09MOSCOW1942, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW,

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1942.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1942 2009-07-30 04:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1942 2110426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300426Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4385
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001942 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: TEHKOM, MOSCOW, 
RUSSIA. 
 
REFTELS: REQUEST FORM #04210022; DATED 6/19/2009 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, Tehkom, Moscow, Russia. 
The company is listed on BIS license applications: NLR as the 
ultimate consignee of one electronic circuit unmounted and 
electronic devices and components. These items are controlled for 
national security, missile technology, nuclear nonproliferation and 
anti-terrorism reasons under ECCN 3A001. The licensee is Actel 
Corporation, 2061 Stierlin CT, Mountain View, CA. 
 
3. On July 15, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Natalya Shipitsina attempted to conduct the requested post-shipment 
verification at the offices of the U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. 
Embassy, 8, B. Devyatinsky per., Moscow, Russia. The export control 
team met with Vladislav Boikachev, General Director. 
 
 
4. The Moscow export control team had received the reftel on June 
19, 2009 and made several attempts to schedule the post shipment 
verification with Vladislav Boikachev.  Boikachev repeatedly 
challenged both the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to 
conduct such a check within Russia, and the identity of members of 
the Moscow export control team as actual U.S. Embassy employees. 
After several requests from the Moscow export control office, 
Boikachev refused to meet with the Moscow export control team at his 
office under any circumstances. LES Shipitsina eventually convinced 
Boikachev to meet with the Moscow export control team at the offices 
of the Foreign Commercial Service located at the U.S. Embassy and 
scheduled the meeting for July 15, 2009. 
 
5. On July 15, 2009 the Moscow export control team met with 
Boikachev at the entrance of the Foreign Commercial Service, in the 
entrance foyer prior to going through the U.S. Embassy security 
check point. Once confronted by the U.S. Embassy security personnel 
and asked to provide his Russian passport, Boikavchev refused to 
cooperate and left the Embassy without the post shipment 
verification being conducted. 
 
6. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend Tehkom, Moscow, 
Russia, as a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
AGNEW

Wikileaks

Advertisements
Post a comment or leave a trackback: Trackback URL.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: