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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMO #2094/01 2031420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211420Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9112
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002094
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: STEINMEIER FAILS TO GET RUSSIAN SUPPORT
FOR DIRECT TALKS, BUT RUSSIA DOES NOT RULE THEM OUT
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Despite FM Lavrov's positive press spin
about German FM Steinmeier's meetings in Moscow July 18,
German colleagues characterized the trip as a "failure," and
said Steinmeier made no progress in securing Russian support
for direct Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations on security issues in
Berlin at the end of the month. MFA told us July 21 that
Lavrov and Steinmeier had agreed that, within the framework
of the Group of Friends, the first step would be to get
agreement on a UNSC Presidential Statement. Such a Statement
would be a "good basis" for further work of the Friends,
including the possibility of a meeting later in the summer in
Berlin with the Georgians and Abkhazians to sign a non-use of
force pledge. The MFA reiterated to us that Russia's
position had not changed: such a pledge, together with
withdrawal of Georgian forces from Kodori, were necessary
first steps, without preconditions. End summary.
MFA Spins Visit Positively
--------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Following Steinmeier's visit, the MFA issued a
relatively positive statement saying that the German proposal
was "well-intentioned," and would be discussed further within
the Friends' group. Lavrov asserted that the plan began with
the "absolute priority items" of signing of a non-use of
force agreement, and withdrawal of troops from Kodori. A
subsequent press announcement underscored that these "first
elements" needed to be achieved "in internationally
recognized formats," reaffirmed Russian appreciation for
German efforts, and called for resumption of talks in the
Joint Consultative Commission as the only channel for
discussing resolution of South Ossetia. A statement on
Medvedev's site also underscored that a no-first use pledge
and withdrawal from Kodori would open up other steps in the
negotiating process.
Germans Say Reality Much More Negative
--------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) German colleagues told us that following a "polite
Georgian rebuff" in Tbilisi and a "rude Bagapsh reception"
(the latter of which Steinmeier characterized as
"fruitless"), Steinmeier had pressed Lavrov and Medvedev to
support the proposed Berlin meeting at the working level.
Lavrov told Steinmeier the initiative would fail. While
praising the last Friends' meeting, Lavrov said the basic
problem was that Georgia did not keep its promises, and cited
the "agreement" between Medvedev and Saakashvili in St.
Petersburg on a basic exit strategy for Abkhazia -- the need
for dialogue, withdrawal from Kodori, and signing of a
non-use of force pledge. Lavrov complained that "nothing
happened." Two subsequent phone calls resulted in the
agreement for Medvedev and Saakashvili to meet in Sochi, but
Lavrov again charged Saakashvili with not being prepared to
fulfill his promise. The meeting in Berlin, Lavrov stressed,
would be in "complete contradiction" to the higher-level
Medvedev-Saakashvili initiative. Lavrov also reiterated
Russian objections to elevating the return of IDPs to the
same level as the security issue; rejected Georgian claims of
500,000 IDPs; and resurrected purported Shevardnadze
statements to Russia that all the refugees that wanted to
return had done so.
¶4. (SBU) German colleagues told us that Lavrov also
complained that Russia's initiative had not received support
in New York, and reiterated that the GOR was talking directly
to Saakashvili and had its own proposals in play. Lavrov was
irritated by U.S. "roadblocks," including insistence on
linking IDPs and security; downplaying of Kodori, and belief
that the security situation there was "under control"; and
push for a NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia.
Medvedev's message was the same, German colleagues said.
MFA Presses for New York Action
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) MFA CIS Deputy Director Semyon Grigoriev told us July
21 that Steinmeier had told Lavrov he had not expected the
effort to get agreement to the German plan to be so
difficult. He had encountered "completely conflicting"
positions in Tbilisi and Sukhumi. Georgia had insisted on
return of refugees and IDPs, whereas Abkhazia had refused to
accept such return, and had pressed for a non-use of force
pledge and full withdrawal of Georgian forces from Kodori
without preconditions.
¶6. (C) Grigoriev said Russia had not rejected Germany's
three-stage proposal. Lavrov supported it "strategically,"
but believed that "tactically," the first step needed to be
unity of the Friends' group, as evidenced by a Presidential
Statement in the UN Security Council. Grigoriev said Lavrov
and Steinmeier had agreed to seek such a Statement. The GOR
saw it as a good basis for further work of the Friends,
including a possible meeting of the Friends, Georgia, and
Abkhazia in Berlin to sign a non-use of force pledge later in
the summer. Grigoriev said such a UNSC Statement should be &#
x000A;agreed by the Friends, but did not need Georgian or Abkhazian
approval first. Grigoriev reiterated that Russia's position
remained unchanged: non-use of force pledge and withdrawal
of forces from Kodori had to precede other possible steps.
Comment
-------
¶7. (C) German colleagues believe the more positive spin in
the MFA statement was designed to support Steinmeier
personally, rather than indicate support for the plan, with
the GOR preferring the Abkhaz and Georgians to take the
public fall for complicating the German diplomatic
initiative.
BEYRLE
Wikileaks: Russia 