Daily Archives: June 5, 2008

08MOSCOW1607, DUMA RESOLUTION CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM BIG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1607 2008-06-05 14:54 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1607 1571454
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051454Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8438
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018 
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL RS
SUBJECT: DUMA RESOLUTION CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM BIG 
TREATY 
 
REF: MOSCOW 1517 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  On June 4, the State Duma adopted a 
nonbinding resolution calling for the GOR to withdraw from 
the "Big Treaty" with Ukraine, should a NATO MAP be extended 
to the GOU.  Prior to the vote, FM Lavrov said Ukraine's NATO 
accession would represent a "colossal geopolitical shift" 
that would threaten Russia's interests.  The vote was timed 
to exert maximum pressure:  just prior to a 
Medvedev-Yushchenko meeting in St. Petersburg and joint 
military maneuvers involving U.S., Ukrainian, and some NATO 
militaries.  Russian experts have speculated that withdrawing 
from the Big Treaty would give the GOR the right to challenge 
Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol.  End Summary. 
 
-------- 
The Vote 
-------- 
 
2. (U) In yet another chapter in the ongoing dispute over 
Ukraine's NATO aspirations, on June 4 the State Duma voted 
408-5 in favor of adopting a nonbinding resolution calling 
for Russia's withdrawal from the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Partnership ("Big Treaty") if Ukraine is 
offered NATO MAP or "takes other steps" to speed up NATO 
accession.  Prior to the vote, FM Lavrov told the Duma that 
every country has the right to pursue its own foreign policy, 
but "the acceptance into NATO of Ukraine and Georgia will 
mean a colossal geopolitical shift and we assess such steps 
from the point of view of our interests."  The vote came just 
days before Medvedev is to meet Yushchenko in St. Petersburg 
on the margins of the International Economic Forum, and one 
week before Ukraine is to participate in joint military 
maneuvers in Crimea with the U.S. and other NATO countries 
beginning June 12.  (Note:  These are not NATO exercises.) 
 
----------------------- 
Moscow Applies Pressure 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) The experts told us the Duma vote is another instance 
of the GOR using the body to issue tough resolutions 
regarding disputes with foreign countries.  According to 
Deputy Director of the Moscow-based CIS Institute Vladimir 
Zharikhin, it was important for Russia to send a message to 
Yushchenko that it does not approve of the GOU's plans to 
join NATO.  The GOR, he said, wanted to take an aggressive 
posture when Medvedev meets with Yushchenko.  The tactic may 
be working, he argued, as the Ukrainian Rada has delayed a 
vote that would allow foreign troops on its soil ahead of the 
upcoming joint military maneuvers.  Allowing NATO troops in 
Crimea at such a sensitive time would greatly upset the GOR, 
he said. 
 
--------------------- 
Possible Consequences 
--------------------- 
 
4. (C) Some experts speculate that withdrawing from the Big 
Treaty could open the door for Russia to mount a legal 
challenge to Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol.  Under 
the Big Treaty, the GOR recognized Sevastopol as part of 
Ukraine (reftel).  Zharikhin (as well as some GOR officials) 
argued, however, that Ukraine's decision to join NATO would 
violate Article 6 of the Treaty, which stipulated that 
neither party will take any action or join any organization 
that threatens the security of the other.  If Ukraine 
violated the Treaty by joining NATO, then Russia could 
possibly lay claim to Sevastopol, he argued. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
5. (C) The GOR has consistently used the Duma to raise the 
temperature of Russian-Georgian relations, particularly with 
respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  As Ukraine's 
aspirations for NATO have achieved a higher profile, the GOR 
has begun to devoted greater political resources to 
suggesting th

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1606, NONPAPER ON PROPOSED JDEC EXPERTS MEETING PASSED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1606 2008-06-05 14:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1606 1571444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051444Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8437
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001606 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: NONPAPER ON PROPOSED JDEC EXPERTS MEETING PASSED 
 
REF: STATE 59667 
 
(U) On June 5 we passed reftel nonpaper to First Secretary 
Alexey Ivanov of the MFA North America Desk, who said he 
would disseminate it to the appropriate MFA offices and the 
MOD.  He said he would let us know as soon as possible if the 
dates worked. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1605, GICNT MADRID MEETING: RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR INVITATIONS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1605 2008-06-05 14:18 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1605 1571418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051418Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8436
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0784

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001605 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/WMDT (ANDREW GRANT) 
     T (TIM KATSAPIS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KNNP PARM PREL KGIC RS
 
SUBJECT: GICNT MADRID MEETING: RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR INVITATIONS TO 
MAKE PRESENTATIONS 
 
REF:  State 57146 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1.  (SBU)  On June 4 we reviewed with Olga Kuznetsova, MFA 
Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs, actions (ref) to 
invite countries to make presentations at the June 16 - 18 GICNT 
Madrid conference.  Kuznetsova noted she had already discussed the 
approaches with Washington, and that Russian Embassies in Ankara, 
Valletta, Manama and Abu Dhabi, in coordination with U.S. Embassies 
in these countries, had already delivered the demarche.  She added, 
however, that Russian Embassies in the other countries listed reftel 
would not have time to deliver the message. 
 
2.  (SBU) Kuznetsova mentioned two related issues that she said she 
had also raised with the Department.  The first was a request for 
USG assistance to encourage Spain to provide Russia with the 
technical equipment necessary for interpretation during the Madrid 
meetings.  The GOS told the GOR that it had limited resources and 
could not support the request.  Kuznetsova added that the GOR was 
willing to pay the entire cost. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Kuznetsova also sought USG support for the GOR's request 
to the IAEA to send a Deputy Director General level attendee to 
Madrid.  The IAEA has an important role in countering nuclear 
terrorism and this level of observer would send a clear message to 
all GICNT partners. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1604, CODEL ROHRABACHER EXPLORES FUTURE PATHS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1604 2008-06-05 13:57 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2132 
OO RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG 
DE RUEHMO #1604/01 1571357 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
O 051357Z JUN 08 
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8434 
INFO RUEANAT/NASA WASHDC 
RUEHZN/EST COLLECTIVE 
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2854 
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3197

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001604 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/PRA, OES/SAT 
 
NASA FOR O'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TSPA PREL OREP RS
SUBJECT: CODEL ROHRABACHER EXPLORES FUTURE PATHS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN 
SPACE COOPERATION 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Congressman Dana Rohrabacher discussed potential 
areas of U.S.-Russian space cooperation with Russian officials in 
Moscow May 30 to June 2. The Russians were receptive to the 
Congressman's proposals for a joint mission to the Moon. Energiya 
Space Corporation President Vitaliy Lopota suggested a joint mission 
to Mars instead of the Moon, and Rohrabacher agreed to study the 
costs and risks of such an endeavor. Russian officials shared the 
Congressman's concerns about the need to establish an international 
partnership to track, detect and divert "Near-Earth Objects" such as 
meteorites, asteroids and comets, from collisions with the Earth. 
Russian officials also raised with the Congressman the draft 
Framework Technology Safeguards Agreement, the Sea Launch program, 
and the use of the Soyuz spacecraft for travel to the International 
Space Station. END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------- 
Planning a Moon Mission 
----------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher discussed U.S. plans to establish a 
manned base on the Moon in separate meetings with Energiya Space 
Corporation President Vitaliy Lopota and Sergey Shishkarev, Chairman 
of the Duma Transport Committee and head of the Parliamentary 
Working Group on Aviation and Space. Noting that Russia had been a 
reliable and trustworthy lead partner on the International Space 
Station (ISS), Rohrabacher invited Russia to join the United States 
in establishing a joint base on the Moon. While the United States 
and Russia should play the lead role, other governments, such as the 
EU, could also participate in such an endeavor. Rohrabacher warned 
that China had its own Moon ambitions that were not necessarily in 
either Russia's or the United States' interests. 
 
3. (SBU) Shishkarev agreed the United States and Russia should join 
forces for a Moon base, given the complexities of such an endeavor 
and the synergies that could be achieved by a meaningful 
partnership. Shishkarev noted that the partnership would need 
high-level political support on both sides to be successful. 
 
4. (SBU) Rather than a moon mission, Energiya President Lopota felt 
that the United States and Russia could more effectively work 
together on a joint manned mission to Mars. Lopota proposed 
establishing within the next 15 years a manned orbiting presence 
around the Red Planet and robotic exploration of the surface. In 
Lopota's view, a Mars mission would be a more significant step 
forward in space science and exploration than establishing a manned 
Moon presence. After a manned Mars orbiting presence was 
established, Lopota suggested that the United States and Russia 
could plan a mission to the Moon from Mars. 
 
5. (SBU) Rohrabacher stated that he would discuss a potential 
U.S.-Russian Moon partnership further with NASA Administrator 
Michael Griffin. He also said he would ask NASA to prepare a cost 
and risk assessment of a joint Mars mission and see how that 
cost-benefit analysis compared with a Moon mission. 
 
------------------ 
Near-Earth Objects 
------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) Rohrabacher proposed establishing an international 
partnership, led by the United States, Russia and possibly the EU, 
to detect and track "Near-Earth Objects" (e.g., asteroids, 
meteorites and comets), and to establish means for preventing 
collisions with the Earth. Both Lopota and Shishkarev welcomed such 
a partnership. Lopota shared the Congressman's concerns about the 
potentially devastating damage that such objects could inflict, 
noting the 1908 Tunguska comet impact in Siberia and the large 
asteroid that recently passed undetected between the Earth and Moon. 
The Russians also welcomed Rohrabacher's suggestions to work toward 
an international agreement on this subject and to hold an 
international conference in California, possibly on the margins of 
an already planned conference on space navigation at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena December 8-14, 2008. 
 
------------------------------- 
Technology Safeguards Agreement 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) During the meeting with Duma Deputy Shishkarev, Roscosmos 
Federal Space Agency International Department Deputy Director Sergey 
Rybkin passed a copy of the June 2007 draft Framework Technology 
Safeguards Agreement to Rohrabacher (FTSA). Rybkin noted that 
Roscosmos Director Anatoliy Perminov had discussed the FTSA with 
Rohrabacher on the margins of the Berlin Air Show on May 28. The 
Russians do not understand why the United States is proposing that 
the agreement only cover commercial, non-government spacecraft, 
launch vehicles and components. In Rybkin's view, the agreement's 
scope should be broad enough to cover the ISS and other government 
technology. Rohrabacher said he would loo
k into the question of the 
FTSA's coverage when he returned to Washington. 
 
-------------------- 
Soyuz and Sea Launch 
-------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Lopota briefed Rohrabacher on the safety and reliability of 
the Soyuz spacecraft for manned transport to and from the ISS. 
Lopota said the recent so-called "ballistic" return landings in 
Kazakhstan had been mischaracterized in the press. He noted that 
only four of the Soyuz's 122 flights had used a "ballistic" descent. 
Rohrabacher said his faith in the Soyuz's reliability had not been 
shaken, given the positive track record. Rohrabacher also discussed 
Sea Launch with Lopota and thanked Energiya for making the program a 
success. Rohrabcher invited Lopota to visit him during Lopota's 
next scheduled visit to Sea Launch's home port in Long Beach. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1599, PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV’S VISIT TO CHINA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1599 2008-06-05 11:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1950 
RR RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG 
DE RUEHMO #1599/01 1571119 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
R 051119Z JUN 08 
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8425 
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 001599 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP PGOV PINS PREL PROP
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO CHINA 
 
REF: Moscow 1430 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. President Medvedev's visit to China on May 23-24 
is seen as confirmation of Russia's desire to project a new foreign 
policy focus towards other major partners, such as China. At the 
same time, Putin's visit to Paris (septel) and Medvedev's upcoming 
trip to Berlin ensure that Russia maintains its traditional ties to 
the West, especially on economic and trade matters. In China, 
Medvedev and Hu Jintao issued a Joint Statement on International 
Policy (text at para 13), highlighting both countries' support for 
"a multi-polar world order and the non-interference in internal 
affairs" of other countries, and their agreement to strengthen 
cooperation on a wide-range of foreign policy issues, energy, and 
trade. The MFA highlighted energy as the most important issue of 
discussion, and noted that both countries shared similar concerns 
over global missile defense efforts. Experts saw the visit as more 
symbolic than substantive, designed to emphasize Russia's global 
reach. End summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
MFA Highlights Eastward Focus 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) At a briefing for the Diplomatic Corps on May 29, Evgeniy 
Timokhin, Deputy Director of the First Asia Department, stressed 
that Medvedev decided to visit China early, in order to expand the 
already strong links established under President Putin, and to 
confirm Russia's increasing focus on China as a foreign policy 
partner. According to Timokhin, Russia-China relations have 
undergone less a transformation than a "normal progression" in 
relations. The visit took place in the backdrop of the earthquake, 
which contributed to its "emotional" nature. The GOR offered China 
12 planes and 12 heavy helicopters' worth of humanitarian aid. 
 
3. (SBU) Timokhin stressed that Russia-China relations rest on 
security, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The GOR supported 
China's position on Taiwan in various international fora including 
in the UNSC. Both countries had to deal with international security 
issues precipitated by the rise of terrorism and extremism. In 
addition, both countries shared similar concerns on the subject of 
U.S. placement of a missile defense system in Europe. Timokhin also 
mentioned that Russia had extended clear support to China for the 
2008 Olympic Games. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Significance of the Joint Statement 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) During the visit, the two presidents signed a Joint 
Statement on international policy, stressing strategic cooperation 
and highlighting the similarity in the foreign policy approach of 
both countries (summary at para 12; text at para 13). According to 
Timokhin, Russia and China have not experienced serious political 
tensions, and benefit from a structure of yearly consultations, but 
both countries were interested in producing more tangible results. 
The two sides also signed several documents calling for "practical" 
cooperation on counterterrorism, nuclear energy, technology, 
aviation, and banking. 
 
5. (SBU) Timokhin stressed that one of the central elements in the 
Joint Statement lies in its human aspect, which stressed the need to 
cooperate in media, education, health and other sectors of society. 
During his speech at Peking University, Medvedev stressed expanding 
cooperation in cultural, educational, and technical spheres. 
Furthermore, the people-to-people project consisting of Russian and 
Chinese themed years was judged a success and would hold a prominent 
place in Russia-China relations for the future. In 2009, the 
emphasis would be placed on the Russian language in China and in 
2010 that emphasis would be placed on the Chinese language in 
Russia. 
 
--------------- 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Capturing most of the press attention was the Joint 
Statement's unease about "expanding military political alliances, 
which should not be established at the expense of the security of 
others [nations]." The statement charged that the establishment of 
a global missile defense system was "not conducive to the 
maintenance of strategic balance and stability, to the efforts on 
international arms control and non-proliferation, as well as to 
mutual trust between nations and to regional stability." Timokhin 
said there had been little detailed discussion between Russia and 
China on missile defense, and the two countries would bring their 
experts together to continue working on the subject. Timokhin 
reiterated that MD was a serious concern to China because of Taiwan. 
 
 
--------------- 
Energy Security 
--------------- 
 
7. (SBU) President Medvedev's visit to Kazakhstan and then to China 
broke no new ground on the oil and gas relationship amongst these 
three countries. Russia's overtures to China have largely been a 
reaction to China's recent activism in Central Asian energy. 
Russia has a number of oil and gas projects in Eastern Siberia with 
t
he Chinese market in mind. Gazprom plans to build two pipelines 
that will deliver natural gas to China. Plans to build an offshoot 
from the East Siberian Pacific Ocean oil pipeline to the Chinese 
city of Daistin have been on hold over disagreement on pricing for 
the oil. Timokhin said energy issues were at the top of Medvedev's 
agenda in China, but much of the energy discussion concerned joint 
nuclear energy projects. According to the Moscow Times a business 
deal was reached to build and supply a "uranium-enrichment plant in 
China worth more than $1 billion." 
 
---------------------------- 
Russia-China Trade Relations 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Russian statistics place bilateral trade at $41 billion, 
with Chinese figures positing $48 billion. In 2007 China was 
Russia's third largest trading partner and both countries estimate 
that trade will reach $60 billion by 2010. Russia's main trade 
concern is that China's growth in exports is significantly higher 
than that of Russia's. Russia's greatest concern stems from the 
structure of the bilateral trade, with Russia providing raw 
materials in exchange for Chinese finished products. Timokhin 
stated that 70% of China's needs are met with Russia's raw 
materials. 
 
------------------ 
Arms Sales and IPR 
------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Experts focused on the absence of any big ticket military 
orders for 2008, with Russian concerns over Chinese IPR violations 
topping the arms sales agenda. While Timokhin stated that the 
actual problem was "exaggerated and sensationalized" with 
consultations in progress, he acknowledged that the issue of 
intellectual property rights was a difficult one. In particular, he 
mentioned that in 1996 Russia and China signed an agreement 
protecting property rights, which was not "solidified." 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Medvedev Visits Other Chinese Officials 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10. (U) Aside from meeting with President Hu Jintao, Medvedev also 
met with China's vice president, the head of China's Parliament, and 
gave a speech at Beijing University. Timokhin noted that the 
premiers of both countries meet on a yearly basis; the last meeting 
of this kind took place in November 2007. The next visit is 
expected to take place in Moscow in the fall. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Experts See Visit as Symbolic, Not Substantive 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (SBU) Experts saw the visit as containing little of substance, 
but important symbolically. Most characterized it as a "propaganda 
trip" and to show the West that Russia had other friends it could 
turn to. Aleksandr Golts of the Weekly Journal said the trip was to 
show that Medvedev was President and had the authority to do foreign 
policy (just as Putin's trip to Paris reinforced that he still 
retained a foreign policy role), and to emphasize the importance 
Russia places on multipolarity. Golts said he did not think the 
two leaders touched on "real issues" during the visit, or addressed 
the "real problems" between the two countries. He added that the 
journalists did not know how to cover the visit - whether to go with 
Medvedev or stay home and follow Putin. Pavel Zolotarev of the 
U.S.- Canada Institute added that the GOR also wanted to protect its 
economic interests with China. The daily Izvestia questioned 
Russia's willingness to protect its economic interests given that 
Sukhoi Director Mikhail Pogosyan and Industry Minister Viktor 
Khristenko avoided criticism of Chinese intellectual property rights 
violations. 
 
-------------------------- 
Summary of Joint Statement 
-------------------------- 
 
12. (U) The text of the Declaration (para 13) outlines the changing 
nature of the international community within a more globalized and 
interdependent structure. It notes that both countries believe that 
they are responsible for peaceful world development as members of 
the UNSC. 
 
-- Article One stresses a multi-polar world order and the 
"non-interference in internal affairs" of other countries, and makes 
a swipe at the continued existence of "unilateralism and power 
politics." 
-- Article 2 stresses support for "the leading role played by the 
UN," and calls for reform to confer greater authority and enhance 
the UN's effectiveness. Timokhin noted this would increase Russia's 
and China's ability to influence world affairs within the 
organization. 
-- Article 3 stresses that the fight against terrorism should be 
carried out through multilateral frameworks, on the basis of the UN 
Charter, and should not bear a "double standard." In addition both 
parties agreed to work together to strengthen the coordinating role 
of the UN. Article 3 also calls for cooperation in fighting 
terrorism, corruption, and illicit drugs within the framework of the 
SCO, ASEAN, and APEC. 
-- Article 4 establishes both countries' commitment to further 
globalization in a balanced fashion, and calls on the international 
community to help developing nations, in particular, to close the 
economic divide between the North and the South. 
-- Article 5 outlines both countries' commitment to international 
security; it calls for strengthening cooperation in international 
arms control and non-proliferation efforts, using political and 
diplomatic means to resolve the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and support for the peaceful use of outer space. 
Article 5 also expresses the two sides' concern over the 
establishment of a global missile defense system. 
-- Article 6 stresses both countries' commitment to sustainable 
development and stresses their "comprehensive compliance" with the 
UN Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. 
-- Article 7 calls for increasing energy dialogues and coordination 
to stabilize and improve the supply and demand market for 
international energy, and to safeguard energy security. 
-- Article 8 outlines both countries' support for the six- party 
talks on North Korea. According to Timokhin, the visit highlighted 
that both Russia and China want a practical solution to the problem. 
However, both sides realized that this was not an easy task and 
would require patience and hard work on behalf of the international 
community and the parties involved. In addition, both countries 
agreed to seek a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions and 
were against the use of military force and sanctions on Iran without 
"taking into consideration the interest of other governments," 
including Iran's. 
-- Article 9 stresses fostering cultural dialogue. 
-- Article 10 calls for the respect of human rights on the basis of 
"sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs" and to 
stand up against the politicization of the term and the use of 
double-standards. -- Article 11 outlines both countries' 
willingness to strengthen cooperation between the G8 and and 
developing countries, and to strengthen other international 
cooperation mechanisms, such as the BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India, 
China). Both sides consider the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) playing an important role in maintaining stability, peace, 
security and fostering economic development in Eurasia. Both 
countries support the consolidation of the SCO in the future to 
deepen dialogue among interested parties "with the goal of solving 
common problems." 
 
13. (U) Begin Text of Joint Statement. 
 
Joint Statement of the PRC and the Russian Federation on Major 
International Issues: 
In view of the responsibilities for world peace and development that 
they assume as permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council as well as their unanimous position on major international 
issues, in line with the "Joint Statement of the PRC and the Russian 
Federation on World Multi-Polarization and Establishment of a New 
International Order" of 23 April 1997 and the "Joint Statement of 
the PRC and the Russian Federation on an International Order for the 
21st Century" of 1 July 2005, the PRC and the Russian Federation 
(thereafter the "two sides") stress that the establishment of a 
strategic cooperation and partnership between China and Russia and 
the conclusion of the "Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly 
Cooperation Between the PRC and the Russian Federation " on 16 July 
2001 are of important historical significance. 
 
The statement is as follows: 
 
One. As the world is undergoing tremendous changes, the era requires 
all countries to pursue peace, seek development and promote 
cooperation. The trend of multi-polarization is irreversible, 
economic globalization is deepening, science and technology are 
progressing rapidly, and global and regional cooperation is booming. 
At the same time, unilateralism and power politics continue to exist 
in the world. While regional conflicts triggered by ethnic and 
religious contradictions frequently arise, the world economy becomes 
increasingly unbalanced, and new threats and challenges emerge 
endlessly. 
 
Because of these, all countries of the world should work together to 
deal effectively with the common threats and challenges and build a 
harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. It is 
necessary to abide by the objectives and principles of the "UN 
Charter," strictly observe the principles of respecting sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual 
non-intervention in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 
peaceful coexistence as well as the international laws and other 
universally recognized norms guiding international relations. All 
countries should abandon the "Cold War mentality" and clique 
politics, and promote equality, democracy and collaboration. 
 
Two. The two sides support the leading role played by the UN in 
international affairs. The role of the UN in safeguarding world 
peace, promoting cooperation among all states, and fostering joint 
development is irreplaceable. The two sides unanimously agree that 
the UN should carry out necessary and rational reform, strengthen 
its authority, and raise its efficiency in order to boost its 
ability to deal with new threats and new challenges. Reform should 
be carried out according to the principle of gradual progress, 
consultation and unanimity. 
 
