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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW438.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW438 | 2010-02-27 19:19 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0002 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #0438/01 0581919 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 271919Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6619
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000438 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CMGT CVIS CASC KFRD RU SUBJECT: CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS Ref: State 12136 ¶1. In accordance with reftel, the Consular Section at U.S. Embassy Moscow completed its review of consular management controls on 25 February 2010. Richard Beer, FE-OC, Consul General, certifies that the management review was successfully completed and that we are in compliance with the Department guidelines with the exception of two items: line-of-sight for IV printing and physical access to the Section by non-consular employees. Both of these issues will be corrected in the coming months. ¶2. Below is a narrative of our review of consular management controls: ¶A. Inventory Count and Reconciliation of Accountable Items: Post has conducted inventories of accountable consular supplies in the NIV, IV and ACS sections. Post always uses the AI module to manage visa foils, CRBAs, passport books and foils; all other accountable items are tracked through a spreadsheet system maintained by the ACO. The physical inventory reconciles with the AI and ACO-file inventory records. The following officers participated in the inventories: Richard Beer, Consul General; Julie Stufft, overall section ACO and ACS ACO; Doug Johnston, NIV ACO, and Jessica Wolf-Hudson, IV ACO. ¶B. Guidance: - All consular officers have access to 7 and 9 FAM, 7 FAH and CA web on their desktops as Qfavorites.Q Moscow officers have access to classified references (including CAWeb) and are encouraged to read classified traffic at least bi-monthly (classified access is located in another building). Consular supervisors routinely stress that only official Department guidance should be consulted. No one should be using training materials or outdated SOPs as references. - All consular officers in Moscow have access to classified systems located in another building. Consular officers from the St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg consulates travel to Moscow quarterly in order to read classified material. MoscowQs Consular Section facilitates their travel, lodging and classified access. For reasons of cost and travel convenience, the lone consular officer at Consulate Vladivostok travels to Embassy Seoul for quarterly access to the classified system. The Consular Chief checks the classified system daily and, in his absence, the acting Consular Chief does the same. Other supervisory officers check the classified system on at least a weekly basis. ¶C. Consular Shared Tables (CST) Management: Post has reviewed its CST tables and verifies it is in full compliance; CST roles are checked by the FPM on a monthly basis to ensure that they are accurate in the system. RSO staff has non-consular roles in INK, NIV and CCD. All parser roles have been disabled in CST. All adjudicatory and management roles are limited to American consular officers. ACOs for fees have separate user IDs for ACRS and ACOs were advised to set different passwords for ACRS. LES consular cashiers have been set up with different user IDs and passwords in ACRS as well. Systems passwords are periodically reset (when the system prompts a change) and are self selected by the individuals. Only the individual user has access to their individual passwords and passwords are never shared. ¶D. Physical Access: - Regular access is limited to consular section employees and those whose responsibilities require access. Currently two employees of our courier service, Pony Express, also have a door combination which allows access during business hours for passport pick-up and delivery. We recognize this is a vulnerability and have requested construction of an entrance with access remotely controlled by an MSG or local guard. Pending construction of that access, we are installing a buzzer and changing the door combination. When complete, Pony Express employees will have to press the buzzer for access. These contract employees, due to the nature of their work, require frequent access. - LES personnel are not present outside of office hours unless a cleared American is present. During working hours, controlled items are secured if an American consular officer is not present. ¶E. Access to PII: Post confirms that collection of PII is kept to a minimum. Access to consular systems containing PII is controlled and limited to consular section employees or those with a legitimate need to see this information; PII is properly secured after business hours. Post has not had any incidents of disclosure of PII. ¶F. Control/Reconciliation/Destruction of Accountable Items: Post confirms that accountable consular items are controlled, handled, destroyed and accounted for in accordance with 7 FAH-1 H-600. The AI module is being used for reconciling daily usage of accountable consular supplies. Post has not had any instance of a missing controlled item in the last twelve months, but reported the loss of two missing passport-application barcodes in January 2010, after the barcodes lost adhesion and fell from the roll. Post is properly destroying spoiled consular accountable items and recording their witnessed destruction in AI when applicable. Post recently sent two cabl es (09 Moscow 2612 and Moscow 3156) including serial numbers of presumed-destroyed items, dating back to 2002, which were still listed in AI as not destroyed; ACO destroyed these in the AI system per Department guidance. ¶G. Cash Accountability: Post confirms that the Accountable Consular Officer, alternates, and consular sub-cashiers, have been designated using the model letters found on the CA web. The ACO and alternates have completed PC-417, and all consular cashiers and alternates have successfully completed PC-419. The ACO has on file the Daily Accounting sheets for the last twelve months signed by both the FMO and ACO, noting no discrepancies between cash count and ACRS records. ¶H. Periodic Comparison of MRV fees and NIV applications: Post confirms the regular and robust periodic comparison of MRV fees and applications on a weekly basis. When postQs ACO receives deposit reports from the off-site fee collection agency, she verifies these against OF-158 receipts issued by postQs Class B cashier, and creates a weekly report comparing the number of NIV applications and the fees registered for that month. Post is using the DS-160. Under current arrangements with our offsite collection agency, it produces one copy of the MRV receipt, which is attached to the passport and initialed by the officer at the time of visa adjudication, to prevent its re-use. At present the offisite collection agency is unable to generate a second copy of the MRV receipt for retention by us. Given these new reconciliation procedures, we will request that the agency do this. ¶I. Referral System: Post certifies it is in full compliance with the Worldwide Referral Policy. All Mission officers are required to attend a referral briefing and submit a signed compliance agreement before they can submit referrals. Only officers under COM authority are permitted to submit referrals and all referral data is captured in the NIV system. The section chief personally reviews every referral (A and B) upon submission and before data entry, to confirm that it meets referral criteria, and returns to the referring officer with an explanation those that do not meet criteria. Referrals are reviewed for fraud trends. Only tenured officers adjudicate Class B referrals. The section chief adjudicates all Class A referrals. Referrals from within the Consular section and from all other sections and agencies are handled in an identical manner. ¶J. Training: - All American and locally employed staff are adequately trained for their responsibilities, including awareness of fraud in visa applications and other benefits. - All cashiers have completed PC-419. All officers and some locally employed staff have completed PC 441; those who have not yet taken the course are currently registered and in the process of completing the on-line class. - All ACOs have completed PC-400 and PC-417, as appropriate. ¶K. Standards of Employee Conduct: We reviewed the DepartmentQs Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch during one of our regularly scheduled training days and provided each officer with a copy of those standards. The Consul General made particular application of these standards to our local context. There are no influences brought to bear on either the visa or passport process that would lead to any perception of impropriety. Officers are instructed to recuse themselves from cases where there may be a real or perceived conflict of interest. The Consular Section is in compliance with the Department standards on gift giving and receiving. The Consul General makes a practice of reminding/reinforcing these standards regularly during weekly staff meetings and our monthly Consular training days. We have reminded all members of the Consular Section of the reporting requirements and options for reporting possible unethical or malfeasant behavior. ¶L. Namecheck and Clearance Reviews: All consular officers are aware of and comply with VLA requirements. Officers understand that if a there is insufficient biographical data to exclude a hit or if the hit is a close match, that it should be treated as if it were a match. ¶M. Visa Lookout Accountability (VLA): Consular supervisors review a random sampling of issuances to verify that adjudicating officers comply with VLA procedures. In addition, bimonthly the FPM pulls the CCD generated report that deals with QIssuances over CAT 1 hits to ensure that officers are compliant with the guidelines. Over the past year, we have held two training sessions on VLA procedures and guidelines. When new officers arrive at Post, VLA responsibilities are explained in detail. ¶N. Intake, Interview, and Screening : The NIV and IV Units are in full compliance with Department instructions regarding intake, interview and screening. LESs data enter, screen for completeness of documentation and take fingerprints. They do not ask further questions or make notes. LESs do not turn away anyone who has paid the MRV fee. If an application is incomplete, an officer refuses 221(g). IV applicants are interviewed by an officer and refused 221(g) if they are missing any required documents. ¶O. Oversight of processing: - Adequate supervision of processing is exercised by American officers. - The layout of the antiquated annex building which houses the Consular section makes it difficult to co-locate cleared Americans with local staff in every case. However, we have improved co-location during the past year. A new Immigrant Visa furniture configuration, when completed, will improve line of site in that unit. - The NIV Unit moved its visa printing operation to improve line of site supervision. Due to the physical layout of the IV Unit, there is currently not line of sight of visa printing stations in IV, although a planned reconfiguration of the IV Unit in the coming months will provide direct officer line-of-sight over all printers in the IV Unit. - The IV Unit Chief exercises oversight of the panel physicians located in Moscow, including occasional unannounced visits. The most recent unannounced visit occurred in January and February 2010. The Consul in Vladivostok exercises direct oversight of the panel physicians located in Vladivostok and visited the clinic last year. At that time, he found all procedures to be in accordance with FAM guidance. The Vladivostok-based panel physician divides her time between a local hospital and the clinic where IV medical examinations are conducted, making it difficult to conduct an unannounced visit, but the Consul in Vladivostok plans to complete an unannounced visit in mid-March. ¶P. Biometric collection: The Consular Section is in compliance with Bio/Visa Enrollment policy and procedures found in 9 FAM Appendix L. LES collect fingerprints and American O fficers verify them. Where fingerprint quality is too low for verification, an EFM collects fingerprints. ¶Q. Photo Standards: Post rigorously applies the photo standards of the Department. Fortunately, most of our applicants visit a Pony Express contractor site prior to submission of application. Pony Express advises applicants to replace unacceptable photos with proper photos before applicants visit us or before they send their applications to us, in the case of interview waiver candidates. If a photo is dated, we refuse the case 221(g) and request a new photo. ¶R. Visa Adjudication Oversight: - NIV refusals and issuances are reviewed electronically daily by the appropriate supervisors in the chain of command. If a supervisory officer determines that an error was made during initial adjudication, the supervisory officer re-interviews the applicant and speaks with the adjudicating officer prior to adjudicating the case under his/her own login. In these rare cases, the supervisory officer enters a thorough explanation in the system. Per DepartmentQs guidance, all of visa applicants for whom a personal appearance is required are being interviewed. - The Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) regularly reviews issuance patterns to third country nationals and reports trends to the Consul General and to all adjudicating officers. Russian posts are authorized to adjudicate Belarusian visa applicants (they are not considered to be applying out-of-district) due to understaffing in Minsk. FPU regularly conducts validation studies of these applicants and reports its findings. - We do not have a written re-application process. Applicants may apply at a time of their choosing through normal visa application procedures. ¶S. Files: Post confirms that it is compliant with the records disposition schedule in 9 FAM Appendix F. In December 2009, we began using the on-line CEAC application for all NIV applicants and therefore, we no longer keep paper records after the NIV case is closed. Additionally, all consular employees, officers, LES and EFMs, understand and abide by INA 222(F). ¶T. Passports and CRBAs: Post confirms that procedures are in place to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the U.S. passport and CRBA functions. Post conducts namechecks for all passport services, including extra visa pages. The ACS Unit Chief audits passport cases adjudicated at post for accuracy, completeness, and fraud detection purposes. ¶U. Fraud Prevention Programs: Post confirms that there is active oversight of the Fraud Prevention Unit by a tenured, mid-level consular officer. All consular officers use the electronic system to refer cases to the FPU for investigation. These cases are first reviewed by the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and then the notes are inserted into the case instructing what action is required by the LES. To ensure that the reports are unbiased and accurate and that no further action is required all investigation reports are reviewed by the FPM prior to processing the results in the system. The FPM randomly selects one to two cases a month to verify the results. We have not conducted a field investigation over the past year, but in the event that a field investigation was required, a consular officer would accompany the LES. ¶V. Wilberforce Act: The Consular Section conducted Wilberforce training on one of its regularly scheduled training days. The same information was conveyed to constituent posts during one of our monthly digital video conferences. Moscow designated an officer to ensure compliance with the Wilberforce Act. Moscow has sufficient copies of the brochures on hand and officers ensure that every affected applicant reads and understands the brochure. ¶W. Oversight of Applicant Service Centers (ASCs): Not applicable. ¶X. Consular Agents: A new Consular Agent was recently designated for Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, in the Russian Far East. He is under the supervision of Consulate Vladivostok, although Embassy Moscow is handling matters relating to his accreditation by the Russian government. BEYRLE
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Russia 