09MOSCOW1649, MOSCOW SAYS IRANIAN ELECTION AN INTERNAL AFFAIR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1649 2009-06-23 09:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO6515
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #1649 1740908
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230908Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3937
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001649 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR RS
SUBJECT: MOSCOW SAYS IRANIAN ELECTION AN INTERNAL AFFAIR 
 
REF: YEKATERINBURG 36 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David Kostelancik for reasons 
 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (U) Moscow has steered clear of the controversy over 
Iran's June 12 Presidential election, waiting until June 22 
for the MFA to release a brief statement declaring the 
election a "purely internal affair."  The statement did 
acknowledge that the election was being "challenged by other 
contenders" for the Presidency, who had the support of 
"certain portions of Iranian society."  This situation had 
led to a dispute over the election outcome that should be 
resolved in accordance with Iranian law.  Until the release 
of this statement, official Russian reaction to the election 
had been limited to DFM Ryabkov's June 15 comment to 
reporters covering the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) summit in Yekaterinburg, to whom he said that the 
"elections are an internal affair of the Iranian people." 
Ryabkov also welcomed the "newly elected President" of Iran 
to Yekaterinburg, where Ahmadinejad gave a June 16 address to 
the SCO summit and had a short meeting with Medvedev (reftel). 
 
2. (C) MFA Iran Section Chief Maxim Baranov told us on June 
22 that Medvedev and Ahmadinejad met for only ten minutes on 
the margins of the SCO summit.  They had been scheduled for a 
one-and-a-half hour meeting on June 15 that was to have 
covered a range of bilateral and regional issues, until 
Ahmadinejad delayed his arrival because of the situation at 
home.  DFM Ryabkov separately told a visiting U.S. delegation 
that Medvedev had "some major issues to discuss" with 
Ahmadinejad, and the GOR was disappointed that the longer 
meeting had not taken place. 
 
3. (C) Despite the GOR's official line on the Iranian 
election, Baranov said that some MFA officials were troubled 
by what appeared to be voting irregularities in Iran, such as 
reports that Ahmadinejad had won majority Azeri regions over 
his ethnically Azeri opponent, former PM Mousavi.  Baranov 
did not think that possible irregularities meant that 
Ahmadinejad had lost the election, but that he may not have 
won by as large a margin as Iranian authorities claimed. 
Furthermore, Baranov said that MFA officials were "not 
satisfied" with FM Mottaki's June 20 remarks to assembled 
Ambassadors to Iran, when he denied that any voting 
irregularities had occurred and praised Iran as more 
democratic than other countries.  Mottaki also took the UK to 
task for what he claimed was its meddling in Iranian domestic 
affairs, an extremely "impolite" gesture before the other 
Ambassadors, in Baranov's estimation.  He added that whereas 
London and Paris had been particularly critical of Tehran, he 
thought Washington's comparative restraint was the right 
approach. 
 
4. (C) Baranov explained that Moscow maintained "good" 
relations with Ahmadinejad, Rafsanjani, and other Iranian 
leaders, and could work with any of them.  He thought that 
Iranian authorities would not arrest Mousavi in order to 
avoid stirring up more protests or a threatened general 
strike. 
BEYRLE

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