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VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMO #3362/01 0901231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311231Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3353
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003362
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC RS
SUBJECT: P-5 HOLD UN CONSULTATIONS MARCH 2 IN MOSCOW
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
For Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Russia hosted a meeting of P-5 IO Directors
March 2 in Moscow to discuss UN Security Council and
management reforms, the proposed Human Rights Council, the
Peacebuilding Commission, and other issues related to
implementation of the World Summit Outcome Document, as well
as appointment of a new Secretary General and revitalization
of the UNSC Military Staff Committee. The group also
reviewed UN Security Council action in the Middle East, Iran,
Iraq, Kosovo, Syria/Lebanon, Cyprus, and Africa. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Kristen Silverberg represented the
United States. Russian MFA International Organizations
Department Director Aleksandr Konuzin represented the Russian
side and served as host. Stephen Pattison, Director for
International Security in the Foreign Office, represented the
UK. The French representative was Sylvie Bermann, Director
of the French MFA's Department of United Nations and
International Organizations. China was represented by newly
appointed MFA International Organizations and Conferences
Department Director Wu Hailun. After consultations with
Konuzin, the group met briefly with Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Aleksandr Yakovenko.
.
REGULARIZING P-5 MEETINGS
-------------------------
¶3. (C) Russia's Konuzin began by noting the importance of a
P-5 meeting to assess progress following the 2005 World
Summit. He suggested regularizing such consultations at the
policy level, with one meeting per year in New York during
the UNGA and another in February to assess UNGA outcomes.
A/S Silverberg welcomed the idea and offered to host the next
session in New York during this year's UNGA. France's
Bermann also agreed and proposed holding the subsequent
session in Paris next February.
.
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
--------------------
¶4. (C) Konuzin said Russia was prepared to be flexible
concerning the draft Human Rights Council text, but harbored
a number of concerns. Russia did not support a mandatory
five-year review of the Council, but felt that after five
years the UN could decide whether a review was required.
Russia opposed a two-term limit on membership as contrary to
the UN's universality principle, and was prepared to put this
point to a vote if it were included in the text. Konuzin
said Russia opposed country-specific resolutions, and was
also uncomfortable with the provision for suspension of
members, since the basis for it was unclear. Russia was
flexible on the number of sessions the Council should hold;
the idea of having three sessions within a ten-week period
was acceptable. Special sessions were also acceptable, in
Russia's view, but should require more than a one-third vote.
While changing the format of the UN's human rights body was
important, Konuzin argued, it must be accompanied by changes
in the substance of the body's work.
¶5. (C) China believed that human rights reform was needed to
end politicization of the issue in the UN context, Wu said.
The new draft resolution on the Council should be further
improved, Wu argued, although China would accept that
resolution if it enjoyed consensus. It was particularly
important for the P-5 itself to reach consensus as soon as
possible. China would accept holding a Human Rights
Commission session this year, and was flexible on its format.
France's Bermann said the current proposal regarding the
Human Rights Council was a compromise and needed further
improvement. It was essential to be able to suspend Council
members if they did not respect human rights. She urged
avoiding a vote on the HRC at all costs for the moment, as it
was more important to broaden support around one position.
UNGA President Eliasson's formulation on membership was not
acceptable, and the issue still needed to be properly
addressed.
¶6. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that Secretary Rice had called
SYG Annan to underscore that the U.S. did not support the
current proposal regarding the Human Rights Council. The
U.S. would not compromise further on the important principle
that members of the HRC share a good-faith commitment to
human rights. The U.S. supported changes to the text to
exclude countries under UNSC sanctions from HRC membership,
and establish a two-thirds vote requirement for election to
membership. The U.S. was open-minded whether to engage in
member state negotiations or delay consideration of the
proposal, A/S Silverberg said, but was prepared to call for a
vote and vote no.
.
SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Konuzin said Russia believed any decision on Council
reform should be based on the maximum possible agreement
among member states, which he interpreted to mean "much more
than two-thirds." In any case, he said, now was not a good
time to vote on a Council reform resolution since it would
only be divisive. Noting that Japan had not joined the other
G-4 countries in sponsoring this year's UNGA resolution on
Council expansion, Konuzin asked whetherQhis was a strategic
or tactical maneuver by the Japanese. He said Russia had
"suspicions," but was not asked to elaborate. Konuzin said
he was unclear on the specific elements of Japan,s proposal,
but asserted that Russia could not agree to the kind of
elections foreseen by the Japanese because it would create an
"uncontrollable situation" and the process would become
"ridiculous."
¶8. (C) Bermann said reform of the Security Council was
essential to fully reform the UN. The HRC and management
reform should come first but the P-5 should continue to work
on the issue. France thought the G-4 plan was "fair and
equitable," but the Japanese plan would be very difficult to
implement. A/S Silverberg stated the U.S. favored modest
Security Council expansion, and believed Japan had the
qualifications to be a valuable member of that body. She
noted the U.S. had concerns with Japan,s "Option C," and
remained opposed to the G-4 plan. Wu argued further
consultation was needed on Security Council reform, but it
was essential to avoid holding "forced" votes that would
damage solidarity among UN members. The P-5 should encourage
"democratic dialogue and consultation" and not take action
that surprised other members.
.
MANAGEMENT REFORM
-----------------
¶9. (C) Konuzin stressed the importance of management reform
but noted that it should not be allowed to change the nature
of the UN as an organization of member states. Russia was
flexible with regard to giving the SYG more authority, and
"reasonably flexible" on budgetary and staffing issues, but
believed new mechanisms should be laid out to foster
efficiency and accountability, and should not take away the
oversight authority of the Member States. Russia opposed
voting on budget packages, believing each programmatic
element of the budget should be considered separately.
Russia favors mandate review, but understands G77
sensitivities in the matter and believed it was important to
work with those countries. Konuzin said Russia did not favor
linking progress on reform with consideration of the current
UN budget. Russia needed more information on the financial
implications of changes to the contracting system but
stressed that in any case, the issue needed additional
consideration in the Fifth Committee. The Russians were
reluctant to establish a strong Deputy SYG, since that would
not be in line with the UN Charter. The system under which a
SYG is elected and is allowed to fill all his functions
should be preserved, Konuzin argued.
¶10. (C) Wu said China believed Secretariat reform should
preserve the nature of the UN as a body of governments.
Internal management of the Secretariat needed to be
strengthened. Wu argued that it was essential for the P-5
countries to remain in close touch on management reform to
avoid surprising one another.
¶11. (C) A/S Silverberg agreed with Konuzin's point that
decisions on mandates must be made by member states. Concern
about specific mandate proposals might be eased when their
details were laid out, A/S Silverberg said. The U.S. was not
supporting this effort primarily as a cost saving exercise,
but believed change was vital so that funds would be devoted
to priority areas.
¶12. (C) Pattison argued that management reform was too
important to leave to the Fifth Committee. He said the issue
did not involve an attempt by the P-5 to gain more power but
was a real effort to make the UN work better. Pattison saw
the SYG paper on system coherence as important, particularly
because of the inefficiencies caused by competition among UN
agencies. Bermann believed it essential to persuade G-77
countries that management reform was in their interests.
.
REVITALIZATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
--------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Konuzin argued that the Security Council was a victim
of its own success, which led elected members to bring issues
to the Council that did not belong there, under the guise
that they were related to conflicts ("(blank) and conflict").
He felt "proud" that the P-5 have resisted this trend.
Konuzin then added he understood the U.S. reasons for calling
Council meetings on PKO management issues, but the Council
"should be cautious about this kind of thing." Konuzin put
forth an "idea" that "instead of being on the defensive," the
P-5 should make proposals for GA revitalization by looking at
the Security Council agenda for issues that could be given to
the GA, and by encouraging the GA President to hold more
discussions on political issues. A/S Silverberg responded
that the U.S. believed PKO-related matters such as sexual
exploitation and procurement scandals were well within the
Council,s mandate. For the U.S., adequate Council oversight
was key to responding to domestic issues concerning the
justification of PKO expenditures.
¶14. (C) Wu stressed that clear divisions existed between the
roles and responsibilities of the Security Council and the
General Assembly, and these should be respected to avoid
duplication. The Security Council's authority must be
maintained, but the roles of other countries must also be
taken into account. Above all, Wu argued, the interests of
developing countries must be kept in mind.
.
PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
--------------------------
¶15. (C) Bermann said the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
represents the result of lessons learned about coordination
on institution building. The PBC needs to be well-funded and
have links to the IFIs. The Council needed to ensure that
the PBC begins its work with a success that would establish
its bona fides. This means not taking on too much at once,
perhaps only one or two countries. Haiti might be too
difficult but Burundi might provide better chances for
success. Wu said the P-5 should be flexible regarding the
rules of election to the PBC, and should give due
consideration to the views of Asian countries.
¶16. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that it was important to have
moderate expectations about the Commission. The PBC needs to
show early success by taking on manageable countries such as
Burundi or perhaps Liberia. Pattison offered Sierra Leone as
another possibility for initial PBC action. Konuzin noted
that Guinea-Bissau had been raised as a possible focus for
the PBC, but agreed Burundi might be more appropriate,
although its government was showing signs of reluctance.
.
OTHER OUTCOME DOCUMENT ISSUES
-----------------------------
¶17. (C) Russia's Konuzin expressed satisfaction that the
World Summit Outcome Document would help strengthen the UN.
The Document had emerged as the common denominator of
discussions in New York, and though it did not fully reflect
the views of any s
ingle member state, it was acceptable to
almost all of them. Wu said the Outcome Document was of
prime importance but should be implemented step-by-step
beginning with easy issues. Work on counterterrorism at the
UN must take into account the concerns of developing
countries. China favors a high-level counterterrorism
conference and enhanced consultations on the draft
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).
The UN should agree "as soon as possible" on a definition of
terrorism in the CCIT. UK's Pattison said it was time to
redevelop the "habit" of P-5 consultation. He agreed with
the Chinese point on defining terrorism. Pattison said the
UK considered the Duty to Protect a very important element of
the Summit outcome, as it was becoming increasingly central
to the Security Council,s work. More broadly, Pattison
continued, the Outcome Document reflected the evolving nature
of conflicts and a corresponding extension of the Security
Council,s agenda. Whereas once the Council had focused on
relations between states, it now focused on intrastate
conflicts, Pattison argued, which made non-traditional issues
such as women's concerns relevant to the Council,s work.
.
SYG APPOINTMENT
---------------
¶18. (C) China's Wu presented four points: the new SYG should
be capable; the UN should follow the accepted principle of
regional rotation, under which it was Asia,s turn -- the P-5
should agree that Asian candidates would "have priority";
September/October was a good time frame for making a
selection; and P-5 unity was important since the P-5 have
"special responsibilities" in the selection process.
Acknowledging current disagreements among the P-5, he said
P-5 members should at minimum try to find an Asian who would
be acceptable. Konuzin agreed on the need to respect the
tradition of regional rotation. When SYG Annan had been
chosen, the African and Asian blocs had agreed that Asia
would provide the next SYG. Those two blocs contained some
100 countries, and while not all might agree to an Asian SYG
now, the majority no doubt did. In Konuzin's view, this
served as an additional argument for choosing an Asian SYG.
A/S Silverberg reiterated that the U.S. does not accept the
rotation principle. She asked about unity within the Asian
bloc on the issue. Wu replied that all Asian countries
favored an Asian SYG, and that the ASEAN countries agreed
that an ASEAN candidate should be selected.
¶19. (C) Pattison raised the possibility of establishing
criteria for choosing the next SYG, which would give a sense
the selection process was being conducted with maximum
transparency. Criteria might include experience in running a
large organization, a prominent international profile, and
experience in international affairs. Bermann echoed
Pattison's view on the desirability of demonstrating
transparency in the selection process, and suggested looking
at procedures used by the WTO or other comparable models.
¶20. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that although she agreed with
Pattison,s criteria, intangible factors inevitably came into
play, and any criteria would be at a level of generality that
would make them unlikely to be useful. She also stressed
that setting criteria could have unintended future
consequences. Konuzin shared A/S Silverberg's concerns about
specific criteria. If the P-5 agreed to criteria, other
groups might put forth their own, less desirable criteria, he
continued. The key was to avoid deadlocks, and the P-5
should work to reach internal agreement.
¶21. (C) On the question of timing for SYG selection, Konuzin
dismissed concern that reaching consensus too early would
make SYG Annan a lame duck. Wu argued for a
September-October time frame to choose the new SYG. Konuzin
responded that this would only ensure that the next UNGA
session would be preoccupied with the succession issue and
would make no progress in other areas. Konuzin urged maximum
flexibility on timing, but said that as soon as general
agreement emerged about a successor to Annan, a vote should
be taken quickly to avoid additional candidacies.
.
MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE (MSC) REVITALIZATION
---------------------------------------------
¶22. (C) A/S Silverberg laid out U.S. arguments for
revitalizing the MSC: The Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) presents UN members with too few options
and frequently fails to adequately justify its requests. For
this reason, outside military advice would be beneficial.
A/S Silverberg added that Congress, and no doubt other
legislatures, often question funding for UN peacekeeping
operations, and a revitalized MSC would help address those
concerns. She urged close P-5 consultation and said the U.S.
would welcome participation of member states outside the P-5.
Bermann said France agreed with the U.S. concerns but not
with institutionalizing the MSC. She questioned the need to
create another layer of decision-making and questioned the
value of input from member states outside the P-5, even if
they had military expertise. Pattison said that while DPKO
sometimes produced useful advice, it could be improved,
however the MSC was not necessarily the answer. Konuzin
expressed enthusiasm for the U.S. initiative and welcomed
that it had been initially raised in the P-5 context.
Agreeing with Pattison that the DPKO sometimes offered useful
advice, Konuzin said that in other cases, such as on the
Democratic Republic of Congo, DPKO's advice had been flawed.
More cooperation with troop contributing countries would be
beneficial, Konuzin argued. Wu said the MSC reflects the
P-5's special responsibility, and China could accept P-5
consensus on a revitalized MSC.
.
MIDDLE EAST/CYPRUS
------------------
¶23. (C) Referring to the then-upcoming Hamas delegation visit
to Moscow, Konuzin assured his P-5 counterparts that
Russia,s message would be fully consistent with Quartet
principles. A/S Silverberg noted the U.S. does not meet with
Hamas, and urges others to avoid meeting with them as well,
then underscored that it was essential not to move the
Quartet goal posts and to retain Quartet unity. France's
Bermann and UK's Pattison echoed that view, with Bermann
stressing that a collapse of the Palestinian Authority would
pose a risk to Israel. Responding to a question from Konuzin
about Sheba Farms, Pattison said the issue should only be
brought to the Council if there is a strong prospect for its
resolution there.
¶24. (C) Turning to Lebanon/Syria, Pattison argued that the UN
needed to keep up pressure to get cooperation from Syria,
including on resolution 1559 obligations concerning the
investigation of former Lebanese PM Hariri's assassination.
Syria must be held to all requirements per Resolution 1636.
Brammertz,s report in mid-March will "force the issue," and
the UN must also be prepared to respond to the report b
y UN
Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen in April. A/S Silverberg
underscored the need to hold Syria to all its obligations, as
this was essential to the Security Council's credibility.
Bermann agreed on the need to keep pressure on Syria, "but
let,s see the reports." She noted that Larsen must be able
to return to the region before completing his report.
¶25. (C) Konuzin questioned the need for additional pressure
on Syria, and said member states should not interfere in the
Brammertz investigation. Russia believes action on
Resolution 1559 must be carried out in the context of the
political dialogue in Lebanon. That dialogue was not going
well, Konuzin argued, but should be encouraged nonetheless.
Wu, noting progress made by the SYG, argued that the
investigation must respect the views of the parties and
others, including the Arab League. China supported a
diplomatic solution; the focus of 1559 should remain on the
investigation.
¶26. (C) Pattison raised the issue of Cyprus, asserting that
no progress had been made since the Annan Report. Inaction
would only worsen the problem, he said, arguing for a "new
look" from the P-5 and the Security Council. However, he
added, no further steps should be taken until after the Greek
Cypriot elections in May and UN Under Secretary-General for
Political Affairs Gambari's visit in June. The P-5 should
focus on making the Gambari visit successful, Pattison said.
Konuzin agreed on the importance of finding a solution, but
urged caution to avoid repeating previous mistakes and said
that no time frames should be imposed. Wu urged a resumption
of the SYG's good offices on the issue.
.
KOSOVO
------
¶27. (C) Bermann underlined that P-5 unity on Kosovo was
critical, and urged "realism": an even-handed approach and a
recognition that Kosovo would not return to Serbia. Konuzin
agreed on the importance of P-5 unity, but lamented that some
P-5 members are sending messages not consistent with the
London agreement. Konuzin embarked on a lengthy discourse
stressing that according to the Guiding Principles of the
Contact Group, there is no predetermined outcome for Kosovo.
However, he said, "some partners" insist independence is the
only option, and see the task of the Contact Group only as
making Belgrade accept this option. Russia rejected this
view, he said.
¶28. (C) Konuzin said the Kosovar Albanians had not delivered
on standards. He noted that of 220,000 ethnic Serbs who had
left Kosovo, only 12,500 had returned. "This is ethnic
cleansing," he declared. Konuzin admitted that ethnic crimes
had gone down in Kosovo, however this was because few Serbs
remained and those that did were physically separated from
the Albanian Kosovars. Konuzin insisted there must be more
progress on standards before resolving Kosovo,s final
status.
¶29. (C) Konuzin rejected the view that Kosovo could offer no
precedent for other conflicts. Rather, he underlined that
Kosovo "is a precedent already." As an example, he said
Abkhaz leaders have been explicit that they regard Kosovo as
precedent. A/S Silverberg countered that the U.S. sees
Kosovo as unique, due to the violent disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the long-standing UN mandate over the
territory. Pattison and Bermann supported the U.S. view.
¶30. (C) Pattison added that status talks needed to start
this year precisely to get the Kosovar Albanians moving on
standards. This did not represent "status first, standards
later," but "standards in the context of status." He argued
that only when Kosovar Albanians see the prospect of
resolution on status will they address standards. Konuzin
reiterated the Russian view in favor of standards before
status. He urged again that the P-5 "stick to the Guiding
Principles and not prejudge status."
.
IRAQ
----
¶31. (C) Konuzin said the time had come for a new Security
Council Iraq resolution to redefine the UN role there. He
said the P-5 could agree on enhancing the role of the UN in
Iraq. A/S Silverberg agreed the UN needs to have an expanded
role in Iraq, but cautioned that it is too early to move
forward on a new resolution. The P-5 should wait to consult
with the new Iraqi government before proceeding with a new
resolution.
¶32. (C) Konuzin raised the status of UNMOVIC. He said that
while post-war inspections had found no WMD in Iraq, danger
remains in the form of WMD potential. The Iraqi government
does not control former WMD facilities and "we don't know
where the Iraqi scientists are." Konuzin said Russia is
"anxious" about possible terrorist access to former chemical
weapons depots. Some sites formerly under UNMOVIC control
have been "penetrated," he said. Konuzin urged that results
of inspections carried out by the Iraq Survey Group under
Charles Duelfer be shared with UNMOVIC. He noted UNMOVIC
needs to determine whether it has completed its mandate, and
added that the Iraqis could draw on UNMOVIC,s experience to
set up their own monitoring mechanisms.
¶33. (C) A/S Silverberg pointed out that UNMOVIC holds over
USD 100 million in Iraqi assets. The Iraqi government has
said that it needs these funds for reconstruction. She
appealed to the P-5 to expand financial assistance to the
Iraqi government through follow-on to Madrid pledges and debt
relief. Pattison said Konuzin was correct to raise the
question of UNMOVIC,s status and the UN role in Iraq.
Following the August 2003 bombing of its headquarters in
Iraq, the UN was understandably cautions. Iraq is now at a
different stage. The UN's role can and should increase once
the Security Council "gives the UN a clear role," he said.
¶34. (C) A/S Silverberg noted that one constraint on the UN in
Iraq is the lack of secure airlift capacity for UN personnel.
Konuzin noted that UN Special Representative for Iraq Qazi
had mentioned this. Konuzin said Russia was prepared to
assist financially to provide the UN with airlift in Iraq.
A/S Silverberg noted that the matter of finding aircraft with
adequate defensive protection for the UN had been a subject
of consultation between SYG Annan and President Bush. Wu
said China was open to a new Iraq political resolution in the
Security Council, and said the time had come to "finish"
UNMOVIC.
.
AFRICA
------
¶35. (C) Bermann noted good news and bad news on Africa. On
the positive side were Liberia and Burundi, where situations
were improving. The situation in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) was also getting better and the outlook for June
elections there has improved. She noted France and others in
the EU are preparing to lend security support at election
time. On the negative side of the ledger was the situation
in
Cote d'Ivoire, where UN peacekeepers need reinforcements.
Sanctions were the right course of action in Cote d,Ivoire,
she said, because it was necessary to support the Prime
Minister. Now the issue was to reinforce UNOCI. France
fully supported the U.S. initiative on Ethiopia/Eritrea
including UNMEE downsizing.
¶36. (C) A/S Silverberg cautioned against pulling out of
Liberia too soon. She said any increase of UN peacekeepers
in Cote d'Ivoire should come from the UNMEE draw down and not
from Liberia. She noted the situation in Darfur was getting
worse. It was necessary to press the AU to allow its forces
to serve under UN auspices. Pattison agreed but noted it was
also necessary to strengthen AU forces to enable them to do
this. Konuzin agreed with this point. Wu stressed the need
to consult the Government of Sudan on peacekeeping forces.
Pattison responded that consultation is necessary but
governments with influence in Khartoum also need to tell the
GOS its behavior in Darfur is unacceptable. Non-interference
must not be used as a cover for genocide, he said.
¶37. (C) A/S Silverberg also urged P-5 members to encourage
economic reforms in Africa by rewarding governments that
create positive trade and investment climates, as the U.S.
was doing through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Trade and private investment are keys to development, she
said. The UN needs to refocus its programs to encourage
these positive changes.
¶38. (C) Pattison mentioned a key problem in the DRC is that
the DRC regular army is not being paid. This is especially
true for former rebels in Eastern DRC who have been
incorporated into the army. On Ethiopia/Eritrea, he said the
situation could blow up at any moment. The UN has to be
careful about any removal of UN forces from the security
zone; "we must maintain some monitoring presence at least,"
he said. Konuzin added that he was "perplexed" about the
Ethiopia/Eritrea situation since it was clearly a personal
issue between the two countries, presidents. As with Cote
d'Ivoire, he had no idea how to improve the situation. Wu
noted China had just given USD 400,000 to AMIS. The Council
should listen to the AU and the Government of Sudan on
rehatting. Threats of additional sanctions would only do
harm. Wu said China could not support extending the arms
embargo to the rest of the country.
.
IRAN
----
¶39. (C) The UK's Pattison said El Baradei's March report to
the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) would make clear that Iran
has not resolved any of its issues with the IAEA and remains
intent on developing nuclear weapons capability. The
Security Council needed to move quickly to show Iran that the
Council was unified. Pattison proposed the P-5 meet in New
York right after the March 6 IAEA Board meeting to discuss
the way forward and prepare for UNSC involvement. He
stressed moving quickly is the key to limit Iran,s
opportunity to respond.
¶40. (C) Wu noted that "we have the same purpose: not to
allow Iran to have nuclear weapons." However, China favored
resolving the issue in the IAEA, not the Security Council.
Wu said the IAEA report to the Security Council does not
require any UNSC action. He said China supports giving
Russia's proposal to conduct enrichment for Iranian reactors
in Russia time to work. China favors patience and restraint
and is concerned about "escalation of confrontation."
¶41. (C) Konuzin endorsed the Chinese approach. Russia wanted
a WMD-free Iran, and the answer was an Iranian moratorium on
enrichment by returning to the pre-January 3 status quo.
However, Konuzin said Russia is "inclined to keep this matter
in the IAEA." He added that he did not think the strategy of
Security Council action was thought through. It was not at
all clear how referral to the Security Council would resolve
the problem, since the Iranians will lash back at UNSC
condemnation and only harden their position and defy the
UNSC. "What is the next step? Do we have a strategy? Or do
we just want to take steps and react to what the Iranians
do?" he asked. Konuzin said Russia, for now, will insist on
"continuing on the basis of a diplomatic approach instead of
a threatening approach" and thus does not favor bringing the
matter to the UNSC for action.
¶42. (C) Pattison stressed that "time is not on our side."
The EU-3 has been engaged in a diplomatic approach but it has
not worked. However, he agreed that Konuzin had raised a
fair question in asking about the consequences of going to
the Council. The UK's view is that going to the Council will
"register with the Iranians" if there is P-5 unity. If the
Iranians see division, they will exploit it. P-5 unity at
the Council offers the best hope of getting the Iranians to
back down. A/S Silverberg and France's Bermann supported
this view. A/S Silverberg pointed to the January 30
Political Directors agreement to take up this issue in the
UNSC after March 6.
.
VENEZUELA'S SECURITY COUNCIL CANDIDACY
--------------------------------------
¶43. (C) A/S Silverberg urged the P-5 not to support
Venezuela's candidacy for a Security Council seat. She noted
that the Security Council must maintain its effectiveness and
professionalism, which Venezuela,s presence would undermine.
France's Berman concurred. Russia and China were
non-committal.
.
SWISS PROPOSAL ON SECURITY COUNCIL PROCEDURES
---------------------------------------------
¶44. (C) Konuzin solicited opinion on the Swiss proposal on
Security Council procedures, which seeks to encourage the
Council to make regular reports to the General Assembly as a
way of enhancing transparency. Konuzin expressed strong
opposition, saying this infringed on Council prerogatives and
was thus contrary to the UN Charter. Pattison said the UK
also did not want the Swiss proposal to be adopted and did
not like the General Assembly "telling the Council how to do
its business." However, he said the UK favors sensible
reforms to "keep ahead of the criticism." A/S Silverberg and
Bermann agreed. Wu said the Council "should improve itself"
but any measures should not limit the prerogatives of the
P-5. China was open-minded on improving Council
transparency, but "any changes must be made by the Council
itself."
.
DFM YAKOVENKO
-------------
¶45. (C) Following the talks, the group met briefly with DFM
Yakovenko, who welcomed the opportunity the consultations had
provided. He endorsed the idea of regular biannual P-5
meetings that would rotate among the members. The U.S. and
UK underlined to Yakovenko the importance of maintaining P-5
unity during discussions of Iran in the Security Council.
Yakovenko took this argument on board while noting that
negotiations with Iran were ongoing
. He also defended
Russia's invitation to the Hamas delegation, stressing
Moscow's adherence to Quartet principles in its discussions
with Hamas. China noted that Iran would be among the "hot
topics" the Council would discuss this year and supported the
need for P-5 consensus. France raised Syria, urging that
Damascus be encouraged to cooperate with the Brammertz
investigation.
¶46. (U) Assistant Secretary Silverberg has cleared this
message.
RUSSELL
Wikileaks: Russia 