Daily Archives: June 10, 2008


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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1649 2008-06-10 13:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow


DE RUEHMO #1649/01 1621339
R 101339Z JUN 08

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001649 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2108 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: Reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
1.  (C)  Summary: In a recent meeting with EUR DAS Merkel, 
Russia's HR Ombudsman Lukin expressed satisfaction with the 
informal human rights dialogue with Carnegie, with the next 
meeting scheduled for September 23, but conceded that the 
dialogue should raise its profile.  Lukin argued strongly for 
keeping a human rights dialogue outside government channels. 
Assessing the Medvedev-Putin tandem, Lukin pointed to 
continuity, with a change in tone and perhaps a less 
self-defensive Russian posture on human rights.  He welcomed 
Medvedev's anti-corruption campaign, but underscored the 
challenge of practical implementation.  Noting the tendency 
to take Russia for granted, Lukin argued that a U.S.-Russian 
partnership was essential on a range of issues, and 
reiterated the need to lower the ideological tone of the 
bilateral dialogue.  End Summary 
Carnegie-Lukin: Less Defensive Russia? 
2.  (C)  In a June 2 meeting with EUR DAS Merkel, HR 
Ombudsman Lukin said he was satisfied with the "informal" 
human rights dialogue with the Carnegie Center, noting that 
the next session would be in Washington on September 23.  The 
next step was to think of ways to make the dialogue more 
representative and publicized.  The actual discussions were 
best conducted behind closed doors, Lukin maintained, 
otherwise participants would revert to swapping talking 
points in front of the press, rather than make a real attempt 
to analyze the issue at hand.  Lukin noted U.S. and Canada 
Institute Director Rogov's suggestion to incorporate a 
meeting of his graduate students with their Washington 
counterparts, with a parallel dialogue on immigration issues, 
as one possibility for broadening the dialogue. 
3.  (C)  Returning to how best to advance a human rights 
dialogue, Lukin argued that practitioners -- "not Foreign 
Ministers" -- should engage, and stressed that he personally 
was against "overlapping" human rights discussions with 
"politics and political seasons."  Human rights, he argued, 
became a tool, and the worse the bilateral relationship, the 
more attention it received, with U.S.-Chinese relations 
instructive in this regard.  Lukin said that Russia should 
have a right to ask about Guantanamo and secret prisons, but 
judged it was most effective to do so outside government 
channels.  Holding out the possibility of Russia becoming 
less defensive on human rights in the near-term, Lukin 
reiterated his support for separate human rights and foreign 
policy dialogues that were "not too linked up."  America, he 
counseled, should not lecture, and should not "expect Russia 
to stand in a corner."  Merkel echoed Lukin's call for a less 
defensive Russian reaction to a human rights dialogue, which 
was important to get right, as U.S. relations with China 
Assessing Medvedev-Putin Tandem 
4.  (C)  Looking at the Medvedev-Putin power tandem, Lukin 
said "it takes two hands to clap," with the "half-new" 
administration providing continuity.  The main priorities 
would remain the same, with Medvedev's trips to Kazakhstan 
and China reflecting Russia's emphasis on its neighborhood, 
and his onward travel to Germany reflecting its status as the 
"pivotal" partner in the EU.  While it mattered that Putin 
was Prime Minister, and his influence remained profound, 
Lukin underscored that "new features" would appear, 
reflecting the vast powers enjoyed by any Russian President. 
Lukin did not exclude a change in style in foreign policy, 
and the rotations of Russian and U.S. Ambassadors also would 
underline this new start.  The objective should be to make 
relations less argumentative and more substantive, with Lukin 
assessing that Medvedev preferred that FM Lavrov stake out 
the hard-line, while the President kept to the high road. 
5.  (C)  Lukin commented that Medvedev's focus on 
anti-corruption measures sounded good, which was why every 
Russian leader proclaimed himself ready to root out the 
practice.  Corruption, as evidenced in the complaints 
received by the Ombudsman's office, was one of the most 
difficult and deep-rooted problems in Russia.  Lukin argued 
that the steps outlined by Medvedev were sound, but practical 
implementation would remain very difficult; Medvedev would 
enjoy the full support of the Ombudsman's office in this 
Reviewing U.S.-Russian Relations 
6.  (C)  Lukin commented that the tendency was for the U.S. 
to take Russia for granted, dating back to the period when 
Russia was too weak assert itself and the U.S. powerful 
enough to believe that it could act unilaterally.  Time, 
Lukin believed, had demonstrated the complicated nature of 
most international problems, whose solution required the 
participation of many countries, including Russia, China, 
India and the EU.  Lukin noted that regardless of whether a 
Republican or Democrat won the U.S. election, the U.S. and 
Russia would need
to work together.  Lukin called for 
lowering the ideological tone of the relationship and pressed 
again on why the U.S. was focused sharply on human rights. 
DAS Merkel agreed that any U.S. administration will seek ways 
to engage Russia, but took issue with Lukin's depiction of 
human rights as an "either, or" proposition.  Rather than a 
realpolitik versus a human rights perspective, he noted, most 
understood there was a linkage between the two that would 
determine the tenor and tone of our relations. 
7.  (U)  DAS Merkel did not have an opportunity to clear this 




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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1648 2008-06-10 13:38 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #1648/01 1621338
P 101338Z JUN 08

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001648 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018 
REF: A. MOSCOW 1340 
     B. MOSCOW 1478 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
1. (C) Summary: At the working-level, the MFA remains hopeful 
the latest P5 1 proposals will lead to progress on the 
Iranian nuclear issue, but believes Tehran is likely to use 
elements of the package Solana will deliver to delay 
negotiations.  The MFA dismissed the IAEA DG's latest report, 
which accomplished little baefering something to each side. 
 Russian officials are aware of reports that Saeed Jalili 
might be replaced as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator by Ali 
Larijani, who may be positioning himself to run for President 
of Iran.  The MFA described Russia-Iran economic relations as 
"pragmatic," with the two countries cooperating on expanding 
transportation links and on energy issues, including the 
Nabucco gas pipeline that is typically seen as a competitor 
to Russia's South Stream pipeline.  Officials characterized 
the EU, which seeks Iranian gas at the same time it presses 
Tehran on the nuclear issue, as taking a more pragmatic 
approach than the security-focused U.S.  The MFA confirmed 
that Russia asked Iran to use its influence with Hizbollah to 
help end the political crisis in Lebanon, but warned against 
assuming that Hizbollah was a "puppet" controlled by its 
foreign patrons.  End summary. 
Iranian Nuclear Program 
2. (C) MFA Iran Desk Chief Maxim Baranov told us on June 9 
that while he was hopeful that delivery of the latest P5 1 
package to Tehran would produce progress towards a settlement 
of the Iranian nuclear issue, MFA officials working the Iran 
account thought it likely that the Iranians would grasp 
certain elements of the package as a means to continue 
dragging out the process.  Baranov observed that Iranian 
tactics changed regularly in order to delay conclusive 
results, and reminded us that in 2006 the Iranians told then 
GOR National Security Council Secretary Ivanov that Iran 
would sign the NPT Additional Protocol but wanted to be 
allowed a limited number of centrifuges to continue pursuing 
uranium enrichment, issues that remained unresolved.  Baranov 
thought Iran might still sign the Additional Protocol, then 
use this act as a propaganda tool to demonstrate to the 
Islamic world that it was a responsible country.  He 
dismissed the characterization of the IAEA Director General's 
May 26 report as having been the most detailed on Iranian 
non-compliance and pursuance of military technology, 
explaining that El-Baredi was "a master of writing," whose 
reports tended to give each side something they were after. 
Ali Larijani's Future 
3. (C) Baranov said that he was aware of reports that Saeed 
Jalili might be replaced as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, 
possibly by parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani.  He cautioned 
against jumping to the conclusion that such a move indicated 
the ascendency of those favoring a more conciliatory approach 
on the Iranian nuclear program, noting that Larijani recently 
made some tough statements in advance of Solana's arrival in 
Tehran, while Ahmadinejad's remarks were softer than usual. 
Baranov thought it possible that Larijani was playing to a 
domestic audience and sought to give Solana the idea that 
despite their reported good personal relationship, the EU 
representative should not expect an easy time in Tehran. 
4. (C) Baranov, who served in Tehran before taking over the 
MFA Iran Desk, speculated that Larijani's appointment as 
parliamentary speaker meant the he was positioning himself 
for another run for President. 
Economics and Energy 
5. (C) Baranov described Iran's approach to its economic and 
energy interests as essentially "pragmatic," with Tehran 
willfully presenting itself as Russia's economic partner at 
the same time they were also competitors.  Russia and Iran 
share, for example, an interest in developing closer 
transportation links that will provide Russia increased 
opportunities to trade with the Middle East and Asia. 
Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan have been discussing completing 
an Azerbaijan-Iran railway link as part of the International 
North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a necessary element 
for increased Russian trade with India.  Baranov noted Iran's 
recent agreements signed with India and Turkmenistan to 
expand sea and rail transit links would also benefit Russia. 
MOSCOW 00001648  002 OF 002 
6. (C) On energy, Baranov said that Russia's relationship 
with Iran was more complex than typically portrayed.  He 
pointed, for example, to a recent press report that Iran was 
ready to start work on the Nabucco pipeline intended to 
deliver gas from the Caspian r
egion to Europe and bypass 
Russia, as well as to a seemingly contradictory report that 
Gazprom was establishing a joint venture with the Iranian 
state oil company that could allow Russian participation in 
Nabucco.  Baranov offered that it would be in Russian 
interests to be involved in Nabucco, which is commonly seen 
as a competitor to the South Stream pipeline 
7. (C) Baranov explained that the "mystery element" in the 
Iranian energy picture was Iran's relationship with the 
European Union, which sees a vital need to tap Iranian gas 
supplies at the same time European countries press Iran on 
its nuclear program.  He pointed to statements by European 
officials that the EU could separate its need for energy from 
other political interests as an indication of Europe's 
pragmatic approach, while the U.S. appeared to link all 
Iran-related matters to security.  Baranov posited, however, 
that the EU might one day lose out to Asian countries whose 
demand for gas would surpass that of the Europe and could 
draw away Iranian supplies. 
8. (C) Baranov confirmed that the GOR reached out to the 
Iranians at various levels of government, asking that they 
help stabilize the political situation in Lebanon by reigning 
in Hizbollah (reftels).  He dismissed, however, any 
suggestion that Hizbollah was a "puppet" of either Iran or 
Syria, explaining that Hizbollah had legitimate political 
interests in Lebanon and a substantial level of support from 
segments of the population.  Baranov thought that while 
Tehran might be the leading sponsor of Hizbollah, Damascus 
still had influence, and the Hizbollah leadership preferred 
to play one off the other in order to lessen dependence on a 
single patron. 



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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1647 2008-06-10 11:20 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow


DE RUEHMO #1647/01 1621120
O 101120Z JUN 08

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001647 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary. Embassy Moscow warmly welcomes you back for the Core Group and 16th session of the U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) meetings. Your visit will enable us to build on the Strategic Framework Declaration adopted in Sochi, discuss differences on Georgia, Kosovo, and conventional arms sales, and identify ways to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation. Afghanistan is an important area where both we and Russia see opportunities for greater practical measures, and we should build on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to enhance our efforts to prevent access to WMD technology by terrorists. At the same time, we should seek ways to encourage the GOR to be more responsive to our UN and Terrorist Financing Designations and requests for law enforcement and intelligence information. End summary.

Core Group Issues -----------------

2. (C) The Core Group dinner on June 19 gives you the opportunity to review implementation of the Sochi Strategic Framework Declaration, including the signing of the 123 Agreement and commencement of the Economic Dialogue, and to address ways we can operationalize other elements, including greater cooperation on counterterrorism through multilateral institutions such as the UN, OSCE, NATO-Russia Council and G-8; deepening our successful cooperation in the nuclear security field; and exploring opportunities to develop joint CT training programs for other countries.

3. (S) Outside the counterterrorism prism, the dinner is a chance to discuss areas of disagreement, including Kosovo, NATO enlargement, missile defense, and conventional arms sales. Kislyak will have returned that morning from Tehran, where he will participate in the joint delivery with Solana of the latest P5 1 proposals. Given Kislyak's late return to Moscow, the dinner may be the best opportunity to get his readout on the trip.

Afghanistan -----------

4. (C) The GOR consistently has reiterated its strong support for a continued U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan, while expressing disappointment over coalition results in eradicating the drug trade and eliminating the Taliban. Recent Russian expressions of interest in doing more to aid Afghanistan's recovery and stabilization, including Medvedev's first foreign policy address in Berlin, provide an opening for the U.S. and Russia to work together both bilaterally and multilaterally. There are obstacles, of course, including Afghan wariness of Russian involvement and opposition to Russian activities on Afghan soil, as well as Russian efforts to press for stronger links between the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and NATO, and to use the CSTO as a mechanism to implement a March 2007 agreement to provide military training and equipment to Afghan military and border officials.

5.(C) Multilateral: We can encourage Russia to expand its participation in NATO-Russia Council initiatives, and take on greater financial obligations under UN programming. During the April NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting in Bucharest, NATO and the GOR signed an agreement to allow non-lethal military equipment to transit Russia en route to ISAF, but we would like to see the GOR agree to broaden the agreement to include military equipment, as well as specifically allowing the equipment to be provided to OEF forces as well as ISAF. Additionally, the NRC decided to make the NRC Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel an on-going initiative. In the last two years some 419 trainees from Afghanistan and Central Asia have undergone training. Russia has provided trainers and training facilities for this project, but should be urged to contribute financially to this and other UNODC programs.

6.(C) Bilateral: There appears to be a role for the U.S. in brokering Russia's efforts to expand bilateral cooperation with Kabul. In October 2007, Russia informed us of its proposal to provide $200 million worth of weapons and material to the Afghan National Army, but complained that it had difficulty coordinating with the Afghans. The GOR said that an invitation for Afghan Defense Minister Wardek to visit Moscow and discuss the aid was ignored and the Russian Embassy in Kabul was frustrated in its attempts to discuss the issue with the Afghan MOD and ISAF. In May, we provided the GOR a list of weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other material that Russia could provide the ANA and suggested that Russia work directly with the Afghan MOD and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to determine what assistance was required. To date, we have received mixed signals from the MFA and Russian Embassy in Kabul as to what steps Russia has taken to advance its assistance proposal, suggesting a lack of coordination on the Russian side. The CTWG presents an opportunity to reiterate that the U.S. welcomes the Russian assistance offer, encourages the GOR to move forward on this issue, and is prepared to reinforce that message with the Karzai government.

Counternarcotics ----------------

7.(U) Trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan and their abuse are major problems facing Russian law enforcement and public health agencies. The Ministry of Health estimates that up to six million Russians take drugs on a regular basis. Th
ere are estimates that nearly 70% of new HIV cases can be attributed to intravenous drug use and 90 percent of injection drug users are Hepatitis C positive. Comments by local Russian officials during Embassy travel to Russian regions through which Afghan opiates are trafficked reinforces the scale of the problem, both societally and through the law enforcement prism. Areas where the CTWG can enhance our cooperation:

8.(C) Quality Intelligence-Sharing: The GOR generally cooperates with U.S. law enforcement on counter narcotics. The most successful examples of this cooperation have been between the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Russian agencies targeting cocaine trafficking organizations operating between South America and the port of St. Petersburg. DEA continues to attempt to engage Russian counterparts on the more serious threat posed by the high-value drug trafficking organizations operating along the "Northern Route" from Afghanistan through Central Asia. This engagement continues to receive limited acceptance from Russian counterparts. DEA continues to struggle with Russian law enforcement agencies to obtain pro-active intelligence from their counterparts on high-value targets.

9.(SBU) UN Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) Membership: We should push the Russians to finalize their participation in CARICC, which is based in Almaty. While the GOR has signaled its intent to join, President Putin did not sign the CARICC Agreement before he left office and the status of the Agreement is uncertain. CARICC will serve as a regional focal point for communication, analysis and exchange of operational information concerning drug trafficking along the "Northern Route" through Central Asia and requires active Russian participation to be effective. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have all finalized and signed the relevant documents. Given the Russian emphasis on international cooperation within the framework of the UN, CARICC should appeal to GOR geopolitical sensibilities.

10.(SBU) Better Liaison: Now that the GOR has begun establishing Drug Liaison Offices in ten countries (including the U.S., Iran, Afghanistan, and in Central Asia) to facilitate information sharing and joint investigations, we should encourage more vigorous Russian cooperation with their counterparts from the U.S. and elsewhere. The establishment of the State Anti-Narcotics Committee in July 2007 offers an opportunity for the U.S. to share its experience in developing a national drug policy, coordinating the efforts of various government agencies, and participating in international drug efforts.

11.(SBU) Expanded "Operation Channel": Since 2003 law enforcement agencies in the CSTO have participated in a biannual, week-long interdiction "blitz" called "Operation Channel" during which extra personnel are stationed at critical junctures on the Russian border and in Central Asia to conduct increased searches and inspections. The GOR indicated this year that it intended to make this "blitz" year-round. It is unclear what is meant by this. A multi-national, multi-year effort will be required to create effective interdiction capacity in the region. 12, (C) Equipment and Paramilitary Training: The Federal Service of the Russian Federation for Narcotics Traffic Control (FSKN) has expressed interest in improving capabilities through improved tactics, as well as procuring increasingly sophisticated equipment from non-Russian manufacturers. FSKN Generals have met with Russian nationals who locally represent U.S. defense contractors to explore the possibility of acquiring thermal/infrared imaging systems and expressed interest in increased cooperation with USG paramilitary units that have counter-drug experience.

United Nations Designations and Terrorist Financing --------------------------------------------- ------

13. (C) Timely Delistings and Designations: While the U.S. and Russia are working together to update the UNSCR 1267 Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Taliban Sanctions list to combat the upsurge of Taliban violence, Russia continues to argue against the reintegration of Taliban elements into the Afghan government and blocks delisting of names from the 1267 list. Reinforcing and assessing Karzai's strategy of reintegration may help address Russian concerns. We also often have difficulty getting timely Russian concurrence for U.S.-generated AQ additions to the list. Frequently, the GOR cites lack of information sufficient to characterize the individual as a terrorist under Russian law and requests additional information from us. Occasionally, the GOR seeks to use our request as a quid-pro-quo for obtaining our agreement to one of their requests. We should encourage Russia to respond in a more timely and detailed manner to our listing requests. At the same time, to the extent feasible, we should seek to increase the level of detail of intelligence and law enforcement information on the targets that could be released to Russia.

14.(C) Improving Terrorist Financing Capacity: Under existing Russian law, financial institutions are unable to refuse the creation of bank accounts or to block financial transactions deemed threatening or suspicious. These legal prohibitions have stalled the GOR's interagency efforts to implement UNSCRs regarding North Korea (UNSCR 1718) and Iran (UNSCRs 1737 and 1747) and to develop tight oversight of possible terrorist-related money flows. Nevertheless, information sharing based on Gulf-based "charitable organizations" continues to yield benefits in Russia's efforts to disrupt financial flows to the Caucasus, and we should explore ways we could assist Russia more on Caucasus-related terrorism in exchange for better information-sharing on AQ and other extremist organizations of concern to us.

15.(C) Better Regional FATF Compliance: When Uzbekistan issued presidential decrees last year that effectively suspended the country's money laundering regime, Russia reached out through the Eurasia FATF Subgroup (EAG) mission to Tashkent to firmly remind the Uzbeks of their obligations under various UN treaties as well as their commitments to the EAG itself. (At this time the decrees are still in effect.) Russia and the EAG have been active in trying to bring Turkmenistan into the EAG and into compliance with international AML standards. Additionally, Russia has directly or through the EAG sponsored, led, and/or participated in many regional seminars and workshops involving the nexus among financial intelligence, money laundering and law enforcement. Russia provides all the financing for the EAG.

Law Enforcement Cooperation ---------------------------

16.(C) Counterterrorism cooperation between U.S. and the Russian law enforcement agencies is rated as fair. We continue to share information regarding specific cases, including those involving Chechen separatists. A meeting of the biannual counterterrorism meeting of the FBI, CIA, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) took place in November 2007. Agents from the FSB Will attend FBI hostage negotiation training in late 2008. The FSB has invited the FBI hostage rescue team for exchange training with FSB's Alfa Team. 17. (C) El-Zahabi Update: The Russians may raise the return of suspected terrorist Mohamed Kamal El-Zahabi, a Lebanese national, who is currently in removal proceedings in El Paso after having been sentenced to time-served for immigration fraud. He has been charged in Russia with terrorism-related offenses. The GOR request has been pending since December 2005. El-Zahabi's attorney has stated that should removability be established, his client will seek CAT relief if the government designates Russia as his place of return. The USG has not taken a position on country designation, but we have obtained GOR assurances from the General Procuracy concerning representation, treatment and U.S. access during trial.
 We are seeking additional assurances from the Ministry of Justice concerning treatment and access if he is convicted. As of late May, no future hearing date had been set.

Military CT Cooperation -----------------------

18. (C) Murder of Russian Diplomats in Iraq: You can reaffirm our willingness to assist the Russians in their investigation of the murder of their diplomats. On 31 March 2008, Russian MOD formally requested direct access to Iraqi suspects charged with killing Russian employees in Iraq in 2006, in order for their own law enforcement officers to question the suspects, including with polygraph. The Secretary wrote to FM Lavrov June 2 expressing our willingness to assist Russian investigators once they received permission from the Iraqi Government, as well as to encourage Iraqi authorities to move quickly in responding to the official Russian request.

19. (C) U.S.-Russian Counterterrorism Cross Talks: At the October 2006 Joint Staff Talks, it was agreed to enhance operational and strategic-level CT coordination and cooperation. During the bilateral meeting in April 2008 in Germany between U.S. Joint Staff and Russian General Staff delegations, the Russian side affirmed the possibility of joint military response to a terrorist attack. The Russian delegation head noted the utility of establishing a hotline between CJCS and the Russian CHOD to manage future CT crises, reversing a Russian reluctance to develop such a capability for the past dozen-plus years. The Russians also have pressed for a formal agreement (since 2005) on expanding CT cooperation, "necessary to legally cooperate in this sensitive area;" such an agreement may be finalized during CJCS visit to Russia at end of July and the Russians may insist on a similar type of framework as a prerequisite for substantive cooperation at the interagency level. The Cross Talks also identified a need for interoperability-focused exercises and combined training, exchanges on IED defeat technologies, joint assessment of terrorist TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures), force protection innovations, and intelligence sharing. There appears to be genuine interest by the FSB's CT units also to conduct cross talks with U.S. military counterparts.

20. (C) Reactivation of Intelligence Exchanges: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) meeting with Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) earlier this month focused on reactivating intelligence exchanges on topics of mutual interest, principally international terrorism, starting with specialists' meetings in U.S. and Russia this summer and fall; DIA will likely remain principal U.S. military intelligence interlocutor. Intelligence exchanges with the GRU to-date have been of marginal utility, closely aligned with Russian policy objectives (e.g., Georgia as base for Islamic terrorists). The absence of a GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement) between U.S. and Russia has also handicapped closer cooperation, requiring case-by-case exceptions to National Disclosure Policy. Even if the veracity of and motives behind GRU's information reports remain questionable, cooperation can help both sides assess the reliability of the information they report, particularly on terrorist threats.

21. (C) Training Centers: The U.S. and Russia engage in combined exercises and training, subject-matter expert exchanges, and courses and seminars that foster interoperability between military operational commands and tactical units involved in precluding or responding to terrorist threats. Russian MOD and Emercon officers attend George C. Marshall and Asia Pacific Center programs on terrorism and security studies. Two International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses in FY09 will focus on CT. If FY09 participation is successful, additional courses and slots will be made available in FY10.

22. (C) Border Security: FSB Border Guards are increasingly employing high-tech networks of sensors to secure remote border areas. Field grade-level officers have repeatedly requested demonstrations on how the U.S. employs sensors along the U.S. southwest border.

WMD: GICNT, Bioterrorism and Smallpox -------------------------------------

23. (C) One of the major success areas of U.S.- Russian counterterrorism cooperation has been in the WMD arena. In addition to reaffirming the existing strong cooperation, the resumption of the CTWG will allow us to press on some stalled initiatives in the biological arena. 24. (C) GICNT and CTR: The U.S.-Russia-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, begun in July 2006 now has over 70 Members, and will hold its fourth meeting in Madrid on June 16-18 where we are likely to issue a U.S.-Russia Joint Presidential Statement. Additionally, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative (CTR) has been one of the cornerstones of U.S.-Russian efforts to secure nuclear and biological facilities and materials and prevent WMD proliferation by helping destroy chemical and biological pathogens and chemical weapons stockpiles. CTR goals to complete security upgrades at Russian nuclear facilities are expected to be finished on time by end-2008. Follow-on activities could include securing Russian agreement to provide incident-response training at nuclear sites. 25. (C) Bioterrorism: Despite some recent advances, the scope of future bioterrorism cooperation is not clear. The U.S. and Russia made significant progress on counter-bioterrorism cooperation in 2006 when interagency U.S. and Russian experts met for the first time in years. Both sides agreed to meet regularly. When U.S. and Russian WMD experts met in February 2008, we agreed to hold a joint bioterrorism tabletop exercise and a seminar on assessment methods for bioterrorism threats. In June 2008, the United States shared a proposed agenda for the tabletop exercise and suggested holding the threat assessment seminar and a planning meeting for the tabletop exercise in July 2008. While Russia is currently considering that proposal, our MFA contacts tell us that there is a disagreement between the security services and other agencies regarding the usefulness of further bioterrorism cooperation. In addition, Russian MFA officials have stated that they view a bioterrorism attack as a "virtual" rather than a real threat. 26. (C) Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP): Due to Russia's unwillingness to cooperate on biological threat reduction and enter into a bilateral cooperation agreement, DOD is reducing its engagement in Russia in the BTRP. The CTWG will be an opportunity to further define Russian interest in BTRP, which helps prevent proliferation of BW-related materials, technologies, and expertise to combat bioterrorism. DOD currently consolidates and secures dangerous pathogens at five sites in Russia, improves safety and security of bio facilities involved in threat agent detection and response, enhances ability to detect and respond to bioterror attacks, and destroys former BW facilities. 27. (SBU) Smallpox: The resumption of U.S.-Russian collaboration on joint smallpox research, including the joint development of antiviral medications or improved vaccines that could be used in the event of a biological attack, has been stalled for over a year in the Russian bureaucratic approval process. In May 2008, A Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) delegation led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness Gerald Parker discussed the status of Russian approval to resume joint smallpox research with Deputy Health and Social Development Minister Ruslan Khalfin and with Gennadiy Onishchenko, Russia's Chief Medical Officer and head of the Federal Surveillance Service for Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being (Rospotrebnadzor). Onishchenko stated that Russ
ia would approve at least two of three proposed joint U.S.-Russian research projects, but he would not commit to a timetable. Russian health officials do not share our sense of urgency about the need to restart joint smallpox research. Similarly, they appear unconcerned about the growing chorus of nations at the World Health Assembly calling for destruction of the only declared smallpox repositories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and at the Vector State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology near Novosibirsk.

MANPADS -------

28. (S) The U.S. and Russia continue to cooperate to prevent the spread of Man-Portable Defense Systems (MANPADS). On July 25-27, 2007, the U.S. and Russia held the fourth Experts meeting to implement the bilateral MANPADS Arrangement that Secretary Rice and then Foreign Minister Ivanov signed in February 2005. The delegations discussed MANPADS transfers to third countries as well as policy and legislative updates. The Russians raised concerns about reported Georgian efforts to acquire MANPADS from Poland. Demarches were presented to Poland and Georgia to discourage the transfer, but there has been no confirmation that the transfer did not occur. We have delivered demarches to the GOR regarding the possible sale of MANPADS to Syria, which Russia has denied.

Transportation Security -----------------------

29. (SBU) Air Marshal Agreement: The MFA has previously shown interest in an air marshal agreement, but only with the condition that the arms would be turned over to the Russian government when the marshals deboard. The Russians are comfortable with a diplomatic note serving as the agreement mechanism, rather than a formal international agreement. Meanwhile, TSA and its local counterpart FANA have a good working relationship on security matters.

30. (C) Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) Program: The ongoing NWTS program enhances security and safety of nuclear weapons during shipment from deployment locations to dismantlement facilities or national stockpile sites. The Transportation Safety Enhancement Project was completed in FY 2006, providing 14 trucks to transport emergency support modules and 78 tents to upgrade shelters at accident sites. DoD funds approximately 48 rail shipments annually, procures and maintains up to 100 new cargo railcars and 15 guard railcars.

31. (C) Port Security: Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and FSB coordinate on conduct of force protection assessments at Russian ports visited by U.S. ships. The FSB Border Guards' relationship with USCG District 17 (Northwest Pacific) involves bi-annual visits to Petropavlovsk and Anchorage; participated in North Pacific Coast Guard Forum in April 2007 (Khabarovsk, experts' meeting) and September 2007 (St. Petersburg summit). When the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Commandant visited St. Petersburg in September 2007, FSB Border Guard leadership and civic leaders expressed an interest in working with USCG to improve port security there.

Comment -------

32. (C) The scope of our counterterrorism cooperation with Russia is significant, but there are opportunities to expand what is an essentially good-news story in the bilateral relationship. While the Russians often complain that they are not given credit for the extent of their CT cooperation, they remain resistant to publicizing success stories, in part because of their own sensitivities in not being tied too closely to U.S. efforts to combat Islamist terrorists. However, their public and private disquiet over Afghanistan, and recent baby steps in enhancing non-military cooperation through the NRC, should be taken up by the CTWG as a natural area of overlapping U.S. and Russian interest. The GOR will want to know if U.S. restructuring proposals for the CTWG remain on the table. 



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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1645 2008-06-10 10:35 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow


DE RUEHMO #1645 1621035
R 101035Z JUN 08

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001645 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018 
REF: STATE 61291 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
(S) On June 10 we passed reftel diplomatic note to Attache 
Yelena Loboda of the MFA North America Desk, who offered no 
substantive reply. 



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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1643 2008-06-10 07:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

DE RUEHMO #1643/01 1620728
R 100728Z JUN 08

E.O. 12958: N/A 
1. (SBU) Summary: In response to President MedvedevQs rhetoric about 
the rule of law and anti-corruption, the EmbassyQs Law Enforcement 
Section (LES) and Resident Legal Adviser (RLA) conducted two 
programs last week focused on strengthening RussiaQs capacity to 
combat corruption.  The first, a roundtable at Moscow State 
University, addressed corporate criminal liability, an important 
tool in combating corruption, white-collar crime and organized 
crime.  The second, a training program for 70 Russian prosecutors, 
focused on the skills needed to draft and argue motions in criminal 
cases, with a special focus on corruption prosecutions.  While the 
programs advanced the ball on both issues, they also highlighted the 
obstacles that Medvedev will face in combating corruption.  End 
2. (SBU) Legal provisions allowing for the criminal prosecution of 
corporate entities are an important component of any anti-corruption 
program.  For example, the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
requires that member states pass legislation sufficient to hold 
corporations liable for corruption offenses and several other 
international conventions contain similar recommendations. 
Moreover, certain crimes, such as foreign bribery, commercial 
bribery, restraint of trade, money laundering and environmental 
offenses, are committed almost exclusively by corporations, and the 
absence of corporate criminal liability makes it exceedingly 
difficult to prosecute such cases. 
3. (SBU) Currently, Russian law provides only for administrative, 
rather than criminal, liability for corporations, a remedy which 
appears completely inadequate.  For example, punishments are limited 
to small fines, insufficient to deter businesses from potentially 
lucrative wrongdoing. Moreover, the absence of criminal liability 
means that almost no criminal cases are brought under RussiaQs 
environmental and restraint of trade statutes and hampers IPR 
enforcement, as many pirate organizations, such as the website 
www.allofmp3.com, operate through corporate entities. (In the U.S., 
by contrast, corporations are regularly prosecuted for all of these 
offenses.  More importantly, knowing that a violation could result 
in an indictment, most companies have implemented rigorous internal 
compliance programs to prevent violations in the first place.) 
4. (SBU) To promote discussion of a possible amendment to Russian 
law, on May 30, LES held a seminar at Moscow State University for 
approximately 100 Russian criminal law scholars and practitioners. 
Anatoly Naumov, one of RussiaQs most famous criminal law scholars, 
began the program by discussing the history of debates in Russia 
over this subject and explained that a similar proposal in the 
1990Qs had been defeated by traditionalists who argued that a 
corporation cannot legally form criminal intent (a view that was 
abandoned in the U.S. and England in the middle of the 19th 
Century.) (N.B. A senior legal advisor in the Presidential 
Administration told RLA that, in fact, the proposal had been 
defeated because too many Duma Deputies use corporations to hide 
assets and launder money and could not risk subjecting them to 
criminal prosecution). 
5. (SBU) After Naumov, U.S. representatives addressed the seminar. 
RLA spoke about the history of corporate criminal liability in the 
US.  Ben Campbell, US Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, 
and one of the lead prosecutors from the Enron case, spoke about 
current US practice and new DOJ guidelines designed to prevent 
abuse. Adam Safwat, a prosecutor with DOJQs Fraud Section and one of 
DOJQs leading experts on international bribery spoke about corporate 
criminal liability in Europe.  Finally, a representative of the 
Business Software Alliance (BSA) spoke about the importance of 
corporate criminal liability in combating intellectual property 
violations and discussed recent legislative amendments in Latvia. 
Other speakers discussed corporate criminal liability in France and 
6. (SBU) These presentations were followed by an open discussion in 
which Russian experts argued vehemently among themselves about 
whether corporate criminal liability could be introduced in Russia. 
Some took the position that such a revision is long overdue and 
resolved to draft proposed amendments and submit them to the Duma. 
Others passionately supported the traditional view that a 
corporation cannot form criminal intent.  Still others argued that 
the structure of the Russian court system, in which cases involving 
corporations are heard in t
he commercial arbitrazh courts, cannot 
MOSCOW 00001643  002 OF 003 
accommodate criminal cases against corporations and pointed out that 
such an innovation would require a major revision of the court 
system.  On the whole, the discussion highlighted the extent to 
which formalistic jurisprudence and complicated court structures 
will continue to pose an obstacle to serious legal reform. 
7. (SBU) Immediately after the corporate criminal liability program, 
RLA conducted a week long training program for 70 Russian 
prosecutors at the St. Petersburg Procuracy Training Institute. The 
program focused on drafting and arguing motions in criminal cases, a 
task which Russian prosecutors often perform extremely poorly, doing 
little more than ritualistically invoking statutory language with 
little supporting argumentation or evidence. 
8. (SBU) The program was significant in that it brought together a 
number of top U.S. and Russian prosecutors as instructors.  U.S. 
instructors included the Chief of the Securities Fraud Unit of the 
New Jersey U.S. AttorneyQs Office; a New York prosecutor currently 
prosecuting a mob boss who solicited the murders of a federal judge 
and a federal prosecutor; a distinguished Wisconsin prosecutor with 
thirty years experience; and a federal magistrate judge with 
extensive federal prosecutorial experience. 
9. (SBU) Russian instructors included the head of the General 
Procuracy Public Prosecution Section; one of the prosecutors from 
the famous Tri Kita (Three Whales) case, a major corruption and 
smuggling case which has figured  prominently in the siloviki wars; 
a prosecutor from the so-called Werewolves in Uniform case, which 
involved the prosecution of police officers who were operating a 
racketeering and extortion gang within the police; and a prosecutor 
who recently convicted several members of a notorious murder for 
hire gang. (In other joint training programs, Russian instructors 
have usually been academic lecturers, rather than prosecuting 
prosecutors, and as far as we are aware, this is the first time that 
so many high profile Russian prosecutors have participated in any 
prosecutorial training program.) 
10. (SBU) Following a format that has proven successful in other LES 
training programs, Russian and U.S. instructors lectured in pairs on 
various skills, included drafting written motions, arguing motions 
in court and drafting and arguing appeals.  These lectures were 
followed by demonstrations in which instructors simulated situations 
drawn from real cases to illustrate how they would argue a 
particular motion.  The demonstrations were followed by work in 
breakout groups in which students practiced the relevant skills and 
received critique from both Russian and U.S. instructors and other 
students.  The program concluded with a mock proceeding in which 
students played the prosecutors, defense lawyers and witnesses. A 
practicing judge from St. Petersburg District Court presided. 
11. (SBU) Throughout, the program emphasized the skills needed to 
prosecute corruption cases, as most of the case demonstrations drew 
on situations from real corruption and white collar cases and the 
mock trial drew on a real case involving the prosecution of two 
Customs officers who extorted a bribe from a businessman in order to 
let a shipment of furniture clear Customs. The program proved highly 
successful.  Students who, at the beginning of the week, appeared 
nervous and inarticulate speaking in court situations, were, by the 
end of the week, arguing motions forcefully and persuasively. 
Student reviews were uniformly enthusiastic and the General 
Procuracy has asked RLA to do a repeat program in Irkutsk for 
prosecutors from Siberia and the Far East. 
12. (SBU) Although the program was successful and the Procuracy 
appears to committed to continuing to work with us in this area, it 
also contained disturbing indications of just how widespread 
corruption is in the Russian legal system and the obstacles that 
Medvedev will have to overcome in combating corruption.  For 
example, one of the Russian prosecutors boasted to RLA about how he 
collects blackmail material on judges to coerce them into reversing 
what he termed illegal decisions.  (Although he claimed this was a 
necessary anti-corruption measure, it is clearly illegal and 
contains enormous potential for abuse. Moreover, his claims do not 
appear to be idle. In one academic survey, 11% of Russian judges 
said that they had been pressured to reach certain decisions in 
cases.  75% of them said that the pressure had come from 
prosecutors.) He also openly admitted to Qmaking problemsQ for 
witnesses who try to change their testimony at trial. 
MOSCOW 00001643  003 OF 003 
13. (SBU) Similarly, in one of the breakout groups, a Russian 
prosecutor proposed (only half-jokingly) altering a document in 
response to a defense motion to exclude it, a comment which prompted 
a question to RLA as to whether American prosecutors QalsoQ engage 
in this practice.  In the mock trial, one student created a scenario 
in which the defendant offered fabricated evidence, which drew 
applause from the audience members, suggesting that the practice is 
quite common. (This reaction appears to be justified. According to 
the survey cited above, 30% of Russian defense lawyers admitted to 
knowingly presenting false information in court, while 50% said that 
they thought it was acceptable to offer evidence of dubious origin.)