Daily Archives: June 20, 2008

08MOSCOW1777, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1777.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1777 2008-06-20 15:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1777 1721539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201539Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8724
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/M.HAMES/L.RITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF APPLIED MICROELECTRONICS, 
NOVOISBIRSK, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D326546 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 10443 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Technological Institute of Applied 
Microelectronics, Novoisbirsk, Russia.  The company is 
listed on BIS license application D326546 as the 
ultimate consignee of two (2) omega/thermovision A10 
18mm camera systems. These items are controlled for 
anti-terrorism, national security, nuclear non 
proliferation, regional stability and UN sanctions 
reasons under ECCN 6A003. The licensee is Indigo 
Systems Corporation, 70 Castilian Drive, Goleta, CA 
93117. 
 
3. On December 7, 2007, Export Control Office Moscow 
received reftel cable and initiated contact with 
stated POC.  On February 6, 2008 per telephone 
conversation with Eduard Demyanov of the Technical 
Institute of Applied Microelectronics, LES Natalya 
Shipitsina was advised that the actual end-user is 
Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant, Novokurznetsky, 
Russia.  The ECO was advised that the Institute made 
some modifications to the subject commodity and then 
shipped them to their client, Kemerovsky Metallurgical 
Plant, in 2005.  Eduard Demyanov of the Institute of 
Applied Microelectronics was not able to provide a POC 
within Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant to the ECO.  On 
March 17, 2008 LES Natalya Shipitsina spoke with the 
POC of Pergam, the Ultimate Consignee, in an attempt 
to locate a POC within Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant 
with no success.  The Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant 
employs more than 5000 people and without a POC for 
the actual sale of the two (2) omega/thermovision A10 
18mm camera systems the ECO cannot conduct the PSV. 
 
4. Recommendations: Post cannot repeat cannot verify 
that the commodities in reftel are being used in 
accordance with terms of the export license.  Post 
does not consider the Institute of Applied 
Microelectronics, Novoisbirsk, Russia as a reliable 
recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

Advertisements

08MOSCOW1776, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT TAKES TOUGH LINE ON TNK-BP

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1776.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1776 2008-06-20 15:36 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1776/01 1721536
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201536Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8722
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS; NSC FOR MWARLICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS: ECON EPET PGOV PREL RS EINV
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT TAKES TOUGH LINE ON TNK-BP 
 
Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In a June 18 meeting Presidential Assistant and G8 
Sherpa Arkady Dvorkovich told NSC Senior Russia Director 
Warlick, EUR/DAS Merkel and EUR/RUS Director Kelly that both 
sides in the TNK-BP dispute were at fault and that the GOR 
would not intervene.  He agreed that a negotiated outcome 
that preserved BP's investment -- and Russia's reputation -- 
was preferable, but that BP would inevitably have to agree to 
changes in the status quo, including the departure of current 
CEO Robert Dudley.  Dvorkovich also reaffirmed the GOR's 
commitment to modernize the economy and to play a larger 
international economic role.  He promised the GOR would 
respond soon with its suggestions for how to structure the 
government roles in the proposed U.S.-Russia 
business-to-business dialogue.  End Summary 
 
------ 
TNK-BP 
------ 
 
2. (C) NSC Senior Director Warlick told Dvorkovich that the 
USG was following the TNK-BP situation closely and was 
increasingly concerned over the dispute.  DAS Merkel said the 
USG perception was that GOR administrative resources were 
being used by the Russian partners to exert pressure on BP. 
Warlick said this perception was hurting Russia's reputation 
with foreign investors.  She suggested that it was in the 
GOR's interest to be more assertive about supporting a 
resolution.  If the dispute ended up in the Russian courts, 
and BP was ultimately driven out of this joint venture, it 
would be a disastrous outcome for all concerned. 
 
3. (C) Dvorkovich responded that the government had no 
intention of intervening.  It was a commercial dispute that 
the shareholders needed to resolve among themselves.  He 
expressed confidence that if the dispute reached the courts, 
it would be adjudicated fairly and argued that the problem 
was with false international perceptions of the Russian legal 
system.  He added that both sides in the dispute had violated 
the "spirit" of the partnership, but he rejected the idea 
that the Russian partners were guilty of anything illegal, 
such as the inappropriate use of state resources. 
 
4. (C) Dvorkovich claimed the source of the dispute was BP's 
policy of treating TNK-BP as a subsidiary, a policy he 
alleged was being pursued by TNK-BP CEO Dudley.  By contrast, 
the Russian partners (with whom he had clearly spoken) viewed 
it as a Russian company that wanted to expand overseas and 
play a larger role in international energy markets.  At BP's 
behest, he claimed, Dudley had frustrated the Russian 
partners' overseas expansion plans, which would have competed 
with BP.  Dudley had also assigned too many BP employees to 
the company. 
 
5. (C) Dvorkovich acknowledged that the GOR was concerned 
over potential damage to the country's investment reputation, 
would prefer a negotiated resolution, and was talking 
informally to both sides.  However, he said BP was making "no 
positive suggestions."  The bottom line was that things could 
not stay as they were and Dudley would eventually have to go. 
 He had suggested informally a possible replacement, Denis 
Morozov, the CEO of Norilsk Nickel, who he said was known to 
be an independent Russian businessman.  In addition, the 
Board of Directors would have to be changed to include 
"independent members."  (Comment: While Dudley's departure 
may be possible, there is little chance that BP would accept 
a Russian substitute.  See Septel for Dudley's views on the 
state of play.) 
 
6. (C) Warlick noted that the claim of an excessive number of 
Westerners working in TNK-BP was exaggerated.  They were at 
most hundreds in a company of tens of thousands.  Merkel 
added that the alleged dispute over expansion plans was also 
exaggerated, as it centered on a limited number of countries 
that were problematic because of sanctions issues, not BP's 
commercial interests.  That said, both Warlick and Merkel 
stressed that the key was not to argue over details but to 
find a way to resolve the dispute that would prevent the 
forced withdrawal of BP, which would not be good for either 
the company or Russia. 
 
--------------- 
Economic Reform 
--------------- 
 
7. (C) In response to a question about the GOR's economic 
priorities, Dvorkovich said that they had been articulated 
numerous times, such as in President Medvedev's February 
speech at the Krasnoyarsk economic forum and most recently by 
Medvedev and First Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov at the St. 
Petersburg Forum.  Internally, the GOR was committed to 
modernizing the Russian economy and externally it was 
determined to play a larger international economic role. 
 
8. (C) Dvorkovich said the main thrust of reform domestically 
was to fight corruption and improve the rule o
f law. 
Comprehensive plans for meeting both these objectives would 
be adopted by Medvedev by September.  In addition, the GOR 
planned to increase spending on infrastructure and social 
programs to improve the country's competitiveness.  He 
acknowledged that this could spur further inflation but 
argued that the way to cool the economy was to increase its 
capacity rather than artificially restricting demand.  He 
added that the GOR hoped to involve private partners in all 
of these initiatives, which should also slow inflation. 
 
9. (C) Externally, Dvorkovich stressed that Russia wanted to 
play a constructive role in the international financial 
system.  The GOR planned to host a meeting for financial 
sector professionals later in the year that would be designed 
to elicit private sector suggestions for how governments 
could reform the international financial system in the wake 
of the sub-prime crisis.  He said Russia also wanted to play 
a constructive role in international energy markets.  The tax 
incentives it was adopting to spur upstream oil production 
were a recognition on Russia's part that it needed to do more 
to boost world supplies. 
 
----------------- 
B2B Dialogue, WTO 
----------------- 
 
10. (C) Warlick said that our understanding following 
Commerce Secretary Gutierrez's meetings at the St. Petersburg 
Forum was that the GOR would get back to us on the 
government's role in the business-to-business dialogue 
proposed in the Sochi Strategic Framework Agreement. 
Specifically, we understood that First Deputy Prime Minister 
Shuvalov had agreed to consult with Economic Minister 
Nabiullina.  Dvorkovich acknowledged that was the GOR's 
understanding as well and said they were planning to meet 
soon internally to discuss how to respond.  Merkel stressed 
the positive results from the government-to-government 
dialogue and our hope that the business dialogue would be 
similarly successful.  Dvorkovich stated that the GOR agreed 
on the importance of establishing the B2B dialogue soon; the 
only outstanding issue was to clarify the role of government 
participation. 
 
11. (C) On WTO, Dvorkovich said the recent visit of World 
Bank (and former USTR) Zoellick had been very positive. 
Zoellick and President Medvedev had discussed the handful of 
remaining issues, including agricultural subsidies, 
state-owned enterprises, and export tariffs for lumber and 
had agreed that all were easily solvable.  Dvorkovich said 
the bilateral agreement with Georgia was likely to be the 
final sticking point.  He added that negotiations with 
Ukraine on a bilateral agreement had begun, but that Russian 
negotiators did not anticipate similar political 
difficulties. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1775, INSIDER VIEWS OF TNK-BP DISPUTE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1775.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1775 2008-06-20 15:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3999715.ece

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1775/01 1721534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201534Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8719
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001775

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RUS; NSC FOR MWARLICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: INSIDER VIEWS OF TNK-BP DISPUTE

REF: MOSCOW 1713

Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

------- Summary -------

1.(C) In meetings on June 18 and 19 with TNK-BP CEO Robert Dudley and Renaissance Capital's Deputy Chairman Robert Foresman (both Amcits), visiting NSC Senior Director for Russia Mary Warlick and EUR/RUS Director Kelly heard first hand accounts of the complicated, opaque and increasingly acrimonious dispute over control of the world's seventh largest oil company. Dudley said negotiations had largely broken down with BP's Russian partners in TNK-BP and with Gazprom on a global partnership. He said the Russian partners were resorting to ever more extreme tactics to gain control of the company, including the continued use of state administrative resources, and that Russian government intervention was needed to broker a settlement. He expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to encourage GOR intervention. Separately, Foresman, whose company advises BP, attributed the freeze in negotiations over the Gazprom-BP global alliance to the influence of Deputy Prime Minister Sechin and suggested that Sechin's company, Rosneft (where he serves as Chairman of the Board), may ultimately emerge as BP's partner in TNK-BP. End Summary.

------------------- A Worsening Dispute -------------------

2.(C) Dudley told Warlick and Kelly that negotiations had largely broken down and that BP's partners, AlfaAccessRenova (AAR), were using increasingly extreme tactics in their efforts to take control of the company. He likened their tactics to the dark days of the 1990s, when Russian businesses used "corporate raiding" methods to take control of assets at prices well below market. Although the GOR claimed to be taking a "hands-off" approach to what it was describing as a "shareholder's dispute." In fact, according to Dudley, the AAR partners were using their influence and wealth to enlist the administrative resources of state entities on their behalf.

3.(C) Warlick responded that the USG was tracking the dispute closely and was concerned not only about BP's investment and the effect of the dispute on Russia's investment climate but also about Dudley's personal safety. Dudley responded that because of the structure of the company, he was the focal point of the attacks. As the CEO, he had authority over all decision-making. He said that if he were taken out of the equation, the AAR partners would achieve their objective of gaining control and would be able to do whatever they wanted with the company's assets to the detriment of other shareholders, including BP. He expected the attacks on him to continue in the form of law suits and the like but said that while the situation was wearing on him, he believed his profile was too great for there to be any physical threat against him.

-------------------------- AAR PR Campaign Succeeding --------------------------

4.(C) Dudley acknowledged that the AAR public relations campaign was resonating within Russia and especially within the GOR. In particular, claims that BP was holding Russia back by inhibiting one of its largest companies from expanding abroad and competing directly with BP appealed to Russian nationalism and the country's sense of itself as victims of the West. Likewise, the claims that BP had foisted large numbers of expatriate employees on TNK-BP, in jobs that could be performed by Russians, also appealed to Russian nationalism. The success of this public relations campaign was likely to make the AAR partners even less inclined to seek a compromise solution with BP.

5.(C) Dudley explained, however, that in fact there was little substance to AAR's claims. The number of expatriates in TNK-BP was less than 250 out of a total of 66,000 employees. Of those, only 110 were permanent TNK-BP employees and of those only 40 had ties to BP. As to international expansion, it was true that BP's preference was to invest in Russia and the FSU, where TNK-BP had competitive advantages. Dudley said the AAR partners, by contrast, were interested in expanding to places like Myanmar, Cuba, and Sudan, which posed problems for BP given U.S. and other Western sanctions.

6.(C) In addition, Dudley said AAR and, in particular, German Khan, had been systematically using TNK-BP resources to vet these projects XXXXXXXXXXXX. This particular dispute arose when Dudley said he had refused to allow Khan to continue to have these projects vetted by TNK-BP.

--------- Deadlines ---------

7.(C) Dudley said there were two important approaching deadlines: June 26, when a shareholders meeting was to be held for TNK-BP holding, which included minority shareholders, and which was to approve the accounts for TNK-BPs regional subsidiaries and renew the mandates of their Board of Directors; and, late July, when his work permit and those of the senior Western managers in TNK-BP were due to expire. He suspected that the AAR partners might attempt to prevent the Board meeting. If it were not held, the result would be two-fold: lawsuits from minority shareholders for failure to receive dividends and anarchy in the operations of the subsidiaries, which would allow their AAR-allied heads to begin stripping assets in the absence of any effective oversight.

8.(C) As to the visas, Dudley said he had submitted a new list to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), which included the senior Western management and also restored the names
of the BP secondees that Khan had removed earlier. Dudley said he planned to meet soon with the FMS and hoped to have the issue resolved at that time.

----------------------- GOR Intervention Needed -----------------------

9.(C) Dudley said Russian Government intervention was needed to convince the AAR partners to negotiate in good faith. However, in that regard, he said he had heard rumors that to curry favor with the Kremlin the AAR partners had agreed to export TNK-BP's crude oil through a trading company close to the Kremlin. (Comment: He most likely meant Gunvor, whose head is reportedly a close personal friend of Prime Minister Putin.) In addition, Dudley indicated that BP's talks with Gazprom about a global partnership had been put on hold because of a power struggle within the governing elite, with officials connected with Rosneft objecting to the partnership. He said he had also heard that the GOR was considering letting the two sides fight each other to exhaustion, like "Siberian tigers," and then capture the survivor to create a third Russian major oil company (in addition to Rosneft and Lukoil).

10.(C) Dudley added that whatever the GOR's motivation, it seemed oblivious to the effect the dispute was having on the country's reputation among foreign investors. He noted that at the recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum the government had made all the right noises about creating a good investment climate, including by fighting corruption and improving the rule of law. However, the GOR's failure to address the dispute was undermining that message. Dudley said he was being constantly approached by current and prospective investors who were deeply disturbed by the government's official inaction in the face of individual Russian businessmen using state resources against a foreign partner.

--------- U.S. Role ---------

11.(C) Warlick noted that the reputational issue had been raised by Commerce Secretary Gutierrez in St. Petersburg and that the U.S. would look for other opportunities to raise our concerns, including meetings with GOR officials this week. Dudley responded that Secretary Gutierrez's efforts on BP's behalf had been deeply appreciated. He hoped that the G-8 meetings in Japan and Treasury Secretary Paulson's visit to Moscow later in the month would provide additional senior-level opportunities to drive home USG concerns. Warlick responded that it would be important for all G8 leaders to reinforce the message with Medvedev. Dudley agreed and said BP was approaching other Western countries to weigh in as well.

----------------------------- RenCap: Rosneft the Solution? -----------------------------

12.(C) In a separate meeting with Robert Foresman, RenCap's Amcit Deputy Chairman said that his firm had been advising BP for some time on its business activities in Russia. Foresman said the Gazprom-BP partnership would have been extremely profitable for both companies and had been blessed at the highest levels of the Russian Government, by Putin himself. What BP and Gazprom had envisioned was an ambitious global partnership in which they would share equity stakes in specific Gazprom and BP assets, as well as a joint venture partnership in TNK-BP. Gazprom would buy out AAR's 50 percent share of TNK-BP and receive one additional share from BP for a majority stake, but BP would continue as the operating partner. Foresman's view was that Gazprom CEO Miller had been given responsibility for making this deal happen and that Miller had fumbled the ball by taking too long and failing to engage successfully with the AAR partners about their stake.

13.(C) Foresman said Gazprom's failure to move quickly had opened the door to the AAR partners, who had seized control of the process of reconfiguring the company in an effort to extract maximum value if forced to sell. He said it was clear the AAR partners were not negotiating in good faith. For instance, it had been Alfa's Mikhail Fridman who had initiated the discussion of AAR trading its stake in TNK-BP for shares in BP. Fridman had then publicly attributed this idea to BP in an effort to further discredit the company in Russia.

14.(C) Foresman said Gazprom's delay had also opened the door to Igor Sechin who, from his new perch as the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the energy sector, saw a chance to promote the fortunes of his company, Rosneft, at the expense of its rival, Gazprom. Sechin, according to Foresman, had seen Gazprom's expansion into the oil business via ownership of the Russian half of TNK-BP as a challenge to Rosneft's position as Russia's national champion for oil, and had moved to block the takeover and the broader Gazprom-BP partnership. XXXXXXXXXXXX

15.(C) Foresman said RenCap had also run the numbers on a BP partnership with Rosneft. It was not as mutually profitable as the Gazprom tie-in, nor as significant globally, but was looking increasingly attractive to BP under the current circumstances. Moreover, BP had bought a substantial stake in Rosneft during its IPO two years ago, a stake that had already risen by 60 percent in the interval. Foresman predicted that a Rosneft buy-out of the AAR partners was now the most likely outcome of the dispute and the one most beneficial to BP. Foresman added under that scenario Dudley would likely be out, replaced by someone acceptable to both sides such as Rosneft's current CEO, Amcit Peter O'Brien.

RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1774, SECURITY COUNCIL’S NAZAROV HOLDS FIRM ON IRAN,

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1774.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1774 2008-06-20 15:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0601
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #1774/01 1721534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201534Z JUN 08 ZDK ZUI RUEHDM 2896
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8717
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR GG IR RS
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL'S NAZAROV HOLDS FIRM ON IRAN, 
GEORGIA, NATO ENLARGEMENT AND MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
REF: MOSCOW 1681 
 
MOSCOW 00001774  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  In a June 19 meeting with NSC Senior 
Director for Russia Mary Warlick, EUR/DAS David Merkel and 
EUR/RUS Office Director Ian Kelly, Russian Federation 
Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov repeated 
the now well worn list of grievances against U.S. policy on 
Iran and interference in Russia's relations with Georgia. 
Nazarov urged renewed contact between the Security Council 
and the Administration.  At the same time, he took a dim view 
of the prospects for significant progress on various areas in 
the Strategic Framework Agreement agreed to in Sochi, saying 
that the GOR was willing to "wait it out" on issues like 
missile defense until after the U.S. presidential elections 
in November.  End Summary. 
 
U.S. Cannot Take Russia's Relations with Iran Hostage 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2.  (C)  NSC Senior Director Warlick began the meeting by 
noting that there had been some progress in several areas of 
the Strategic Framework Agreement issued after the meeting 
between Presidents Bush and Putin in Sochi.  Among these was 
the signature in Moscow and the forwarding by the 
Administration of the 1-2-3 Agreement regarding nuclear 
cooperation to Congress for its mandatory 90 consecutive day 
review.  Warlick noted that the Administration was consulting 
closely with key members of Congress and staff regarding the 
benefits and importance of the Agreement, but also warned 
that Russian actions related to Iran, including possible 
sales of conventional military equipment, would be closely 
scrutinized on the Hill. 
 
3.  (C) Nazarov agreed with the importance of the proposed 
1-2-3 Agreement for both Russia and the U.S., but in response 
to the point that Congress would see the 1-2-3 Agreement in a 
negative light with regard to arms transfer to Iran, he added 
that he hoped its entry into force would not be contingent on 
Russia altering its relations with Iran.  Nazarov said that 
GOR policy on Iran is well developed and based on the notion 
that Iran's perception of its own security is important for 
peace and security in the entire region.  He contrasted this 
with U.S. policy on Iran he felt was based on "phobias, 
threats and sanctions" which, in his view, was sure to result 
in a dead-end.  He said that direct USG negotiations with 
Iran are absolutely necessary and asked how the USG could 
negotiate directly with North Korea, a country that already 
possesses nuclear weapons, and not with Iran, which does not. 
 He also down-played EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's 
efforts on behalf of the EU and U.S. as a poor substitute for 
direct U.S. engagement with Iran. 
 
"Hands Off" Russia's Relations with Georgia 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) On Georgia, Nazarov feigned appreciation of U.S. 
efforts to calm things down in Abkhazia (which he described 
as being within Russia's "zone of influence"), including our 
support for the recent meeting in St. Petersburg between 
Saakashvili and Medvedev.  He challenged DAS Merkel's 
assertion that the introduction of additional railroad troops 
destabilized the situation, stating that their deployment was 
within the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping agreement.  He 
also described their deployment as a humanitarian gesture, 
repeating the argument fellow Security Council Deputy 
Secre-tary Yuriy Zubakov had made earlier this month (reftel) 
that the troops were needed to restore the railroad through 
Abkhazia to Georgia and then onward to Armenia, the timing of 
which Merkel said Washington did not understand.  He added 
that these railroad troops were really engineers with little 
military training who could do the work to repair the 
railroad cheaper and faster than civilian employees. 
 
5.  (C) Nazarov closed the discussion on Georgia by accusing 
the USG of providing the Georgian military with heavy 
armaments which could then be used against Russian 
peace-keepers.  Nazarov accused the GOG of creating a mirror 
government in the Kodori Gorge region and made reference to a 
recent incident involving Georgian troops and several Russian 
soldiers.  (NOTE:  The meeting with Nazarov took place one 
day after Georgian police detained and later released four 
Russian soldiers in the Zugdidi district while they were 
transporting anti-tank missiles between two Russian bases. 
END NOTE.)  Nazarov also alleged that unlike Georgia's 
"friends" in Europe, only the USG was providing Georgia with 
such heavy weaponry.  He said the GOR has information 
purporting to show that the USG is paying a salary to 
Saakashvili and others, including Georgian officials involved 
 
MOSCOW 00001774  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
in the initial attempt to ethnically cleanse Abkhazia at the &#
x000A;beginning of the conflict.  He added that he receives 
information every day that the USG is working actively to 
worsen Russia's relations with its fellow CIS members. 
 
Ramifications NATO Enlargement Not Fully Understood 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6.  (C) On NATO enlargement, Nazarov said the GOR was most 
bothered by the situation in Georgia.  Accepting Georgia into 
NATO, he said, would destabilize Europe and harm relations 
between the U.S. and Russia.  He said he knew that the USG 
has been working very hard since the NATO Summit in Bucharest 
in April to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine receive their 
formal invitation to join in December.  He added that the 
situation in Ukraine is also dangerous and could destabilize 
both eastern and western Ukraine.  He concluded that the 
people who are pushing NATO membership for Georgia and 
Ukraine are far away from the area geographically and do not 
fully understand its ramifications. 
 
GOR Willing to Wait on Missile Defense 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Nazarov disagreed with Warlick's suggestion that some 
progress had been achieved in recent missile defense experts' 
discussions regarding transparency and confidence building 
measures related to the proposed missile defense 
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.  Nazarov 
asserted that the promised dialogue on coordination and 
transparency has not been concrete and Russia remains 
troubled by the actions of several eastern European 
countries.  He reiterated that the GOR does not see any logic 
for the U.S. in setting up such a system and negotiating with 
Poland and the Czech Republic for its installation on their 
sovereign territory.  He also discounted any attempts by the 
USG to convince the GOR that the system is not directed at 
Russia and suggested that the GOR might be able to reach 
agreement with a new administration after the U.S. 
presidential elections.  DAS Merkel told Nazarov that while 
any future U.S. administration will be free to make its own 
decision on missile defense, both political parties in the 
U.S. see a value in such a system. 
 
New Security Council; New National Security Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
8.  (C) Nazarov said that in addition to former FSB chief 
Nikolay Patrushev as its head, the Security Council has also 
gotten additional staff who are well experienced in security 
work.  He said that many of the Council's "old guard" remain, 
some of whom will work on a new law on national security (to 
replace the 1992 law which has 40 amendments) and a new 
National Security Strategy that will reflect the changes in 
Russia's economy and its new status in the world.  Nazarov 
said that the Security Council had studied the U.S. National 
Security Strategy and that theirs would be a similarly open 
document.  The long-term strategy would focus on existing 
groups that threaten Russia's security as well as some new 
threats.  When pressed by Warlick, he said that despite the 
recent selection of former Russian Ambassador to the U.S. 
Ushakov as Putin's foreign affairs advisor, Medvedev would 
continue to run Russia's foreign policy, as is required by 
the constitution. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
9.  (C) A 30-year veteran of the KGB and FSB intelligence 
services, Nazarov pulled few punches in the meeting.  He 
urged renewed contact by the Administration with the Security 
Council.  But, he was frank in his assertion that a resurgent 
Russia will not countenance meddling in its "sphere of 
influence" and is willing to wait out the U.S. presidential 
election cycle to see what kind of hand Russia is dealt the 
next time around. 
 
10.  (SBU) NSC Senior Director Warlick and EUR DAS Merkel 
cleared this message. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1772, U/S BURNS’S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1772.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1772 2008-06-20 14:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1772/01 1721457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201457Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8712
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON GG UP MD RS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Prior to the CTWG Core Group consultations, 
on June 19, U/S Burns met with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Karasin and covered Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Karasin described to U/S Burns Russia's 
reaction to the increasing distance between Russia and 
Ukraine and expressed hope for a Ukraine able to maintain 
good relations with both Russia and the West.  U/S Burns 
urged Russian restraint in Abkhazia, while Karasin put the 
onus for an improvement there on Saakashvili.  Karasin hoped 
the USG would ease sanctions against Belarus.  DAS Merkel 
noted the need for Belarus to allow the U.S. Embassy to 
return to normal and to free political prisoners.  Karasin 
was cautiously optimistic about progress over Nagorno - 
Karabakh, terming the Aliyev - Sarkisyan meeting at the St. 
Petersburg Economic Forum "not bad."  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) In a June 19 meeting, U/S Burns and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Karasin discussed Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova 
and Nagorno-Karabakh.  DFM Karasin expounded his view that, 
in the 21st century, international problems defy a simple 
solution.  Unfortunately, leaders of new young democracies 
were in search of rapid solutions that did not require a 
concerted, protracted effort.  The U.S., Russia, and other 
global leaders must remain in close contact in order to help 
guide more inexperienced players.  U/S Burns recalled 
Karasin's visit to Washington 18 months ago and invited him 
back.  Karasin suggested consultations in Washington close to 
the end of the year. 
 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
3.  (C) Karasin thought that NATO Secretary General de Hoop 
Scheffer's just-completed visit to Ukraine had yielded no 
surprises, and the situation on the ground remained 
unchanged.  The majority of Ukrainians continue to oppose 
Ukraine's entry into NATO, but "the picture is messy."  NATO 
membership -- a choice with enormous strategic implications 
-- continued to widen divisions within the country and could 
catalyze early elections.  At the same time, Russia and 
Ukraine, which share a common history, are moving further and 
further away from their traditionally close ties.  Karasin 
reinterated that stability in Ukraine was of paramount 
importance to Russia.  The GOR hoped for a Ukrainian 
government friendly to Russia, to the U.S, and the EU.  At 
the same time, the GOR had to take into account an emotional 
response by the Russian people to events inside Ukraine.  U/S 
Burns emphasized that stability in Ukraine and a healthy 
relationship between Moscow and Kiev were likewise important 
for the U.S.  The decision to seek NATO membership was for 
sovereign Ukraine alone to make, but the NATO MAP process was 
careful, measured, and transparent. 
 
4.  (C) U/S Burns expressed concern about the recent 
escalation in rhetoric vis-a-vis Ukraine and urged a more 
low-key approach.  Karasin likened the current situation to 
close relatives who had shared one communal apartment but 
were now scattered among several while memories of their 
shared "time together" remained fresh.  He defended Moscow 
Mayor Luzhkov who, in a May 12 speech, had claimed Russia's 
right to the naval base in Sevastopol.  Luzhkov was 
responding to a large crowd chanting "Sevastopol! Crimea! 
Russia!" during the ceremony marking the 225th anniversary of 
the base.  Karasin, who had accompanied Luzhkov on May 12 and 
DPM Sergey Ivanov on June 14 to Sevastopol, had witnessed the 
fervor of the community first hand.  He agreed that respect, 
calm, and predictability should prevail, but argued that the 
Black Sea Fleet was "at home" in Sevastopol.  Karasin warned 
that a NATO MAP offer for Ukraine would change everything in 
the Russian approach to the 1997 bilateral agreement on the 
Black Sea Fleet. 
 
5.  (C) Karasin affirmed that bilateral relations with 
Ukraine were continuing to develop, but the complicated 
relationship between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko made the work 
of the Intergovernmental Commission difficult. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
6.  (C) U/S Burns reminded Karasin that the U.S. had made a 
steady effort to have the GOG exercise restraint and engage 
Abkhazia directly.  In light of the Georgians' unilateral 
discontinuation of  UAV flights and reduced security forces 
in Kodori, the GOR should withdraw its military railroad 
construction battalion as soon as possible.  U/S Burns also 
recommended that the GOR consult with the Georgians in 
advance of any new initiatives.  Karasin predicted that the 
battalion would depart Abkhazia about August 10.  He stressed 
that Saakashvili must understand that the process of conflict 
resolution started with him, not with Washington, Moscow or 
the Friends.  Karasin argued that the GOG had launched an all 
out diplomatic offensive against Russia on a global scale, 
including in New York and Vienna.  Now the new theme was the 
CIS
 PKO, he said.  Karasin warned that no amount of drawn out 
legal analysis could produce constructive results until the 
Georgians accepted Abkhazia as a partner to the 1994 
Agreement.  In the case of the CIS PKO, the Georgians 
pretended not to understand that the Abkhaz were afraid of 
the Georgians and that UNOMIG could not stay without a CIS 
mandate. 
 
7.  (C) Karasin praised Alasania's visit to Abkhazia.  The 
first step should be to sign an agreement not to resort to 
force and to normalize the situation in Kodori.  That would 
set the stage for further constructive steps, said Karasin. 
Karasin briefed on his discussion with visiting German 
Coordinator the Friends' Group Hans-Dieter Lucas earlier the 
same day, adding that the Russia would participate in the 
June 30 Friends' meeting in Berlin. (CIS Fourth Department 
Director Andrey Kelin will represent the GOR.)  One danger, 
Karasin warned, was Saakashvili's mistaken belief that the 
settlement would be arranged for him by the Friends.  U/S 
Burns countered, maintaining that the German three-step 
proposal and a Georgia - Abkhazia dialogue were not mutually 
exclusive.  Both tracks should be pursued.  In response to 
U/S Burns's repeated questions on the areas where Russia 
could take positive steps, Karasin replied only that the GOG 
must create the appropriate circumstances by reducing its 
forces in Kodori. 
 
8.  (C) Karasin insisted that instead of criticizing the 
April 16 Presidential instructions to strengthen social, 
economic and consular ties, Georgia should join in.  Abkhaz 
aspirations had been heightened by Kosovo's declaration of 
independence.  A "delicate" issue remained IDP return, 
because the Abkhaz worried it could jeopardize their survival 
as a people.  U/S Burns suggested that, instead of waiting 
for the Georgians to make the first move, Russia could move 
unilaterally to reduce tensions.  Karasin noted that the June 
18 phone conversation between Medvedev and Saakashvili, had 
resulted in DFM Vashadze's June 23 Moscow visit.  He, 
however, insisted that the Georgian leadership should muster 
the political courage to sign the non-use of force agreement 
and normalize the situation in Kodori.  Georgia's gesture 
would not only increase trust among the Abkhaz but allow the 
GOG to challenge the Abkhazians with "We have done it, how 
about you?" "Bargaining," long arguments, and political 
rhetoric have led the Georgians nowhere. 
 
Belarus 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Karasin said that Lukashenko had launched reforms and 
advised the U.S. to ease sanctions against Belarus, 
particularly Belneftkhim.  U/S Burns said that the USG 
planned no significant changes in its policies at this time. 
DAS Merkel added that the re-establishment of a normal 
embassy, the freeing of political prisoners, including 
opposition leader Kozulin, and good cooperation with the OSCE 
could help. 
 
Moldova 
------- 
 
10. (C) In response to U/S Burns's request for information on 
Security Council Deputy Secretary Zubakov's June 18-21 visit 
to Tiraspol and Chisinau, Karasin said that the preliminary 
report over the phone had been positive.  He also previewed 
the Moldovan Prime Minister's June 20 visit to Moscow for 
meetings with Prime Minister Putin.  Karasin indicated that 
not much movement had taken place since the April 
Voronin-Smirnov meeting.  Plans for a meeting between their 
representatives were in place, however. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
11.  (C) Karasin observed that the flurry of unhelpful 
behavior by the Azerbaijan government that followed Kosovo's 
independence had subsided.  The Aliyev - Sarkisyan meeting at 
the St. Petersburg Economic Forum had been "not bad."  The 
two determining factors remained the internal situation in 
Armenia  and the level of political patience in a dynamic and 
oil-flush Azerbaijan, where certain political factions 
supported a military solution. Fortunately, Aliyev understood 
the danger of precipitous military action, said Karasin. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1771, DAS MERKEL’S MEETING WITH TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATOR

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1771.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1771 2008-06-20 14:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1771 1721427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201427Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8711
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001771 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RS
SUBJECT: DAS MERKEL'S MEETING WITH TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATOR 
NESTERUSHKIN 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell.  Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (C) In a short June 19 meeting, GOR Special Negotiator 
for the Transnistria conflict Valeriy Nesterushkin briefed 
EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Merkel on recent developments. 
 Nesterushkin said that the conflict was entering an 
"exciting" period, and highlighted Security Council Deputy 
Secretary Zubakov's June 18-21 visit to Tiraspol and 
Chisinau.  According to Nesterushkin, Zubakov met with 
Smirnov on June 18 and would meet Voronin on June 19.  After 
the Zubakov - Smirnov meeting, Tiraspol issued a press 
release forecasting that Medvedev and Smirnov would meet 
before the end of the year.  Nesterushkin maintained that for 
Tiraspol, it was Russia, not Moldova, that mattered. 
Nesterushkin plans to visit Kyiv on June 24 to learn more 
about Ukrainian FM Ohryzko's June 14 meeting with Smirnov, 
which the Ukrainians touted as "groundbreaking." 
Nesterushkin suspected that the GOU was trying to make Odessa 
the permanent base for 5 plus 2 meetings; the GOR had no 
objection, but thought that the attempt would not succeed. 
 
2.  (C) DAS Merkel stressed that meetings for the sake of 
meetings would not help the process.  Instead, the main 
players should make an effort to use meetings and events in 
pursuit of a concrete goal.  DAS Merkel thought the location 
of the 5 plus 2 meetings was of no importance, but worried 
that the participants might lose confidence in the process if 
there was a prolonged period without results.  Nesterushkin 
thought it was important that the dialogue continue 
regardless. 
 
3.  (C) Nesterushkin said that Romanian President Basescu 
planned to visit Moscow soon.  With Romania desiring to be 
recognized for its "contribution" to the Transnistria 
negotiation process, there was a talk of a new format: 
Ukraine, Romania and Moldova, he added.  DAS Merkel inquired 
about the sequencing of the Medvedev meeting, the 5 2, and 
the importance of flowing into the 5 2 format. 
 
4.  (C) DAS Merkel asked if the GOR concerns regarding 
neutrality were satisfied with the Constitution and National 
Security strategy.  Nesterushkin said that with all capitals' 
consent, basic elements of neutrality could be secured and 
accepted. 
 
5.  (C) DAS Merkel and Nesterushkin agreed on early September 
consultations in Washington. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1770, DAS MERKEL’S MEETING WITH DUMA CHAIRMAN KOSACHEV

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1770.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1770 2008-06-20 14:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1770/01 1721423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201423Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8708
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001770 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP GG MD RS
SUBJECT: DAS MERKEL'S MEETING WITH DUMA CHAIRMAN KOSACHEV 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affares Daniel A. Russell.  Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
1.  (C) In a June 19 meeting, DAS Merkel and Duma 
International Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev 
discussed missile defense, NATO enlargement, Ukraine, 
Georgia, Moldova, Russia and the EU, and Russia's foreign 
policy structure.  DAS Merkel briefed Kosachev on the status 
of missile defense talks.  NATO dominated the discussion, 
with Kosachev arguing that it added little to existing 
security cooperation against common threats such as Iran, 
North Korea and Afghanistan, but would damage Russia's 
bilateral relations with Ukraine and Georgia.  He criticized 
Saakashivili's failure to address the needs of the Abkhaz. 
Kosachev was more positive on the Transnistria conflict, 
praising Voronin for his willingness to take Russia's 
interest in Moldovan neutrality into account.  For the 
upcoming Russia - EU summit, Kosachev urged all EU states to 
put collective interests before their bilateral grievances 
against Russia.  Kosachev shed no light on the state of the 
foreign policy decision making process with Medvedev at the 
helm.  End summary. 
 
Missile Defense and Information Sharing 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman 
Konstantin Kosachev opened a June 19 meeting with DAS Merkel 
with the latest press "sensation;" the report of Lithuania's 
offer to host facilities for U.S. missile defense deployment, 
and asked about the status of negotiations on missile 
defense.  DAS Merkel replied that there had been no 
breakthrough but the talks had become more focused and 
concrete.  He emphasized an open and transparent process, 
with a role for all parties, especially those where 
facilities might be located.  Kosachev warned against any 
form of "game playing" and urged regular information sharing. 
 
3. (C) Kosachev lamented that the Russian public and 
parliamentarians remained unaware that the U.S. and Russia 
cooperate well in areas such as counterterrorism.  The result 
was a widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, that affected the 
bilateral relationship.  DAS Merkel underscored the need for 
GOR representatives to articulate the value of cooperation 
with the U.S.  He urged Kosachev not to lose important time 
during the transitional period in the U.S. 
 
4.  (C) DAS Merkel noted that with a long "to-do list" such 
as the 123 agreement, WTO negotiations, and the Jackson- 
Vanick Amendment, ahead, Kosachev's recent Washington 
consultations were well-timed and contributed to Foreign 
Affairs Committee Chairman Berman's deeper understanding of 
bilateral issues.  Kosachev agreed, saying that a steady 
dialogue with no surprises would be of paramount importance. 
Kosachev said that Berman and he had agreed on a joint 
mission to Iran.  DAS Merkel did not comment on a 
Berman-Kosachev trip, but recalled his early June meeting 
with former PM Primakov, and thought that concrete 
discussions on the Iranian issues were helpful. 
 
Ukraine:  All About NATO 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) Kosachev criticized the U.S. for "pressuring Ukraine 
to join NATO."  According to Kosachev, the GOR was also at 
the mercy of certain domestic forces.  The result, Kosachev 
said, was a "dangerous game," which could create another 
mistake, as in 2004 when the U.S. and Russia rallied behind 
two different political groups in Ukraine.  Noting that 
Ukraine was deeply divided on NATO, and that Ukrainian 
leaders could not even agree on a referendum, Kosachev 
thought that Ukraine should be "left alone" to decide its own 
fate.  If Russia were "provoked" by U.S. meddling, it would 
have little choice but to get involved, Kosachev added.  DAS 
Merkel maintained that there was no reason why Ukraine's NATO 
membership would close the door to cooperation with Russia. 
Instead, Ukraine could be a bridge between Europe and Russia. 
 DAS Merkel noted that Germany's interpretation of MAP as the 
last door to NATO was not shared by the U.S.  In sum, NATO 
members should be exporters, not consumers of security, and 
the MAP process was the toll to make them more stable, secure 
and, over time, more acceptable NATO applicants. 
 
6.  (C) DAS Merkel urged the GOR to undertake an effort to 
portray NATO as an alliance of shared values, not just a 
military alliance.  Overemphasis on the military aspect of 
NATO vis-a-vis Ukraine and Georgia and aggressive rhetoric by 
Russian officials including FM Lavrov's speech at the Duma 
and the Duma debates only forced Ukraine and Georgia to take 
a precipitous decision.  Kosachev admitted that Russia felt 
left out when more and more countries were admitted while 
Russia was excluded.  Clearly, Russia would never be part of 
NATO, Kosachev said.  Kosachev lamented that even in areas 
where the U.S. and Russia should and could cooperate well, 
such as Afghanistan, NATO was in the way.  NATO limited 
cooperation rather than promoting it.  NATO added little to 
efforts
to promote joint security in Iran and North Korea 
while it "damaged" the overall atmosphere of cooperation. 
"Eighty percent of Ukrainians are against NATO membership, 
yet you pursue it.  Doesn't that violate your principles of 
democracy?" Kosachev asked. 
 
7.  (C) Kosachev termed Ukraine, "a special case."   Citing 
an example of a small border town near Rostov, where many 
residents cross the unmarked border daily, Kosachev asked, 
"What's going to happen to this town once Ukraine joins NATO? 
  According to him, border disputes will flare up and the 
bilateral relationship would be further damaged.  Ukrainian 
firms that produce military materiel for the Russian military 
would suffer.  Furthermore, the CFE would disappear once 
Ukraine enters NATO, Kosachev warned.  The U.S.'s repeated 
argument that NATO enlargement was "not about Russia" simply 
was not convincing, especially for the Russian military, he 
added.  DAS Merkel responded that nothing would happen in 
that small town unless Russia took action because Russia is 
not a threat to NATO, and NATO is about projecting force and 
addressing instability, not border protection.  In response 
to DAS Merkel's question on Medvedev's reference to a 
European security structure in his June 5 Berlin speech, 
Kosachev said that the U.S. could not be excluded in any kind 
of a new structure.  The only pan-European organization, the 
OSCE, does not function well on the two main issues of the 
day: energy security and Kosovo. 
 
8.  (C) Kosachev defended Moscow Mayor Luzhkov who claimed 
Russia's right to the Sevastopol naval base during his May 12 
speech and was subsequently barred from entering Ukraine. 
Luzhkov was simply responding to pressure from the local 
population who greeted him with " Why do you leave us on our 
own?" "Sevastopol does not want to belong to Ukraine"; and 
"Crimea does not want to be part of NATO," Kosachev said. 
 
Georgia:  NATO and More 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Kosachev was not happy with what had happened in 
Russia - Georgia relations, terming the 80 percent support 
for the Georgian referendum on NATO membership "a defeat for 
Russia's foreign policy."  After Kosovo's declaration of 
independence, keeping Russia - Georgia relations rational was 
not possible.  Kosachev maintained that many Duma deputies 
supported an even more aggressive policy against Georgia. 
After Kosovo, many thought there was no need to abide by 
international law. 
 
10.  (C) Kosachev argued that the biggest mistake made by the 
Georgian leadership was to deny the existence of the conflict 
itself and blame Russia for all of its ills.  For the 
majority of the Abkhaz, Georgia's territorial integrity does 
not include Abkhazia.  Kosachev warned that the worse 
scenario -- Georgia seeking a military solution -- would 
certainly bring Russia's intervention.  Kosachev hoped that 
the railroad battalion would leave in 2-3 months; if not he 
would be disappointed at Russia's "inconsistency."   He said 
that Russia had been a much better observer of international 
laws, considering that "you ignored UNSC resolutions in 
invading Iraq and did what you wanted to do in Kosovo." 
 
Moldova 
------- 
 
11.  (C) Kosachev said that unlike Saakashivili, Voronin was 
ready to address the conflict itself and consider Russia's 
interests, including Moldova's neutrality.  In response to 
DAS Merkel's question on whether the guarantee of neutrality 
in the Moldovan Constitution and the new National Security 
Strategy were sufficient,  Kosachev said that it was 
acceptable as long as a mechanism prohibiting the amendment 
of the Constitution was instituted. 
 
Russia-EU Summit 
---------------- 
 
12.  (C) Kosachev warned against attempts by EU member states 
to promote their bilateral issues with Russia through the EU. 
 Despite the EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner's promise 
of no more surprises during her recent Moscow visit, Kosachev 
felt that some member states were not "adult enough" to put 
the collective interest before their bilateral grievances. 
In response to DAS Merkel's query on whether Russia sought 
common interests or common values with the EU, Kosachev 
concluded that the EU itself was divided on values, lacking 
commonality on such issues as prostitution, national 
minorities, drug use, and freedom of expression. 
 
Foreign Policy Making in the New Structure 
------------------------------------------ 
 
13.  (C) DAS Merkel invited Kosachev to elaborate on the role 
of PM Putin and his new foreign policy advisor, former U.S. 
Ambassador Ushakov, in foreign policy decision making. 
Kosachev answered, "Read our Constitution," saying that 
President Medvedev would lead, but quickly added that, 
"Nobody knows, yet."   Kosachev said that he once had 
Ushakov's position, which was purely administrative in 
nature.  Presidential Administration Foreign Policy Advisor 
Prikhodko had suggested Ushakov's appointment, Kosachev said. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1769, MARGELOV REFLECTS ON MEDVEDEV – PUTIN

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1769.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1769 2008-06-20 13:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1769/01 1721343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201343Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8706
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR RS GG UP
SUBJECT: MARGELOV REFLECTS ON MEDVEDEV - PUTIN 
RELATIONSHIP; OFFERS VIEWS ON UKRAINE AND GEORGIA 
 
Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reason:  1.4 (b). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chairman Mikhail Margelov assured EUR DAS David Merkel June 
18 that the GOR's unhappiness over Abkhazia was at bottom 
economic and that any friction would abate as the Sochi 
Olympics approached."  Margelov comments on Iran were 
similarly bottom line:  "even Zhirinovskiy does not want 
Teheran to go nuclear," he said in promising Russian 
cooperation with the U.S.  Margelov thought that Medvedev's 
suggestion, during his June 5 visit to Berlin, of a European 
security arrangement, had been "born in the MFA," and had 
been designed to prompt discussion of a new security 
architecture.  He planned to have his Committee in closed 
session in July hold discussions of its own on what such an 
arrangement might look like.  While acknowledging that the 
Russian "eagle has two heads," Margelov thought that 
Medvedev, whom he described as "no puppet," would soon be 
unarguably in charge.  End summary. 
 
No Russian Politician Wants 
A Nuclear Iran 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Mikhail Margelov on June 18 sidestepped expressions of 
concern about continued equipment transfers to Iran by 
repeatedly assuring EUR DAS David Merkel that "no one 
Russian, even (national political gadfly Vladimir) 
Zhirinovskiy wants Teheran to go nuclear."  Margelov cited 
earlier GOR decisions to postpone deliveries to Bushehr in 
attempting to convince DAS Merkel that Russia remained 
willing to sideline its commercial interests and join 
international efforts to pressure Iran.  DAS Merkel also 
pointed out concern over conventional transfers to Iran adn 
that Margelov should use his understanding of the U.S. 
Congress to express to GOR how the 123 Agreement would be 
impacted by future transfers. 
 
MAP for Ukraine Will Strengthen 
Hand of Those Opposed to West 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Margelov told DAS Merkel that he had just met with 
Henry Kissinger, who was "opposed to offering NATO membership 
to former republics of the Soviet Union."  Margelov thought 
that the offer of a MAP to Ukraine would only strengthen the 
hand of the estimated 60 - 70 percent of the Russian 
population that remained somewhat agnostic about the West.  A 
MAP offer to Georgia would "not be that painful," Margelov 
thought. 
 
4. (C) Underlying and partially explaining some of Russia's 
anxiety about a MAP for Ukraine were economic factors, 
Margelov thought. Russia was indifferent to the involvement 
of France or Finland in NATO because bilateral economic 
relations were sound.  Yuliya Tymoshenko's occasional 
comments about re-privatization caused uncertainty in some 
Russian circles, and in NATO increased questions about 
Ukraine's economic future and Russia's participation in it. 
 
Saakashvili Losing Credibility 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) To DAS Merkel's comment about reports of a good 
initial meeting between Medvedev and Saakashvili at the St. 
Petersburg Economic Forum, Margelov replied only that 
Saakashvili had lost much credibility among many in Georgia. 
Margelov worried that Saakashvili might "do something stupid" 
if he felt that Abkhazia was "slipping away."  Margelov 
posited that if Saakashvili were to find a "common economic 
language" with the Abkhazian representatives much of the 
tension would evaporate.  The GOR's only concern at the 
moment, he said, was that it have a peaceful border with 
Abkhazia at the time of the 2014 Sochi Olympics. 
 
Medvedev No Puppet 
------------------ 
 
6. (C) Margelov spoke at length about President Medvedev. 
While agreeing that the Russian "eagle has two heads," and 
that it was likely that even Putin and Medvedev were not 
certain how their relationship would clarify, Margelov 
expected Medvedev to, over time, be fully in charge. 
Margelov described Medvedev as "smart," and "no puppet." 
Medvedev was a "student, who had learned much from his 
teachers" and from the "dean of the faculty (Putin)."  Putin 
did not want Medvedev to be held hostage by "Putin's inner 
circle," and Putin, to that end, was working hard to ensure 
Medvedev's independence. 
 
7. (C) It would take time for Medvedev to become conversant 
in international affairs, and during that transitional 
period, Putin would speak frequently about international 
issues, and would have meetings with key international 
figures.  Putin, Margelov said, "does not want to be in 
charge of national security," and would gradually cede ground 
to Medvedev. 
 
8. (C) Margelov had traveled with Medvedev to Berlin on June 
5.  In his telling, the Germans were impressed that 
Medvedev's delegation was small and focused.  With the 
President had been Foreign Minister Lavrov, Presidential &#x
000A;Administration Foreign Affairs Advisor Prikhodko, the Russian 
Ambassador to Germany, and Margelov, accompanied by fewer 
bodyguards, less staff, and fewer press.  German Foreign 
Affairs Council member Alexander Rahr had told Margelov that 
Medvedev had said the right things, but that the Germans 
would match his words to his deeds over the next one hundred 
days.  Margelov had passed Rahr's comments to Medvedev. 
 
9. (C) Margelov agreed with DAS Merkel that Medvedev had not 
yet devised a plan for tackling corruption, and guessed that 
the composition of Medvedev's anti-corruption team would give 
observers a clue as to the President's seriousness.  He saw 
hope in that fact that the new cabinet had little overlap 
between ministerial portfolios and the personal business 
interests of the ministers, as had been the case with 
ministers like Reyman in the preceding cabinet.  Margelov 
predicted that Minister of Agriculture Gordeyev would soon 
leave the government. 
 
10. (C) Margelov described Medvedev's allusion in Berlin to 
the need for a European security structure as an MFA 
concoction.  The intention, he said, was to stimulate a 
discussion about the new architecture of European security. 
Margelov told DAS Merkel that he planned to convene a closed 
session of his Committee in July to explore the idea, but he 
was not certain what might emerge from the session, or from 
the fact that Medvedev had floated the idea in Berlin. 
 
11. (U) Message cleared by DAS Merkel. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1768, VOLGOGRAD FOCUSES ON LOCAL POLITICS

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1768.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1768 2008-06-20 13:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1768/01 1721327
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201327Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8703
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

08MOSCOW1767, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN RUSSIA

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1767.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1767 2008-06-20 12:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1767/01 1721231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201231Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8701
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 
TAGS: PHUM KIRF PGOV RU
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN RUSSIA 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Bob Patterson. Reason 1.4(d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In a recent interview, Human Rights Ombudsman 
Vladimir Lukin outlined his concerns and views on religious 
freedom in Russia, including his opposition to mandatory 
classes on religion in public schools, his liberal stance 
allowing "non-traditional" religious groups to register as 
legal organizations, and the need to support freedom of 
assembly and freedom of speech when attacked with religious 
fervor.  The Chief of the Ombudsman's Religious Affairs 
Office reinforced these views and gave us additional insight 
on the tension between the Ombudsman's office and the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Human Rights experts noted the conservative 
stance of most religions in Russia, and one noted that in a 
country where orthodoxy (in all faiths) is the mainstream, 
variation from the norm quickly becomes "extreme." 
Christians, Muslims, and Jews all recently found common 
ground in condemning the 2007 "Forbidden Art" exhibit at the 
Sakharov Center, which has led to the trial of the Center's 
director on charges of extremism. 
 
The Human Rights Ombudsman on Religion 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin outlined his 
views on freedom of religion and religious tolerance in an 
extensive interview with Nezivisimaya Gazeta published June 
4.  Lukin judged the Federal Law on Religion, which has been 
in effect for more than 10 years, an overall success and 
noted Russia's large and growing number of religious 
organizations, monasteries, education institutions, and media 
outlets.  On the other hand, he cited problems in the 
implementation of the law, specifically in the failure to 
register non-traditional religious groups, the misuse of 
anti-extremist laws against groups because of their religious 
beliefs, and the lack of a government authority with a 
presence in the regions to ensure the uniform application of 
this and other human rights laws. 
 
3. (SBU) Lukin dismissed Russian criticism of the United 
States and the annual Religious Freedom report, arguing that, 
for the most part, the analysis was fair.  Russia had 
willingly assumed its human rights obligations and Russia 
itself criticizes other countries for not fulfilling 
international obligations, so these external critiques should 
be recognized as part of a normal process and welcomed as an 
opportunity for self-improvement, he said.  Lukin noted that 
the report was "on the whole" accurate, and that the 
violations noted in the report needed to be rectified. 
 
4. (C) Repeating a theme from his own annual report, Lukin 
was very critical of the attempts to introduce a mandatory 
course on Orthodox Culture in the public schools. He called 
such a course "inconsistent with Russian law" and "a retreat 
from the principle of state secularism."  Lukin said that the 
government and religious authorities have no right to dictate 
individual morality, and that "a secular state...builds a 
system based on law, not on 'common religious beliefs.'" 
Mikhail Odintsov, the Chief of the Ombudsman's Religious 
Affairs Department, told us on June 9 that his office 
considered this to be the most important issue that his 
office handled. 
 
5. (C) Geraldine Fagan, the Russia correspondent for the 
Religious Freedom news service Forum 18, told us on June 18 
that church leaders and like-minded government officials had 
stopped their public advocacy for introducing this course 
beyond the five regions where it is now taught.  Instead, she 
said, many are now advocating an alternate course on ethics 
and morality. 
 
The Role of The European Court of Human Rights 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6. (SBU) Lukin highlighted the recent European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) cases in which small religious groups had won 
victories against Russia.  Lukin emphasized that these cases 
are binding upon Russia, and that the government needed to do 
more than simply pay the fines by taking action to change the 
underlying problems. 
 
7. (C) In a meeting with NSC Senior Director Mary Warlick EUR 
DAS David Merkel, and EUR/RUS Office Director Ian Kelly on 
June 18, Allison Gill, the AmCit Director of the Moscow 
Office of Human Rights Watch, complained about GOR inaction 
on ECHR cases.  "Russia has the money, so they pay the fines, 
but they keep having the same problems over and over again." 
Gill said that the GOR simply needed to publish the ECHR 
decision in the Supreme Court bulletin to give the Russian 
courts the ability to reference these cases in their own 
decisions, but that there was no political will to set that 
precedent. 
 
Banning of "Extremist" Works 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Lukin criticized the May 2007 decision by a Moscow 
court to ban as extremist the writings of 20th-century 
Turkish theologian Said al-Nursi.  Aleksandr Verkhovskiy, the 
Director of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 
told us that t
he authorities have searched homes and offices 
in Tatarstan, Novosibirsk, Dagestan, and other places, and 
arrested people for possessing or distributing his writings. 
Lukin consulted with several religious leaders, academics, 
and legal experts, none of whom found anything extremist or 
inciting in al-Nursi's writings.  Afterwards, he sent a 
letter to the Moscow court advising it that to find these 
writings "extremist" would require the court to take an 
unwarranted step out of the legal and into the theological 
realm.  Lukin noted that if the courts can make rulings on 
interpretations of the Koran, there was nothing to stop them 
from doing the same to different interpretations of the 
Bible. 
 
9. (C)  Gill also found the ruling worrisome and said that 
HRW has seen reports that al-Nursi's writings were now being 
planted by police as a pretext for searching or arresting 
people.  Odintsov said that he had heard of an internal 
directive in the Ministry of Justice that instructed the 
prosecutors how to deal with issues of religious extremism, 
but that he had not yet been able to get a copy of it. 
 
Offensive Art as Protected Speech 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (U) In his interview, Lukin also defended free speech and 
artistic expression, even if these actions insult religions. 
In 2007, the Sakharov Center presented an exhibit entitled, 
"Forbidden Art" (not to be confused with their 2003 "Danger: 
Religion!" exhibit, which got them temporarily closed and 
fined).  Following a complaint from the patriotic Orthodox 
movement The People's Assembly, a Moscow court charged Center 
Director Yuriy Samodurov with inciting religious and ethnic 
hatred.  The artwork, which was placed behind wooden walls 
and required viewers to peer through peepholes, offended many 
with such provocative works as Mickey Mouse Jesus; "Chechen 
Marilyn," a veiled Muslim girl lifting up her skirt to reveal 
skull and crossbones tights and a suicide bomber belt; and 
"Glory to Russia!," a photoshopped rendition of a smiling 
Russian General sodomizing an enlisted soldier.  Christian, 
Muslim, Jewish, and nationalist groups condemned the exhibit, 
while leaders of the human rights community have publicly 
defended the Sakharov Center. 
 
11. (U) Lukin weighed in on the exhibit, saying that he found 
much in the exhibit to be distasteful, and that in his 
opinion the exhibit did not honor the legacy of Andrey 
Sakharov.  Nevertheless, he recommended more dialogue and 
less litigation, and urged that those offended by the exhibit 
exercise "one of the most powerful, essential ideas of 
Christianity: forgive those who trespass against us." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (C) Lukin continues to be a strong advocate for a 
tolerant and just civil society.  By striving both to protect 
religion from state pressure and to protect the individual 
from religious pressure, Lukin often places himself in 
unpopular positions, but he has been successful in 
maintaining his reputation as an honest broker. 
Unfortunately, his influence is limited by both his lack of 
resources and the legal limits on his office. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks