and NATO 
combat poppy growing by "making deals" with local Afghan 
leaders who would agree to oversee a halt in poppy production 
in exchange for rebuilding local infrastructure.  If, after 
several years, the local leaders had failed, or were not 
willing, to halt poppy production, all poppy fields would be 
eradicated.  Borodavkin said the pressure felt by Afghan 
farmers to grow cost-efficient poppies over less lucrative 
crops required applying "law enforcement measures" as well as 
offering economic incentives.  The GOR hoped the June 12 
Paris Donors Conference would present an opportunity to 
convince the Afghan authorities to be "more resolute" in 
their anti-Taliban activities. 
 
Pakistan 
-------- 
 
MOSCOW 00001587  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Borodavkin cautioned Rohrabacher against being too 
optimistic about the change in government in Pakistan, 
explaining that the GOR saw the new Pakistani government's 
efforts to appease
extremists in the tribal areas as an 
"unfavorable development" that could hinder anti-Taliban 
efforts in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Borodavkin 
stressed Russia's concern that the Pakistani government 
retain control of the country's nuclear weapons.  He said 
that while Russia was not a "great supporter" of Musharraf's 
government, when a totalitarian regime is removed a period of 
instability often follows. 
 
China 
----- 
 
6. (SBU) Rohrabacher explained that international stability 
required closer U.S.-Russia cooperation, particularly given 
Chinese ambitions.  Borodavkin responded that Russia did not 
seek closer ties with the U.S. as an antidote to China, but 
benefited from closer ties with both countries.  He assured 
Rohrabacher that Russia continued to develop economically and 
would not fall behind the emergent China depicted by the 
Congressman. 
 
Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) In response to Rohrabacher's question about the 
proposed Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline that would carry gas from 
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, 
Borodavkin said in principle the GOR supported such efforts 
if the economic need existed and the countries involved had 
the means to provide the required resources.  He doubted, 
however, that Turkmenistan had the capacity to send gas 
through the proposed pipeline while also meeting existing 
obligations to provide gas to Russian companies.  Borodavkin 
also expressed Russia's pique over pipelines devised to avoid 
Russian territory at "any cost." 
 
8. (U) Congressman Rohrabacher did not have an opportunity to 
clear this cable. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1576, FEAR AND LOATHING IN THE RUSSIAN MORTGAGE MARKET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1576 2008-06-04 06:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0623
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1576/01 1560617
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040617Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8398
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4969
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2850
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3193
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001576 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EIND PGOV RS SOCI
SUBJECT: FEAR AND LOATHING IN THE RUSSIAN MORTGAGE MARKET 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 1536 
     B. MOSCOW 1501 
     C. MOSCOW 1450 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Continuing our series of cables on Russia's real 
estate sector, Econoffs met with Dmitri Galkin, Director of 
Mortgage Lending at BINBank, a leading retail lender. 
According to Galkin, although most Russians cannot yet afford 
mortgages, even those who can shy away from them out of fear 
of debt and financial naivet.  He expected demand for 
mortgages to rise in the near future as Russians became more 
sophisticated about financial services.  Without a 
corresponding increase in the supply of affordable housing, 
this could cause already rising prices to explode.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Mortgages Under-Utilized 
------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Galkin told us that BINBank provides a wide range of 
corporate and retail banking services.  Last year BINBank was 
recognized for its transparency by Standard & Poor's and as 
"the most dynamic bank of the year" by well-known Russian 
business journal "Company" for its expansion into Russia's 
regions.  The bank increased its outlets from 64 to 125 and 
has plans to further increase the number to 150-200 this 
year. 
 
3. (SBU) Galkin said BINBank also doubled its retail loan 
portfolio last year, with mortgages increasing from 21 to 30 
percent of all retail loans.  Despite the larger role 
mortgages play in the bank's portfolio, he said mortgages 
remained drastically under-utilized.  Only 7-8 percent of all 
apartment purchases last year were made with the help of 
mortgages.  Galkin said 25 percent of Russians could afford a 
mortgage, either on their own or with the help of 
co-borrowers.  This means many more Russians can afford a 
mortgage than are taking one.  However, it also means that 75 
percent of Russians still can not. 
 
4. (SBU) Galkin profiled his typical mortgage client as 
follows: 
 
-- Marital status: 50 percent single, 30 percent married, and 
20 percent married with children 
-- Average income: USD 2,000 per month 
-- Average purchase: USD 160,000 for a 538 square foot, 
one-bedroom apartment in Moscow's suburbs 
-- Down payment: 30 percent 
-- Allowable debt-to-income ratio: 50 percent 
-- Mortgage term: 15 years (BINBank's maximum) at 12.5-14.5 
percent interest (USD and ruble denominated, respectively) 
-- Additional fees: application fee (USD 20), property 
evaluation (USD 150)500), commission (1 percent of the 
loan), personal mortgage consultant (USD 300), bank safe 
rental (USD 85), realtor fees (5-7 percent of the purchase 
price), and insurance. 
 
-------------------------- 
Fear and Financial Navet 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Galkin said there are a number of obstacles in the 
housing sector that were to blame for the under-utilization 
of mortgages.  On the supply side, there is simply a lack of 
housing stock, especially affordable homes. (Ref. A, B) On 
the demand side, Galkin said the average homebuyer's fear and 
financial naivet prevented them from seeing a mortgage as a 
viable option. 
 
6. (U) Galkin said Russia's history with financial crises had 
caused a general distrust of the overall financial system. 
Russians not only needed time to regain this trust, but also 
to be educated -- or re-educated -- on the benefits financial 
services, and mortgages in particular, could provide. (Ref. C) 
 
7. (U) Galkin said this lack of understanding also explained 
a strange phenomenon in his bank's business.  Despite taking 
mortgages with a 20-year term on average, most of BINBank's 
 
MOSCOW 00001576  002 OF 002 
 
 
clients paid off their loan well before the term because they 
were afraid of having debt.  Galkin also blamed financial 
navet for the fact that clients living in Russia's regions 
preferred to borrow in rubles just because they were more 
"comfortable" with local currency, even though the rate is 4 
percent higher than for borrowing in USD.  (Comment: The rate 
difference is probably even more, considering the ruble's 
fast appreciation. End Comment.) 
 
------------------------ 
Supply Response Critical 
------------------------ 
 
8. (U) Galkin predicted that over the next ten years, 
Russians would become more educated on financial services and 
more comfortable with the idea of taking on long-term debt. 
However, he noted that while this was good in principle, once 
the country's pent-up mortgage demand was unlocked, it would 
only widen the mismatch of supply and demand for affordable 
housing.  The lack of housing stock would be amplified and 
prices would soar even higher.  Galkin warned that the 
picture would be grim if t
he government did not adopt 
concentrated measures to increase the housing supply. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1570, RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE REGARDING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1570 2008-06-04 03:47 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1570 1560347
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 040347Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8392
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001570 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2018 
TAGS: KACT START JCIC US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE REGARDING 
CONVERSION OF B-1 BOMBERS DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 59143 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
(S) On June 3 we delivered reftel diplomatic note to the MFA 
North America Desk. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
RUSSELL

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08MOSCOW1569, DEMARCHE DELIVERED: JUNE 2008 SECURITY COUNCIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1569 2008-06-04 03:47 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1569 1560347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040347Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8391
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0428

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001569 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC UN UNSC KWMN PHUM RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED:  JUNE 2008 SECURITY COUNCIL 
THEMATIC DEBATE AND DRAFT RESOLUTION ON "SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT" 
 
REF: STATE 59132 
 
We delivered reftel demarche on June 3 to MFA Senior 
Counselor for International Organizations Peter Ilichev, who 
offered no substantive comments. 
RUSSELL

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08MOSCOW1568, BLACK SEA FLEET STIRS CONTROVERSY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1568 2008-06-04 03:47 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0533
RR RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1568/01 1560347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040347Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8389
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001568 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
REF:  A. MOSCOW 1517 
       B. MOSCOW 1330 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: MARR MCAP PBTS PGOV PREL ECIN ETRD WTRO
SUBJECT: BLACK SEA FLEET STIRS CONTROVERSY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND 
UKRAINE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The dispute over the termination of Russia's 
Black Sea Fleet basing in Sevastopol by 2017 has only grown more 
intense since Russia celebrated the fleet's 225th anniversary on May 
12.  In response to Ukrainian President Yushchenko's order to draw 
up a draft law by July 20 to terminate all international agreements 
regarding the Black Sea Fleet's base, the Russian MFA asserted it 
was too early to consider the fleet's status, and predicted that the 
fleet would continue to be located in Ukraine, with Medvedev 
counseling Yushchenko against any hasty decision.  MFA negotiators 
argue that treaty language foresaw a "likely" extension of the 
lease, with experts stressing Russia's resistance to Sevastopol 
falling into NATO hands.  FM Lavrov accused the GOU of fanning 
populist flames to galvanize support for NATO accession, a move he 
said would have dire consequences.  Russian experts point to 
statements by Ukrainian officials potentially linking Sevastopol's 
status to Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession as a 
further irritant.  Mayor Luzhkov's recent comments questioning 
Crimea's Ukrainian status continue to reverberate, with the MFA 
announcing a tit-for-tat travel ban and a local newspaper falling 
victim to the Mayor's wrath.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Russia Presumes Right to Sevastopol... 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) On May 21, the MFA posted a response to Ukrainian President 
Yushchenko's May 20 decree ordering his cabinet to draft a law by 
July 20 that would terminate all international agreements on the 
presence of Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.  Citing the 1997 
Agreements on the Status and Conditions of Stationing the Black Sea 
Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine, the 
Parameters for Division of the Black Sea Fleet, and on Mutual 
Settlements Associated with the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and 
with the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Presence on the 
Territory of Ukraine, MFA officials pointed out that the Agreements 
provide for automatic five-year extensions past their 2017 
expiration unless one side notified the other in writing one year 
prior.  Thus, the MFA said the GOR presumed that the Black Sea Fleet 
would continue to be based in Ukraine in the future, and argued 
Russia and Ukraine should concentrate on practical issues to improve 
operations of the fleet.  These issues included housing, navigation 
support, citizenship of servicemen and their families, and others. 
MFA officials argued the Russian and Ukrainian presidents agreed to 
work on these issues when they signed the Russia-Ukraine Action Plan 
To 2009. 
 
3. (U) Lavrov and other GOR officials called Yushchenko's order 
premature and said it jeopardized trust between Russia and Ukraine. 
In press coverage, some GOR officials speculated that Ukraine's 
actions could endanger the ten-year Friendship and Cooperation 
Treaty between Russia and Ukraine, which came into force on April 1, 
1999.  On May 29 Medvedev called Yushchenko and stressed the 
importance of not taking unilateral decisions that run counter to 
previous treaty obligations. 
 
---------------------------- 
...Then Clarifies the Record 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (U) In an attempt to control the press speculation and clarify 
the MFA's May 21 statement, Ambassador at Large Vladimir Dorokhin in 
a press conference on May 29 pointed out the benefits the Black Sea 
Fleet brings to Sevastopol:  Russia pays about USD 98 million per 
year to rent the base, plus an additional USD 4 million in subsidies 
to the local government.  The base also provides about 25,000 jobs 
for local residents.  Dorokhin stressed that 20-year lease on the 
base at Sevastopol would be automatically renewed for another five 
years unless one side notified the other in writing.  This, 
according to Dorokhin, meant that the original agreement foresaw a 
"likely" further presence of the fleet in Ukraine.  He argued that 
it has never been a secret that the GOR would like to keep the Black 
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol for as long as possible. 
 
5. (U) Dorokhin acknowledged that, as a sovereign state, Ukraine had 
the right to conduct its own affairs, but argued that Russia should 
also have a voice in the matter.  He questioned the timing of 
Yushchenko's announcement, as well as the GOU's logic that it would 
take nine years for Russia to withdraw the Black Sea Fleet from 
Sevastopol.  He also said the GOR would not give up its interests in 
the Black Sea.  A recent opinion poll showed approximately 70 
percent of Russians support basing the Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol. 
 
-----
---------------------------------------- - 
 
MOSCOW 00001568  002 OF 002 
 
 
GOR Links Black Sea Fleet Issue To Ukraine MAP 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6. (SBU) At the BRIC Ministerial on May 16, FM Lavrov linked the 
GOU's demands to have the Black Sea Fleet leave Sevastopol by 2017 
to a possible NATO MAP offer to Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian 
authorities have been "whipping up emotions" as part of an effort to 
"artificially draw Ukraine into NATO."  Lavrov said the GOU was 
damaging Russia-Ukraine relations and acting against the will of the 
majority of Ukrainians.  He said this would have "destructive 
consequences," and Russia would do everything it could to prevent 
Ukrainian accession to NATO.  Other GOR officials have made similar 
statements, including Chair of the State Duma Committee on CIS 
Affairs Alexey Ostrovsky, who declared in April that Russia could 
reclaim Crimea if Ukraine was admitted to NATO.  Other GOR officials 
have speculated that Ukraine wants to conclude negotiations over the 
Black Sea Fleet early in order to make a NATO MAP offer easier to 
extend. 
 
7. (SBU) Russian experts tell us that the GOR remains concerned that 
Sevastopol could become a NATO base, despite provisions in Ukraine's 
constitution that prohibit foreign bases.  In the GOR's assessment, 
Ukrainian politics show that constitutions can be changed on a whim. 
 Some experts argue that the GOR would like to drag out negotiations 
over the Sevastopol base as long as possible in the hope that the 
next Ukrainian president might be more amenable to hosting the Black 
Sea Fleet on Ukrainian soil.  Experts maintain that the GOR does not 
want Sevastopol to become a central issue in its relationship with 
Ukraine, and so is in no hurry to commence negotiations on the 
fleet's withdrawal.  GOR officials reiterate that Russia would like 
to avoid the logistical and financial trouble of relocating the 
Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk (ref A). 
 
----------------------- 
WTO-Sevastopol Linkage? 
----------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Russian experts are concerned that Ukraine could use 
bilateral negotiations with Russia over WTO to introduce political 
linkage to Sevastopol.  Gaining wide press play in Russia was 
Supreme Rada member Andrey Paruby, of the pro-Yushchenko Our 
Ukraine-People's Self-Defense Bloc, statment that Ukraine can "block 
Russia's accession to the WTO until an agreement on the withdrawal 
of Russia's Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine is signed."  Ukraine was 
expected to participate in the Working Party multilateral 
negotiations and Russian trade negotiators have been prepared for a 
bilateral request. 
 
----------------- 
Luzhkov's Revenge 
----------------- 
 
9. (U) In retaliation for the GOU's May 12 announcement that Moscow 
Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov was no longer welcome in Ukraine following 
comments questioning Crimea's Ukrainian status (ref B), the Russian 
MFA announced on May 22 that it would impose entry restrictions on 
Ukrainian politicians who "damage the Russian Federation by action 
or word."  The MFA immediately banned Ukraine's First Deputy Prime 
Minister Evhen Kornichuk from entering Russia because of his 
suggestion that Putin should be declared persona non grata. 
"Considering what Evhen Kornichuk said in his public address, we 
assume that he will not be planning to visit the Russian 
Federation," said Andrey Nesterenko, a Foreign Ministry spokesman. 
 
10. (SBU) Domestically, Luzhkov has lashed out against the 
independent Nezavisimaya Gazeta for its critical coverage of his 
Sevastopol remarks, with Editor Konstantin Remchukov receiving a 
one-month eviction notice from the newspaper's city-owned premises. 
While Remchukov intends to fight the order, he noted that the 
Russian media have been muted in their analysis of Luzhkov's 
incendiary rhetoric, precisely because the mayor holds substantial 
levers with which to complicate their operations. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks