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VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHMO #1664/01 1760828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250828Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3960
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001664
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KACT START MARR KNNP RS
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON: A/S GOTTEMOELLER PRESENTS U.S.
POSITIONS, HEARS INITIAL GOR REACTIONS
REF: A. STATE 61832
¶B. MOSCOW 1544
¶C. STATE 60487
¶D. STATE 60343
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin. Reasons 1.4(b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller led an
inter-agency delegation that presented U.S. papers on
SNDVs and ODSNWs, a draft Joint Understanding (Refs C and D),
and the U.S. non-paper containing comments on the
Russian "vision" paper to a Russian interagency delegation
June 15-16. Antonov reiterated that the June 15-16 meetings
in Moscow were not intended to negotiate text, but to give
the U.S. the opportunity to brief on new proposals in
preparation for the June 22-24 formal negotiations in Geneva,
and to enable the Russian side to understand U.S.
positions. The first day (two hours), the U.S. side briefed
on the first two papers, with the Russian side asking
questions about SNDV and ODSNW limits, heavy bomber weapon
storage areas, counting rules, and data exchange provisions.
Antonov downplayed the need for a substantive presidential
START follow-on statement at the July 6-8 Summit. NSC Senior
Director Look countered that the interagency had just held
several important meetings in Washington and that, while it
was recognized that not all issues would be settled by the
Summit, it was essential to agree on a text to present to the
Presidents. A simple progress report would be viewed as a
failure. On June 16, the U.S. delegation continued to
clarify concepts contained in the U.S. non-papers and went
through the U.S. response to the Russian vision paper.
Antonov noted that with each meeting the position of the two
sides had become clearer and thus there was some basis upon
which to think about a joint document for the Presidents that
reflected "converging positions" of the two sides. Antonov
undertook to reconsider the idea of a simple report to the
Presidents, in response to Look's comment of the day before.
Saying he would not be bringing a new position to the
following week's talks in Geneva, Antonov commented that "it
was hard to obtain interagency agreement on the Russian
position but harder to change it." End Summary.
June 15
-------
U.S. Presentation on SNDVs and ODSNWs
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) A/S Rose Gottemoeller opened June 15 talks in Moscow
by formally presenting a U.S. position paper (Ref D) on
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and Operationally
Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads (ODSNWs), which had been
delivered to the MFA June 12 (Ref B). A/S Gottemoeller
commented on the helpful symmetry developing in the two
sides' approach to START follow-on work. Some differences
remain to be worked out, and not all differences would be
resolved by the time of the July Moscow summit. Nonetheless,
the U.S. hoped that there would be substantial progress to
report to the Presidents, which they could endorse and use to
launch the effort to reach a follow-on agreement by the end
of the year.
¶3. (C) Delegation member Ted Warner explained that the
U.S.Government was presently reviewing the issue of arming
ICBMs and SLBMs with conventional warheads and it was not
clear how that review would turn out. Referring to the
non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW, Warner and Mike Elliott
enumerated conditions under which warheads and SNDVs would be
counted against the respective limits - and conditions under
which they would not, noting in particular that operational
systems undergoing extensive maintenance periods and new
systems designed to be conventional only necessitated a more
flexible approach to counting ODSNW and SNDVs. For example,
when warheads are removed from submarines during extended
refueling overhaul, the warheads should no longer be counted
against the ODSNW limit. When the warheads are reinstalled
following the overhaul period, these warheads should again be
counted against the ODSNW limit.
Initial Russian Reactions
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Noting that both papers had arrived late June 12
(Russian national day), Antonov said he had called his people
back into work, and emphasized that he saw the meetings June
15-16 as giving the U.S. an opportunity to provide more
information on its proposals. Deputy Head of the Russian
delegation General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy opened discussion by
asking whether the corresponding limit for each category is
intended to be independent from the other, or whether there
is a logic in linking the limits on numbers of SNDV and
warheads. A/S Gottemoeller responded that the two levels
were related but independent of each other, emphasizing that
there were no sublimit
s for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers,
as there had been under START, and thus giving each side the
freedom to distribute warheads among various delivery
systems. In this light, it might be expected that the
Russian Federation could have - and more importantly would be
allowed to have - a greater number of warheads on ICBMs,
while the U.S. might place more warheads on SLBMs. Warner
amplified that, under START, there exists a close linkage
between types of SNDVs and warheads; agreed attribution
figures are associated with ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.
The new U.S. approach removes those attribution rules. The
number of ODSNW under the new proposal for each side would
be determined by the actual numbers on delivery vehicles.
Each side would be required to provide greater transparency
in reporting and facilitating verification to confirm the
number of warheads actually deployed under the terms of the
new agreement.
¶5. (C) In some cases, but not all, delivery vehicles would
count against the SNDV limit. For example, during extended
refueling overhaul periods, submarines have neither warheads
nor missiles onboard; therefore, they would not count against
the limit of ODSNW. However, when work is completed and
ODSNW are reloaded, they would again count against the limit.
To promote transparency, the U.S. was prepared to work out
with Russia transparency measures for verification during the
refueling overhaul period. Buzhinskiy summarized his
understanding of the explanations as: each party would be
able to structure its strategic forces, within the numerical
limits, to suit its own strategic preferences. Warner
clarified that the U.S. proposed to identify, with respect to
heavy bombers, the number of ODSNWs stored in weapons storage
areas that support the heavy bomber air bases. The number of
warheads and their location was connected with the ability of
the bomber to serve as a delivery vehicle for those weapons.
In this regard, Antonov reminded the U.S. delegation that
Russia was still waiting for a reply to questions posed by
General Venetsev at previous sessions. (Note: Response was
received, Ref A, and delivered June 16. End Note.)
Testing of Old and New Delivery Systems
---------------------------------------
¶6. (C) MFA Ambassador Streltsov sought further clarification
concerning U.S. proposals about testing of current and future
missiles with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Was
it the U.S. position that a side could test an ICBM or SLBM
with any type of warhead? Would the number of warheads be
agreed? Would both sides be required to conduct elaborate
verification means concerning the number of warheads each
delivery vehicle was capable of carrying, as well as data
exchanges pertaining to launchers and missiles, and the
number of warheads on each, as is now the case under START?
A/S Gottemoeller responded that such verification procedures
could be required. However, as to data exchanges, the U.S.
had not yet defined how those would be undertaken, but was
certain that they would likely differ from those being
conducted under START. Warner added that the logic of
Ambassador Streltsov's question was sound, i.e., if one side
claimed that a certain number of warheads were on a missile,
it would be necessary to be able to verify that fact.
¶7. (C) A/S Gottemoeller said she had taken note of Russian
concerns about telemetry. Clarity and transparency in the
testing process would be necessary so both sides could see
how new types of delivery vehicles were being developed, as
well as checking current systems. A principal goal of the
treaty would be providing predictability for both sides
regarding the future development of the other side's nuclear
forces. The attractiveness of the new U.S. "hybrid" approach
to counting delivery vehicles and warheads was that it
combined the predictability of START with the flexibility of
the Moscow Treaty.
¶8. (C) The Russian delegation returned to the matter of
Verification of conventionally-armed long-range missiles
(ICBMs and SLBMs). Streltsov asked what procedures the U.S.
side envisioned to enable each side to determine whether new
missiles in flight testing were intended to carry a nuclear
or conventional warhead. Warner agreed with the Russian side
that this would be very difficult to determine. Streltsov
also asked how the U.S. side would mitigate the dangers
associated with the launch of a conventionally-armed ICBM or
SLBM that might overfly or closely approach Russia in its
flight to its non-Russian target. A/S Gottemoeller stated
that the uncertainties associated with the use of
conventionally-armed long-range missiles could be addressed
through different types of verification and transparency
measures. For example, pre-launch notifications might be
used in circumstances where a conventionally-armed missile
was launched against a non-Russian target. And in
circumstances where one was verifying the presence of a
conventional warhead on an ICBM or SLBM in its launcher,
on-site inspections using radiation detection equipment might
be used. The utility of such measures would depend on the
goal being sought, and the question would require a great
deal of further discussion.
Joint Understanding: Key for Summit
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Turning to the draft Joint Understanding (Ref C), A/S
Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. had taken some of the
concepts from the Russian vision paper while stressing that
the specific numerical limits were a significant addition
to the initial discussion of this issue. Antonov responded
that the U.S. concept was becoming clearer and clearer but
that it was going to take a lot of time to consider it
thoroughly, including into the autumn. Buzhinskiy asked
whether there would be any real reductions under the U.S.
concept or whether ODSNW would just be taken to storage areas
and delivery vehicles removed from deployment rather than be
destroyed. A/S Gottemoeller stressed that the START
follow-on treaty should be seen as a "bridge agreement"
leading to further negotiations focused on affecting deep
reductions.
¶10. (C) Summing up the proposals for a joint declaration by
Presidents Obama and Medvedev at the July summit in Moscow,
A/S Gottemoeller said that the U.S. had endeavored to combine
the Russian vision document and the aforementioned
U.S. proposals. The declaration accepted the timeframe
during which U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would be
reduced to the new limits (7 years), and the duration of the
new agreement (10 years). The U.S. proposal for
limitations on ODSNW's (1500-1600) and SNDVs (1100) was a
significant addition to the Geneva discussions. Given the
complexity of the issues, the U.S. recognized that not all
issues could be resolved by the time of the July summit.
Nonetheless, it is important that the presidents agreed to a
concrete, detailed framework for t
he START follow-on treaty
that will guide the work of both sides through the end of the
year. The U.S. sees the joint understanding as an important
summit deliverable.
Russian Reaction: Maybe by Summit Time
--------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Antonov thanked the U.S. side for the presentations,
noting that U.S. positions are much clearer as a result.
Still, he argued that the nuances and implications required
careful study through the summer before returning to work on
details of the new agreements in the autumn. Buzhinskiy
argued that, in effect, the U.S. proposals would not result
in the destruction of any ODSNWs or SNDVs, i.e., that current
levels could be maintained. In response, A/S Gottemoeller
underscored that, from the U.S. perspective, although
eliminations under the START follow-on treaty may be modest,
it would serve as a "bridge" between START and the Moscow
Treaty on one side and future agreements to reduce ODSNW. As
President Obama noted in his April speech in Prague, deeper
reductions in arsenals would come later. Still, for U.S.
strategic posture what is being proposed will result in
reductions. The new proposals (1500-1600 warheads) will take
the U.S. below the lower limit (1700) of the Moscow Treaty,
and will also require the U.S. to reduce SNDVs below START
numbers. Buzhinskiy contended, nonetheless, that the
agreement would not result in deep reductions or mandate
actual destruction of launchers or warheads. A/S Gottemoeller
again observed that future negotiations would tackle those
issues.
¶12. (C) Warner noted that neither under START nor in the
Moscow Treaty was Russia and the U.S. obliged to destroy
warheads. In the on-going U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, no
decisions had been made about the appropriate levels of
warheads for the U.S. It remained to be seen whether deliver
vehicles will actually be eliminated.
¶13. (C) In response to Antonov's comments downplaying the
need for a substantive presidential START follow-on statement
at the July 6-8 Summit, NSC Senior Director Look countered
that the interagency had just held several important meetings
in Washington and that, while it was recognized that not all
issues would be settled by the Summit, it was essential to
agree on a text to present to the Presidents. A simple
progress report would be viewed as a failure. Therefore, a
good faith effort was required to agree on core elements to
establish a framework that would result in agreement by
December 2009. Antonov responded that the real negotiations
would begin on June 22 and that he was devoting all of his
efforts to the START Follow-on treaty negotiations.
June 16
-------
Answers to Russian Questions
----------------------------
¶14. (C) The U.S. delegation continued to clarify concepts
contained in U.S. non-papers provided the previous day,
including "nuclear armaments for heavy bombers located in
specified weapon storage areas" and a description of
reductions in U.S. SNDVs that could result if simplified
elimination procedures or exemptions were agreed for
delivery vehicles that are no longer capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. A/S Gottemoeller described the concept of
"phantom" warheads, noting these were warheads still
attributed under START to SNDVs that are no longer capable of
delivering such warheads. The U.S. proposed two ways of
addressing this issue: Eliminate the launchers associated
with such warheads through agreed, simplified provisions; or,
exempt them from the new treaty through an agreed exemption,
which could include additional transparency measures. In
response to Koshelev's question at the BIC meeting in Geneva
the previous week regarding ODSNW "floating" in and out of
treaty accountablity, Gottemoeller said theQssue needed
further discussion between the two sides, as there were some
Russian warheads that also could "float."
¶15. (C) Streltsov posed more questions: whether there would
be a category of "non-deployed' SNDVs that would become
accountable at some stage and subject to some verification
measures (such as notifications) prior to becoming
"deployed," and whether the U.S. was able to address the
issue of "nuclear ambiguity" with respect to the launch of
conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs. Concerning the latter
question, the U.S. delegation's identification of
transparency measures, notifications, and the changed
strategic relationship between Russia and the United States
did not appear to be persuasive, with Streltsov asserting
that this issue had to be seen in a broader context, i.e.,
with respect to obligations under Article VI of the NPT,
while also noting that assessments were based on
capabilities rather than on intentions. He stressed that
the issue of "nuclear ambiguity" had much broader
implications than the bilateral treaty.
¶16. (C) Buzhinskiy followed up by making a "purely military
comment" that in 1995 when U.S.-Russian relations were even
better than today, then-President Yeltsin had been "ready to
push the button," when the Norwegians test-fired their
sounding rocket. That was when the idea for the Joint Data
Exchange Center (JDEC) was developed. While the U.S.
arguments for conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs were based
on targeting terrorists and rogue states, the United
States needed to understand that these targets were located
along the periphery of Russia and therefore any
conventionally-armed ballistic missile launch would be
heading in the direction of Russia, which was the root
cause of Russia's concern, Buzhinskiy said.
¶17. (C) Buzhinskiy also asked how the United States came up
with the limit of 1100 for SNDVs in the draft Joint
Understanding, noting that according to the U.S. concept of
exempting certain delivery vehicles from the new treaty as
described by Warner earlier that morning, the number could be
reduced to 922 (starting from a baseline of the current
declared 1196, minus 96 launch tubes from the Ohio-class
submarines that have been converted, minus 66 B1 bombers
which will have been converted, minus 12 B52's, equaled 922).
He also pressed on whether the U.S. would have to actually
eliminate any SNDVs in order to reach this number. He
stressed that Russia would not accept "just counting them
out."
JDEC
----
¶18. (C) In response to Warner's comment about the possibility
of using JDEC to address the question of nuclear ambiguity,
Buzhinskiy asked whether the U.S. envisioned using JDEC to do
pre-notifications of U.S. launches, which was different from
the original purpose for JDEC. Warner said JDEC could be a
potential forum for such pre-notifications if both sides
agreed, but stressed that the U.S. was not proposing a new
use for JDEC.
Russian "Vision" Paper
----------------------
¶19. (C) Gottemoeller presented the U.S. non-paper containing
comments on the Russian "vision" paper. Antonov noted that
with each meeting, the position of the two sides has become
clearer and thus there was some basis upon which to think
about a joint document for the Presidents that reflected
"converging positions" of the two sides. He assured
Gottemoeller that the Russian side would study and review the
U.S. papers and be prepared to work on them for the upcoming
session in Geneva. Gottemoeller responded that the U.S.
proposed draft Joint Understanding already focused on points
of convergence, and asked whether the Russian side would be
prepared to take the U.S. paper and add some more points of
convergence either before or during the next session.
Antonov demurred on providing anything prior to the upcoming
meeting in Geneva, but confirmed that he had understood the
U.S. comments that a simple report to the Presidents, as he
had described it earlier, would be seen as a failure in
Washington. In that light, he stated that he would look
again at the Russian idea for the report to the Presidents
and see what can be taken from the U.S. non-paper and try to
formulate some proposals. He confirmed that "we want our
Presidents to be satisfied with our work" but also noted that
what was important was that after the Summit we should be
able to continue our work on a draft treaty. Gottemoeller
emphasized the need to reach a consensus on the summit
document by June 24 and, if not, then to consider more
meetings, perhaps in Washington.
No New Russian Positions in Geneva
----------------------------------
¶20. (C) Antonov said there would be no surprises from Russia
at the Geneva meetings; he would arrive with unchanged
positions on the major elements of the Russian proposal, and
explained that "it was very difficult to obtain interagency
agreement on the Russian position, but even more difficult to
change it." He stressed that the Russian side was prepared
to work as long as necessary to reach a consensus. He added
that there were difficulties with the Russian delegation
traveling to Washington, and suggested the two sides could
agree in Geneva on possible future meetings. Gottemoeller
agreed.
¶21. (C) Comment: Although there was little substance agreed
during the meeting, Antonov was back to a workmanlike
attitude, focusing on what could be accomplished, and
acknowledging areas of convergence between the two sides. He
made clear that Russia would be prepared to address many of
the substantive issues during the Geneva talks. Antonov did
not raise the subject of missile defense and links to the
START Follow-on treaty during the two days of talks, but
during the lunch after the meeting, asked Gottemoeller if it
was true the U.S. would not have an answer on the "third
site" before the Summit.
BEYRLE
Wikileaks: Russia 