Daily Archives: June 13, 2008

08MOSCOW1691, RUSSIA-SAUDI TIES REMAIN FIRM BUT PUZZLING

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1691.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1691 2008-06-13 13:36 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO8757
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMO #1691 1651336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131336Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8597
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0274

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD SA RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-SAUDI TIES REMAIN FIRM BUT PUZZLING 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: According to the MFA, Russia-Saudi relations 
remain "firm" despite the tough stance the Saudis took during 
bilateral negotiations on Russia's WTO accession.  Agreement 
was reached only after a personal phone call from Putin to 
King Abdullah.  The MFA said that Russian Railways' failure 
to secure a $800 million contract to build a new rail line in 
Saudi Arabia was not a reflection of troubled ties.  The MFA 
also denied any stress in the bilateral relationship over the 
recent political crisis in Lebanon, affirming that Moscow and 
Riyadh informed each other of steps taken to help settle the 
situation.  The Saudis did not ask Russia to press Syria and 
Iran to reign in Hizbollah.  A potential Saudi purchase of 
Russian military equipment is still under discussion, with 
the MFA reluctant to provide any details.  End summary. 
 
Russia Puzzled Over Saudi Approach to WTO 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) MFA Counselor for the Persian Gulf Rashid Izmailov 
told us on June 10 that although Russia-Saudi relations 
remained "firm," the GOR was puzzled by the approach taken by 
the Saudis over Russia's WTO accession, particularly Riyadh's 
demand that Russia raise domestic prices on oil and gas.  In 
the GOR's view, there was no economic benefit in this for 
Saudi Arabia since it did not compete with Russian energy 
firms in the domestic market, and few Saudi companies 
competed with Russian manufacturers that benefited from low 
energy prices.  Izmailov said that the deciding factor in 
reaching an agreement on June 3 was a personal phone call 
Putin made to King Abdullah.  (Note:  We understand that in 
the end, the Saudis dropped their demand that Russia increase 
its domestic oil and gas prices, but reserved the right to 
raise the issue again in the context of multi-lateral 
negotiations in Geneva over Russia's Working Party report, a 
crucial part of the accession package.  End note.) 
 
Russian Railways Did Not Lose Saudi Contract 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Izmailov said that to the contrary of speculation that 
appeared in the Russian press, the MFA knew of no connection 
between the WTO accession negotiations and Russian Railways' 
(RR) May 21 announcement that it had "lost" a $800 million 
tender to build a new rail line in Saudi Arabia.  RR 
President Vladimir Yakunin appeared to blame this predicament 
on the state of Russia-Saudi ties when he told the press that 
losing the contract was the result of "a problem in 
international relations."  RR announced in January that it 
had won the contract after learning that its bid on the 
tender had been viewed more favorably than the competitors', 
but Izmailov said that the deal was never formally secured. 
In May, he noted, the Saudis announced that they had not 
chosen any of the bids received and would begin taking new 
bids to construct the 323-mile rail line. 
 
No Stress Over Lebanon 
---------------------- 
 
4. (C) Izmailov told us that that neither the drawn out 
nature of the WTO negotiations nor the RR situation reflected 
problems in Russia-Saudi relations.  He denied that there had 
been any trouble with the Saudis over Russian reaction to the 
recent Lebanese political crisis.  The Saudis did not ask 
Russia to press the Iranians or Syrians to reign in 
Hizbollah.  Moscow and Riyadh were in contact about the 
situation and simply informed each other of the actions they 
were taking to help settle the crisis. 
 
Saudi Arms Deal Still in the Works 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Izmailov said that the Saudi purchase of Russian 
military equipment was still under discussion.  He did not 
know any details regarding the size of the purchase under 
consideration, nor could confirm the accuracy of a press 
report that Rosoboronexport was preparing a $4 billion 
contract that included tanks, APCs, helicopters, and medium 
range surface-to-air missiles. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1689, INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1689.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1689 2008-06-13 12:48 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1689/01 1651248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131248Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8592
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reason:  1.4 (d). 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Several recent studies of Russian public 
opinion demonstrate the extent to which corruption is a part 
of every Russian's daily life.  Due to red-tape, weak 
government oversight and poorly thought-out reforms, 
corruption has expanded in various fields, such as health 
care education and military conscription.  Russian traffic 
police have long had a well-earned reputation for taking 
bribes or "on the spot" fees.  While the studies show some 
signs that Russians have increasingly refused to pay for 
supposedly free services, the jury is still out on whether 
this is a trend.  Given the endemic nature of corruption in 
society, Medvedev's "no holds barred" war against corruption, 
announced with great fanfare on May 19, will be an uphill 
battle.  End Summary. 
 
Corruption is a Pervasive Part of Russian Life 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  (SBU) Three recent studies have found that corruption 
remains a pervasive part of Russian life.  According to a 
March 2008 national survey by the Fund for Public Opinion 
(FOM), slightly more than half of all respondents said they 
believed corruption in Russia could not be eradicated, and 
only one-third said they felt such a task was achievable.  In 
fact, almost half of respondents indicated they saw an 
increase in corruption, while only five percent thought 
corruption had decreased.  This tracks with a joint study by 
Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) and the Levada 
Center in 2005 which estimated that 50 percent of all 
Russians were required to pay a bribe in order to receive a 
government service.  Transparency International's 2007 
Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Russia as one of the most 
corrupt countries, along with Indonesia, Angola and Nigeria. 
 
3.  (SBU) The FOM and INDEM studies measured corruption as 
experienced by citizens in contacts with government 
officials.  Both studies broadly defined corruption as the 
giving of money or other valuable items in return for some 
benefit from a government worker that was inconsistent with 
the law or regulations.  The two studies highlighted the ways 
corruption affects citizens in their contacts with law 
enforcement, health care education, the military draft, and 
the courts. 
 
Corruption Permeates all Layers of Education 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Citizens surveyed by FOM and INDEM alleged an 
increase in corruption and the risk of corruption in the 
educational system.  INDEM limited its study to higher 
education, while FOM surveyed "education establishments" in 
general.  Over the past ten years, the proportion of 
respondents in FOM's survey that felt universities and 
colleges were corrupt doubled, from 10 to 20 percent.  INDEM 
found that the risk of being exposed to corruption in the 
education sector had increased from 36 to 52 percent, 
although the size of bribes had decreased slightly from USD 
4,300 to USD 3,870.  INDEM reported that despite lower 
bribes, corruption had become more widespread and estimated 
that the amount of money paid in bribes in higher education 
had increased during this period almost 30 percent from USD 
450 million to USD 584 million. 
 
5.  (C)  The head of the Moscow office of Transparency 
International, Yelena Panfilova, also believed that 
corruption permeates all layers of Russia's education system 
and is on the rise.  She traced this rise in corruption to an 
out-of-date education system and poorly designed educational 
reforms.  Russia's demographics have changed considerably, 
while the infrastructure in education has not kept up.  Some 
regions have experienced a population decline, yet maintain a 
large number of unneeded schools, while other regions have 
seen huge increases in population without a corresponding 
increase in schools.  Panfilova said this has put bureaucrats 
who control school admissions in areas like Moscow, where the 
population has increased, in a position to demand bribes from 
parents for placing their child in the neighborhood 
kindergarten or primary school. 
 
6.  (C) Panfilova traced a large increase in corruption to 
the school reforms of 2003-2004.  The FOM study also showed a 
sharp rise in the perception of corruption after this date. 
During this period, the INDEM study found opportunities for 
corruption to be greater at the university level, but average 
bribe payments slightly reduced.  However, INDEM's report 
concluded that the total value of bribes increased markedly 
because bribes were demanded or expected more often. 
 
Marked Increase in Corruption in Health Care 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The FOM and INDEM studies showed a marked increase 
in the instance and perception of corruption in health care. 
FOM found the perception of corruption in health care had 
increased more than two-fold from 2002 to 2008.  INDEM found 
that the instance of corruption in health care markedly 
increased, although again with caveat
s.  Based on its 
analysis of the data, INDEM concluded that the willingness to 
pay a bribe for health care decreased while the average size 
of a bribe increased about 40 percent (from USD 1,093 to USD 
1,420).  Considered as a whole, INDEM concluded, however, 
that there was actually a significant decrease in the amount 
of money paid in bribes for health care. 
 
8.  (C) Panfilova disagreed with INDEM's findings. 
Transparency International's analysis of corruption in health 
care found no decrease in corruption, nor did its surveys 
find any decreased willingness by Russians to pay bribes to 
obtain better health care.  Panfilova said that her data 
mirrored the FOM's.  As with the case of corruption in 
education, she laid the blame for the increase at the feet of 
failed reforms.  Russia's health care system had undergone 
significant changes, including monetarization of the 
previously free system.  Panfilova blamed weak controls and 
oversight for the creation of greater opportunities for 
corruption. 
 
Corruption in Avoiding Conscription Surges 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9.  (SBU) Both the FOM and INDEM reports highlighted the poor 
public image of the military draft board.  All Russian men 
are obliged to enter the army for one year at the age of 18, 
although there are exceptions for men who attend universities 
or other qualifying institutions of higher learning with 
military courses, those who opt for a two-year term of 
alternative service, and those with disqualifying health 
conditions.  After health care and education, the draft 
offices showed the steepest increase in perceived corruption 
in FOM data from 1998 to 2008.  Reports of corruption roughly 
doubled from 10 percent of all respondents to 20 percent. 
INDEM noted not only a substantial increase in the 
opportunities for bureaucrats to ask for bribes, but also in 
the amount of bribes themselves.  It estimated a five-fold 
increase in the amount paid from about USD 3,200 to USD 
15,400 per transaction. 
 
10.  (C) Panfilova commented there are two reasons for the 
surge in corruption in this area.  The second war in Chechnya 
was underway from 2002 to 2005 and conscripts could have 
expected to have been deployed there.  Second, young men 
entering the army in that period had little memory of the 
Soviet Union, in which serving in the military was considered 
an honor.  (Panfilova's comments ignored the demoralizing war 
in Afghanistan.)  After two bloody wars in Chechnya, that 
feeling of civic pride had evaporated.  Given the Russian 
army's reputation for harsh treatment of conscripts (hazing 
and even slave labor), parents' efforts to keep their sons 
out of the army were understandable. 
 
The Ubiquitous Traffic Police 
----------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The FOM and INDEM studies found that the traffic 
police (GAI) had by far the worst reputation for corruption 
of all government institutions, and this perception has only 
gotten worse.  Half of all respondents in the March 2008 FOM 
survey felt that GAI was corrupt -- up from one-third in 
2002.  INDEM noted that the opportunities for corruption 
among traffic police have remained relatively constant, as 
has the size of bribes paid.  Although many ordinary Russians 
pay off police to avoid traffic tickets, the size of such 
bribes has remained small, meaning that in total, the size of 
the market for GAI corruption (measured by the amount of 
money grossed) has remained small compared to other areas of 
corruption such as conscription into the military. 
 
Why do Russians Put Up with Corruption? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Panfilova disagreed with Georgiy Satarov, president 
of INDEM and the principal researcher on the 2001 and 2005 
studies, concerning Russians' willingness to pay bribes. 
Satarov attempted to show through his study that the average 
Russian's willingness to pay a bribe had decreased during the 
period.  He suggested instead that, more often than before, 
Russians sought legal means to accomplish their tasks or 
simply gave up the attempt.  Panfilova provided a slightly 
more nuanced approach.  She divided bribes into two types -- 
bribes for comfort and bribes for necessity. 
 
13.  (C) According to Panfilova, bribes for comfort included 
those pay-offs that come from a desire to accomplish a task 
more quickly or more easily.  The fact that the law places no 
time limits on most bureaucratic decision making serves to 
increase the opportunity for corruption.  The seemingly 
impenetrable red-tape Russians experience in their attempt to 
obtain a driver's license, buy an apartment, remodel a home, 
or register ownership of land, fosters extensive occasions 
for corruption.  Most GAI pay-offs fall under this category 
as they forestall a trip to court and potential loss of 
driving privileges.  Bribes of necessity include paying 
school bureaucrats to get a child registered in kindergarten 
or bribing clinic directors to receive needed medical care. 
Panfilova believed that these two types of paid corruption 
are equally common in Russian society although not equally 
distributed.  The exact proportion depends on the sector of 
government.  For example, about 80 percent of bribes to GAI 
would be bribes of convenience, whereas about half of the 
bribes paid in clinics or hospitals would be bribes of 
necessity.  Unfortunately, no data exist to substantiate 
Panfilova's thesis. 
 
More Government Means More Corruption 
------------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) According to the FOM survey, 27 percent of 
respondents had to bribe a government worker at some time 
during 2007.  Lyudmila Presnyakova, a senior researcher at 
FOM, told us that this national average differed greatly 
depending on where a person lives.  For example, 40 percent 
of Muscovites reported being expected to pay a bribe while in 
villages only 25 percent reported the same. 
 
15.  (C) Presnyakova noted that with increasing disposable 
income, more people can afford cars and come into contact 
(and more often) with the traffic police.  She also said that 
as more people send their children to college or university, 
they again come into greater contact with corrupt practices. 
Satarov agreed with Presnyakova, adding that, in fact, the 
probability of any one contact with a government agency 
requiring a bribe does not significantly differ 
geographically across Russia.  He contended that villagers 
have much less need of government services while residents of 
large cities like Moscow make continual demands on the 
government.  The difference, according to him, lies in the 
fact that more Muscovites are stopped by the GAI. 
 
16.  (C) Satarov also indirectly supported Panfilova's point 
that recent reforms in education and health care brought 
about greater corrup
tion.  He saw no oversight over the 
bureaucracy, and indeed as government services became more 
centralized, believed the levers of control had weakened. 
Without oversight by elected officials and without 
transparency in the system, it is difficult to hold 
bureaucrats to account for their actions. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
17.  (C) The FOM and INDEM studies support the contention 
that Russians deal with corruption daily in obtaining routine 
government services.  No one with whom we spoke knew of any 
grass-roots political movement to combat corruption although 
all national leaders speak of combating it.  On June 6, the 
head of the Investigation Committee under the Office of the 
General Prosecutor that investigates government corruption 
cited recent INDEM statistics that businesses spend USD 33 
billion each year bribing bureaucrats.  The committee 
reportedly received 33,000 reports of corruption in 2007 and 
16,000 in the first five months of 2008. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1688, REP. ROHRABACHER MEETS WITH ROSATOM’S KIRIYENKO

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1688.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1688 2008-06-13 12:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1688/01 1651248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131248Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8590
INFO RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001688 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP OREP PREL RS
SUBJECT: REP. ROHRABACHER MEETS WITH ROSATOM'S KIRIYENKO 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Rosatom Director General Sergey Kiriyenko welcomed 
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher's strong support for the U.S.-Russia 
123 Agreement during a June 3 meeting at Rosatom.  Congressman 
Rohrabacher highlighted the potential for bilateral collaboration in 
the development of a high temperature gas cooled reactor.  Kiriyenko 
agreed the technology was promising, but added that U.S funding for 
joint R and D should not come out of the $400 million the U.S. has 
pledged under the Plutonium Disposition Agreement.   Kiriyenko noted 
that Russia has called on Iran to cease enrichment and offered Iran 
ways to guarantee its nuclear fuel supply without enriching. 
Kiriyenko expressed concern about a bill drafted by Senator Domenici 
which would impose new restrictions on future Russian exports of low 
enriched uranium to the U.S. market.  End Summary. 
 
U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Rosatom State Corporation Director General Sergey 
Kiriyenko received Congressman Rohrabacher and Charge at Rosatom 
June 3.   Joining Kiriyenko were Rosatom Deputy Director General 
Nikolay Spasskiy and three Rosatom Department Directors.   Kiriyenko 
welcomed Congressman Rohrabacher's expression of strong support for 
the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. 
Congressman Rohrabacher confirmed that some of his colleagues on 
Capitol Hill opposed the Agreement because of Russia's involvement 
in Iran's civilian nuclear program.   Kiriyenko thanked the 
Congressman for his frankness. 
 
Bilateral Civilian Nuclear Cooperation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Kiriyenko was optimistic about the potential for expanded 
U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear and nonproliferation cooperation.  He 
observed that the best way to combat lingering cold war mindsets on 
both sides was to increase cooperation through concrete projects. 
He highlighted U.S.-Russian cooperation in bringing about the 
shutdown of the plutonium-generating reactor in Seversk.  He also 
praised the longstanding HEU-LEU program as a major achievement in 
advancing nonproliferation goals while supplying a significant 
portion of the fuel used by U.S. nuclear power plants. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) offers an 
additional avenue for enhanced cooperation, Kiriyenko observed. 
GNEP is consistent with Russia's call for International Uranium 
Enrichment Centers, such as the one in Angarsk.  GNEP and 
International Enrichment Centers will help promote the safe use of 
nuclear power by developing countries. 
 
High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher stressed that the development of 
high temperature gas cooled reactors could serve as a foundation for 
enhanced bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation.  He follows the 
development of the technology closely, since General Atomics is 
located in Southern California.  High temperature gas cooled 
reactors would be cleaner and safer and fit the goal of providing 
the benefits of nuclear power technology to developing countries 
without increasing the proliferation risk.  Rohrabacher recounted 
how he had met the day before with the Vice President of the 
Kurchatov Institute, Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy, who is a strong 
proponent of the gas cooled reactor.  In Stepnoy's view, this joint 
U.S.-Russian program was the only genuine current cooperative civil 
nuclear research project. 
 
Gas Cooled Reactors and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Kiriyenko agreed that since high temperature gas cooled 
reactors could burn plutonium efficiently they had strong 
non-proliferation potential.  He welcomed Russian cooperation with 
General Atomics and favored intensifying it.  Kiriyenko observed 
that Rosatom's twenty year strategic plan contained funding for 
research and development of the high temperature gas reactors. 
 
7.  (SBU) Kiriyenko noted that the U.S. and Russia are still engaged 
in negotiations on the Plutonium Disposition agreement.  Kiriyenko 
maintained that when he and Secretary Bodman signed the Joint 
Statement on the Agreement in November 2007, Secretary Bodman had 
agreed to include research into the gas cooled reactors under the 
Agreement's auspices.  However, Russia believed that U.S. funding 
for R and D into the gas cooled reactors should be in addition to 
the $400 million set out for the Plutonium Disposition program.  The 
U.S. side wanted to take funding out of the $400 million. 
(Rohrabacher heard much the same from Kurchatov's Ponomarev-Stepnoy. 
 If the U.S. did not provide additional funds, Stepnoy warned, 
Kiriyenko would continue to support the effort, but not as a joint 
project, effectively cutting off the existing flow of R and D 
information.) 
 
8.  (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher said he would speak with Senator 
Lugar and inquire wh
ether CTR funds might be used for purposes of 
development of the gas reactor given its effectiveness in burning 
plutonium. 
 
Russian-Iranian Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Charge asked Kiriyenko to describe the state of 
Russian-Iranian civil nuclear cooperation.  Kiriyenko said Russia's 
position is clear: it firmly opposes Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. 
 Russia's analysis of the risk is similar to that outlined in the 
U.S. NIE on Iran: Russia has no evidence that Iran has an active 
weapons program but can not rule out that such a program exists. 
Russian leaders, including Putin, have told Iranian counterparts 
that if they seek only civilian nuclear power, then their enrichment 
program makes no sense.  Enrichment only makes economic sense if it 
can supply a base of ten or, preferably, twenty reactors.  Iran has 
only one reactor -- Bushehr -- and Russia will supply all the fuel 
for it and take away all waste.  From an economic perspective, the 
Iranian enrichment program thus makes no sense for civilian uses. 
 
10.  (SBU) The Iranians reply that they are moving forward in the 
fuel cycle in order to have an assured fuel supply, Kiriyenko said. 
Russia has responded that it is willing to provide Iran with 
assurances of supply, as long as Iran remains in good standing with 
the IAEA.  An international enrichment center, such as the one in 
Angarsk operating under IAEA auspices, can institutionalize such 
assurances.  Russia's provision of fuel to Bushehr demonstrates that 
Iran need not fear a cut-off of fuel and that its enrichment program 
is entirely unnecessary. 
 
11.  (SBU) Kiriyenko said that in his personal opinion, sanctions 
against Iran will not stop its enrichment program unless the 
sanctions target Iran's oil and gas sector.  Only then would Iran 
take sanctions seriously.  But the costs of such action could be as 
detrimental to the West as to Iran.  The spike in prices would, 
however, not hurt Russia, given its status as an exporter, he 
observed. 
 
Amendment to the Uranium Anti-Dumping Suspension Agreement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Kiriyenko recounted how in February he and Secretary 
Gutierrez had signed the amendment to the Uranium Anti-Dumping 
Suspension Agreement.  The amendment, Kiriyenko said, was important 
in providing stability by granting Russia a fixed percentage of the 
U.S. market.   U.S. utilities were in favor of it.  While Russia had 
hoped for more than 20 percent of the U.S. market, they had signed 
on.  With the advent of a bill by Senator Domenici, however, the 
Suspension Agreement appears in jeopardy.   Senator Domenici's bill 
would have the effect of voiding the Suspension Agreement, Kiriyenko 
said.  The bill would insist that imports of LEU to the U.S. from 
Russia could only be from down blended HEU, according to Kiriyenko. 
(Note:  We understand that the Domenici bill actually permits 
400,000 kg/year of Russian LEU imports to the United States 
beginning in 2014, but any imports beyond that would be linked to 
down blended HEU.)  Russia could not meet that condition.  Kiriyenko 
said he might write a letter to the U.S. Administration laying out 
the issue.  (Note:  On June 5, Kiriyenko did send a letter to Energy 
Secretary Bodman highlighting Russian concerns with the Domenici 
bill.) 
 
13.  (SBU) Congressman Rohrabacher concluded the meeting by 
reiterating his belief in the important role U.S.-Russian 
collaboration could play in developing a new generation of safe and 
clean nuclear reactors.  He underlined that success in that endeavor 
would spread the benefits of nuclear power worldwide while reducing 
proliferation risk. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1683, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: NORTH-WESTERN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1683.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1683 2008-06-13 08:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1683 1650826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130826Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8581
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001683 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LIARITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: NORTH-WESTERN 
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY EXPERT CENTER, ST PETERSBURG, 
RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D396871 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 03270 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, North- 
Western Industrial Safety Expert Center, St 
Petersburg, Russia.  The company is listed on BIS 
license application D396871 as the ultimate consignee 
of thermal imaging camera containing a vanadium oxide 
(VOX) uncooled microbolometer with 25 micron pitch, 
320 X 240 focal plane array.  Purchase may include 10, 
20, 54 mm lenses, and fusion (FT) and high temperature 
(HT) capabilities.  These items are controlled for 
national security, nuclear non-proliferation reasons 
under ECCN 6A003. The licensee is FLUKE Corporation, 
6920 Seaway Blvd, Everett, WA   98203. 
 
3. On June 10, 2008, Export Control Attach Peter 
Liston and LES Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested pre-license check at the offices of North- 
Western Industrial Safety Expert Center, St 
Petersburg, Russia. The export control team met with 
Yuri Murashkintsev, General Director of North-Western 
Industrial Safety Expert Center, St Petersburg, 
Russia. 
 
4.  Yuri Murashkintsev, General Director of North- 
Western Industrial Safety Expert Center ((NWISEC)) 
told the Export Control Team that his company was 
registered in 2007 as a Limited Liability Company 
(LLC).  NWISEC obtained all requisite government 
licenses and certifications in October 2007 to conduct 
feasibility studies and expert examination of 
hazardous facilities and materials.  NWISEC is located 
in a multi-office complex with manned, electronic 
access card and video controlled security.  NWISEC has 
exclusive and secure access to one complete floor of 
the building.  NWISEC is a 100% Russian owned company 
and they do not conduct business outside of the 
Russia. 
 
5.  The subject commodity in reftel, a thermal imaging 
camera containing a vanadium oxide (VOX) uncooled 
microbolometer with 25 micron pitch, 320 X 240 focal 
plane array, will be utilized by NWISEC to conduct 
diagnostic examinations of building structures, gas 
and oil industry equipment, transferring stations, 
pipelines, and tanks for petroleum and mineral oil. 
NWISEC has 10 employees including 5 engineers who have 
experience working with thermal imaging equipment and 
who have been trained in the use and operation of 
FLUKE thermal imaging equipment. 
 
6.  North-Western Industrial Safety Expert Center 
((NWISEC)) has the technical and commercial 
sophistication consistent for which the commodity in 
reftel was designed.  NWISEC has sufficient engineers 
who are qualified to operate the commodity.  NWISEC 
has a legitimate need and end-use for the commodity in 
reftel. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends North-Western 
Industrial Safety Expert Center, St Petersburg, 
Russia, as reliable recipients of sensitive U.S. 
origin commodities. It is requested that post be 
notified of final disposition of the application, and 
of any shipments for this organization in order to 
conduct appropriate FCS follow-up and statistical 
reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1681, DAS BRYZA’S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1681.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1681 2008-06-13 05:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1681/01 1650543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 130543Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8577
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY 
SECRETARY ZUBAKOV 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  In a June 5 meeting, DAS Bryza and Security 
Council Deputy Secretary Yuriy Zubakov reviewed the latest 
developments in Abkhazia and discussed a possible joint 
effort to improve relations with Georgia.  Both agreed that a 
military solution was not an option.  DAS Bryza briefed 
Zubakov on positive developments in Tbilisi's relationship 
with Sukhumi, and urged the GOR to make concessions in order 
to reduce tensions.  Zubakov presented a long list of 
grievances against the Georgian leadership, but agreed that 
the U.S. and Russia should jointly attempt to move the 
negotiation process forward.  End summary. 
 
Common Language Not Impossible 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Zubakov opened the meeting by stressing the 
importance of continued U.S. - Russian dialogue.  During his 
recent trip to Tbilisi, Zubakov had met his "old friend" 
Ambassador Tefft, and had felt the two had understood one 
other.  DAS Bryza reviewed U.S. efforts to normalize direct 
contacts between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, and to help 
the two parties overcome the historic animosity and navigate 
the current delicate situation in and around Abkhazia.  He 
underscored U.S. concern that the GOR, despite its repeated 
rhetoric of respect for Georgia's territorial integrity, had 
engaged in provocative actions.  DAS Bryza thought that the 
independence of Kosovo had created an expectation that 
"something" might happen in Abkhazia.  Many in Georgia had 
feared an impending cataclysm.  To complicate matters 
further, the Saakashvili leadership was contending with a 
group of hard-liners who would protect Georgian honor at any 
cost.  The hard-liners saw only two choices: to lose Abkhazia 
through its independence or annexation to Russia or to 
attempt to regain it via military action.  DAS Bryza said 
that the U.S. goal was to help Georgia make a third choice: 
to resume direct negotiations with Abkhazia.  With many 
serious professionals in Georgia, including Minister of 
Reintegration Yakobashvili, urging a moderation on the 
Georgian leadership, the GOG has begun to talk to the Abkhaz 
and understand that their ultimate goal was a guarantee of 
security and of respect for Abkhazian cultural and political 
rights.  DAS Bryza thought that the May 11 Alasania proposal 
had brought Tbilisi and Sukhumi closer together.  The task 
now was to find a workable formula, perhaps one borrowed from 
international precedents, such as Bosnia or Cyprus, to ensure 
that if/when Georgian IDPs return to Abkhazia, ethnic Abkhaz 
will maintain disproportionately large political rights.  DAS 
Bryza added that each party's concerns, including the return 
of IDPs, the renunciation of force, and the reduction of 
forces in the Upper Kodori, would have to be negotiated. 
 
Russia's Turn to Make Concession 
-------------------------------- 
 
3,  (C) DAS Bryza said that Russia's willingness to make 
concessions -- whether it be the removal of paratroops and 
their artillery or the discontinuation of railway 
construction by the Ministry of Defense -- would be immensely 
helpful in opening a new and promising negotiating process. 
He emphasized that Russia's "humanitarian" work would have 
been acceptable and appreciated had Russia consulted first 
with Georgia and especially if the two countries were to 
engage in joint projects.  The GOR's dispatch of MOD 
personnel for railway construction in Abkhazia a day after 
Georgia had announced the discontinuation of UAV flights was 
not very helpful. 
 
Without Russia, Nothing Goes 
---------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) DAS Bryza, recalled that both Abkhaz "president" 
Bagapsh and the UNSYG Special Representative to Georgia Jean 
Arnault believed the Friends' Group was "non-functional," and 
reiterated that the conflict could be solved only if the U.S. 
and Russia worked together with a strong commitment to a 
peaceful solution.  Without Russia, there would be nothing. 
 
Trusting Georgia: Hardest Thing to Do 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Zubakov said he met with many prominent Georgians 
during his recent trip to Tbilisi, including President 
Saakashvili.  He expressed concern for the Georgian 
hard-liners, who tended to make emotional decisions, with no 
regard for their consequences.  He requested that the U.S. 
attempt to dampen emotion among Georgian leaders.  Zubakov 
dismissed the GOG's list of complaints as not serious. 
Georgia's grievance about the Joint Control Commission (JCC) 
for the South Ossetia conflict was not convincing, as the 
success of any negotiation depended on the commitment of the 
participants.  Zubakov criticized the GOG for pretending that 
Putin's April 16 instructions had triggered the impasse, 
although the current "abnormal" relationship had in fact 
preceded it.  Zubakov presented to DAS Bryza a list of 
Georgian "provocations," including the recent firing on a bus 
in Gali, where the journalists and TV crew had been 
"pre-positioned" to record the "event;" and the killing of 
six Cossacks in South Ossetia.  In the latt
er instance, 
Zubakov said, the Georgians had  quickly changed the clothing 
of a murdered South Ossetian to make him look like a Russian 
Cossack.  Give that track record, he asked, "How can we trust 
the Georgians?" 
 
Saakashvili's Policies 
---------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Zubakov maintained that the Georgian leadership 
should be more cognizant of the negative consequences of its 
behavior.   Saakashvili's intention to settle status before 
the principle of the non-use of force and confidence building 
had been established did not work.  Zubakov urged the 
Georgian leadership to study the origins of the 1994 war, and 
listen more closely to the Abkhaz.  As Russia cherishes and 
loves Georgian culture, the Georgians should learn to respect 
Abkhaz culture instead of trying to supplant it with their 
own.  He advised never to forget that it was Russia who saved 
Shevardnadze.  Saakashvili claimed that Russia was Georgia's 
number one threat and had boasted to Zubakov that the whole 
international community was behind Georgia in its conflict 
with Russia. (DAS Bryza questioned the validity of such 
assertion.)   In contrast to the GOG's impulsive and 
provocative actions, the GOR has been transparent and abided 
by the rules set: in increasing peacekeeping troops it had 
been careful to keep their number below the ceiling 
established by the 1994 mandate.  Instead of reciprocating 
the GOR's goodwill gestures, the GOG had endlessly talked 
about the wine embargo -- which was simply "ridiculous."  The 
Russian market was flooded with counterfeit Georgian wines 
that required GOR quality control. 
 
7.  (C) Zubakov noted that Georgian cabinet members rotate 
with alarming rapidity, and many "competent" professionals 
were dismissed for no reason, making long-term cooperation 
based on personal rapport difficult.  He lamented the loss of 
"respectable" Georgian leaders, with whom the GOG could work 
effectively, such as former FM Zourabichvili, former Georgian 
Ambassador to Russia Abashidze and former Russian Ambassador 
to Georgia Chikvishvili.  Where is Salome now?" Zubakov 
asked, referring to the former Georgian FM, Salome 
Zourabichvili, who is now working for the opposition. 
Zubakov said that he had much respect for Yakobashvili and 
his academic background but Yakobashvili himself admitted to 
Zubakov that he might not last long.  For the time being, 
Yakobashvili is busy "looking for scholarly justifications 
for Saakashvili's emotional decisions." 
 
Kosovo Not Yet Finished 
----------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Zubakov warned that the Kosovo settlement was not yet 
completed and many unexpected results of the forced 
settlement were in store.  He asked DAS Bryza how the West 
would handle the second largest Moslem country in the heart 
of Europe.  Arguing Russia's policy toward Kosovo based on 
"tolerance" was more responsible than the West's, Zubakov 
advised against a hasty imposition of a settlement on 
Abkhazia. 
 
Defending GOR "Humanitarian" Assistance 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Zubakov defended the dispatch of MOD troops to 
Abkhazia as a good example of humanitarian work performed by 
unarmed, disciplined military personnel.  The proposal to 
jointly restore the railway had been rejected by the 
Georgians a few years ago.  The GOR's proposal for a railway 
connecting Abkhazia with the Russia-Georgia-Armenia railway 
had also been dismissed by the Georgians.  "In the meantime, 
the Gali district lies in complete ruin," said Zubakov.  He 
claimed that the Abkhaz were entitled to basic human rights 
including freedom of movement, trade and health care, which 
the GOR was trying to restore.  Georgia should join Russia in 
its effort to improve the lives of the Abkhaz, rather than 
continuing provocative actions such as flying UAVs which had 
only two purposes: military intelligence and improved 
targeting. 
 
Joint Steps 
----------- 
10.  (C) Zubakov stressed that Russia welcomed open 
consultation and dialogue with the U.S., and asked DAS Bryza 
to publicize the U.S.'s intention to work with Russia on the 
frozen conflicts, especially through the press.  He claimed 
that even the Georgian press understood the responsibility to 
inform the public correctly and was ready to help.  During 
his four press interviews -- two with the Russian wire 
services immediately after the Zubakov meeting -- DAS Bryza 
had done just that.  Zubakov ended the meeting by thanking 
DAS Bryza for seeking consultations with GOR officials. 
 
11.  (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks