09MOSCOW1941, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: MERCURY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1941 2009-07-30 04:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1941 2110425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300425Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4384
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: MERCURY 
ELECTRONICS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST #4210002; DATED 4/9/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Mercury Electronics, 
Moscow, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license applications: 
CIV as the foreign purchaser of ninety six electronic integrated 
circuits and electronic devices and components. These items are 
controlled for national security, missile technology, nuclear 
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The 
licensee is Actel Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. The contact information provided in reftel was for Advanced 
Electronics, the intermediate consignee.  LES Natalia Shipitsina 
telephoned Advanced Electronics, the official distributor of Actel 
Corporation in Russia, on May 18, 2009 and was provided with contact 
information for Mercury Electronics, the ultimate consignee of the 
reftel commodities. On May 20, 2009 LES Natalia Shipitsina spoke 
with Mr. Volkov of Mercury Electronics, advising him of the 
requested end use check for the commodities Mercury Electronics 
purchased from Actel Corporation. Mr. Volkov stated that he was too 
busy to discuss the matter and advised LES Shipitsina that he would 
call the Moscow export control team on May 28, 2009 to schedule the 
end use check. However, Mr. Volkov never called the Moscow export 
control team.  LES Shipitsina made several attempts to reach Mr. 
Volkov over the past several weeks to no avail. 
 
4. Mercury Electronics is aware of the Bureau of Industry and 
SecurityQs request to conduct an end use check of the commodities 
its company purchased from Actel Corporation and has not responded 
to the request in a timely manner. The Moscow export control team 
has made repeated efforts to contact Mercury Electronics which 
appear to be ignored. 
 
5. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Mercury Electronics, 
Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

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