Daily Archives: July 30, 2009

09MOSCOW1961, DEMARCHE DELIVERED: DELAY OF START OF WORK IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1961 2009-07-30 14:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0297
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1961 2111416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301416Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4407
INFO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4508
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2688
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2214
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1961
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6826
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5351
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0505

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001961 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC CH FR PK RS UK
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: DELAY OF START OF WORK IN THE 
CD 
 
REF: STATE 77710 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
(C) On July 30 we delivered reftel demarche to MFA DVBR 
Second Secretary Dmitriy Kostychenko, who told us he would 
pass the information on to the proper GOR authorities.  He 
said he would inform us when the GOR was prepared to respond. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1960, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: T.K.BRUKVOOD,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1960 2009-07-30 12:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1960 2111232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301232Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4406
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001960 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: T.K.BRUKVOOD, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210011; DATED 5/14/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, T.K. Brukvood, Moscow, 
Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as 
the ultimate consignee of thirty two IB cable 4X 1M, CNDCTR: fitted 
w/connector, volts and transmission equipment. These items are 
controlled for anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 5A991. The licensee 
is Voltaire Inc., 6 Fortune Drive, Billerica, MA 01821. 
 
3. On June 25, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of T.K. Brukvood, 4, Ilyinka Street, 
Moscow, Russia. The export control team met with Ionas Varikoos, 
General Director. 
 
 
4. T.K. Brukvood was founded in 1995 as a closed joint stock company 
specializing in transportation services. It has 65 employees at 
various offices throughout Moscow, Russia. As the transportation 
company grew, it expanded into investment projects and the 
electronics distribution market. T.K. BrukvoodQs offices are located 
in prime real estate very close to the Kremlin. It has a secure 
warehouse at a separate location that the Moscow export control team 
did not see. The Qship toQ address on the invoice is a mail drop 
facility that T.K. Brukvood uses to receive shipments. 
 
5. The end user of the commodities in reftel is JSC QBirs KomQ, 
Michurinsky pr. 8/29, Moscow, Russia, a long time customer of T.K. 
Brukvood. The stated end use was cabling upgrade on an existing 
electronics system. The reftel commodities will remain in Russia. 
 
6. The Moscow export control team did not inspect the reftel 
commodities because they had been forwarded to the end user in 2006. 
There were no indications of impropriety and the consigneeQs answers 
were not evasive. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends T.K. Brukvood, Moscow, Russia, 
as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1958, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE LOCKE’S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1958 2009-07-30 11:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0087
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV
RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1958/01 2111127
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301127Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4401
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5347

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001958 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC:MMCFAUL/HSOLOMON 
WHITE HOUSE PASS USTR:CWILSON/MRODHE 
GENEVA FOR USTR MISSION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON EFIN RS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF COMMERCE LOCKE'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN 
MINISTER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NABIULLINA 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary.  During a meeting with Russian Minister of 
Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina on July 7 in Moscow, 
Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke stressed U.S. support for 
continued Russian integration into the world economy, 
including WTO accession, and raised several trade issues. 
Minister Nabiullina said that Russia would work in parallel 
on WTO accession and its customs union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan.  (Note: Two days later, after Secretary Locke had 
mentioned her remarks to a reporter, Minister Nabiullina 
insisted to a reporter that the Russian government's decision 
was to accede to the WTO in a customs union.  However, 
President Medvedev stated at a press conference at the end of 
the same week that acceding separately to the WTO would, in 
his view, be more simple and realistic than seeking to accede 
as a customs union.  End note.)  Secretary Locke and Minister 
Nabiullina looked forward to co-chairing the new U.S.-Russia 
Presidential Commission's Business Development and Economic 
Relations Working Group, and they agreed that each would 
appoint a person to lead this work.  End Summary. 
 
Summit Opens Doors for Further Trade and Investment 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (SBU) Russian Minister of Economic Development Nabiullina 
welcomed Secretary Locke on his first visit to Moscow as 
Commerce Secretary and noted their brief conversation the day 
before at the Kremlin.  Minister Nabiullina said that Russia 
values very highly its economic relations with the United 
States.  She noted that trade and investment had expanded 
during recent years but both remained far below their full 
potential.  Trade will be lower in 2009 because of the 
economic crisis and the decline of Russian exports.  She 
expressed the hope that this trend would not continue and 
said that both governments should use this Presidential 
Summit opportunity to further economic cooperation.  Noting 
that Russian companies had recently invested in the United 
States (particularly production ventures), she said that 
Russia now seeks to expand two-way investment.  She admitted 
that Russian investment in the United States was not on a par 
with the volume of U.S. investment in Russia.  She emphasized 
that Russia is interested in joint projects, especially in 
high-tech.  Also, Russian policy is to emphasize innovation 
in technology, and President Medvedev has created a 
commission for investment in innovation, including in energy 
efficiency, aerospace technology, medical and biotechnology, 
information technology and energy--areas in which Russia 
would be interested in developing cooperation. 
 
3. (SBU) Secretary Locke expressed his desire to discuss the 
expansion of trade and investment, and he added that 
President Obama and President Medvedev were holding both 
public and private meetings in support of this objective. 
The Secretary stressed (1) that President Obama places 
importance on establishing good relations with Russia and (2) 
that economic cooperation can create stronger political 
relations.  He remarked that Russian companies have excellent 
opportunities to invest in the United States, where there are 
very few restrictions on foreign investment; the United 
States welcomes increased Russian investment.  Many U.S. 
companies are doing business in Russia, a win-win situation 
for people and governments on both sides.  He explained that 
U.S. companies are employing tens of thousands of workers in 
Russia, creating both jobs and a better quality of life. 
Bringing advanced new technologies to market helps Russian 
companies, too.  He recounted a recent conversation with a 
representative of U.S. agribusiness company Cargill, who had 
described the firm's business in processing crops from 
Russian farms for supply to Russian consumers.  Secretary 
Locke expressed satisfaction with the success of U.S. 
companies in Russia, but noted that some are encountering 
tariff, customs and regulatory problems that restrict their 
ability to expand.  He said that to help increase bilateral 
commercial activity, both Presidents asked him and Minister 
Nabiullina to co-chair an intergovernmental Working Group on 
Business Development and Economic Relations that would, in 
part, examine recommendation from U.S. and Russian business 
leaders. 
 
Locke:"Uncertainty Over Russia's Position on WTO" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
MOSCOW 00001958  002 OF 004 
 
 
4. (SBU) Citing President Obama's Kremlin remarks, Secretary 
Locke said that the United States remains very supportive of 
Russia's accession to the WTO, and looks forward to Russia 
joining by the end of the year.  Referring to Minister 
Nabiullina's St. Petersburg meeting with U.S. Trade 
Representative
 Kirk, the Secretary expressed the belief that 
accession could bring substantial benefits to Russia, as well 
as to its trade partners. However, Prime Minister Putin's 
June 9 statement had created uncertainty about the path 
forward.  Secretary Locke added that a customs union 
approach, which Russia has indicated its intention to follow, 
would very likely delay things. 
 
Trade Irritants from the U.S. Side 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Secretary Locke commented on specific market access 
issues which concern us, including high Russian tariffs on 
farm equipment and off-highway trucks.  He added that a lack 
of access to subsidized bank financing also is hurting sales 
of U.S. agricultural equipment.  He cited Russian 
restrictions on U.S. meat that have been imposed in reaction 
to the H1N1 virus.  He also reminded Nabiullina of Russia's 
commitment to streamline import procedures for information 
technology products that contain encryption capability, 
noting that such products are updated so rapidly that they 
can become outmoded in the time currently required for import 
approvals.  Regarding intellectual property rights (IPR), the 
Secretary said that data for pharmaceutical products must be 
protected.  In the Secretary's discussions with U.S. 
companies in Moscow, they had emphasized progress in 
transparency, but noted that more is needed.  These company 
representatives had expressed their appreciation for Minister 
Nabiullina's help and that of her ministry. 
 
Nabiullina:Parallel Negotiations for WTO and Customs Union 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Regarding WTO accession, Minister Nabiullina said 
that Russia's strategic aim had not changed, and that it is a 
priority for Russia to be within the WTO framework.  The 
accession process had dragged out, however, and in Russian 
eyes, the reasons for this were "not in the commercial 
sphere."  She contended that Russia had made a "huge" effort 
to accede, and that its legislation needed for WTO-conformity 
is complete.  She said that it remains Russia's intention to 
accede as soon as possible, and that formation of a customs 
union would proceed in parallel.  In early June, there had 
been significant progress on this front, with Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus agreeing to implement the customs 
union by January 1, 2010.  This task had been established by 
the Prime Minister working together with the President. 
Russia wants to integrate these two goals, she explained. 
President Medvedev had noted during the Kremlin meeting that 
there were two approaches for WTO negotiations, and a search 
is underway for the best way.  She stated that Russia wants 
the quickest way into the WTO, and wants to retain agreements 
already reached with the WTO membership.  Although Russia is 
the only large economy outside the WTO, it si already living 
by the rules of the WTO, she commented. 
 
Economic Crisis Leads to Protectionism Regarding Tariffs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
7. (SBU) Nabiullina remarked that the economic crisis is 
leading to government steps to support the economy; for 
example, there are "Buy American" measures in the United 
States.  She characterized Russia's steps as quite moderate, 
and said that unlike some other countries, Russia has taken 
no measures regarding investment. (Note: It was not clear 
what Nabiullina may have been referring to here.  End Note.) 
She also said that Russia has taken only limited steps 
regarding tariffs, primarily with automobiles.  Moreover, she 
asserted that these measures are temporary (for only nine 
months) and are justified by the fact that many imports are 
subsidized.  The automobile market in Russia is open, with 
more than fifty percent of demand satisfied by imports. 
Regarding agricultural equipment and off-highway trucks, 
Nabiullina admitted that the GOR is motivated by a desire to 
establish competitive production in Russia.  Many foreign 
companies enter the Russian market through investment, she 
 
MOSCOW 00001958  003 OF 004 
 
 
said, and Russia is interested in having U.S. firms enter the 
market in agricultural machinery and road construction 
equipment production ventures. 
 
Agricultural Machinery Financing is for Manufacturers 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8. (SBU) Regarding state-backed loans for agricultural 
machinery, Minister Nabiullina asserted that the loans in 
question were not government-guaranteed loans to end-users 
(such as farmers), but rather, loans extended by Russian 
banks to Russian equipment manufacturers (who presumably then 
pass along savings to end-users in the form of a lower 
purchase price). 
 
Russian Position on Plant Certifications 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) On the subject of the H1N1 virus, Minister 
Nabiullina characterized recent GOR bans on U.S. meat as a 
natural response to protect the health of its citizens.  She 
then called upon Russian veterinary and food surveillance 
service chief Sergey Dankvert.  He noted that Russian food 
imports had grown from 2006 through 2008, a trend which he 
argued shows that Russia's market is not becoming more 
restrictive.  He believes results of U.S.-Russian cooperation 
are smaller than they could be, and cited several reasons. 
One was a lack of integration of U.S. government services; 
there are "three or four agencies" involved in food 
regulation, but an absence of any one person who can be 
responsible for decisions.  He said that he had told the U.S. 
Ambassador that his (Dankvert's) office had better relations 
with U.S. industry than with USG agencies.  Dankvert pointed 
out that at a recent roundtable in Paris, Russian government 
representatives had come to a good understanding with U.S. 
industry, but U.S. government representatives were less open 
to discussion.  Regarding pork, Dankvert asserted that Russia 
has made greater efforts to resolve the issue than the United 
States. 
 
Nabiullina:Legislation on Data Exclusivity 
------------------------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Responding to Secretary Locke's comments on 
pharmaceutical data protection, Minister Nabiullina said that 
legislation was being prepared that would be adopted and make 
protection of data more effective.  (Note: this was 
notwithstanding her previous comment that Russia's 
WTO-related legislation was complete. End note.) In reference 
to an earlier mention by the Secretary that imported cellular 
phones were being held up at customs, Minster Nabiullina said 
that she had not been aware of the problem but would look 
into it and consider it in the context of WTO discussions. 
 
Irritants from the Russian Side: Anti-Dumping Cases 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
11. (SBU) Minister Nabiullina raised two ongoing U.S. 
anti-dumping cases.  First, she said that Russia wanted to 

amend the ammonium nitrate suspension agreement for which the 
Russians felt they had an understanding with the previous 
U.S. administration to resolve this question.  Secretary 
Locke replied that there had been a change in market 
conditions.  Given this, he added, the Commerce Department is 
reaching out to U.S. industry to look for mutually 
satisfactory courses of action. 
 
12. (SBU) Second, Minister Nabiullina raised the magnesium 
suspension agreement, noting that the Russian company, 
VSMPO-AVISMA (known as Avisma) is a partner of Boeing.  The 
Secretary stated that, unfortunately, the Russian respondent 
Avisma did not submit the necessary information and, in fact, 
withdrew itself from the case.  Accordingly, we are concerned 
and are at an impasse.  Minister Nabiullina replied that, as 
far as she knew, the information requested of Avisma touched 
on commercially sensitive information that Avisma felt was 
"beyond the framework of usual requirements" for 
transaction-related information.  Secretary Locke said that 
the Commerce Department follows open and transparent 
procedures, and that if Avisma feels that it is being 
required to submit sensitive, non-typical information, the 
 
MOSCOW 00001958  004 OF 004 
 
 
Department would be prepared to discuss the concern. 
Minister Nabiullina requested that a meeting be held before 
the end of July.  (Follow-up: As of July 24, Commerce's 
Import Administration has tentatively scheduled a meeting 
with Russian Ministry of Economic Development representatives 
for August 4 in Washington.) 
 
Science Should Determine Food Safety Decisions 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
13. (SBU) Secretary Locke returned to the subject of food 
standards, commenting that, as the parent of three children, 
he is very concerned about food safety.  He recognized the 
responsibility of each country to have its own food safety 
rules and regulations. In the case of "swine flu," scientific 
studies show no connection between H1N1 and eating pork.  He 
added that the United States appreciates Russia's recent 
removal of restrictions from four U.S. states, and that we 
would be providing additional documentation.  Minister 
Nabiullina said that she agreed that all decisions should be 
based on scientific work.  She had read carefully 
international reports, noting that several countries (i.e., 
not only Russia) still have significant import restrictions 
in place.  Nevertheless, as the process moves forward and 
more information is made available, Russia will review the 
restrictions.  Director Dankvert added that he had received 
about eighty pages of information in English and will try to 
read them, even though a month for translation would normally 
be required. 
 
Next Steps for Working Group 
---------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Secretary Locke sought Minister Nabiullina's ideas 
about how to move forward after the Business Summit presents 
recommendations.  She expressed hope that the Business Summit 
would be useful and lead to a business dialogue that will 
form part of an "integrated framework."  Her understanding 
was that the U.S. side wanted to include the business 
community in the work of the Business Development and 
Economic Relations Working Group.  Secretary Locke suggested 
that the Working Group should consider the recommendations of 
the U.S. and Russian CEOs who were at the Moscow Business 
Summit.  Nabiullina noted that Russia was planning an 
exhibition in Chicago in the fall, which could serve as an 
occasion for a business dialogue session.  The Secretary 
asked whether Minister Nabiullina wished to designate a 
person to lead Russia's work on the Working Group; she 
suggested Elena Danilova of the Ministry's Department for the 
Americas.  Secretary Locke responded that he was designating 
Acting Commerce Under Secretary for International Trade 
Michelle O'Neill as the U.S. contact point. 
 
15. (U) This cable has been cleared by Commerce Headquarters. 
 
 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1956, NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK’S KOMID PROCURING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1956 2009-07-30 10:24 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0021
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1956 2111024
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301024Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4399
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001956 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/RUS, AND EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2034 
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS KN YM
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK'S KOMID PROCURING 
VEHICLE, PARTS VIA RUSSIA FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE PROJECT IN 
YEMEN (S) 
 
REF: STATE 77515 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
, (c), and (d). 
 
(S) On July 30 we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR First 
Secretary Denis Davydov, who said he would convey our 
concerns to the proper GOR entities. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1954, NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK’S KOMID PROCURING

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1954.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1954 2009-07-30 10:21 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0019
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1954 2111021
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301021Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4397
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2034 
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS KN YM
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: DPRK'S KOMID PROCURING 
VEHICLE, PARTS VIA RUSSIA FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE PROJECT IN 
YEMEN (S) 
 
REF: STATE 77515 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
, (c), and (d). 
 
(S) On July 30 we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR First 
Secretary Denis Davydov, who said he would convey our 
concerns to the proper GOR entities. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1953, NONPAPER DELIVERED: JCIC-DIP-09-008: RUSSIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1953 2009-07-30 10:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1953 2111010
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301010Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4396
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0279
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0345
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5346
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2029 
TAGS: PARM KACT START US RS
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: JCIC-DIP-09-008: RUSSIAN 
FAILURE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED START NOTIFICATION FOR THE 
FLIGHT TEST OF AN SLBM ON JULY 13, 2009 
 
REF: STATE 78777 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Margaret Hawthorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
1. (S) On July 29 Acting A/S Van Diepen delivered reftel 
nonpaper to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov, who 
acknowledged the seriousness of the GOR's failure to properly 
notify the United States about its recent missile launch.  He 
promised to convey our concerns to appropriate GOR 
authorities. 
 
2. (U) Acting A/S Van Diepen cleared this message. 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1946, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: AKNIIPO ANO,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1946 2009-07-30 06:39 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1946 2110639
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300639Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4389
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001946 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: AKNIIPO ANO, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210017; DATED 6/04/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, AKNIIPO ANO, Moscow, 
Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as 
the ultimate consignee of forty eight electronic integrated circuits 
and micro assemblies, digital field programmable gate arrays, 
product no:APA450-PQ2081. These items are controlled for national 
security, missile technology, nuclear non-proliferation and 
anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel 
Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. On July 29, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina conducted the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of AKNIIPO ANO (Aerospace Scientific and 
Research Test Industrial Company, Automated Non-Commercial 
Organization), 5, Aviatsionny Pereulok, Moscow, Russia. The export 
control team met with Dmitry Kholomkin, General Director and Pavel 
Turikin, Department Head. 
 
4. AKNIIPO ANO was created in 2001, when three companies, 
Rocket-Space Corporation Energy, Holding Company Aviapribor and 
Russian Scientific Research Institute Electrostandart, joined 
together.  It has 60 full time employees and approximately 300 under 
various contracts for special projects. 
 
5. AKNIIPO ANO is licensed by the Russian government to produce and 
develop various finished components for space exploration projects. 
 
6. The commodities in reftel were purchased by AKNIIPO ANO for use 
in a joint space exploration project with NASA involving the 
Fobos-Grunt mission.  The missionQs objectives are to collect soil 
samples from Fobos, a moon of mars and to bring the samples back to 
Earth for comprehensive scientific research into Fobos, Mars and 
Martian space. 
 
7. The commodities in reftel were not located in the consigneeQs 
facility because they have already been placed onboard the Russian 
launch vehicle that is scheduled for an October launch. The 
commodities do appear to be being used for the end use for which 
they were licensed. There were no indications of impropriety and the 
consigneeQs answers were not evasive. 
8. Recommendations: Post recommends AKNIIPO ANO, Moscow, Russia, as 
a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1942, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1942.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1942 2009-07-30 04:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1942 2110426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300426Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4385
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001942 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW, 
RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210022; DATED 6/19/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Tehkom, Moscow, Russia. 
The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as the 
ultimate consignee of one electronic circuit unmounted and 
electronic devices and components. These items are controlled for 
national security, missile technology, nuclear nonproliferation and 
anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel 
Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. On July 15, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina attempted to conduct the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of the U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. 
Embassy, 8, B. Devyatinsky per., Moscow, Russia. The export control 
team met with Vladislav Boikachev, General Director. 
 
 
4. The Moscow export control team had received the reftel on June 
19, 2009 and made several attempts to schedule the post shipment 
verification with Vladislav Boikachev.  Boikachev repeatedly 
challenged both the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to 
conduct such a check within Russia, and the identity of members of 
the Moscow export control team as actual U.S. Embassy employees. 
After several requests from the Moscow export control office, 
Boikachev refused to meet with the Moscow export control team at his 
office under any circumstances. LES Shipitsina eventually convinced 
Boikachev to meet with the Moscow export control team at the offices 
of the Foreign Commercial Service located at the U.S. Embassy and 
scheduled the meeting for July 15, 2009. 
 
5. On July 15, 2009 the Moscow export control team met with 
Boikachev at the entrance of the Foreign Commercial Service, in the 
entrance foyer prior to going through the U.S. Embassy security 
check point. Once confronted by the U.S. Embassy security personnel 
and asked to provide his Russian passport, Boikavchev refused to 
cooperate and left the Embassy without the post shipment 
verification being conducted. 
 
6. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Tehkom, Moscow, 
Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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09MOSCOW1941, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: MERCURY

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1941.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1941 2009-07-30 04:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1941 2110425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300425Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4384
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: MERCURY 
ELECTRONICS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST #4210002; DATED 4/9/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Mercury Electronics, 
Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: 
CIV as the foreign purchaser of ninety six electronic integrated 
circuits and electronic devices and components. These items are 
controlled for national security, missile technology, nuclear 
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The 
licensee is Actel Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. The contact information provided in reftel was for Advanced 
Electronics, the intermediate consignee.  LES Natalia Shipitsina 
telephoned Advanced Electronics, the official distributor of Actel 
Corporation in Russia, on May 18, 2009 and was provided with contact 
information for Mercury Electronics, the ultimate consignee of the 
reftel commodities. On May 20, 2009 LES Natalia Shipitsina spoke 
with Mr. Volkov of Mercury Electronics, advising him of the 
requested end use check for the commodities Mercury Electronics 
purchased from Actel Corporation. Mr. Volkov stated that he was too 
busy to discuss the matter and advised LES Shipitsina that he would 
call the Moscow export control team on May 28, 2009 to schedule the 
end use check. However, Mr. Volkov never called the Moscow export 
control team.  LES Shipitsina made several attempts to reach Mr. 
Volkov over the past several weeks to no avail. 
 
4. Mercury Electronics is aware of the Bureau of Industry and 
SecurityQs request to conduct an end use check of the commodities 
its company purchased from Actel Corporation and has not responded 
to the request in a timely manner. The Moscow export control team 
has made repeated efforts to contact Mercury Electronics which 
appear to be ignored. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Mercury Electronics, 
Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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