Three. The two sides condemn terrorism in any form. The two sides 
poQt out: Terrorism is seeking ideological expansion and has 
increasingly closer ties with transnational organized crimes and 
drug trafficking. The two sides expressed their concern about this. 
The international community should jointly combat terrorism within 
the multilateral frameworks on the basis of the "UN Charter" and 
internationally recognized principles on international relations. 
Double standards should be discarded in the fight against terrorism, 
and anti-terrorism should not be used as an excuse to achieve goals 
that are contrary to the tasks of safeguarding international 
stability and security. 
 
For this reason, the two sides are committed to strengthening the 
UN's central coordination role in combating terrorism and facing up 
to other new threats and challenges in the international community. 
The international community should fulfil the UN's important 
anti-terrorism documents, including the "UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy," and promote early consensus on the "Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism." The two sides will take 
positive measures, mobilize social forces, including 
non-governmental organizations and personages in the industrial 
circles, to curb terrorism thoughts and eliminate new threats and 
challenges 
 
The two sides reiterate that they will relentlessly enhance 
cooperation in regional organizations and forums, first of all 
within the multilateral frameworks of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in a bid to fight against terrorism, 
drug trafficking and crimes. The two sides will continue efforts to 
build a partner network for international and regional organizations 
and their anti-terrorism organs in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Four. The two sides are ready to jointly push forward the 
development of economic globalization towards a balanced, 
universally beneficial and win-win direction. They call on the 
international community, especially the developed countries, to 
increase development aid and comprehensively honour their 
commitments on providing aid for developing countries, so as to 
create a favourable international environment for their development. 
 
The two sides support a reciprocal and win-win open strategy, the 
promotion of South-North dialogue and South-South cooperation, and 
narrowing south-north gap. To this end, it is necessary to improve 
the international trade and financial system, oppose trade 
protectionism and investment protectionism, and address economic and 
trade friction and problems through consultations on equal-footing 
and cooperation 
 
Five. The two sides maintain that to safeguard lasting peace, all 
countries of the world should take the "UN Charter" as well as the 
principles of mutual trust, consideration of each other's interests, 
equality, cooperation, openness and predictability as a basis, and 
push forward the development of the international security system in 
a direction that is more consistent with the demands of the times 
and the common interest of all countries. 
 
The two sides maintain that international security is comprehensive 
and inalienable. The security of some countries cannot be guaranteed 
at the cost of some others', including expanding military and 
political allies. The two sides stress the need to fully respect and 
take into consideration the interests and concerns of concerned 
countries. 
 
The two sides are willing to continue to actively push forward the 
international arms control process under the premise that no harm 
will be done to the security of all countries as well as to strive 
to promote the universality and effectiveness of multilateral arms 
control and of the non-proliferation treaty. The two sides propose 
the use of political and diplomatic means to resolve the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery within the framework of international laws in order to 
promote international security. 
 
The two sides maintain that the establishment of a global missile 
defence system, including the deployment of the system in some 
regions of the world or the initiation of relevant cooperation, is 
not conducive to the maintenance of strategic balance and stability, 
to the efforts on international arms control and non-proliferation, 
as well as to mutual trust between nations and to regional 
stability. The two sides express their concern about this. 
 
The two sides stand for the peaceful utilization of outer space and 
oppose the weaponization of outer space and of any space arms race. 
The two sides also stress the importance of signing relevant 
international laws and regulations to forbid the deployment of 
weapons in outer space through negotiations within the framework of 
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. 
 
Six. The two sides maintain that sustainable development is an 
important area in international cooperation. All countries should 
step up exchange of experiences, protect natural resources and 
biodiversity, and strive to build an environmentally friendly and 
resource efficient society. 
 
The two sides attach importance to the issue of climate change and 
reiterate their comprehensive compliance with the obligations of the 
"UN Framework Convention on Climate Change" and its "Kyoto 
Protocol." They are ready to abide strictly by the principles of the 
Convention, particularly the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities" and of each according to its ability, and initiate 
dialogue and cooperation in this area. The developed countries 
should provide capital and technological support to the developing 
countries in order to raise the capabilities of the developing 
countries to deal with climate change. 
 
Seven. The two sides call on all countries to step up energy 
dialogues and coordination based on the principle of equality and 
mutual benefits in order to stabilize and improve the supply and 
demand market for international energy as well as to jointly 
safeguard global energy security. The two sides support the 
establishment and implementation of a new energy security concept 
featuring mutually beneficial cooperation, diversified development, 
and coordinated guarantees. They also call for acceleration in the 
development and research as well as popularization of new energy 
technology that are beneficial to the protection of the environment. 
 
 
Eight. The two sides positively appraise the progress made in the 
six-party talks on the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. They also 
call on all parties to persist with the direction of a peaceful 
resolution of the issue through dialogues and negotiations, continue 
to move towards each other, show flexibility and advance the process 
of the six-party talks in order to realize a nuclear free Korean 
peninsula as soon as possible, realize the normalization of 
relations between the relevant countries, and realize the lasting 
peace and security of the North Asian region. The two sides are 
prepared to continue to play an active role to this end. 
 
The two sides propose the resolution of the Iran nuclear issue, the 
reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the issues of the 
Middle East, Kosovo, Sudan (Darfur) and other urgent international 
issues through dialogues and peaceful consultation. All parties 
should consider global and regional security, make diplomatic 
efforts, refrain from military and extreme means, cautiously resort 
to sanctions and take into account the interests of the country 
involved when resolving the aforementioned issues. 
 
Nine. The two sides maintain that the diversity of civilization and 
culture constitutes an important driving force for the progress of 
mankind. In line with the principles of equality and mutual respect, 
all countries should strengthen dialogues between different 
civilizations, different cultures, and different religions in order 
to realize the harmonious development as well as tolerance and 
coexistence of all kinds of civilizations and cultures. 
 
Ten. The two sides reiterate the universal principle of respect of 
human rights. At the same time, they also maintain that all 
countries have the right to promote and protect human rights in 
accordance to the national conditions of their respective countries. 
On the question of human rights, all countries should eliminate 
frictions through dialogues and cooperation on the basis of 
sovereignty, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of others, oppose the politicization of the human rights issue and 
the practice of double standards, oppose the use of human rights 
issue as an excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries, as well as push forward the handling of human rights 
issue by the international community in an objective and 
non-selective manner. 
 
Eleven. The two sides are ready to jointly strengthen dialogues 
between the leaders of the "Group of Eight" and the developing 
countries as well as to strengthen international cooperation 
mechanism such as the "Golden BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China)" and the foreign ministers' meeting between China, Russian 
and India. They are ready to push forward the establishment and 
further development of the above and other international cooperation 
mechanism on the basis of the unanimity of interests in order to 
find a coordinated and unanimous solution to the challenges and 
threats confronting global and regional security and sustainable 
development. 
 
The two sides welcome the establishment of a coordinating mechanism 
between integrated regional organizations, particularly the 
strengthening of cooperation in the East Asian region, in order to 
expand the political dialogues, economic cooperation, as well as 
social and cultural exchanges in this region. China supports a more 
active integration of Russia into the integration process in East 
Asia. 
 
The two sides maintain that the SCO has already become an extremely 
important factor for consolidating strategic stability, safeguarding 
peace and security, as well as developing all kinds of economic and 
human cooperation. The two sides reiterate that they will further 
consolidate the unity of the SCO. The two sides also maintain that 
to resolve the urgent issues of contemporary times and make them 
acceptable to all sides, deepening SCO's dialogues with relevant 
countries, international organizations and forums on the basis of 
the principle of openness and not targeting a third country is of 
vital importance. 
 
President of PRC Hu Jintao (signature) 
President of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev (signature) 
23 May 2008 in Beijing. 
End Text. 
 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1598, CTWG BIOTERRORISM TABLETOP EXERCISE DELIVERED

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1598 2008-06-05 10:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1598 1571028
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051028Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8424

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER TBIO RU
SUBJECT: CTWG BIOTERRORISM TABLETOP EXERCISE DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 56911 
 
(U) On June 4 we delivered reftel working paper to Vladimir 
Prokhorov of the MFA Office of New Threats and Challenges, 
who told us he would disseminate it to the appropriate MFA 
offices.  Prokhorov said he would try to respond prior to the 
upcoming CTWG meeting. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1597, FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SEMINAR U.S.

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1597.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1597 2008-06-05 10:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1597 1571027
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051027Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8423

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT KRAD PREL PTER RO RS TBIO
SUBJECT: FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SEMINAR U.S. 
WORKING PAPER DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 57531 
 
(U) On June 4 we delivered reftel working paper to Vladimir 
Prokhorov of the MFA Office of New Threats and Challenges, 
who told us he would disseminate it to the appropriate MFA 
offices.  Prokhorov said he would try to respond prior to the 
upcoming CTWG meeting. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1595, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: PTK

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1595.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1595 2008-06-05 06:29 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1595 1570629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050629Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8421
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001595 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: PTK 
ELECTROSTEEL LLC, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D397317 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 03408 
 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, PTK 
Electrosteel LLC, Moscow, Russia. The company is 
listed on BIS license application D397317 as the 
ultimate consignee of the HAAS Manufactured ES-5-4T, a 
horizontal machine with 40" X 18" X 22" (XYZ) travels, 
imbedded 4th axis and a 5-axis option making this 
machine capable of 5-axis simultaneous contouring. 
These items are controlled for national security and 
non-proliferation reasons under ECCN 2B001. The 
licensee is HAAS Automation Inc., 2800 Sturgis Road, 
Oxnard, CA  93030. 
 
3. On June 3, 2008, Export Control Attach Peter 
Liston and LES Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested pre-license check at the offices of 
Electrosteel LLC, B. Andronevskaya 23, Moscow, Russia. 
The export control team met with Boris Dolgikh, 
General Director of Electrosteel LLC. 
 
4.  General Director Boris Dolgikh told the export 
control team that Electrosteel LLC was founded in 
2000.  Dolgikh stated that Electrosteel LLC has been 
producing unfinished stamped banks and casting blanks 
of turbine blades for various Russian industries for 7 
years.  Electrosteel LLC then subcontracts the 
unfinished turbine blades to be refined and finished 
to the required specifications of the customer. 
Electrosteel LLC employs 25 people and grosses 
approximately $10 million dollars a year. 
 
5. Dolgikh told the export control team that 
Electrosteel LLC intends to purchase the commodity in 
reftel through the HAAS Automation Inc. Moscow 
representative.  Dolgikh stated that he often attends 
industry trade show and exhibitions and that that is 
where he learned of the reftel commodity.  Dolgikh 
stated that reftel commodity would enable Electrosteel 
LLC to produce their own finished product, a chrome 
steel turbine blade.  Dolgikh stated that his company 
would no longer be dependant on subcontracting out the 
finishing work. 
 
6. Electrosteel LLC appears to have the technical and 
commercial sophistication and the physical resources 
consistent with those for which the commodity in 
question was designed.  It should be noted here that 
if the license is granted, and Electrosteel LLC goes 
through with the purchase from HAAS, they intend to 
purchase a commercial property within 100km of Moscow 
where they will build a production facility.  The 
Export Control Team would recommend a Post-Shipment 
Verification in that event. 
 
7. The export control team believes that Electrosteel 
LLC has both a legitimate need and a legitimate end 
use for the subject reftel commodity. 
 
8. Recommendations: Post recommends Electrosteel LLC, 
Moscow, Russia, as reliable recipients of sensitive 
U.S. origin commodities. It is requested that post be 
notified of final disposition of the application, and 
of any shipments for this organization in order to 
conduct appropriate FCS follow-up and statistical 
reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1594, BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: COMPLETED PRE-LICENSE END-USE CHECK

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1594.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1594 2008-06-05 03:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1594 1570345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050345Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8420
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001594 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/DDTC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ETTC RS KOMC
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: COMPLETED PRE-LICENSE END-USE CHECK 
ON LICENSE 050104476 
 
REF: STATE 56172 
 
1. (U) Summary:  Arsenal Hunting Equipment representatives confirmed 
their company wanted to import reftel firearms under license 
050104476.  The company was established in 1994 under the name 
V.V.V. Ltd., and the three original owners still serve as the 
company President and Vice Presidents.  Arsenal Hunting Equipment 
sold about 100 such firearms last year, which company officials said 
could be used to hunt large game.  Post verified the bona fides of 
Arsenal Hunting Equipment and recommends it as a reliable end-user 
of United States Munitions List (USML) items.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) In a May 30 meeting, Arsenal Hunting Equipment General 
Director Valeriy Sevastiyanov and International Procurement Manager 
Irina Zazdravnykh told us Arsenal Hunting Equipment was established 
in 1994.  Its original name was V.V.V. Ltd., and the name was 
changed to Arsenal Hunting Equipment in December 2007.  The company 
has three owners:  company President Valeriy Startsov, Vice 
President Vladimir Cherivichniy, and Vice President Aleksandr 
Seleznov.  Sevastiyanov has served as the General Director since 
1997.  The Deputy General Director is Nikolai Sirdorkin. 
 
3. (U) Sevastiyanov provided us with copies of licensing documents 
that give Arsenal Hunting Equipment the right to import firearms. 
 
4. (U) Sevastiyanov told us the ultimate end users of these firearms 
will be private hunters.  He said Russian hunters use such firearms 
to hunt bear, elk, and bison.  He added that some hunters might use 
these firearms to hunt big game on safari in Africa. 
 
5. (U) Sevastiyanov told us that Arsenal Hunting Equipment used to 
import such firearms from Germany and Austria, but now wanted to 
purchase U.S.-made firearms.  In 2007, he said, Arsenal Hunting 
Equipment sold approximately 100 such firearms, while other 
companies in Moscow sold hundreds more. 
 
6. (U) Sevastiyanov told us they were familiar with the restrictions 
governing the import of USML commodities, and in particular the 
prohibition of unauthorized re-export.  Post confirms the bona fides 
of Arsenal Hunting Equipment as a reliable end-user of USML items. 
 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks