Monthly Archives: June 2008

08MOSCOW1811, RUSSIAN ANALYST WARNS OF CONSEQUENCES IF UKRAINE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1811 2008-06-24 20:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1811/01 1762008
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 242008Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8755
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR GG UP RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYST WARNS OF CONSEQUENCES IF UKRAINE 
JOINS NATO, SAYS RUSSIANS BELIEVE U.S. HAS HIDDEN AGENDA 
 
REF: MOSCOW 1714 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Dmitriy Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center 
told NSC Senior Director for Russia Mary Warlick and EUR/RUS 
Office Director Ian Kelly on June 19 that there was nothing 
the U.S. could do to convince Russia to accept Ukrainian 
membership in NATO.  He thought that the GOR could abide by 
the Finlandization of Ukraine and Georgia, with both 
countries politically close to the West while remaining 
outside the alliance.  Trenin warned that NATO membership 
would exacerbate domestic divisions in Ukraine and could 
result in the violent secession of Crimea.  He thought Moscow 
hoped to use possible economic consequences to deter Ukraine 
from this course, while also taking advantage of the 
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko rivalry.  For Georgia, Moscow held out 
the reintegration of Abkhazia in exchange for Tbilisi staying 
out of NATO.  Trenin spoke of Russians' deep mistrust of the 
U.S., which stemmed from American policies seemingly directed 
at Russia and Russians' inflated sense of their country's 
importance.  Trenin argued that NATO membership had 
emboldened anti-Russian sentiment in Eastern Europe and 
tipped the balance in the alliance against countries 
sympathetic to Russian concerns.  He thought the 
Putin-Medvedev transition had gone smoothly, with Putin 
taking on the role of Russia's "elder statesman."  Medvedev's 
focus on the rule of law stemmed from the fact that the 
country had become so corrupt as to be "ungovernable," as 
well as popular demand that the issue be addressed.  End 
summary. 
 
Russia Will Not Accept NATO Membership for Ukraine 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2. C) Moscow Carnegie Center analyst Dmitriy Trenin told NSC 
Senior Director for Russia Warlick and EUR/RUS Office 
Director Kelly that there was nothing the U.S. could do to 
diminish Russian opposition to Ukraine joining NATO - no 
deals on missile defense or quid pro quo could change the 
GOR's position.  He believed the proposal Medvedev made in 
Berlin for a new European security treaty was meant to 
highlight GOR "frustration" with Euro-Atlantic policy towards 
Russia (reftel).  Trenin thought Medvedev intended not to 
call into question the legitimacy of the trans-Atlantic 
relationship, but draw attention to Russian concern over 
potential NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. 
 
3. (C) Trenin explained that as much as Russia opposed NATO 
membership for Ukraine and Georgia, the GOR "abhorred" the 
thought of any kind of confrontation with the West, which 
would draw attention and resources from its preferred 
domestic and foreign policy agendas.  Despite this fear, 
offering MAP to Ukraine would compel Russia to "repulse this 
massive encroachment" on its interests.  Trenin speculated 
that the GOR could "tolerate" Ukraine and Georgia operating 
as Finland did - in the EU and pro-Western, but not in NATO. 
 
Ukraine:  Unstable and Unpredictable 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Trenin warned that NATO membership for Ukraine was a 
"looming crisis," particularly as the country's domestic 
situation remained highly unstable and unpredictable.  He 
expressed considerable concern over the lack of consensus on 
the issue of NATO membership in Ukraine, where western 
Ukrainians saw Russia as a historic aggressor, while a large 
number of Ukrainians saw Russia more benignly:  "a separate 
country, but not a foreign country," in Trenin's words. 
Should Ukraine pursue NATO membership, Trenin feared that 
this divide would widen and lead to violence.  He thought 
Crimea could follow the precedent of Kosovo, where an ethnic 
minority seceded with the assistance of a powerful sponsor. 
In Crimea, the GOR would not formally support secession, but 
sympathizers among the Russian military contingent could 
easily "leak" weapons to Russian-speaking separatists.  For 
Russian nationalists, such a situation would be a "godsend," 
allowing Russia to assert itself militarily.  For the GOR, 
however, the situation could spiral out of control.  Trenin 
thought such an outcome unlikely in Georgia, where the GOR 
had greater control and no fear of rogue Russian military 
supporting Abkhazia against Tbilisi. 
 
Russia Hopes to Deter Ukraine 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Trenin was not sure if the GOR had a real strategy on 
Ukraine, but believed Moscow hoped to deter Ukraine from 
seeking NATO membership by threatening economic repercussions 
and a strict visa regime.  The GOR also hoped to take 
 
advantage of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko rivalry.  Trenin 
argued that Moscow saw Tymoshenko as more malleable and less 
anti-Russian, wanting the presidency more than NATO 
membership.  To succeed politically, she needed to discuss 
gas prices with Moscow, which could use this lever to 
influence the PM's stance on NATO. 
 
Georgia Can Have Abkhazia but not NATO 
-----
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Trenin said that Russia's message to Georgians was 
that they could have their country whole if they did not join 
NATO, otherwise Russia would not support reconciliation with 
Abkhazia.  Trenin thought Medvedev brought a new element to 
Russia-Georgia relations, which had been "poisoned" by 
Putin's stormy relationship with Saakashvilli.  During their 
recent meeting in St. Petersburg, Medvedev even proposed to 
Saakashvilli that Russia and Georgia settle the Abkhaz 
dispute "between the two of us," without the U.S. 
Ultimately, however, Trenin thought Georgia was a "sideshow" 
for Russia, while Ukraine remained a "visceral issue." 
 
Russians Believe U.S. Has a "Hidden Agenda" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Trenin explained that Russia did not see Europe as a 
military threat, but was still not sure about the U.S., the 
only country that had the ability to harm Russia when it was 
weak militarily.  The GOR viewed NATO as a "platform" for the 
U.S. to "expand" against Russia should it wish to do so.  For 
Trenin, this was the real problem with initiatives such as 
missile defense, which raised questions about the U.S.' real 
intentions.  Trenin argued that average Russians believed the 
U.S. had a hidden agenda, "so hidden that we don't see it," 
which caused "tremendous distrust."  He blamed this mindset 
both on U.S. actions and Russians' "inflated sense" of their 
country's importance.  They see Russia as the only country 
that could prevent the U.S. from ruling the world, which 
makes it a natural American target.  Trenin said Russians 
really do believe the U.S. wants to seize their country's 
natural resources.  Politically, this results in the GOR 
frequently misreading U.S. security and intelligence 
initiatives, even those directed at terrorists, as somehow 
directed at Russia. 
 
8. (C) Trenin dismissed the idea that NATO membership helped 
"moderate" the anti-Russian sentiments of the USSR's former 
satellite states.  He explained that after the first wave of 
NATO expansion in the 1990s, some Russians hoped NATO 
membership could temper the "anti-Russia phobias" of Eastern 
Europeans, but believed instead that NATO membership simply 
"emboldened" countries to revisit the history of WWII and the 
postwar period.  Politically, the GOR saw NATO and EU 
expansion shift the balance of opinion against Russia in both 
institutions.  This was most acute in the EU, where the new 
Eastern European members counterbalanced Italy, Germany and 
France, which were more prone to understand Russian concerns. 
 
Smooth Political Transition 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Trenin thought the transition from a Putin to Medvedev 
presidency was surprisingly smooth considering the tension 
among Kremlin clans and potential for dispute.  He saw a 
"balance forming" between the President and PM, with Medvedev 
attempting to demonstrate he was the real President by 
performing the role of Commander in Chief:  Medvedev visited 
military bases, presided over the Victory Day parade, and 
held regular Security Council meetings.  Putin, meanwhile, 
played his natural role as Russia's "elder statesman." 
 
10. (C) Trenin said Medvedev's political priorities, 
consolidating Russia's economic development and instituting 
the rule of law, were closely linked.  Corruption made the 
country "ungovernable," while Russia had become 
"sophisticated enough" for its citizenry to demand the 
implementation of real rule of law.  Medvedev hoped to 
accomplish this, in part, by making the courts more 
functional and independent at the mid-level, while the 
Kremlin would retain the ability to dictate to the courts 
when necessary.  Trenin believed there was no need to limit 
state corporations, which were actually the "personal 
fiefdoms" of whichever government figures controlled them, 
and not actual state property. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

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08MOSCOW1810, BIC MEETING PROPOSAL PASSED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1810 2008-06-24 14:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1810 1761444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241444Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8754
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5146
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001810 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018 
TAGS: JCIC KACT PARM RS US START
SUBJECT: BIC MEETING PROPOSAL PASSED 
 
REF: STATE 67326 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Margaret D. Hawthorn 
e for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
(C) On June 24 we passed reftel paper to MFA DVBR Second 
Secretary Andrey Grybochuk who had no substantive reply. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1809, COLOMBIAN VICE PRESIDENT SANTOS’S HISTORICAL VISIT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1809 2008-06-24 14:02 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1995
RR RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1809 1761402
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241402Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0828
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8753
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001809 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL MCAP PGOV MASS ETRD EPET EINV
 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN VICE PRESIDENT SANTOS'S HISTORICAL VISIT TO 
RUSSIA 
 
1. (U) Summary.  Moscow officials and experts viewed Colombian Vice 
President Francisco Santos's visit to Russia as a turning point in 
the bilateral relationship.  Santos used the visit to strengthen 
economic ties and to explore the possibility of increasing Russian 
arms sales to Colombia. He met with President Medvedev, Foreign 
Minister Lavrov, Defense Minister Serdyukov and Patriarch Alexey II 
and attended the 12th International Economic Forum in St. 
Petersburg. End summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Russia-Colombia Economic Relations 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) VP Santos' June 1-9 trip to Russia stressed economic 
cooperation.  Denis Davydov, MFA Latin America Desk, told us June 11 
that VP Santos's visit with Russia's leaders was unofficial in its 
nature, and stemmed from Minister of Economic Trade and Development 
Nabiullina's invitation to the 12th International Economic Forum in 
St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, Santos met with Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov where both sides reaffirmed the need to deepen 
political dialogue that would lead to more intensive economic and 
investment cooperation. He also sought to strengthen ties between 
the Russian and Colombian business communities.  In Moscow, VP 
Santos took part in an investment forum called "Colombia, A Mine of 
Opportunity."  This forum included executives from Russia's leading 
energy companies such as LUKOIL, Rosneft, and Gazprom.  Since 2002 
LUKOIL Overseas has been exploring the Llanos Basin, Colombia's 
largest oil and gas basin, with Colombian company Ecopetrol.  The 
Russians have expressed interest in engaging in ground and 
underground drilling to extract oil from unexplored regions of 
Colombia. 
 
3. (SBU) Referring to Colombia's "competent administration, abundant 
natural resources, and economic potential," Davydov told us that 
Latin America is "coming out of the shadows" and is proving to be a 
prospective place for development. While Colombia is not at the top 
of Russia's priority list as evidenced by the lack of media coverage 
of VP Santos' visit, Russia is steadily seeking to deepen ties with 
the region, including recently opening embassies in Guatemala and 
Paraguay.  The Russian government in general and the business 
community in particular would like to gain a more reciprocal trade 
relationship with Latin American countries since Russia exports less 
to Latin America than Latin America does to Russia. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Military Hardware Diversification 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) Santos expressed interest in signing weapons contracts that 
would allow Colombia to maintain a balance of power in the region. 
Russian arms sales to Colombia have been insignificant in comparison 
to Venezuela, consisting of a few Mi-17 helicopters.  According to 
press reports, Russia is looking to places such as Latin America for 
arms exports because long-time markets in China and India are 
"oversaturated with hardware" and are shifting toward high 
technologies. 
 
5. (SBU) Davydov countered a report in news daily Kommersant that 
Santos would urge the GOR to curb arms exports to Venezuela in order 
to avoid an arms race in the region.  Davydov said that the sale of 
arms to either Colombia or Venezuela would not result in a regional 
arms race and that Russia would continue military-technical 
cooperation with both countries.  He noted that Russia sold military 
helicopters to Colombia as early as 1996-1997.  Moreover, he 
characterized Russia-Colombia relations as strong since there were 
no conflicts or disputes among the two sides in their respective 
backyards.  In addition, both countries supported each other in 
international fora such as the UN and cooperated on anti-terrorism 
and drug-trafficking.  Furthermore, he posited that while Russia did 
not support the FARC or ALN, it had stopped short of designating 
them as terrorist organizations, as the EU had done.  Davydov said 
Colombian drugs were present on the local Russian market and the GOR 
sought ways to cooperate with Colombia to address this issue. 
 
6. (SBU) A mid-level Colombian embassy official told us Santos's 
visit had focused on economic relations and trade, and he had not 
discussed Venezuelan arms sales. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1794, MTCR CANBERRA PLENARY INVITATION PASSED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1794 2008-06-23 14:56 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1794 1751456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231456Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8740

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2018 
TAGS: ETTC KSCA MNUC MTCRE PARM PREL TSPA
SUBJECT: MTCR CANBERRA PLENARY INVITATION PASSED 
 
REF: STATE 65780 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Margaret D. Hawthorn 
e for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
(C) On June 23 we passed reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR Second 
Secretary Sergey Davidchuk who told us the GOR would deliver 
presentations on unmanned aerial vehicles and global trends 
in missile proliferation at the MTCR Plenary in Canberra. 
The GOR, he said, probably would not deliver presentations on 
any other issues. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1793, G-8 HEALTH INITIATIVES DEMARCHE DELIVERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1793 2008-06-23 13:21 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1793 1751321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231321Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8739

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001793 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/TIERRA COPELAND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO SENV PREL WHO RS
SUBJECT: G-8 HEALTH INITIATIVES DEMARCHE DELIVERED 
 
REF:  STATE 66363 
 
1. (SBU) On June 23, Acting DCM shared the USG's health-related 
priorities for the 2008 G-8 Summit with MFA North America Department 
Director Igor Neverov.  Post also shared the USG health priorities 
with Deputy Minister of Finance Dmitriy Pankin (Russia's G-8 
Sous-Sherpa), and with GOR officials at the International 
Departments of the Ministry of Health and Social Development (MOHSD) 
and the Federal Surveillance Service for Consumer Rights Protection 
and Human Well-Being (Rospotrebnadzor). 
 
2. (SBU) Yevgeniy Slastnykh, Head of the Office of Bilateral 
Cooperation in the MOHSD International Department, expressed 
interest in the USG initiative to train health care workers.  He 
noted that Russia currently hosted about 6,000 foreign medical 
students, many of whom were studying on GOR-funded stipends and 
fellowships under bilateral agreements with various countries 
administered by the Ministry of Education and Science.  He believed 
Russia could consider hosting more medical students and increasing 
the number of GOR-funded stipends and fellowships.  Alexander 
Kucherenko, head of the Rostpotrebnadzor International Department, 
noted that his agency would likely be interested in supporting the 
USG initiative on neglected tropical diseases.  We will continue to 
follow up with GOR officials regarding their reaction to the USG's 
G-8 health priorities. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1790, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1790.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1790 2008-06-23 11:40 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1790 1751140
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231140Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8736
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/M.HAMES/L.RITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
ELECRONY COMPONENTS, ST PETERSBURG, RUSSIA LICENSE NO. 
NLR 
 
REF: USDOC 03647 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Electrony Components, St Petersburg, Russia. The 
company is listed on BIS license application: NLR as 
the ultimate consignee of One (1) thermotracer model 
TH7700, and other measuring or checking instruments, 
appliances and machines.  ECCN 0x000. The exporter is 
Mikron Infrared Incorporated, 16 Thornton Road, 
Oakland, NJ  07436. 
 
3. On May 29, 2008, Export Control Office Moscow 
received subject reftel request to conduct the post- 
shipment verification with Electrony Components, PR. 
Engelsa 30 RU, St Petersburg, Russia. The export 
control team made several attempts to contact 
Electrony Components to no avail.  On June 5, 2008 FSN 
Natalya Shipitsina spoke with Vadim Golovicher of 
Panatest, the Intermediate Consignee and Moscow 
distributor for Mikron Infrared Inc.  Golovicher 
advised the ECO that Electrony Components was not the 
end-user of reftel commodity, stating that they were 
only a transportation/Custom Broker company in St 
Petersburg.  Golvicher told the ECO that Electrony 
Components has been out of business for approximately 
18 months.  Golovisher stated that Panatest did use 
Electrony Components to transport the subject 
commodity to Kazan-City, Russia. 
 
4. Export Control Office Moscow was unable to conduct 
Post Shipment Verification as stated in subject 
reftel. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post cannot repeat cannot 
recommend Electrony Components, St Petersburg, Russia 
as reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1789, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1789.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1789 2008-06-23 11:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1789 1751139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231139Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8735
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/M.HAMES/L.RITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
ELECRONY COMPONENTS, ST PETERSBURG, RUSSIA LICENSE NO. 
NLR 
 
REF: USDOC 03646 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Electrony Components, St Petersburg, Russia. The 
company is listed on BIS license application: NLR as 
the ultimate consignee of One (1) thermotracer model 
TH7700, and other measuring or checking instruments, 
appliances and machines.  ECCN 0x000. The exporter is 
Mikron Infrared Incorporated, 16 Thornton Road, 
Oakland, NJ  07436. 
 
3. On May 29, 2008, Export Control Office Moscow 
received subject reftel request to conduct the post- 
shipment verification with Electrony Components, PR. 
Engelsa 30 RU, St Petersburg, Russia. The export 
control team made several attempts to contact 
Electrony Components to no avail.  On June 5, 2008 FSN 
Natalya Shipitsina spoke with Vadim Golovicher of 
Panatest, the Intermediate Consignee and Moscow 
distributor for Mikron Infrared Inc.  Golovicher 
advised the ECO that Electrony Components was not the 
end-user of reftel commodity, stating that they were 
only a transportation/Custom Broker company in St 
Petersburg.  Golvicher told the ECO that Electrony 
Components has been out of business for approximately 
18 months.  Golovisher stated that Panatest did use 
Electrony Components to transport the subject 
commodity to Kazan-City, Russia. 
 
4. Export Control Office Moscow was unable to conduct 
Post Shipment Verification as stated in subject 
reftel. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post cannot repeat cannot 
recommend Electrony Components, St Petersburg, Russia 
as reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1777, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1777.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1777 2008-06-20 15:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1777 1721539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201539Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8724
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/M.HAMES/L.RITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF APPLIED MICROELECTRONICS, 
NOVOISBIRSK, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D326546 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 10443 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Technological Institute of Applied 
Microelectronics, Novoisbirsk, Russia.  The company is 
listed on BIS license application D326546 as the 
ultimate consignee of two (2) omega/thermovision A10 
18mm camera systems. These items are controlled for 
anti-terrorism, national security, nuclear non 
proliferation, regional stability and UN sanctions 
reasons under ECCN 6A003. The licensee is Indigo 
Systems Corporation, 70 Castilian Drive, Goleta, CA 
93117. 
 
3. On December 7, 2007, Export Control Office Moscow 
received reftel cable and initiated contact with 
stated POC.  On February 6, 2008 per telephone 
conversation with Eduard Demyanov of the Technical 
Institute of Applied Microelectronics, LES Natalya 
Shipitsina was advised that the actual end-user is 
Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant, Novokurznetsky, 
Russia.  The ECO was advised that the Institute made 
some modifications to the subject commodity and then 
shipped them to their client, Kemerovsky Metallurgical 
Plant, in 2005.  Eduard Demyanov of the Institute of 
Applied Microelectronics was not able to provide a POC 
within Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant to the ECO.  On 
March 17, 2008 LES Natalya Shipitsina spoke with the 
POC of Pergam, the Ultimate Consignee, in an attempt 
to locate a POC within Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant 
with no success.  The Kemerovsky Metallurgical Plant 
employs more than 5000 people and without a POC for 
the actual sale of the two (2) omega/thermovision A10 
18mm camera systems the ECO cannot conduct the PSV. 
 
4. Recommendations: Post cannot repeat cannot verify 
that the commodities in reftel are being used in 
accordance with terms of the export license.  Post 
does not consider the Institute of Applied 
Microelectronics, Novoisbirsk, Russia as a reliable 
recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/PLISTON) 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1776, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT TAKES TOUGH LINE ON TNK-BP

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1776.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1776 2008-06-20 15:36 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1776/01 1721536
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201536Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8722
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS; NSC FOR MWARLICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS: ECON EPET PGOV PREL RS EINV
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT TAKES TOUGH LINE ON TNK-BP 
 
Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In a June 18 meeting Presidential Assistant and G8 
Sherpa Arkady Dvorkovich told NSC Senior Russia Director 
Warlick, EUR/DAS Merkel and EUR/RUS Director Kelly that both 
sides in the TNK-BP dispute were at fault and that the GOR 
would not intervene.  He agreed that a negotiated outcome 
that preserved BP's investment -- and Russia's reputation -- 
was preferable, but that BP would inevitably have to agree to 
changes in the status quo, including the departure of current 
CEO Robert Dudley.  Dvorkovich also reaffirmed the GOR's 
commitment to modernize the economy and to play a larger 
international economic role.  He promised the GOR would 
respond soon with its suggestions for how to structure the 
government roles in the proposed U.S.-Russia 
business-to-business dialogue.  End Summary 
 
------ 
TNK-BP 
------ 
 
2. (C) NSC Senior Director Warlick told Dvorkovich that the 
USG was following the TNK-BP situation closely and was 
increasingly concerned over the dispute.  DAS Merkel said the 
USG perception was that GOR administrative resources were 
being used by the Russian partners to exert pressure on BP. 
Warlick said this perception was hurting Russia's reputation 
with foreign investors.  She suggested that it was in the 
GOR's interest to be more assertive about supporting a 
resolution.  If the dispute ended up in the Russian courts, 
and BP was ultimately driven out of this joint venture, it 
would be a disastrous outcome for all concerned. 
 
3. (C) Dvorkovich responded that the government had no 
intention of intervening.  It was a commercial dispute that 
the shareholders needed to resolve among themselves.  He 
expressed confidence that if the dispute reached the courts, 
it would be adjudicated fairly and argued that the problem 
was with false international perceptions of the Russian legal 
system.  He added that both sides in the dispute had violated 
the "spirit" of the partnership, but he rejected the idea 
that the Russian partners were guilty of anything illegal, 
such as the inappropriate use of state resources. 
 
4. (C) Dvorkovich claimed the source of the dispute was BP's 
policy of treating TNK-BP as a subsidiary, a policy he 
alleged was being pursued by TNK-BP CEO Dudley.  By contrast, 
the Russian partners (with whom he had clearly spoken) viewed 
it as a Russian company that wanted to expand overseas and 
play a larger role in international energy markets.  At BP's 
behest, he claimed, Dudley had frustrated the Russian 
partners' overseas expansion plans, which would have competed 
with BP.  Dudley had also assigned too many BP employees to 
the company. 
 
5. (C) Dvorkovich acknowledged that the GOR was concerned 
over potential damage to the country's investment reputation, 
would prefer a negotiated resolution, and was talking 
informally to both sides.  However, he said BP was making "no 
positive suggestions."  The bottom line was that things could 
not stay as they were and Dudley would eventually have to go. 
 He had suggested informally a possible replacement, Denis 
Morozov, the CEO of Norilsk Nickel, who he said was known to 
be an independent Russian businessman.  In addition, the 
Board of Directors would have to be changed to include 
"independent members."  (Comment: While Dudley's departure 
may be possible, there is little chance that BP would accept 
a Russian substitute.  See Septel for Dudley's views on the 
state of play.) 
 
6. (C) Warlick noted that the claim of an excessive number of 
Westerners working in TNK-BP was exaggerated.  They were at 
most hundreds in a company of tens of thousands.  Merkel 
added that the alleged dispute over expansion plans was also 
exaggerated, as it centered on a limited number of countries 
that were problematic because of sanctions issues, not BP's 
commercial interests.  That said, both Warlick and Merkel 
stressed that the key was not to argue over details but to 
find a way to resolve the dispute that would prevent the 
forced withdrawal of BP, which would not be good for either 
the company or Russia. 
 
--------------- 
Economic Reform 
--------------- 
 
7. (C) In response to a question about the GOR's economic 
priorities, Dvorkovich said that they had been articulated 
numerous times, such as in President Medvedev's February 
speech at the Krasnoyarsk economic forum and most recently by 
Medvedev and First Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov at the St. 
Petersburg Forum.  Internally, the GOR was committed to 
modernizing the Russian economy and externally it was 
determined to play a larger international economic role. 
 
8. (C) Dvorkovich said the main thrust of reform domestically 
was to fight corruption and improve the rule o
f law. 
Comprehensive plans for meeting both these objectives would 
be adopted by Medvedev by September.  In addition, the GOR 
planned to increase spending on infrastructure and social 
programs to improve the country's competitiveness.  He 
acknowledged that this could spur further inflation but 
argued that the way to cool the economy was to increase its 
capacity rather than artificially restricting demand.  He 
added that the GOR hoped to involve private partners in all 
of these initiatives, which should also slow inflation. 
 
9. (C) Externally, Dvorkovich stressed that Russia wanted to 
play a constructive role in the international financial 
system.  The GOR planned to host a meeting for financial 
sector professionals later in the year that would be designed 
to elicit private sector suggestions for how governments 
could reform the international financial system in the wake 
of the sub-prime crisis.  He said Russia also wanted to play 
a constructive role in international energy markets.  The tax 
incentives it was adopting to spur upstream oil production 
were a recognition on Russia's part that it needed to do more 
to boost world supplies. 
 
----------------- 
B2B Dialogue, WTO 
----------------- 
 
10. (C) Warlick said that our understanding following 
Commerce Secretary Gutierrez's meetings at the St. Petersburg 
Forum was that the GOR would get back to us on the 
government's role in the business-to-business dialogue 
proposed in the Sochi Strategic Framework Agreement. 
Specifically, we understood that First Deputy Prime Minister 
Shuvalov had agreed to consult with Economic Minister 
Nabiullina.  Dvorkovich acknowledged that was the GOR's 
understanding as well and said they were planning to meet 
soon internally to discuss how to respond.  Merkel stressed 
the positive results from the government-to-government 
dialogue and our hope that the business dialogue would be 
similarly successful.  Dvorkovich stated that the GOR agreed 
on the importance of establishing the B2B dialogue soon; the 
only outstanding issue was to clarify the role of government 
participation. 
 
11. (C) On WTO, Dvorkovich said the recent visit of World 
Bank (and former USTR) Zoellick had been very positive. 
Zoellick and President Medvedev had discussed the handful of 
remaining issues, including agricultural subsidies, 
state-owned enterprises, and export tariffs for lumber and 
had agreed that all were easily solvable.  Dvorkovich said 
the bilateral agreement with Georgia was likely to be the 
final sticking point.  He added that negotiations with 
Ukraine on a bilateral agreement had begun, but that Russian 
negotiators did not anticipate similar political 
difficulties. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1775, INSIDER VIEWS OF TNK-BP DISPUTE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1775.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1775 2008-06-20 15:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles:
http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3999715.ece

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1775/01 1721534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201534Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8719
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001775

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RUS; NSC FOR MWARLICK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: INSIDER VIEWS OF TNK-BP DISPUTE

REF: MOSCOW 1713

Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

------- Summary -------

1.(C) In meetings on June 18 and 19 with TNK-BP CEO Robert Dudley and Renaissance Capital's Deputy Chairman Robert Foresman (both Amcits), visiting NSC Senior Director for Russia Mary Warlick and EUR/RUS Director Kelly heard first hand accounts of the complicated, opaque and increasingly acrimonious dispute over control of the world's seventh largest oil company. Dudley said negotiations had largely broken down with BP's Russian partners in TNK-BP and with Gazprom on a global partnership. He said the Russian partners were resorting to ever more extreme tactics to gain control of the company, including the continued use of state administrative resources, and that Russian government intervention was needed to broker a settlement. He expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to encourage GOR intervention. Separately, Foresman, whose company advises BP, attributed the freeze in negotiations over the Gazprom-BP global alliance to the influence of Deputy Prime Minister Sechin and suggested that Sechin's company, Rosneft (where he serves as Chairman of the Board), may ultimately emerge as BP's partner in TNK-BP. End Summary.

------------------- A Worsening Dispute -------------------

2.(C) Dudley told Warlick and Kelly that negotiations had largely broken down and that BP's partners, AlfaAccessRenova (AAR), were using increasingly extreme tactics in their efforts to take control of the company. He likened their tactics to the dark days of the 1990s, when Russian businesses used "corporate raiding" methods to take control of assets at prices well below market. Although the GOR claimed to be taking a "hands-off" approach to what it was describing as a "shareholder's dispute." In fact, according to Dudley, the AAR partners were using their influence and wealth to enlist the administrative resources of state entities on their behalf.

3.(C) Warlick responded that the USG was tracking the dispute closely and was concerned not only about BP's investment and the effect of the dispute on Russia's investment climate but also about Dudley's personal safety. Dudley responded that because of the structure of the company, he was the focal point of the attacks. As the CEO, he had authority over all decision-making. He said that if he were taken out of the equation, the AAR partners would achieve their objective of gaining control and would be able to do whatever they wanted with the company's assets to the detriment of other shareholders, including BP. He expected the attacks on him to continue in the form of law suits and the like but said that while the situation was wearing on him, he believed his profile was too great for there to be any physical threat against him.

-------------------------- AAR PR Campaign Succeeding --------------------------

4.(C) Dudley acknowledged that the AAR public relations campaign was resonating within Russia and especially within the GOR. In particular, claims that BP was holding Russia back by inhibiting one of its largest companies from expanding abroad and competing directly with BP appealed to Russian nationalism and the country's sense of itself as victims of the West. Likewise, the claims that BP had foisted large numbers of expatriate employees on TNK-BP, in jobs that could be performed by Russians, also appealed to Russian nationalism. The success of this public relations campaign was likely to make the AAR partners even less inclined to seek a compromise solution with BP.

5.(C) Dudley explained, however, that in fact there was little substance to AAR's claims. The number of expatriates in TNK-BP was less than 250 out of a total of 66,000 employees. Of those, only 110 were permanent TNK-BP employees and of those only 40 had ties to BP. As to international expansion, it was true that BP's preference was to invest in Russia and the FSU, where TNK-BP had competitive advantages. Dudley said the AAR partners, by contrast, were interested in expanding to places like Myanmar, Cuba, and Sudan, which posed problems for BP given U.S. and other Western sanctions.

6.(C) In addition, Dudley said AAR and, in particular, German Khan, had been systematically using TNK-BP resources to vet these projects XXXXXXXXXXXX. This particular dispute arose when Dudley said he had refused to allow Khan to continue to have these projects vetted by TNK-BP.

--------- Deadlines ---------

7.(C) Dudley said there were two important approaching deadlines: June 26, when a shareholders meeting was to be held for TNK-BP holding, which included minority shareholders, and which was to approve the accounts for TNK-BPs regional subsidiaries and renew the mandates of their Board of Directors; and, late July, when his work permit and those of the senior Western managers in TNK-BP were due to expire. He suspected that the AAR partners might attempt to prevent the Board meeting. If it were not held, the result would be two-fold: lawsuits from minority shareholders for failure to receive dividends and anarchy in the operations of the subsidiaries, which would allow their AAR-allied heads to begin stripping assets in the absence of any effective oversight.

8.(C) As to the visas, Dudley said he had submitted a new list to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), which included the senior Western management and also restored the names
of the BP secondees that Khan had removed earlier. Dudley said he planned to meet soon with the FMS and hoped to have the issue resolved at that time.

----------------------- GOR Intervention Needed -----------------------

9.(C) Dudley said Russian Government intervention was needed to convince the AAR partners to negotiate in good faith. However, in that regard, he said he had heard rumors that to curry favor with the Kremlin the AAR partners had agreed to export TNK-BP's crude oil through a trading company close to the Kremlin. (Comment: He most likely meant Gunvor, whose head is reportedly a close personal friend of Prime Minister Putin.) In addition, Dudley indicated that BP's talks with Gazprom about a global partnership had been put on hold because of a power struggle within the governing elite, with officials connected with Rosneft objecting to the partnership. He said he had also heard that the GOR was considering letting the two sides fight each other to exhaustion, like "Siberian tigers," and then capture the survivor to create a third Russian major oil company (in addition to Rosneft and Lukoil).

10.(C) Dudley added that whatever the GOR's motivation, it seemed oblivious to the effect the dispute was having on the country's reputation among foreign investors. He noted that at the recent St. Petersburg Economic Forum the government had made all the right noises about creating a good investment climate, including by fighting corruption and improving the rule of law. However, the GOR's failure to address the dispute was undermining that message. Dudley said he was being constantly approached by current and prospective investors who were deeply disturbed by the government's official inaction in the face of individual Russian businessmen using state resources against a foreign partner.

--------- U.S. Role ---------

11.(C) Warlick noted that the reputational issue had been raised by Commerce Secretary Gutierrez in St. Petersburg and that the U.S. would look for other opportunities to raise our concerns, including meetings with GOR officials this week. Dudley responded that Secretary Gutierrez's efforts on BP's behalf had been deeply appreciated. He hoped that the G-8 meetings in Japan and Treasury Secretary Paulson's visit to Moscow later in the month would provide additional senior-level opportunities to drive home USG concerns. Warlick responded that it would be important for all G8 leaders to reinforce the message with Medvedev. Dudley agreed and said BP was approaching other Western countries to weigh in as well.

----------------------------- RenCap: Rosneft the Solution? -----------------------------

12.(C) In a separate meeting with Robert Foresman, RenCap's Amcit Deputy Chairman said that his firm had been advising BP for some time on its business activities in Russia. Foresman said the Gazprom-BP partnership would have been extremely profitable for both companies and had been blessed at the highest levels of the Russian Government, by Putin himself. What BP and Gazprom had envisioned was an ambitious global partnership in which they would share equity stakes in specific Gazprom and BP assets, as well as a joint venture partnership in TNK-BP. Gazprom would buy out AAR's 50 percent share of TNK-BP and receive one additional share from BP for a majority stake, but BP would continue as the operating partner. Foresman's view was that Gazprom CEO Miller had been given responsibility for making this deal happen and that Miller had fumbled the ball by taking too long and failing to engage successfully with the AAR partners about their stake.

13.(C) Foresman said Gazprom's failure to move quickly had opened the door to the AAR partners, who had seized control of the process of reconfiguring the company in an effort to extract maximum value if forced to sell. He said it was clear the AAR partners were not negotiating in good faith. For instance, it had been Alfa's Mikhail Fridman who had initiated the discussion of AAR trading its stake in TNK-BP for shares in BP. Fridman had then publicly attributed this idea to BP in an effort to further discredit the company in Russia.

14.(C) Foresman said Gazprom's delay had also opened the door to Igor Sechin who, from his new perch as the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the energy sector, saw a chance to promote the fortunes of his company, Rosneft, at the expense of its rival, Gazprom. Sechin, according to Foresman, had seen Gazprom's expansion into the oil business via ownership of the Russian half of TNK-BP as a challenge to Rosneft's position as Russia's national champion for oil, and had moved to block the takeover and the broader Gazprom-BP partnership. XXXXXXXXXXXX

15.(C) Foresman said RenCap had also run the numbers on a BP partnership with Rosneft. It was not as mutually profitable as the Gazprom tie-in, nor as significant globally, but was looking increasingly attractive to BP under the current circumstances. Moreover, BP had bought a substantial stake in Rosneft during its IPO two years ago, a stake that had already risen by 60 percent in the interval. Foresman predicted that a Rosneft buy-out of the AAR partners was now the most likely outcome of the dispute and the one most beneficial to BP. Foresman added under that scenario Dudley would likely be out, replaced by someone acceptable to both sides such as Rosneft's current CEO, Amcit Peter O'Brien.

RUSSELL

Wikileaks