Monthly Archives: February 2010

10MOSCOW438, CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW438 2010-02-27 19:19 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0438/01 0581919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271919Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6619

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT CVIS CASC KFRD RU
SUBJECT:  CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 
 
Ref:   State 12136 
 
1.  In accordance with reftel, the Consular Section at U.S. Embassy 
Moscow completed its review of consular management controls on 25 
February 2010.  Richard Beer, FE-OC, Consul General, certifies that 
the management review was successfully completed and that we are in 
compliance with the Department guidelines with the exception of two 
items:  line-of-sight for IV printing and physical access to the 
Section by non-consular employees.  Both of these issues will be 
corrected in the coming months. 
 
2.  Below is a narrative of our review of consular management 
controls: 
 
A. Inventory Count and Reconciliation of Accountable Items: Post has 
conducted inventories of accountable consular supplies in the NIV, 
IV and ACS sections.  Post always uses the AI module to manage visa 
foils, CRBAs, passport books and foils; all other accountable items 
are tracked through a spreadsheet system maintained by the ACO.  The 
physical inventory reconciles with the AI and ACO-file inventory 
records.  The following officers participated in the inventories: 
Richard Beer, Consul General; Julie Stufft, overall section ACO and 
ACS ACO; Doug Johnston, NIV ACO, and Jessica Wolf-Hudson, IV ACO. 
 
B. Guidance: 
-  All consular officers have access to 7 and 9 FAM, 7 FAH and CA 
web on their desktops as Qfavorites.Q  Moscow officers have access 
to classified references (including CAWeb) and are encouraged to 
read classified traffic at least bi-monthly (classified access is 
located in another building).  Consular supervisors routinely stress 
that only official Department guidance should be consulted. No one 
should be using training materials or outdated SOPs as references. 
-  All consular officers in Moscow have access to classified systems 
located in another building.  Consular officers from the St. 
Petersburg and Yekaterinburg consulates travel to Moscow quarterly 
in order to read classified material.  MoscowQs Consular Section 
facilitates their travel, lodging and classified access. For reasons 
of cost and travel convenience, the lone consular officer at 
Consulate Vladivostok travels to Embassy Seoul for quarterly access 
to the classified system.  The Consular Chief checks the classified 
system daily and, in his absence, the acting Consular Chief does the 
same.  Other supervisory officers check the classified system on at 
least a weekly basis. 
 
C.  Consular Shared Tables (CST) Management:  Post has reviewed its 
CST tables and verifies it is in full compliance; CST roles are 
checked by the FPM on a monthly basis to ensure that they are 
accurate in the system.   RSO staff has non-consular roles in INK, 
NIV and CCD.  All parser roles have been disabled in CST.  All 
adjudicatory and management roles are limited to American consular 
officers.  ACOs for fees have separate user IDs for ACRS and ACOs 
were advised to set different passwords for ACRS.  LES consular 
cashiers have been set up with different user IDs and passwords in 
ACRS as well.  Systems passwords are periodically reset (when the 
system prompts a change) and are self selected by the individuals. 
Only the individual user has access to their individual passwords 
and passwords are never shared. 
 
D. Physical Access: 
-  Regular access is limited to consular section employees and those 
whose responsibilities require access.  Currently two employees of 
our courier service, Pony Express, also have a door combination 
which allows access during business hours for passport pick-up and 
delivery.  We recognize this is a vulnerability and have requested 
construction of an entrance with access remotely controlled by an 
MSG or local guard.  Pending construction of that access, we are 
installing a buzzer and changing the door combination.  When 
complete, Pony Express employees will have to press the buzzer for 
access.  These contract employees, due to the nature of their work, 
require frequent access. 
- LES personnel are not present outside of office hours unless a 
cleared American is present.  During working hours, controlled items 
are secured if an American consular officer is not present. 
 
E. Access to PII: Post confirms that collection of PII is kept to a 
minimum.  Access to consular systems containing PII is controlled 
and limited to consular section employees or those with a legitimate 
need to see this information; PII is properly secured after business 
hours.  Post has not had any incidents of disclosure of PII. 
 
F. Control/Reconciliation/Destruction of Accountable Items: Post 
confirms that accountable consular items are controlled, handled, 
destroyed and accounted for in accordance with 7 FAH-1 H-600.  The 
AI module is being used for reconciling daily usage of accountable 
consular supplies.  Post has not had any instance of a missing 
controlled item in the last twelve months, but reported the loss of 
two missing passport-application barcodes in January 2010, after the 
barcodes lost adhesion and fell from the roll.  Post is properly 
destroying spoiled consular accountable items and recording their 
witnessed destruction in AI when applicable.  Post recently sent two 
cabl
es (09 Moscow 2612 and Moscow 3156) including serial numbers of 
presumed-destroyed items, dating back to 2002, which were still 
listed in AI as not destroyed; ACO destroyed these in the AI system 
per Department guidance. 
 
 
G. Cash Accountability:  Post confirms that the Accountable Consular 
Officer, alternates, and consular sub-cashiers, have been designated 
using the model letters found on the CA web.  The ACO and alternates 
have completed PC-417, and all consular cashiers and alternates have 
successfully completed PC-419.  The ACO has on file the Daily 
Accounting sheets for the last twelve months signed by both the FMO 
and ACO, noting no discrepancies between cash count and ACRS 
records. 
 
H. Periodic Comparison of MRV fees and NIV applications:  Post 
confirms the regular and robust periodic comparison of MRV fees and 
applications on a weekly basis.  When postQs ACO receives deposit 
reports from the off-site fee collection agency, she verifies these 
against OF-158 receipts issued by postQs Class B cashier, and 
creates a weekly report comparing the number of NIV applications and 
the fees registered for that month. Post is using the DS-160. Under 
current arrangements with our offsite collection agency, it produces 
one copy of the MRV receipt, which is attached to the passport and 
initialed by the officer at the time of visa adjudication, to 
prevent its re-use. At present the offisite collection agency is 
unable to generate a second copy of the MRV receipt for retention by 
us. Given these new reconciliation procedures, we will request that 
the agency do this. 
 
I. Referral System: Post certifies it is in full compliance with the 
Worldwide Referral Policy. All Mission officers are required to 
attend a referral briefing and submit a signed compliance agreement 
before they can submit referrals. Only officers under COM authority 
are permitted to submit referrals and all referral data is captured 
in the NIV system. The section chief personally reviews every 
referral (A and B) upon submission and before data entry, to confirm 
that it meets referral criteria, and returns to the referring 
officer with an explanation those that do not meet criteria. 
Referrals are reviewed for fraud trends. Only tenured officers 
adjudicate Class B referrals. The section chief adjudicates all 
Class A referrals. Referrals from within the Consular section and 
from all other sections and agencies are handled in an identical 
manner. 
 
J. Training: 
-  All American and locally employed staff are adequately trained 
for their responsibilities, including awareness of fraud in visa 
applications and other benefits. 
-  All cashiers have completed PC-419.  All officers and some 
locally employed staff have completed PC 441;  those who have not 
yet taken the course are currently registered and in the process of 
completing the on-line class. 
-  All ACOs have completed PC-400 and PC-417, as appropriate. 
 
K.  Standards of Employee Conduct:  We reviewed the DepartmentQs 
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch 
during one of our regularly scheduled training days and provided 
each officer with a copy of those standards.  The Consul General 
made particular application of these standards to our local context. 
 There are no influences brought to bear on either the visa or 
passport process that would lead to any perception of impropriety. 
Officers are instructed to recuse themselves from cases where there 
may be a real or perceived conflict of interest.  The Consular 
Section is in compliance with the Department standards on gift 
giving and receiving.  The Consul General makes a practice of 
reminding/reinforcing these standards regularly during weekly staff 
meetings and our monthly Consular training days.  We have reminded 
all members of the Consular Section of the reporting requirements 
and options for reporting possible unethical or malfeasant 
behavior. 
 
 L.  Namecheck and Clearance Reviews:  All consular officers are 
aware of and comply with VLA requirements.  Officers understand that 
if a there is insufficient biographical data to exclude a hit or if 
the hit is a close match, that it should be treated as if it were a 
match. 
 
M.  Visa Lookout Accountability (VLA):  Consular supervisors review 
a random sampling of issuances to verify that adjudicating officers 
comply with VLA procedures.  In addition, bimonthly the FPM pulls 
the CCD generated report that deals with QIssuances over CAT 1 hits 
to ensure that officers are compliant with the guidelines. Over the 
past year, we have held two training sessions on VLA procedures and 
guidelines.  When new officers arrive at Post, VLA responsibilities 
are explained in detail. 
 
N.  Intake, Interview, and Screening :  The NIV and IV Units are in 
full compliance with Department instructions regarding intake, 
interview and screening.  LESs data enter, screen for completeness 
of documentation and take fingerprints.  They do not ask further 
questions or make notes.  LESs do not turn away anyone who has paid 
the MRV fee.  If an application is incomplete, an officer refuses 
221(g).  IV applicants are interviewed by an officer and refused 
221(g) if they are missing any required documents. 
 
O.  Oversight of processing: 
- Adequate supervision of processing is exercised by American 
officers. 
-  The layout of the antiquated annex building which houses the 
Consular section makes it difficult to co-locate cleared Americans 
with local staff in every case.  However, we have improved 
co-location during the past year.  A new Immigrant Visa furniture 
configuration, when completed, will improve line of site in that 
unit. 
- The NIV Unit moved its visa printing operation to improve line of 
site supervision.  Due to the physical layout of the IV Unit, there 
is currently not line of sight of visa printing stations in IV, 
although a planned reconfiguration of the IV Unit in the coming 
months will provide direct officer line-of-sight over all printers 
in the IV Unit. 
- The IV Unit Chief exercises oversight of the panel physicians 
located in Moscow, including occasional unannounced visits.  The 
most recent unannounced visit occurred in January and February 2010. 
 The Consul in Vladivostok exercises direct oversight of the panel 
physicians located in Vladivostok and visited the clinic last year. 
At that time, he found all procedures to be in accordance with FAM 
guidance.  The Vladivostok-based panel physician divides her time 
between a local hospital and the clinic where IV medical 
examinations are conducted, making it difficult to conduct an 
unannounced visit, but the Consul in Vladivostok plans to complete 
an unannounced visit in mid-March. 
 
P.  Biometric collection:  The Consular Section is in compliance 
with Bio/Visa Enrollment policy and procedures found in 9 FAM 
Appendix L.  LES collect fingerprints and American O
fficers verify 
them.  Where fingerprint quality is too low for verification, an EFM 
collects fingerprints. 
 
Q.  Photo Standards:  Post rigorously applies the photo standards of 
the Department.  Fortunately, most of our applicants visit a Pony 
Express contractor site prior to submission of application.  Pony 
Express advises applicants to replace unacceptable photos with 
proper photos before applicants visit us or before they send their 
applications to us, in the case of interview waiver candidates.  If 
a photo is dated, we refuse the case 221(g) and request a new 
photo. 
 
R.  Visa Adjudication Oversight: 
-  NIV refusals and issuances are reviewed electronically daily by 
the appropriate supervisors in the chain of command.  If a 
supervisory officer determines that an error was made during initial 
adjudication, the supervisory officer re-interviews the applicant 
and speaks with the adjudicating officer prior to adjudicating the 
case under his/her own login. In these rare cases, the supervisory 
officer enters a thorough explanation in the system.  Per 
DepartmentQs guidance, all of visa applicants for whom a personal 
appearance is required are being interviewed. 
-  The Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) regularly reviews issuance 
patterns to third country nationals and reports trends to the Consul 
General and to all adjudicating officers.  Russian posts are 
authorized to adjudicate Belarusian visa applicants (they are not 
considered to be applying out-of-district) due to understaffing in 
Minsk.  FPU regularly conducts validation studies of these 
applicants and reports its findings. 
-  We do not have a written re-application process.  Applicants may 
apply at a time of their choosing through  normal visa application 
procedures. 
 
S.  Files:  Post confirms that it is compliant with the records 
disposition schedule in 9 FAM Appendix F.  In December 2009, we 
began using the on-line CEAC application for all NIV applicants and 
therefore, we no longer keep paper records after the NIV case is 
closed.  Additionally, all consular employees, officers, LES and 
EFMs, understand and abide by INA 222(F). 
 
T. Passports and CRBAs: Post confirms that procedures are in place 
to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the U.S. passport and CRBA 
functions.  Post conducts namechecks for all 
passport services, including extra visa pages.  The ACS Unit Chief 
audits passport cases adjudicated at post for accuracy, 
completeness, and fraud detection purposes. 
 
 
U.  Fraud Prevention Programs: Post confirms that there is active 
oversight of the Fraud Prevention Unit by a tenured, mid-level 
consular officer.  All consular officers use the electronic system 
to refer cases to the FPU for investigation.  These cases are first 
reviewed by the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and then the notes 
are inserted into the case instructing what action is required by 
the LES.  To ensure that the reports are unbiased and accurate and 
that no further action is required all investigation reports are 
reviewed by the FPM prior to processing the results in the system. 
The FPM randomly selects one to two cases a month to verify the 
results.  We have not conducted a field investigation over the past 
year, but in the event that a field investigation was required, a 
consular officer would accompany the LES. 
 
V.  Wilberforce Act:  The Consular Section conducted Wilberforce 
training on one of its regularly scheduled training days.  The same 
information was conveyed to constituent posts during one of our 
monthly digital video conferences.  Moscow designated an officer to 
ensure compliance with the Wilberforce Act.  Moscow has sufficient 
copies of the brochures on hand and officers ensure that every 
affected applicant reads and understands the brochure. 
 
W.  Oversight of Applicant Service Centers (ASCs):  Not applicable. 
 
X.  Consular Agents:  A new Consular Agent was recently designated 
for Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, in the Russian Far East. He is under the 
supervision of Consulate Vladivostok, although Embassy Moscow is 
handling matters relating to his accreditation by the Russian 
government. 
 
BEYRLE

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10MOSCOW437, DEMARCHE DELIVERED: PREPARING FOR SYRIA AT MARCH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW437 2010-02-26 16:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0437 0571604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261604Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6618
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0594

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2015 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP IAEA SY RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: PREPARING FOR SYRIA AT MARCH 
IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING 
 
REF: SECSTATE 16530 
 
Classified By: Deborah Klepp, ESTH Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) EmbOff delivered reftel message on February 26 to 
Third Secretaries Aleksandr Bulychev and Roman Ustinov in the 
MFA Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament.  After 
listening attentively, they responded that Russia had 
reviewed the DG's sixth report on Syria and Amano did not say 
that Syria was in "serious violation" of IAEA safeguards. 
Russia will support the DG's call for Syria to cooperate with 
IAEA, but also believes that other states, specifically 
Israel, need to provide information as well.  In short, they 
did not think the new report provided much new information 
that was not already in the November report.  (Note: 
Although we asked, they did not specify how Russia would 
treat this issue at the March Board of Governors meeting. 
End Note.) 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW435, CUSTOMS UNION’S AIRCRAFT DUTI…

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW435 2010-02-26 14:43 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles:
http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/11/29/boeing/

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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000435 
 
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DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/CIP, EEB/IFD/OIA, DOC FOR JBROUGHER, 
USTR FOR EHAFNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2010 
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD EINV RS
SUBJECT: CUSTOMS UNION'S AIRCRAFT DUTI...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000435 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/CIP, EEB/IFD/OIA, DOC FOR JBROUGHER, USTR FOR EHAFNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/19/2010 TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD EINV RS

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10MOSCOW410, FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RUSSIA ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW410 2010-02-24 14:55 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2109
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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0723
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR RS AF
SUBJECT: FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RUSSIA ON 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: MOSCOW 00239 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Cooperation on Afghanistan remains a top 
item on the U.S.-Russia agenda.  We have achieved success in 
gaining Russia's public, rhetorical support for our efforts 
(despite private skepticism) and concrete help on transit 
issues.  Efforts to have Russia contribute substantial 
economic and military assistance have stalled.  Going 
forward, Embassy Moscow recommends concentrating on three 
priorities: strategic-level dialogue; counternarcotics 
cooperation; and transit.  Focusing on these three areas will 
better leverage Russia's concerns about Afghanistan and give 
us the best chance for successfully achieving our objectives. 
 Russian economic or military assistance may be possible, but 
we should not have exaggerated expectations.  End summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Improved Tone, Limited Capabilities 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Russia's posture towards international stabilization 
efforts in Afghanistan has continued to improve during recent 
months thanks to the overall improvement in U.S.-Russian 
relations and high-level attention from SRAP Holbrooke and 
other senior officials.  The Russian attitude has paid 
dividends: improved implementation of the over-flight 
agreement, cooperation on improving UNSCR 1267 and a more 
positive public tone on counternarcotics issues. 
 
3.  (C) Despite these advances, Russia's ability and 
willingness to participate in Afghanistan is limited by three 
factors.  Although the GOR shares our perception of the 
dangers posed by an unstable Afghanistan, many senior 
officials are skeptical about the prospects for American 
success and believe the GOR should avoid associating too 
closely with our efforts.  Second, Russia's ambition to 
transition from an aid-recipient to an aid-donor country 
remains largely an aspiration.  GOR institutions are not yet 
able to deliver development assistance abroad, let alone in 
an environment as challenging as Afghanistan.  Finally, the 
memories of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan remain raw, 
making the GOR (particularly the military and security 
forces) skittish about anything suggesting a military 
contribution.  As a result, Russia prefers an arms-length 
approach, such as support for transit, donations through 
international relief agencies and the use of private 
companies on a fee-for-services basis. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Synergy: U.S. Goals and Russian Interests 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Given these limitations, Embassy Moscow recommends 
focusing our efforts with Russia on three priorities: 
 
--Strategic-level dialogue.  To the extent possible, we 
should treat Russia as a senior partner and consult with them 
prior to announcing key decisions.  The recent visit by 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director 
Kerlikowske, which led to a narrowing of differences on 
counter-narcotics strategy, highlighted the value of this 
approach. 
 
--Counternarcotics.  Given Russia's deep concern about this 
issue, U.S.-Russian cooperation in interdicting drug 
trafficking on Afghanistan's periphery or enhancement of 
Afghanistan's indigenous counternarcotics capabilities is a 
win-win for both Russia and Afghanistan. 
 
--Transit.  While the Northern Distribution Network and 
overflights are functioning better, we can make additional 
improvements to serve ISAF better. 
 
5.  (C) These priorities unite Russia's 
interests/capabilities with top U.S. priorities.  While we 
should remain open to opportunities for military equipment 
donations and economic development assistance, we should 
understand that such aid will be modest -- any value would be 
largely symbolic with minimal impact on the ground in 
Afghanistan.  In this regard, we should encourage the GIROA 
to approach the GOR directly to double-track assistance 
requests in order to foster improved Kabul-Moscow 
communication and to demonstrate to Russia that Kabul values 
 
MOSCOW 00000410  002 OF 003 
 
 
it as a partner. 
 
------------------------ 
Strategic-Level Dialogue 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Beginning with the July 2009 Presidential Statement 
on Afghanistan, we have seen the benefits of strategic-level 
dialogue on Afghanistan.  Presidential impetus enabled us to 
conclude the over-flight agreement.  Subsequent Moscow visits 
by NSA Jones and SRAP Holbrooke gave the Russians an advance 
look at the soon-to-be-released Afghanistan and Pakistan 
strategy, raising the level of confidence on which to build 
further cooperation. 
 
7.  (C) We have an opportunity to continue this effort in 
2010 as regional diplomacy intensifies following the London

Conference.  During DSRAP Jones' March visit to Moscow, we 
recommend extending invitations to DFM Borodavkin and Russian 
SRAP Kabulov to visit Washington.  When Russian Federal Drug 
Control Service (FSKN) Director Ivanov visits Washington 
mid-year, he should meet with SRAP Holbrooke.  Additionally, 
at every opportunity, talking points on Afghanistan should 
continue to be included in Presidential- and Ministerial- 
level meetings.  Finally, we should consider marking the July 
anniversary of the joint statement with a second bilateral 
Presidential statement on Afghanistan, noting our successes 
and how we plan to cooperate in the future. 
 
---------------- 
Counternarcotics 
---------------- 
 
8.  (C) As of October 2009, the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that roughly 30 percent of 
Afghanistan's  heroin exports go through the "Northern 
Route", with a total of 75-80 metric tons consumed in Russia 
itself.  GOR officials claim Afghan heroin kills over 30,000 
Russians annually and that Afghan exports have increased 
eight-fold since the fall of the Taliban.  For domestic 
reasons, these statistics provide irresistible temptation for 
some Russian leaders to assign blame for their domestic drug 
addiction problem to Afghanistan and -- by extension -- the 
U.S.  FSKN Director Viktor Ivanov and others have regularly 
beat this drum and will likely do so in the future.  Regular, 
high-level dialogue with the GOR (including the Duma and 
Federation Council) on our Afghan counternarcotics strategy 
will help reduce the frequency of such statements.  ONDCP 
Director Kerlikowske's commitment to monitor the effects of 
our counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan on drug flow into 
Russia was a welcome gesture and consultation should continue 
regularly. 
 
 
9.  (C) Director Kerlikowske's visit also facilitated 
enhanced cooperation on interdiction of drugs in Central Asia 
and the prosecution of drug traffickers and financiers.  In 
addition to the names of eight Drug Trafficking Organizations 
(DTOs) DEA provided to their Russian counterparts, we should 
look for additional avenues of information and intelligence 
sharing, such as the participation of a Russian official in 
the Afghan Finance Threat Center and encouraging stepped-up 
Russian participation in CARICC.  Russia will likely continue 
to press for U.S. and NATO counternarcotics cooperation with 
the CSTO; our position should be that we are open to 
counternarcotics proposals from CSTO while deflecting 
Russia's desire for formal recognition of the organization. 
The Drug Trafficking working group of the Bilateral 
Presidential Commission will play a key role.  This forum 
provides an opportunity for real cooperation in law 
enforcement and intelligence sharing, not only at senior 
levels but also at the working level.  The recent decision to 
include the Counternarcotics Financing Sub-Working Group 
under the Drug Trafficking group demonstrates the commitment 
by both sides to make this working group an effective forum 
for results-oriented law-enforcement. 
 
10.  (C) Finally, we should encourage the GOR to increase its 
support for training Afghan security and counternarcotics 
forces in Russia and Central Asia.  Winning GOR buy-in for 
more OSCE projects, possibly inside Afghanistan, is also 
possible in the coming year. 
 
------- 
Transit 
 
MOSCOW 00000410  003 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
 
11.  (C) Both air and rail transit are broadly recognized as 
successful areas of cooperation, despite the continuing 
challenges we face implementing the over-flight agreement. 
Depending on DOD needs, we believe expanded our cooperation 
in both of these areas is possible. 
 
12.  (C) On air transit, we now are averaging about one 
flight per day under the agreement.  We expect to resolve the 
ICAO standards issue (reftel) in the near term, allowing 
charter flights to carry hazardous cargo in the same way 
military flights now do.  We believe Moscow would be 
receptive to opening polar routes; while the current routes 
create savings of approximately 25-40 minutes on each trip, 
using polar routes would typically save 2-3 hours per flight, 
and in some cases could save as much as 15 hours.  Second, we 
are working with the GOR to streamline processing for 
clearances and increasing the clearance window from 24 to 72 
hours in certain circumstances, making the clearances more 
flexible to changes or delays. 
 
13.  (C) The current arrangement allowing commercial rail 
shipment of non-hazardous materials via the Northern 
Distribution Network through Russian territory operates 
effectively and is being expanded to use the Trans-Siberian 
route from the Pacific in addition to cargo shipped through 
Europe.  The next step is to approach the Russians requesting 
the ability to use this route to transport certain categories 
of hazardous materials.  We understand that work is ongoing 
to determine which items would be included and such requests 
are also being coordinated with the Central Asian 
governments.  We believe that seeking an amendment to the 
existing NATO-Russia rail agreement offers the best path to 
success. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (C) Cooperation on Afghanistan has emerged as one of the 
most visible successes of the "reset" of U.S.-Russian 
relations during the past year.  To build effectively on this 
foundation in ways that will materially advance our goals in 
Afghanistan, we should concentrate efforts on transit, where 
we have a track record, and counter-narcotics, Russia's 
number one priority.  These efforts and our regional 
diplomacy goals will be well served by continued 
strategic-level dialogue.  All three of these prongs will 
gain Russian buy-in for more activities that help make 
Central Asia a force for political stability and economic 
growth along Afghanistan's northern tier. 
 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW396, APEC INVITE DELIVERED TO RUSSIAN POCS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW396 2010-02-22 14:27 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0396 0531427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221427Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6567

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRC ECIN ELTN ENRG PREL TNGD TPHY TSPL BTIO
RS 
SUBJECT: APEC INVITE DELIVERED TO RUSSIAN POCS 
 
REF: STATE 5572 
 
Post delivered reftel invite to Sergey Rybkin of Roscosmos on 
February 9, to Mark Shmulevich of the Russian Research 
Institute of Space Device Engineering on February 10, and to 
Elena Batalova at the Ministry of Transportation on February 
22. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW395, NONPAPER DELIVERED TO GOR: MANAGING PART I OF THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW395 2010-02-22 14:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0395 0531425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221425Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCNDSC/DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6566

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000395 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/MNSA FOR BUZZ MENOLD, GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 
TAGS: KNNP PARM MNUC PREL RS
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED TO GOR: MANAGING PART I OF THE 
2010 CD SESSION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 13698 
 
Classified By: Acting ESTH Counselor Isabella Detwiler for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
1,  (C) Post delivered reftel demarche on February 19 to 
Aleksandr Boluchev, Third Secretary of the MFA's Department 
of Security and Disarmament. His preliminary reaction was 
that all activities leading up to FMCT negotiations should 
take place within the Conference on Disarmament.  He warned 
that otherwise the FMCT might "go the way of the landmine 
convention," during which side meetings led to some states 
drafting text and others left only to agree or disagree.  He 
added that, particularly in the nuclear area, this could lead 
to the formation of other negotiating bodies "without our 
intent." Based on previous experience, Boluchev judged that 
the GOR would not welcome approaching Pakistan jointly with 
other governments, but acknowledged he did not know what the 
GOR's position might be on a possible bilateral approach.  He 
promised to report to us any further feedback from his 
superiors. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW392, IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU’S VISIT TO MOSCOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW392 2010-02-22 11:32 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9554
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #0392/01 0531132
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221132Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6552
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2246
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0342

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Eric Green for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  In a two-day visit to Moscow, PM Netanyahu 
pressed his case on Iran while the GOR was more focused on 
trade than the MEPP.  The Israeli PM downplayed disagreements 
over Hamas and welcomed government initiatives to help 
crisis-depleted economic relations.  Netanyahu came away 
pleasantly surprised with Moscow's tougher attitude towards 
Tehran and the GOR's willingness to countenance sanctions, 
even though disagreement remains on their content.  Israeli 
contacts are confident Russia will not deliver the S-300s to 
Iran anytime soon.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
A Special Relationship 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C) In his first official visit to Russia, PM Netanyahu 
met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin as well 
as leaders from Russia's Jewish community.  Both sides 
described this as a productive visit with "frank but positive 
discussions." 
 
3.  (C) Israeli DCM Roi Rosenblit said Netanyahu's visit 
emphasized the "special relationship" between Israel and 
Russia.  He indicated that this the connection between the 
two countries has flourished in the past year.  Thanks to 
visa free travel, 400,000 Russian tourists travelled to 
Israel in 2009. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Bilateral Economic and Cultural Ties Increasing 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4.  (C) According to Dmitri Lebedov, Second Secretary in the 
MFA's Israel and Palestine Department, there was some 
discussion of economic issues, including cooperation in 
nanotechnology, agriculture, tourism and banking.  The 
Russian-Israeli Bilateral Economic and Trade Commission last 
met in November 2009.  The commission is planning another 
meeting in 2010 in Jersusalem although a date has not yet 
been selected.  Lebedev noted that Putin has agreed to visit 
Israel in 2010. 
 
5.  (C) Rosenblit said both sides blamed the economic crisis 
for the decrease in bilateral trade in 2009 which affected 
Israeli imports of both raw diamonds and petrochemicals. 
Both sides are looking for ways to diversify trade to include 
more agricultural products.  Rosenblit noted that Russia was 
very interested in attracting Israeli investment, citing a 
bilateral agreement on industrial research and development 
which gives both governments the ability to finance joint 
start-ups. 
 
6.  (C) Elaborating on economics issues, Rosenblit said that 
Netanyahu and Putin discussed energy issues.  Rosenblit said 
that Israel had discussed with Russia and Turkey the 
possibility of extending to Israel a gas pipeline but this 
proposal became unnecessary after Israel found offshore gas 
reserves in Haifa.  Although Gazprom is still interested in 
building facilities in Haifa and aiding in distribution, 
Rosenblit said this was now a question for the private 
sector.   Rosenblit also claimed that an agreement was 
reached to launch a bilateral agricultural business forum in 
Moscow, possibly in March 2010.  This would also be a private 
effort, but under governmental auspices.  He also said that 
there was some discussion about future outer space 
cooperation for peaceful purposes. 
 
7.  (C) Rosenblit claimed that the 65th anniversary of World 
War II and Holocaust remembrance were high on the agenda.  He 
said that both the GOI and the GOR are unhappy with recent 
attempts to revise the history of these events.  He noted 
that a Holocaust Museum will be built in Russia and a 
commemorative site recognizing the Red Army's role in WWII 
will be constructed in Israel.  Rosenblit also said that PM 
Putin invited President Peres to the May 9 Victory Day 
ceremonies in Moscow later this year.  Medevedev also 
reportedly green lighted the idea of a cultural program 
including a "Year of Russia in Israel" and "Year of Israel in 
Russia" exchange. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Middle East Peace Not High on Either Agenda 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) According to Rosenblit, MEPP was not thoroughly 
discussed and he "doubted that the Moscow Conference 
specifically was mentioned."  Rosenblit also downplayed the 
 
MOSCOW 00000392  002 OF 003 
 
 
recent visits of Abbas and Meshaal and the importance 
attached to them by the Russians.  He said that he believed 
Georgia was of greater importance to Russia than Syria, 
Lebanon or Palestine. 
 
9. (C) Rosenblit said that Netanyahu emphasized his openness 
to talks between the GOR and the Palestinians because he 
welcomed any way to bring them back to negotiations.  "We 
wanted everyone to tell Abbas to return to negotiations 
because we can't give him a deal until he sits down."  He 
noted that Israel prefers direct contacts but supports any 
kind of negotiations.  Rosenblit said that Israel s
till 
insists on talks without preconditions and no interim 
agreements: "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." 
Rosenblit said that Israel supported Russia's efforts to 
achieve comprehensive negotiations including Syria and 
Lebanon. 
 
10.  (C) Referring to the recent visit to Moscow of Khaled 
Meshaal, Netanyahu told his interlocutors that Hamas should 
not be legitimized by other countries.  Although Meshaal had 
only a 15 minute meeting with Lavrov, it received significant 
coverage in the media.  Rosenblit said Medvedev asked what 
Russia could do to help with Hamas.  Netanyahu repeated that 
Israel does not see Hamas as a legitimate partner but would 
use the Russia-Hamas channel to discuss humanitarian issues 
such as the proposed prisoner swap for IDF soldier Gilad 
Shalit. 
 
------------------------ 
Closer than Ever on Iran 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) Lebedov sought to downplay discussions of Iran saying 
that, while it was discussed, other bilateral issues took up 
most of the discussions. 
 
12. (C) Rosenblit, however, claimed that Iran was clearly at 
the top of Israel's agenda for this visit.  He said Netanyahu 
was "keen to form a group of like-minded parties" who 
recognized the danger of Iran's program and would cooperate 
to stop its "militant nuclearlization."  Netanyahu emphasized 
that Israel believes that once Iran has nuclear capabilities, 
other regional powers will immediately seek their own nuclear 
weapons.  Because of this danger, and the threat from Tehran 
itself, Netanyahu urged Russia to cooperate on tougher 
sanctions against Iran. 
 
13. (C) The Israeli side, according to Rosenblit, was 
pleasantly surprised at Russia's harsh tone on Iran which had 
changed dramatically even since FM Lieberman's visit in 
November.  "We heard words from them that we've never heard 
before," Rosenblit claimed, "and we aren't hearing the same 
old arguments."  Rosenblit credited this change to the 
Iranians themselves, saying that their rejection of the TRR 
proposal and their decision to enrich to 20 percent had 
toughened Russia's stance on Iran.  He remarked that just a 
few months ago, there was concern in Israel that Iran would 
divide the international community, but Iran's actions have 
only served as a unifying factor. "Russia's understanding of 
the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to ours than it was a few 
months ago." 
 
-------------------------- 
Ready to Discuss Sanctions 
-------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) On the issue of sanctions, Netanyahu reportedly 
handed the GOR a list of areas where Israel felt sanctions 
could affect change in Iran's behavior.  The list included 
restrictions on Iranian exports of energy products; Iranian 
imports of refined petroleum products; the financial and 
banking sectors; and, shipping and aerospace companies.  He 
noted that, while Russia was ready to discuss sanctions, the 
two did not necessarily see eye to eye on the specifics. 
Both sides did agree, however, that the UNSC had to agree on 
sanctions.  Rosenblit said that Russian officials do not 
believe that unilateral sanctions will have the desired 
effect.  They believe that the international community has to 
maintain united and either agree to impose or not impose 
sanctions. 
 
15.  (C) Netanyahu encouraged Russia to be an example for 
China regarding sanctions.  Rosenblit said both Israel and 
Russia had been working bilaterally with China to convince 
them that it was time for a serious discussion on sanctions. 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
S-300s: No Quid Pro Quo, but We Trust Medevedev 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000392  003 OF 003 
 
 
16.  (C) When asked about media reports citing Netanyahu 
himself which suggested that Israel had agreed not to restart 
arms deals with Georgia in exchange for Russia's continued 
inaction on the S-300s contract with Iran, Lebedov noted 
that, in spite of this statement, there had been no change in 
the GOR's policy.  He claimed that fulfillment of the S-300s 
contract remained a political decision.  He remarked that the 
S-300 system was itself defensive in nature and could not be 
used against another party, such as Israel. 
 
17.  (C) Rosenblit also would not acknowledge that a deal had 
been made.  Instead, he said that Netanyahu had reiterated 
his trust in Medvedev regarding the S-300s.  According to 
Rosenblit, Netanyahu believes that Russia has taken "all 
aspects of regional stability" into account when taking 
decisions on the S-300s.  Rosenblit did note that the S-300s 
issue offered a window onto the different vectors in Russian 
foreign policy, with the contradictory statements that their 
delivery was imminent, and the delay being caused by 
technical and political issues, coming just days before 
Netanyahu's visit. 
 
18.  (C) Rosenblit said that neither Russia nor Israel was 
linking the S-300 issue with arms sales to Georgia.  Israel, 
he claimed, as a Russian partner, was "listening attentively" 
to Russia's concerns about weapons supplies to Georgia and 
the effects this could have in the region.  Israel has 
friendly relations with Georgia but the Russian relationship 
was also very important, he said.  He indicated that both 
sides were trying to come to an "understanding." 
 
19.  (C) Comment: The Russian media built up the Prime 
Minster's visit as the final stage of Russia's 
Abbas-Meshaal-Netanyahu trifecta of Middle East callers. 
While both sides paid lip-service to MEPP issues, Iran was 
the main agenda item.  This reflects Netanyahu's priorities 
and the GOR's belief that it is Washington's job, not 
Moscow's, to pressure the Israelis on MEPP issues.  Israel 
came away pleased with Russia's changed posture on Iran, but 
disappointed that its list of sanctions was too ambitious for 
the GOR.  Separately, the widely reported "quid-pro-quo" on a 
mutual freeze of the Russian S-300 delivery for Iran and 
Israeli military sales to Georgia could be a convenient 
Israeli invention.  While Israeli contacts say there is no 
formal deal, Netanyahu's statements to the media created 
enough speculation to put Russia in a corner.  Should Moscow 
eventually deliver the system to Iran, Israel has a pretext 
to step up arms sales to Georgia. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW391, RUSSIAN DUMA MEMBERS WANT US-RUSSIA RELATIONS BASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW391 2010-02-22 11:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9514
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHMO #0391/01 0531103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221103Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6550
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000391 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, H, EUR/RUS, VCI/SI 
 
E.O.  12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ECON ETRD RS
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DUMA MEMBERS WANT US-RUSSIA RELATIONS BASED 
ON TRUST AND DIALOGUE 
 
MOSCOW 00000391  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: At the invitation of Duma Foreign Relations 
Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev, the Ambassador met for 90 
minutes with a delegation of Duma members traveling with 
Kosachev to the U.S. to meet with members of Congress. 
Discussion topics ranged from imports of U.S. chicken to 
Afghanistan, with considerable attention focused on the recent 
announcement of deployments in 2015 of SA-3 missile systems to 
Romania.  Kosachev, joined by other members, was extremely 
critical of the announcement, questioning timing and 
justifications.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Ambassador Beyrle opened the 90-minute session, 
conducted in Russian but closed to the press, by giving an 
overview of U.S.-Russian relations since the inauguration of 
President Obama.  He emphasized achievements of the Bilateral 
Presidential Commission, and noted the importance of 
completing a START agreement, working closely to address the 
Iranian nuclear threat and instability in Afghanistan. 
Kosachev (United Russia) welcomed the Ambassador's comments, 
himself stressing the need for constructive results, not just 
discussion, on such matters as European security, non- 
proliferation, and energy markets.  He supports the idea of 
establishing a U.S. Congressional Caucus on Russia.  Kosachev 
and his delegation will meet with Rep. Howard Berman and other 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee the week of 
February 22. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Real Confidence and Cooperation Needed 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Duma Deputy Leonid Slutskiy (Liberal Democratic 
Party) questioned the real impact of the "reset."  He argued 
that comprehensive common goals have not yet been set by both 
governments.  He cited the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the 1-2-3 
Agreement, and the failure by U.S. poultry firms to meet 
Russian sanitary requirements.  He noted that the situation 
with poultry products has been improving, after U.S. firms 
acknowledged Russia's concerns over chlorine.  Slutskiy asked 
the Ambassador to study the initiative by Senators Kerry and 
Levin on eliminate the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in order to 
establish normal trade relations between the U.S. and Russia. 
He expressed interest in meeting with Kerry and LEvin when in 
Washington.  He urged the U.S. Trade Representative to study 
the proposal, commenting that outdated amendments adversely 
affect U.S. economic interests. 
 
4. (SBU) Deputy Andrey Klimov (United Russia) reinforced the 
initiative of Russian and EU MPs to invite members of the U.S. 
Congress to their joint European Parliament-Russian Duma 
sessions in order to remove any suspicions that Russia is 
attempting to foment discord between the U.S. and EU.  He 
reported that the next joint session with U.S. participation 
is scheduled for December 2010. 
 
5. (SBU) Deputy Semyon Bagdasarov (Just Russia) spoke about 
Afghanistan, and the involvement of Russian companies in 
support of Coalition Forces.  According to Bagdasarov, Russia 
is already providing a great deal of assistance to ISAF 
troops.  He cited the threat of terrorism and narcotic 
trafficking into Russia as increasing.  He argued that the war 
in Afghanistan will last long time and Coalition Forces should 
be more active in the northern parts of the country fighting 
the producers of heroin and destroying starting points of 
narco-trafficking.  Both sides should work together to prevent 
the emergence of new terrorist activity in Central Asia.  He 
argued passionately that Russia is not interested in Iran's 
nuclear capabilities.  He is concerned that Iran is actively 
arming under the group of religious radicals and we must 
prevent Iran from disintegrating by acting very carefully. 
 
------------------------- 
Missile Defense and START 
------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Chairman Kosachev asked the Ambassador about the 
"shocking uncooperativeness and secretiveness of U.S. Missile 
Defense (MD) plans in Romania and Bulgaria."   He lamented 
that Russian leaders, including FM Lavrov, learned of the news 
from media reports.  He recalled the September 2009 disclosure 
information about a second Iranian nuclear facility in Qom as 
a similar unilateral act that was incompatible with an overall 
atmosphere of "reset" and the improvement of trust and 
confidence between the U.S. and Russia.  Such acts by the 
U.S., he argued, threatened the gradual rapprochement of 
positions on Iran, Afghanistan and especially START. 
 
MOSCOW 00000391  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Other committee members agreed with Kosachev's 
concerns.  Bagdasarov questioned the timing of the 
announcement.  Why before START is finished?  He argued that 
Iran does not present a threat that would be mitigated by SA- 
3's (ignoring Ambassador
's explanation that the deployment was 
scheduled for 2015, and that we want to begin now to prepare 
for a possible threat down the road.) 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW381, NONPAPER DELIVERED: PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW381 2010-02-19 14:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0381 0501405
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191405Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6509

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, RS 
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO 
RUSSIAN COMMENTS ON U.S. NONPAPER ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT 
 
REF: STATE 14660 
 
On February 19 we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR Third 
Secretary Aleksandr Bulychev, who offered no substantive 
reply. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW380, NONPAPER DELIVERED: POINTS ON STRATEGIC DATA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW380 2010-02-19 14:05 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0181
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0380 0501405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191405Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6508
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0037

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000380 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020 
TAGS: KACT PARM KTIA START US RS
SUBJECT: NONPAPER DELIVERED: POINTS ON STRATEGIC DATA 
EXCHANGE 
 
REF: STATE 13921 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
(S) On February 19, we delivered reftel nonpaper to MFA DVBR 
Second Secretary Dmitry Kostuyenko, who offered no 
substantive reply. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks