Monthly Archives: November 2006

06MOSCOW12717, RUSSIAN YOUTH POLITICS, OR LACK THEREOF: PART 2 OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12717 2006-11-30 17:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2929
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2717/01 3341710
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301710Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5562
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012717 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN YOUTH POLITICS, OR LACK THEREOF: PART 2 OF 
2 
 
REF: 2005 MOSCOW 3617 
 
Classified By: A/PolMin Counselor Colin Cleary: Reason 1.4(b/d) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY. This is the second part of a two-part 
message describing Russian political youth groups. Russia's 
youth is overwhelmingly apolitical, and youth groups in 
general have very little impact on political life in Russia. 
The small bit of political life that does exist is restricted 
to the margins or co-opted by the Kremlin.  The political 
youth groups, driven by idealism, can be divided into the 
democrats, the communists, and the nationalists/skinheads. 
The skinheads are most numerous, but generally unorganized. 
The Kremlin fears the emergence of an "Orange" movement, and 
systematically  moves to diffuse grassroots youth movements 
using either carbon-copy groups or harassment and 
intimidation.  Kremlin fears of a democratic uprising are 
unfounded, as the democratically-oriented youth groups are 
paralyzed by infighting and the overwhelming apathy of 
Russia's youth.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Russian Youth Interests: Sex and Money 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) According to our contacts among politicians, 
journalists, and academics, the overwhelming majority of 
Russian youth are simply not interested in politics.  This 
large non-political group can be subdivided into three parts: 
those who simply do not care about politics, those who do 
care but think that fighting the system is pointless, and 
those who fear the consequences of participating in political 
organizations. Yevgeniya Zubchenko, a Novaya Izvestiya 
reporter who covers youth politics told us, "Young people 
here care about sex and money, they care about finding a good 
job. They know there is money now in Russia, and they want a 
piece of it." 
 
3. (C) Ilya Yashin, the head of the Yabloko party's youth 
movement, cited the difficulty he has both recruiting and 
keeping people in his organization because they feel that the 
powers-that-be are too strong and too entrenched for any 
youth movements to make a difference.  This difficulty has 
only grown with time.  Some who have been involved in 
politics have been frightened away by threats from the 
security services or their academic institutions (see paras 
9-11 below). 
 
-------------------- 
Attack of the Clones 
-------------------- 
 
4. (U) The Kremlin-backed groups, Nashi ("Ours") and Mestnye 
("Locals"), have mounted a coordinated effort to co-opt 
grassroots political movements among Russia's youth. Most 
youth groups use political protests to express themselves, to 
win attention from the media, and to attract members.  The 
Kremlin-backed groups rarely attack grassroots groups 
head-on, but instead mimic them while emphasizing their own 
loyalty to the president and to Russia.  For example, 
following a Yabloko protest against the military draft, 
Mestnye staged a larger counter-protest.  They claimed that 
they were also in favor of some military reforms, but in 
general, they supported Putin and the Russian army. 
 
5. (U) The Kremlin-backed groups also mimic nationalist 
movements.  Following the nationalist Russia March on 
November 4, Mestnye parroted the better-known Movement 
Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and adopted an 
anti-immigration attitude.  On November 26, it sponsored a 
protest by a reported 6,000 youths at Moscow-region farmers 
markets and conducted spot checks on market workers' work 
permits.  Mestnye members turned over to the militia 73 
workers who lacked proper documentation.  According to 
Yashin, these tactics successfully siphon away support from 
the grassroots organization by dividing and confusing 
potential supporters. 
 
6. (C) Kremlin-backed youth groups are often used to 
reinforce Russian foreign policy by staging protests at 
foreign embassies. Mestnye has recently been used to conduct 
protests at the U.S. and Georgian embassies.  Nashi has been 
staging a continuous harassment campaign against British 
Ambassador Tony Brenton following his appearance at the 
"Other Russia" conference in July. The British Embassy told 
us that they had appealed to the MFA for increased diplomatic 
security following an altercation between an embassy guard 
and a member of Nashi at the Ambassador's residence. 
 
7. (U) According to several sources, Nashi and Mestnye both 
pay people to participate in their protests.  Nashi 
 
MOSCOW 00012717  002 OF 003 
 
 
reportedly pays protesters 100-300 rubles, and Mestnye 
sometimes pays with McDonald's vouchers.  Zubchenko told us 
that when she covered one Mestnye protest, most people there 
did not know what they were protesting; they were there for 
the money. 
 
----------------------------- 
Electoral Success and Failure 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (U) Not all activity is focused on the streets. Molodaya 
Gvardiya has been successful in actually helping young people 
become active in politics.  During the last year, Molodaya 
Gvardiya has held a series
 of contests called Politzavod 
("Political Factory") to find and develop candidates.  In 
this successful combination of entertainment and politics, 
contestants participate in a "Survivor"-type contest where 
they organize public events and compete in speech contests 
before a voting audience.  United Russia offers winners a 
position on their legislative party lists.  In the October 
regional elections, United Russia fulfilled its pledge to 
fill 20 percent of its regional party lists with candidates 
under age 28 by using the winners of Politzavod, and 31 
United Russia candidates between 21 and 28 years of age were 
elected. Molodaya Gvardiya leader Andrey Turchak was 
nominated by United Russia as a replacement Federation 
Council member from the Nenets Autonomous District following 
the forced resignation of his predecessor. He was also 
recently mentioned as a candidate for membership in United 
Russia's Supreme Council. 
 
9. (U) In contrast, opposition youth movement leaders have 
been stymied in their electoral bids.  Mariya Gaydar ran for 
State Duma in the Fall of 2005, Ilya Yashin ran for Moscow 
City Duma (winning 17% of the vote), but both were defeated. 
They have since resorted to small protests and the occasional 
stunt. Gaydar and Yashin were arrested on November 23 for 
hanging a large banner from a Moscow bridge that read 
"Return the Elections to the People, Bastards!" They were 
protesting the recent changes to the electoral law that 
removed the minimum voter turnout requirements. Gaydar told 
us that this did not mark a change in tactics for DA!, but 
was a specific response to a specific government action. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Government Monitoring and Intimidation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The government has used police and legal means to 
harass and intimidate participants in youth movements. Yashin 
told us that after two of his colleagues from Yabloko were 
arrested last year, an FSB agent approached him and said, 
"Your girlfriend will be next, and it will not be pretty for 
her in jail."  The agent reportedly offered to help Yashin's 
girlfriend avoid jail if Yashin would meet with him two times 
a month to tell the FSB about what he was planning and what 
Yabloko was doing.  "So, I met with him. What else could I 
do? But I didn't tell him anything that wasn't on our 
website, and after a few meetings, he stopped calling." 
Yashin said that many people would be scared off by the 
possibility of arrest. 
 
11. (C) Yashin also said that many of his members have been 
harassed at home and at school.  For example, police have 
visited students in their dormitories to question them about 
their membership and activities, police officers have warned 
parents to keep their children out of trouble, and school 
officials have threatened members with expulsion or poor 
grades if they continued to participate in youth movements. 
Gaydar told us that the press secretary of "Other Russia" 
(who is a Moldovan), was warned by the FSB that she would not 
be able to finish her final year at MGU if she continued her 
political activities.  When DA! attempted to hold a debate 
between DPNI Chairman Belov and Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov 
at a Moscow nightclub, the authorities threatened to cut the 
club's electricity, and the club canceled the event. (Note: 
Since previous DA! debates had not faced problems, it appears 
that this action was aimed at DPNI, not DA! End Note). 
 
12. (SBU) According to Pribylovskiy, there are nearly 100 
young people in prison for political actions, mainly from the 
National Bolshevik Party, who are serving terms of five or 
six years for participating in protests that involved the 
storming of government ministries. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
13. (C) Youth movements have stagnated or declined in 
strength and influence since we last reported on this topic 
 
MOSCOW 00012717  003 OF 003 
 
 
(reftel).  Russian youth are politically apathetic (the 
military draft is the sole issue that seems able to mobilize 
them) because they believe that the issues do not affect them 
or that they cannot affect the issues.  Those groups that 
attract our attention because they are daring or outspoken 
are the exception.  The few genuinely democratic youth groups 
are being hastened to irrelevancy by a well-funded and 
organized government effort intent on avoiding the orange- 
and rose-colored revolutions of its neighbors.  The 
nationalist groups, should they grow in strength, would 
likely also face a campaign of intimidation and harassment. 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW12713, UNITED COMPANY RUSAL: MAKING OF A RUSSIAN NATIONAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12713 2006-11-30 14:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2734
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2713/01 3341437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301437Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5556
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012713 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EB/TPP/BTA 
NSC FOR TGRAHAM, TMCKIBBEN 
USDOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 
TAGS: ETRD ECON RS
SUBJECT: UNITED COMPANY RUSAL: MAKING OF A RUSSIAN NATIONAL 
CHAMPION? 
 
Classified By: Econ M/C Quanrud by reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  The proposed merger this coming spring of 
Russian Aluminum (RUSAL), Siberian Ural Aluminum (SUAL 
Group), and Glencore International AG (Glencore) into "United 
Company RUSAL" will create the world's largest aluminum 
producer, unseating Alcoa.  Industry insiders cast the deal 
more in terms of global aluminum M&A trends than as part of 
the Kremlin's drive to create national champions, but both 
factors are at play.  Neither RUSAL nor SUAL were able to 
launch IPOs on their own, and a clear goal of the current 
exercise is an IPO as soon as market conditions are ripe 
sometime in the next 18 months.  President Putin has blessed 
the deal, but it still faces antimonopoly approvals in Russia 
and the European Union, and issues surrounding taxation, 
registration, and litigation could be difficult -- although 
RUSAL executives see these more as "technicalities" than real 
barriers.  Igor Artemyev, Chairman of the Russian Federal 
Antimonopoly Service (FAS) tells us that he plans to take a 
vigorous look at both the impact of the merger on domestic 
players as well as overall trends in the global aluminum 
business in making his decision, but we doubt he will stand 
in the way of this deal.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UNITED COMPANY RUSAL 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) The transaction will bring the three groups under a 
new holding company, United Company RUSAL, with RUSAL owning 
66%, SUAL 22%, and Glencore 12%. The new company will be the 
world's largest aluminum and alumina producer, with an 
estimated worth of $25-30 billion.  It will employ more than 
110,000 people in 17 countries on five continents, with 
annual production volumes of roughly 4 million tons of 
aluminum and 11 million tons of alumina -- approximately 
12.5% of global aluminum production.  Profits are projected 
to reach $10 billion a year, much of this due to cheap 
electricity from hydropower in Siberia, which is said to be 
at the heart of the new company's business plan. 
 
3. (C) RUSAL representatives tell us that the decision of 
where to register the company has not yet been made, but 
London seems to be where the partners are leaning.  The 
Russian Government is likely to want to see the holding 
company registered in Russia, for both tax and prestige 
reasons.  In this light, a London registration would be a 
significant bow to pressing commercial considerations, and is 
something to watch carefully.  RUSAL reps say the new company 
has definite plans to launch an IPO -- "a key ingredient to 
the merger."  They say the timing of the IPO will be 
determined by market conditions, but for the partners, 
especially SUAL's Viktor Vekselberg, clearly the sooner the 
better. 
 
ANTIMONOPOLY APPROVALS 
AND OTHER GRITTY DETAILS 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) The new company will need approval from at least three 
foreign antimonopoly agencies (the European Union, Bulgaria, 
and Ukraine) in addition to Russia's FAS.  Tolling schemes 
for the export of aluminum smelted in Russia will be 
carefully scrutinized.  Artemyev tells us he plans to analyze 
the effects of the merger on the world market, as well as 
Russian domestic companies, and will seek informal input from 
Alcoa (as an expert third party) in this regard.  He hinted 
any restrictions that might be placed on the merger could be 
formed by guidance from Alcoa. 
 
5. (C) The new company will need to contend with several 
litigation issues to ensure its commercial survival.  One 
case involves Mikhail Chernoy, who claims that Oleg Deripaska 
(RUSAL) has shorted him by about $3 billion on payment for a 
stake in Siberian Aluminum (Sibal).  Press reports put total 
liability (taking into account other outstanding litigation 
against RUSAL) at approximately $4 billion.  RUSAL reps tells 
us this figure is inflated, and refer to litigation issues as 
&a technicality.8  Simply put, no one from the firm seems 
very concerned that on-going or threatened litigation would 
affect the new company. 
 
ALCOA AND ALCAN: 
DEALS AND REACTIONS 
------------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00012713  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6. (C)  Conversations with senior representatives of ALCOA 
indicate that SUAL was not Deripaska's first or only choice 
for this merger (which is one possible reason why it has 
taken more than five years for the two parties to come 
together).  Deripaska approached ALCOA in the first half of 
this year, but the talks broke down when the asset valuation 
gap could not be closed to Deripaska's satisfaction.  The 
announcement of the RUSAL/SUAL merger has shelved, probably 
indefinitely, a number of pending ALCOA plans with RUSAL in 
Russia, given the unlikelihood of FAS approvals going 
forward. 
 
7. (C
) According to contacts in both the aluminum industry 
and those close to SUAL, Vekselberg appears to have been 
equally reluctant to partner with RUSAL, but reconciled 
himself to the merger as a way to cash out of the business 
(through the eventual IPO) reportedly "on his own terms." 
Vekselberg has articulated a desire to IPO SUAL for some time 
now, but appears to have been unable to pull it off on his 
own.  A back of the envelope analysis of the proposed equity 
division between the partners suggests Vekselberg more or 
less held his own in this negotiation, and that he was 
neither dragged into the deal, nor is facing a loss of his 
investment, assuming the IPO is successful. 
 
8. (C) Meanwhile senior ALCAN representatives have 
volunteered to us their pleasure with the pending merger. 
The merger will force RUSAL and SUAL to play by generally 
accepted rules, which will have the effect of leveling the 
playing field.  If United Company RUSAL wants to be a global 
leader, the firm will have to leave behind bad past practices 
-- which would be inconsistent with global practice, and 
could cost the firm its commanding edge. The merger, they 
say, makes a good deal of sense in light of global 
consolidation trends, and was likely driven in large part by 
pure commercial considerations. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) The prospective merger was announced by Deripaska 
immediately following a meeting with Putin (at which 
Vekselberg was also present) which RUSAL contacts say signals 
the deal has Putin's blessing. Deripaska enjoys a favorable 
relationship with President Putin -- he is a more or less 
permanent fixture on Putin's trips abroad, and he is widely 
acknowledged by our contacts to be among the 2-3 oligarchs 
Putin turns to on a regular basis.  Viktor Vekselberg has 
arguably been at the sharp end of the stick more than once 
over the past year, between being bought out of his VMSPO 
titanium shares, and being caught in an uncomfortable squeeze 
play with his TNK partners.  The merger is both good business 
and potentially good politics for both of them, but there is 
a fine line emerging here.  The degree to which the partners 
are allowed to pursue their commercial instincts (registering 
the firm in London, with a probable IPO on the London Stock 
Exchange) will tell us how important the drive for national 
champions is to the Kremlin.  Our RUSAL contacts were visibly 
nervous on this point, and we understand why. END COMMENT 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW12712, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12712 2006-11-30 14:09 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0023
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2712 3341409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301409Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5555
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 012712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/DMUSLU/MHAMES 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
FEDERALNAYA SLUZHBA OHRANY, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE 
NO: D348852 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 04152 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Federalnaya Sluzhba Ohrany, Moscow, Russia. The 
company was listed on BIS license number: D348852 as 
the ultimate consignee of one Thermovision system, 
model Security HD, ECCN: 6A003.B.4. These commodities 
are controlled for national security and regional 
stability reasons. The exporter is Indigo Systems 
Corporation, 70 Castilian Dr., Goleta, CA 93117. 
 
3. On November 22, 2006, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with Federalnaya 
Sluzhba Ohrany (Russian abbreviation FSO) at the 
offices of Pergam Engineering,3A, pr. Olminskogo., 
office 830, Moscow, Russia. The export control team 
met with Pavel Ushakov, FSO Chief Inspector, Sergey 
Ivanov, FSO Chief Engineer and Dmitry Korneyev from 
Pergam Engeneering. 
 
4. FSO is an agency of the Government of Russia (GOR) 
tasked with the protection of the President of the 
Russian Federation and other state officials.  The 
agency is also responsible for the security of certain 
state property, such as the Kremlin. 
 
5. The camera in reftel will be used to upgrade the 
surveillance system of a facility under the 
jurisdiction of the FSO. The camera has not yet been 
installed; the upgrades to other systems are being 
completed first.  Until it is installed, the camera 
system is being stored in a high-value area of the 
Pergam warehouse.  Access to the warehouse is limited 
to authorized personnel and a security officer guards 
the high-value area at all times. Once installed, no 
more than ten people will have direct access to the 
system.  Pergam has trained the FSO staff on the use 
of the camera. 
 
6. The team was shown a Flir Systems ThemoVision 
camera, 427-00087100, S/N 2062 SHP23 CAGE code 064Y2. 
The camera and accessories were in a hard-sided case 
as shipped from the factory.  FSO was notified in 
writing of the license conditions by the exporter, and 
signed an end-user agreement which restated the 
license conditions. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends Federalnaya 
Sluzhba Ohrany, Moscow, Russia, as reliable recipients 
of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW12711, CIS SUMMITS: GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12711 2006-11-30 13:55 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2677
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2711/01 3341355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301355Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5552
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012711 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR BY RS
SUBJECT: CIS SUMMITS:  GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS? 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 12695 
     B. MOSCOW 8841 
     C. MOSCOW 12264 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  After a series of low-impact/low-turnout 
meetings, CIS Heads of State gathered again in Minsk on 
November 28.  The meeting -- billed as a "working" summit -- 
will be followed by another, more formal gathering in Astana 
in December to commemorate the CIS's fifteenth anniversary. 
From Moscow's perspective, the Minsk meeting was more notable 
for bilaterals between President Putin and Presidents Voronin 
and Lukashenko than for any attempt to revive the faltering 
organization.  Growing differences among CIS members and a 
persistent failure to implement CIS decisions have called 
into question the group's continuing relevance.  Although 
members have agreed on the need for reform, there is a lack 
of consensus about the group's direction.  No drastic changes 
in either the format or membership are expected until at 
least 2008.  End Summary. 
. 
Low Expectations Summit 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (C) While President Putin called the CIS summit 
"productive and businesslike," the most useful work was done 
on the summit margins or at separate bilateral meetings.  In 
a press briefing following the summit, Putin stressed that he 
had spoken at the summit table with Georgian President 
Saakashvili, and had had extended discussions with Lukashenko 
about outstanding energy issues, including the valuation of 
gas firm Beltransgaz.  Talks with Voronin led to the lifting 
of the ban on Moldovan wine and meat products (ref A) and a 
pledge to step up Transnistrian talks.  The Moscow Carnegie 
Center's Nikolay Petrov told us that these were real 
accomplishments, given the low expectations before the 
summit.  However, on the critical question of CIS reform, the 
leaders agreed to put off any decision until the foreign 
ministers provide consensus recommendations by a July 
deadline.  Petrov said that Moscow was pleased with this 
outcome because it wanted to avoid contentious discussions on 
the organization's future. 
. 
CIS:  Broken Tea Cup or Graveyard for Soviet Dreams? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3.  (C) Russia's caution in dealing with changes to the CIS 
status quo was reflected in pre-summit comments by the 
Director of the MFA's Third CIS Department (Central Asia) 
Maksim Peshkov.  He likened the CIS to a cracked tea cup.  It 
does not produce a clear resonating sound when tapped, he 
told us, but one can use it forever if it is held gently.  If 
handled roughly, it will break.  Others in Moscow compare the 
CIS to a divorce agreement, a simile first used by 
then-President of Ukraine Kravchuk and repeated by Putin last 
year.  In this view, the CIS was an artificially created 
arrangement designed to ease the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.  With that divorce finalized, the CIS had no useful 
purpose.  For Director of the CIS Institute Vladimir 
Pomanenko, the CIS is where Soviet legacies are interred.  He 
lamented the "unnecessary" break up of the Union and insisted 
that the desire to unite had not disappeared completely. 
Peshkov agreed: "For over seventy years, we were together; we 
cannot dispense with those ties." 
. 
The CIS Atrophies 
----------------- 
 
4.  (C) Experts we spoke to argued that the CIS's ill-defined 
raison d'etre had led to organizational atrophy.  Also 
contributing to organizational weakness were the growing 
differences among member states.  Carnegie's Petrov told us 
that some of the CIS countries tended to be isolationist, 
while others were much more outward-looking.  The same 
organization encompasses Georgia and Ukraine as well as 
Turkmenistan (albeit as an "associate" member).   Leonid 
Vardomskiy, head of the Center of the CIS and the Baltic 
States at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of 
Economy, claimed that CIS members had already drifted too far 
apart to be shoehorned into a coherent organization.  Russia, 
despite its "primitively defined" political ambitions, did 
not really consider the CIS a viable organization, Vardomskiy 
claimed.  The outmoded technologies and economies of many CIS 
countries reduced economic relations to barter trade in raw 
materials.  The economic disparity among the countries -- 
Russia and Kazakhstan at the top; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
bringing up the rear -- made the development of a common 
economic agenda a virtual impossibility.  Russia's main 
economic interests lay outside the CIS, Vardomskiy said.  The 
disconnect between Russia's interests and those of other CIS 
states acted as an impediment to Russia's ambitions to lead 
 
MOSCOW 00012711  002 OF 003 
 
 
the CIS. 
 
5.  (C) Flaws in the organization itself have also crippled 
its effectiveness.  Most CIS observers point to the members' 
persistent failure to implement the hundreds of CIS 
a
greements as evidence of the group's uselessness.  Aleksey 
Vlasov of Moscow State University (MGU) noted that the CIS's 
organizational structure remained skeletal and would likely 
stay that way because of the lack of a credible "integration" 
philosophy.  Andrey Ryabov of the Institute for World Economy 
and International Relations (IMEMO) suggested that some of 
the fault for the CIS's dysfunctional nature can be laid at 
the feet of Russia, which was "ill-equipped to deal with 
multilateral organizations."  "Russia made efforts but always 
failed," he said. 
. 
Russia Tries to Show Leadership 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Given such clear-cut failures, why then does Russia 
remain invested in the CIS?  FM Lavrov was quick last year to 
try to explain away Putin's comment that the CIS was merely a 
divorce decree, arguing that a commonality of interests still 
tied the former republics together.  Aleksey Bogaturov of 
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) 
suggested that the CIS remained relevant -- at least from the 
Russian point of view -- because it continued to provide a 
stage for Moscow's ambitions.  Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS 
Institute echoed Bogaturov, arguing that Russia's continued 
struggle for regional leadership was the only reason why the 
CIS had been spared "liquidation." 
. 
One Summit to Many? 
------------------- 
 
7.  (C) With many former Soviet republics celebrating their 
15th year of independence this fall, the 15th "jubilee" CIS 
summit was scheduled for October 16-17 in Minsk.  However, 
Putin and Nazarbayev intervened at the last minute to 
substitute a CIS Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting 
(CFM) for the summit, which was postponed to November.  In 
the end, only a few ministers attended the CFM (Belarus, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan).  The November 28 Summit 
in Minsk will be followed by yet another summit -- in Astana 
-- to mark the 15th anniversary of the creation of the CIS. 
The experts we spoke to before the Minsk summit unanimously 
agreed that not much would be decided at either gathering. 
Events in Minsk seemed to bear them out.  Other than putting 
off any decision on CIS reform until next year, the members 
could only agree on the appointment of the head of the CIS 
Anti-Terrorist Center and on a joint statement on fighting 
illegal immigration.  The group was unable to come to a 
consensus on demarcating borders between CIS states. 
. 
Putin, Nazarbayev and Lukashenko 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The "dueling" summits in Minsk and Astana are only 
one reflection of the tensions within the organization.  Many 
Moscow experts believed that Putin will need to play a 
balancing role between Nazarbayev and Lukashenko.  According 
to Fadeyev of the CIS Institute, Lukashenko had no patience 
for Kazakh reform proposals (that "Asian stuff") that sought 
to reduce the areas the CIS acted in while increasing the 
possibilities that decisions would be implemented.  In 
Fadeyev's view, Belarus did not believe that Kazakhstan 
should exert influence over CIS processes.  MGU's Vlasov told 
us after the Minsk summit that the Kazakh President's 
proposals were meant to burnish his credentials as a 
statesman and had little chance of success because of the 
growing differences in interests among members. 
. 
Beyond the CIS, So Many Groups: SES, EURASEC, BSEC and SCO 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
9.  (C) Several of our interlocutors agreed that, as with the 
EU, Russia worked better bilaterally than through the CIS. 
Reviewing the alphabet soup of regional economic 
organizations Moscow sought to lead, experts questioned their 
effectiveness or relevance in spurring economic cooperation, 
much less integration.  The Separate Economic Space (SES: 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) existed only on paper.  Experts 
dismissed it as "non-functional" without Ukraine's 
participation.  Varying levels of economic development 
impeded efforts by the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc: 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan) to cooperate effectively, while persistent 
economic disputes between Russia and Belarus, and Russia and 
Kazakhstan also got in the way (reftel A).  Russia and 
several CIS countries also belong to the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation organization (BSEC: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, 
 
MOSCOW 00012711  003 OF 003 
 
 
Ukraine and Serbia).  Despite efforts by Russia to invigorate 
this organization, observers also questioned its relevance 
(reftel B). 
 
10.  (C) In the view of Moscow experts, including Mikhail 
Titarenko, Director of the Far Eastern Institute  the one 
organization that Russia did not lead alone -- the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) -- had the greatest 
potential in both the economic and security fields.  He 
claimed that a Chinese-led SCO had much more capacity to 
further economic integration than did the CIS.  IMEMO's 
Andrey Ryabov argued that the SCO, although at a rudimentary 
stage, could develop into a "NATO 2" given China's political 
ambitions and economic power.  China will continue to 
strengthen the SCO's influence in the region as it reached 
for regional political and economic hegemony, Ryabov warned. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C) The CIS is suffering from chronic malaise -- lack of 
strong direction and of a well-defined agenda -- and 
corrosive discontent among its member countries.  However, 
even if members like Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova left the 
organization, it is clear to most observers that without 
substantial reforms, the CIS will become even less relevant. 
We expect the CIS will limp along -- at least until the 2008 
leadership change in Russia -- because Moscow continues to 
view the organization as an emblem of Russian leadership in 
the post-Soviet space. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12709, A GUIDE TO RUSSIAN POLITICAL YOUTH GROUPS: PART 1

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12709 2006-11-30 13:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2659
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2709/01 3341346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301346Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5548
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012709 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL RS
SUBJECT: A GUIDE TO RUSSIAN POLITICAL YOUTH GROUPS: PART 1 
OF 2 
 
REF: MOSCOW 12311 
 
Classified By: Acting PolMin Counselor Colin Cleary: Reason 1.4(b/d) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY. This is part one of a two-part message 
describing Russian political youth groups.  This cable 
contains a summary of the major political youth movements in 
Russia.  Russian political youth groups can be broadly 
divided into two categories: grassroots organizations driven 
by idealism, and Kremlin-sponsored organizations aimed at 
marginalizing those groups and avoiding an "Orange 
Revolution" in Russia.  The groups most likely to have an 
effect on Russian politics are the Movement Against Illegal 
Immigration (DPNI) and the Kremlin-sponsored Molodaya 
Gvardiya.  More radical groups like the Young Bolsheviks, 
while small in number, get attention because of their 
penchant for direct action, such as storming government 
buildings.  Russia's youth is overwhelmingly apolitical; most 
youth groups are, and will likely remain, a sideshow in 
Russian politics. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
Ideological Groups 
------------------ 
 
2. (U) The nationalists/skinheads, democrats, and communists 
are very different in their beliefs, but all possess 
characteristics of authentic grassroots movements. They vary 
widely in their organization, level of activism, and 
political goals.  In general, the democrats strive for a 
place in the political firmament, the nationalists strive to 
influence policy, and the communists appear to be lost in the 
past. 
 
Nationalists and Skinheads 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Nationalist groups are xenophobic and rally around the 
slogan "Russia for Russians."  The most popular and active 
nationalist groups are the Movement Against Illegal 
Immigration (DPNI) with 2,000 members, the Russian All-People 
Union (RONS), the Russian National Unity (1,500 members), 
People's National Party, Slavic Union, and the National 
Socialist Society.  DPNI, led by 30 year-old Aleksandr Belov, 
has been growing in popularity and recognition.  He figured 
most recently in the November 4 Russia March (reftel). 
Although both the federal and Moscow city governments 
prohibited the march, Belov assembled more than 1,000 people 
in Moscow.  While this was only a fraction of his stated goal 
of 10,000, it is large in comparison with the meager crowds 
that other grassroots youth groups have been able to produce. 
 
4. (U) Skinheads in Russia lack any formal national 
organization.  Russian law prohibits them from distributing 
extremist literature, and prohibits Russian internet 
providers from hosting their webpages.  Estimates of the 
number of skinheads vary.  The Moscow Human Rights Bureau 
projects 50,000 skinheads in 85 cities in Russia.  Skinheads 
are especially active in the Moscow suburbs (estimated 
10,000), St. Petersburg (estimated 1,000), Nizhniy Novgorod, 
Yaroslavl, and Voronezh.  Vladimir Pribylovskiy of the 
Panorama Information Center told us that the St. Petersburg 
skinheads are fewer in number but more violent than their 
Moscow brethren.  "In Moscow, they beat up immigrants, in St. 
Petersburg, they murder them." 
 
Democratic Groups 
----------------- 
 
5. (C) Youth Yabloko (300-1000 members) was created in 1995 
by the Yabloko party.  It works closely with the party, which 
provides a majority of its funding. It is led by the 23 
year-old Ilya Yashin, who claims 1,000 active members in 10 
different regions.  Youth Yabloko holds protests, campaigns 
for Yabloko candidates, plans to hold a summer camp for 
activists with the like-minded DA!, and plans to publish a 
small newspaper called "Freedom Street."  While upbeat and 
animated, Yashin is not optimistic about the future of either 
the Yabloko party or himself. He will campaign in the March 
2007 elections in St. Petersburg, but "if Yabloko does not 
win seats there, it will no longer be a political party, but 
just a movement." He said that for himself, "the best-case 
scenario is that I'm not in jail four years from now." 
 
6. (U) Oborona (300 members) was an effort to combine the 
strengths of the liberal, pro-Western groups Yabloko and the 
Union of Rightist Forces (SPS). Oborona has been plagued by 
infighting and almost theological disagreements about 
democracy. Soon after they united, Yashin withdrew Yabloko 
from Oborona's Moscow branch. SPS soon after pulled out of 
the St. Petersburg branch. Yashin told us that "Oborona is 
 
MOSCOW 00012709  002 OF 003 
 
 
funded by oligarchs, and I don't agree with (SPS youth 
leader) Koslovskiy on that."  According to Pribylovskiy, "In 
some places, Oborona is SPS, and in some places it is 
Yabloko, but it doesn't really matter because Oborona is 
dying." 
 
7. (C) DA!: Mariya Gaydar, daughter of former Prime Minister 
Yegor Gaydar, leads DA! (Democratic Alternative).  She is 
ardent in her promotion of democracy, but realistic about the 
obstacles she faces. Gaydar said that DA! is focused on 
non-partisan activities designed to raise political 
awareness.
 She has received funding from the National 
Endowment for Democracy, a fact she does not publicize for 
fear of appearing compromised by an American connection. She 
told us that DA! was a complement to Oborona, not a 
competitor, and is an effort to widen the democratic base. 
"People who would want to join Oborona would not want to join 
DA! and vice versa, but we work together for a common goal." 
Gaydar told us that DA! was more a forum for open discussion 
than a political movement.  She has organized a series of 
debates among people with controversial viewpoints.  She is 
also planning to hold a summer camp in 2007 to train up to 
2000 students in the ways of democratic activism. 
 
Communists 
---------- 
 
8. (U) The communists are also divided. The Union of 
Communist Youth (SKM) (700 members), is the official youth 
movement of the KPRF.  They claim over 500,000 members, but 
Pribylovskiy told us that number is misleading since every 
member of the KPRF under the age of 28 is automatically 
registered in SKM.  Vasily Koltashov of SKM told us that very 
few SKM members are active, and those who are active often 
disagree with the KPRF and are attracted to other communist 
movements.  SKM has held joint actions with other communist 
groups, but they have no formal association. 
 
9. (U) Other communist groups are more radical than SKM. The 
Vanguard of the Red Youth (AKM) (500 members), the National 
Bolshevik Party (NBP) (1,000 members in Moscow), and the 
National Bolshevik Front (NBF) are the most significant. The 
NBP, led by Eduard Limonov, is known for direct action, such 
as storming government ministries.  Both NBP and AKM are 
becoming less confrontational.  In the past, AKM activists 
sprayed water at Gorbachev, handcuffed themselves to form 
human chains and blocked traffic.  Lately, they have 
cooperated with liberal groups against common opponents, as 
they did when they protested against the Russia March. The 
NBF, founded by Aleksandr Dugin, is an offshoot of the NBP. 
Dugin's goal is to thwart an overthrow of the government by 
"fugitive oligarchs together with liberal remnants and 
ultra-nationalists and Chekhists in the presidential 
entourage." 
 
------------------------ 
Kremlin-Sponsored Groups 
------------------------ 
 
10. (U) Some youth movements are linked to the Kremlin, and 
the United Russia party boasts three: Nashi ("Ours"), 
Molodaya Gvardiya ("Young Guards"), and Mestnye ("Locals"). 
According to Vladimir Pribylovskiy, Director of the Panorama 
Research Institute, the groups reflect divisions within 
United Russia, and the leaders of Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya 
strongly dislike each other. 
 
Molodaya Gvardiya 
----------------- 
 
11. (U) Molodaya Gvardiya is the most polished of any Russian 
youth group, which is a testament to its budget, marketing, 
and Kremlin backing. It appeals to Russian youth by 
emphasizing fun activities and sanctioned protests, often 
with an anti-American or pro-Putin flavor.  In the last year, 
for example, it organized a July 4th "Independence from 
America" demonstration across the street from the Embassy, an 
anti-Yushchenko protest in front of the Ukrainian embassy, 
and an anti-Saakashvili protest following the arrest of four 
Russian army officers in Georgia. Although TV personality 
Ivan Demidov is the face of Molodaya Gvardiya, the 
organization is led by the up-and-coming Andrey Turchak, the 
son of Anatoliy Turchak, a friend of Putin's from St. 
Petersburg, former Chairman of St. Petersburg's Nash Dom 
Rossiya party, and now Director General of Leninets, a 
defense avionics company.  According to Pribylovskiy, other 
Molodaya Gvardiya leaders are similarly connected -- they are 
the sons and daughters of the elite. 
 
12. (U) Molodaya Gvardiya has also been successful in 
actually helping young people become active in politics. 
 
MOSCOW 00012709  003 OF 003 
 
 
During the last year, Molodaya Gvardiya has held a series of 
contests called Politzavod ("Political Factory") to find and 
develop candidates.  In this successful combination of 
entertainment and politics, contestants participate in a 
"Survivor"-type contest where they organize public events and 
compete in speech contests before a voting audience.  United 
Russia offers winners a position on their legislative party 
lists.  In the October regional elections, United Russia 
fulfilled its pledge to fill 20 percent of its regional party 
lists with candidates under age 28 by using the winners of 
Politzavod. Thirty-one United Russia candidates between 21 
and 28 years of age were elected. 
 
Nashi (3,000 members) 
--------------------- 
 
13. (C) United Russia, which created Nashi, describes it as 
"a counterbalance to radical youth movements from the left 
and the right like those in Kiev and Tbilisi."  According to 
Pribylovskiy, Nashi is the client organization of Vladislav 
Surkov, the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. 
Surkov funds Nashi, whose leader Yakimenko is a relative of 
Surkov's wife.  Nashi generally opposes Moscow Mayor Yuriy 
Luzhkov, but "they will support Luzhkov if directed to do 
so."  The members of Nashi are generally younger and less 
wealthy than their Molodaya Gvardiya cousins.  "Nashi members 
are not connected, but they want to become connected, and 
they are trying to work their way into the system," 
Pribylovskiy told us.  According to several of our contacts, 
most Nashi protesters are paid (reportedly 100-300 rubles) to 
participate in protests. 
 
Mestnye (1,000 members) 
----------------------- 
 
14. (U) Mestnye is lead by army veteran Sergey Fateyev and 
advertises itself as the "movement for young political 
ecologists of the Moscow suburbs."  The name, along with its 
symbol of three trees on a green shield, is misleading since 
the group rarely addresses ecological issues.  Instead, it 
focuses on opposing grassroots youth movements, often by 
imitating successful protests.  For example, following a 
Youth Yabloko protest against the military draft, Mestnye 
staged a counter-protest.  They claimed that they also 
favored some military reforms, but in general, they supported 
Putin.  Mestnye has also been used to support Russian foreign 
policy by conducting protests at the U.S. and Georgian 
embassies. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12708, COMMUNIST PARTY: NOT DEAD YET

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12708 2006-11-30 12:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2571
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2708/01 3341244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301244Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5545
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3603
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1793
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2046

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012708 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM RS
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY: NOT DEAD YET 
 
MOSCOW 00012708  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Most observers describe the Communist 
Party (KPRF) as a party on life-support sustained by 
nostalgic pensioners.  The cliche has it that as party 
stalwart's die off, so too will the KPRF.  This assessment, 
however, ignores a relatively constant level of support, 
despite the demographics, and the attraction that some feel 
for a well-defined political party structure.  The KPRF 
accommodates not only the "Soviet" socialist traditionalists, 
but also a new generation of intellectuals who wish, 
literally, to overthrow Russia's current system which they 
believe only helps the select few.  KPRF's message, however, 
is unlikely to reach beyond these two small constituencies. 
End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
VOTER SUPPORT DECREASING 
------------------------ 
 
2. (U) From the fall of the Soviet Union until the 2003 Duma 
elections, the KPRF increased its percentage of the vote with 
every successive Duma election.  The KPRF was perennially in 
second place.  The bulk of its support came from the "red 
belt", a swathe of conservative, agrarian regions that 
consistently supported KPRF candidates against all comers. 
 
3. (U) As participants at a September roundtable held by the 
"November 4 Club" noted, KPRF's opponents stoked fears of the 
re-creation of the Soviet Union and the concomitant loss of 
freedoms that Russians had come to take for granted to 
significantly erode that support in the 2003 State Duma 
election.  The resulting Duma has 47 KPRF party members 
(compared to 110 deputies in the 1999 Duma), which represents 
about ten percent of the legislative body. 
 
4. (U) Voter support for the KPRF has eroded regionally, as 
well.  In the most recent regional elections, held October 8, 
the KPRF won 10-18 percent of the vote in all but one of the 
nine regions holding elections (now a distant second or third 
place finish), just enough to overcome the 7 percent 
threshold for regional representation.  This was not the case 
in Tuva where the party received 5 percent of the vote. 
 
---------------------------- 
WHERE ARE KPRF VOTERS GOING? 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Since KPRF voters are generally understood to be 
pensioners who support the KPRF out of a sense of nostalgia 
or force of habit, many commentators attribute the drop in 
KPRF voter rolls to death.  In an October 24 meeting, KPRF 
Information Technology Center's Ilya Ponomarev offered a more 
nuanced explanation.  While KPRF voter rolls are being 
reduced by death and disability, the inherent "conservatism 
of the peasant class" may have prompted others to change 
their allegiance to United Russia, the party that now 
represents the status quo and stability. 
 
6. (SBU) Indem political analyst Yuriy Korgunyuk agreed with 
Ponomarev.  Russians want a "chief" to take care of them and 
will vote for the person with the connections to Moscow and 
the money.  Today, he concluded, that person belongs to 
United Russia. 
 
7. (SBU) In recent years, many regional politicians have 
followed the voter to United Russia.  Even one of the KPRF's 
staunchest erstwhile supporters, ultra-nationalist Aleksandr 
Prokhanov, has declared the party a spent force and switched 
his allegiance to President Putin, whom he credits with the 
renaissance of the Russian empire.  Putin, Prokhanov told us, 
has given Russia stability. 
 
--------------------------- 
BUT POLLS REMAIN CONSISTENT 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (U) Opinion polls, however, show that since 2003 the KPRF 
has maintained a fairly steady level of support, with no 
other party yet able to challenge its grip on second place. 
Levada Center polls taken monthly over the last three years 
show the KPRF typically garnering 15-22% of support among 
likely voters.  The most recent poll, taken in October 2006 
shows support at 22%. 
 
9. (SBU) Ponomarev reported a dip in KPRF support among 35 to 
60 year olds, but claimed that support increases among those 
under 35.  Ponomarev described these young supporters as 
"Trotskyites": young intelligentsia, who believe that the 
Soviet Union represented state capitalism and that communism 
 
MOSCOW 00012708  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
is the ideal with which to shape society. 
 
10. (SBU) In a November 20 meeting, Vasiliy Koltashov, member 
of the Central Committee of the Youth Communist League, 
reported disillusionment with KPRF Central Committee Head 
Gennadiy Zyuganov's hold on power because of his ties to the 
Kremlin, which sanctions the criticisms that Zyuganov makes. 
Koltashov spoke of his disagreement with the KPRF's tame 
views.  He promised that he would create a new party (the 
"Left Party") which would oversee the nationalization of 
industry, d
o away with residence permits, and ensure housing 
for all.  He also told us of impending labor unrest in Tyumen 
over low wages and poor working conditions.  Koltashov 
admitted that he did not know when these things would come to 
pass, but was firm in his belief that young Russians would 
not remain passive. 
 
11. (SBU) Ponomarev also claimed that the KPRF was gaining 
strength in the regions, particularly in the cities, because 
it represents real opposition.  He argued that this was true 
even in regions such as Krasnoyarsk, a major part of the 
Soviet Gulag system. 
 
------------------------------- 
EXPLANATION FOR THE DISCREPANCY 
------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) The discrepancy between Ponomarev's description and 
the opinion polls and the actual election results was 
explained by allegations of fraud.  KPRF Duma Deputy Sergei 
Reshulskiy detailed to us the many forms in which fraud could 
occur, including instructing workers and others dependent on 
administrative resources how to vote, helping "voters" fill 
out their ballots, and falsifying the results after the fact. 
 
 
---------- 
THE FUTURE 
---------- 
 
13. (U) Despite the allegations, Ponomarev argued that fraud 
can only succeed at the margins.  Citing the Samara mayoral 
elections, where the Party of Life candidate unexpectedly 
won, he proposed that if Russians sensed a real possibility 
for change, they would vote in sufficiently large numbers to 
overcome attempts to falsify the results. 
 
14. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Duma Deputy Reshulskiy was 
less optimistic, pointing out that with no access to the 
media it would be impossible for such a candidate to become 
known to the electorate.  In combination with the recently 
enacted electoral legislation that prohibits negative 
campaigning, removes minimum voter turnout requirements, and 
expands the reasons for which a candidate may be removed from 
the ballot, Reshulskiy doubted that real change could occur. 
He told us that he would content himself with using his Duma 
position to speak out against the wrongs of the Putin 
administration. 
 
15. (SBU) Despite attempts to build the KPRF base and sharpen 
its message, Ponomarev believes that, barring an arrangement 
with the Kremlin, it is a distinct possibility that the KPRF 
will lose all representation in the Duma in the next election. 
 
16. (SBU) In a recent press briefing, Zyuganov expressed the 
hope that the KPRF would win 20 percent of the State Duma 
seats next year and announced his intention to stand for 
president in 2008.  Ponomarev, however, told PolOff that 
Zyuganov is due to step down next summer, although it is 
unclear who will replace him.  He contended that for many 
politicians, getting to the top of the KPRF party structure 
represents a livelihood rather than the chance to work for 
social change and that, therefore, there would be no dearth 
of candidates. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
17. (SBU) While trumpeting democratic ideals (free speech and 
press and transparent business climate) and socialist goals 
(housing and health care for all and use of the Stabilization 
Fund for the people), the KPRF message is not resonating with 
voters, despite reputed dissatisfaction with the Government, 
if not Putin per se.  With the establishment of A Just 
Russia, a purported Kremlin creation that parrots much of the 
KPRF's platform, KPRF's future is still dimmer.  Although it 
will likely retain Duma representation, it will probably not 
 
MOSCOW 00012708  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
have a meaningful voice for the foreseeable future. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12702, RUSSIA: CEMENTING OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS

WikiLeaks Link

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW12702.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12702 2006-11-30 03:56 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2037
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2702/01 3340356
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300356Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5537
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012702 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB SULLIVAN AND EUR KRAMER 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DWOSKIN/DONNELLY 
DOE FOR HARBERT/EKIMOFF/PISCITELLI 
DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
USDA FOR OSEC:TERPSTRA; FAS FOR OA:YOST; OCBD:FOSTER; 
OCRA:FLEMINGS 
NSC FOR GRAHAM AND MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014 
TAGS: ECON EAGR ENRG ETRD PREL RS EINV
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: CEMENTING OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
 
REF: MOSCOW 11239 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: After thirteen years of tough negotiations, 
we finally have in hand a bilateral agreement on Russia's 
accession to the WTO.  Understanding that we are not yet out 
of the woods, with hard work ahead in the multilateral forum, 
we should take full advantage of the improved atmosphere 
generated by our landmark deal to strengthen economic ties 
and bolster GOR reformers who, having delivered the bilat, 
remain critical to Russia's economic modernization and our 
bilateral economic relations over the upcoming electoral 
cycle. 
 
2. (C) Certainly one way to build positive momentum is to 
increase the tempo and level of visits - in both directions. 
This could include a trade mission led by Secretary 
Gutierrez, visits by USTR Schwab and Secretary Johanns, and 
meetings in Moscow or Washington of other senior executive 
and legislative branch officials and their Russian 
counterparts.  End summary. 
A Trade Mission: 
The Timing is Right 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) A DOC-led trade mission in the spring of 2007 would 
focus on the commercial opportunities created by Russia's 
economic growth of the past eight years, would reciprocate 
the 2005 Russian trade mission led by Industry and Energy 
Minister Khristenko, and would likely enjoy the same entree 
here Khristenko enjoyed in Washington.  While we cannot be 
driven by others' agendas, our European counterparts have led 
a number of widely hailed missions to Russia over the past 
year.  Moreover, a mission is about much more than providing 
Kremlin access to U.S. companies -- it is a clear signal of 
our interest in broader and deeper commercial relations. 
 
4. (C) U.S. firms have been among the most energetic 
investors, and 2006 FDI is likely to be triple that of just 
two years ago.  Just this year, International Paper, Boeing, 
Ford, GM, ConocoPhillips, Coca Cola, and Guardian Glass have 
announced or told us of plans to put anywhere from $150 
million to $1 billion in Russia over the next few years. 
Large consumer goods companies like Walmart now appear ready 
to jump in with significant initial investments.  Others, 
including Alcoa, Citigroup, John Deere, Dow, ExxonMobil, 
Cargill, Procter and Gamble, United Technologies and General 
Electric have been steadily increasing their presence here, 
spurred on by a consumer boom and double-digit sales growth. 
 
5. (SBU) Among the BRIC countries, Russia is the second 
fastest growing economy, with the highest Gross National 
Income and Gross Domestic Product per capita.   FDI as a 
percentage of GDP is now in line with Poland and Mexico and 
is moving into China territory (i.e., over 3% of GDP). 
Reflecting the ongoing consumer spending boom (spurred by 
real average income growth of 66% over the past five years), 
investment is diversifying away from the oil and gas sectors 
into manufacturing and consumer goods and services.  A new 
GOR Investment Fund of over $20 billion to finance 
infrastructure, six new Special Economic Zones and a $100 
million World Bank credit line to finance seven technoparks 
offer a wide array of opportunities to U.S. firms.  Companies 
such as Intel, Motorola, Boeing, and IBM are taking advantage 
of Russia's affordable and well-trained human capital to 
establish and expand engineering/R&D centers here. 
 
Time to Retool our 
Trade Policy Dialogue 
--------------------- 
 
6. (C) An early 2007 visit by USTR Schwab would not only 
reinforce the GOR reformers who delivered on our bilateral 
WTO deal, but could serve as a platform to launch discussion 
of a new architecture for our trade policy dialogue.  Over 
the past few years, much of trade dialogue was of necessity 
placed under the rubric of our bilateral WTO negotiations. 
We need a new forum to take us into the post-accession era. 
Our trading partners are already ahead of us: the European 
Commission, the UK, France, Finland, Germany, and Italy have 
 
MOSCOW 00012702  002 OF 003 
 
 
all established multi-tiered dialogues including annual or 
semi-annual high level meetings and sector specific working 
groups on issues ranging from civil aviation, to regulatory 
reform, agriculture, and transportation.  Successful economic 
dialogue models routinely include a hefty business component, 
and a new generation Russian-American Business Dialogue 
appears in order, which
could be another trade mission 
outcome.  USTR Schwab is also well-placed to help orient 
Russia to the post-accession challenge of participation in 
ongoing global trade liberalization talks. 
 
Moving Ahead on Agriculture 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The proposed visit of Secretary Johanns in September 
2007 would demonstrate we have moved beyond the contentious 
agricultural discussions that plagued our bilateral market 
access negotiations and to focus on ways in which Russia's 
agricultural sector will benefit from Russia's eventual WTO 
membership.  To get the most out of the proposed September 
visit, steps could be taken now to resuscitate the bilateral 
agriculture cooperation MOU, dormant since 2003.  The Russian 
Agriculture Ministry has signed MOUs with other counterparts, 
most recently with the EU, and will be looking for a similar 
gesture on the part of the USG.  Obviously, Minister Gordeyev 
and his veterinary service chiefs were resistant to 
concluding our bilateral market access agreement, with its 
side letters and new beef and pork health certificates. 
Gestures such as revitalizing the MOU and early confirmation 
of a Secretarial visit to Russia could help curb their 
instincts to take out frustrations in ways detrimental to our 
bilateral agricultural trade. 
 
Transportation, IPR and Energy 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Already in the works are visits on transportation, IPR 
and energy.  Transportation Secretary Peters recently invited 
her counterpart, Minister Levitin, to Washington in the next 
two months to discuss establishing a bilateral Transportation 
Working Group focused on security and infrastructure 
development.  Deputy USTR Shaun Donnelly will lead the U.S. 
delegation to Moscow late this year or early next for the 
semi-annual bilateral IPR Working Group meeting focused on 
legislation and enforcement.  In addition, Deputy Secretary 
of Energy Clay Sell plans to visit Moscow early next year for 
a meeting of the bilateral Energy Working Group focused on 
regulatory and investment climate issues and technical 
cooperation.  The same progressive Russians who helped 
deliver the WTO agreement have been long-standing supporters 
of information sharing in areas such as licensing, taxation, 
LNG, and pipelines. 
 
Additional Opportunities 
------------------------ 
 
9. (C) Executive and legislative branch contact with Russian 
counterparts, either in Moscow or Washington, reinforce our 
economic relations and move Russia toward stronger economic 
legislation and institutions.  Examples of what could be 
pursued include: greater cooperation between GAO and the 
Russian Audit Chamber on parallel audits and personnel 
exchanges; follow-up to the Russian Central Bank proposal to 
formalize information exchange with the Federal Reserve on 
money laundering and terrorism financing; cooperation between 
OMB and the Russian National Institute for Technical 
Regulation to share U.S. experience in regulation drafting 
and implementation; and a continuation of successful 
cooperation between the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Russian Antimonopoly Service on Russian antimonopoly 
legislation and better consumer protection. 
 
Continuing Russia's Integration 
into the Global Economy 
------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) As we strengthen our bilateral economic ties, we 
should continue to encourage and support Russia's integration 
into international economic institutions that require greater 
adherence to global norms and behavior.  There is much to be 
gained from Russia's eventual membership in the OECD 
 
MOSCOW 00012702  003 OF 003 
 
 
(reftel).  Opening the door, and laying out clear, tough 
benchmarks for Russia's OECD membership would reinforce 
Putin's economic modernization instincts and, once again, 
bolster the tenuous role of reformers within the Russian 
bureaucracy.  Within the IEA (of which Russia is not a 
member) cooperation should continue between U.S. and other 
members on Russia-specific issues. 
 
11. (C) As the U.S. and Russia approach their election cycles 
next year, political rhetoric will sharpen on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  This, added to the potential divergence of 
views on how to handle inherently thorny subjects such as 
Iran, North Korea, and Russia's neighborhood, argues strongly 
for doing what we can now to reinforce economic and 
commercial ties that can keep our relationship on a more even 
keel.  The bilateral WTO deal, capping years of tough 
negotiations, is the best opportunity we see on the horizon 
to bolster our economic dialogue and commercial ties and 
ensure that Russia's economic modernization has sufficient 
momentum to weather the coming elections. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12666, RUSSIA’S APPROACH TO POST-ORANGE UKRAINE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12666 2006-11-28 16:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0381
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2666/01 3321630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281630Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5486
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012666 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S APPROACH TO POST-ORANGE UKRAINE 
 
REF: MOSCOW 9018 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Russia has reinvigorated its engagement 
with Ukraine, focusing on practical cooperation.  Last 
month's Fradkov-Yanukovich meeting, which yielded a gas deal, 
set the stage for the December 23 Putin-Yushchenko Summit. 
Russian attitudes, however, still seem to lack an 
appreciation for Ukraine's continuing interest in European 
integration and of its developing national identity.  End 
Summary. 
 
A Turn for the Better 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C) From Moscow's perspective, while transitory political 
changes in Kyiv have clearly affected its interests, there 
are deeper, underlying factors that drive Russia to seek 
close ties with its most important neighbor.  In an early 
November conversation, MFA Director of the Second CIS 
Department (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) Viktor Sorokin 
insisted that a stable, unified Ukraine was important for 
Russia, particularly for the "survival" of the Russian 
economy.  Sorokin listed three critical factors: 
 
-- over 10 million ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, and more 
than 50 percent of the population considers Russian its 
native language; 
 
-- the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based in Ukraine; 
 
-- energy security, in particular Ukraine's dependence on 
Russian energy and Russia's dependence on Ukraine's transit 
routes (eighty percent of Russian gas and fifty percent of 
Russian oil transit Ukraine on its way to Europe). 
 
These and other reasons have helped Russia and Ukraine 
"de-link" politics and economics, Sorokin added. 
 
3.  (C) Moscow Carnegie Center's Nikolay Petrov agreed that 
both countries are now putting business before politics.  Now 
that "Orange" emotions have subsided and a 
mutually-acceptable price for gas has been reached, the 
relationship was less political, and both countries are 
focused on pragmatic cooperation.  Petrov termed Ukraine the 
most important partner for Russia among its neighbors. 
Andrey Ryabov, a scholar at the Institute for World Economy 
and International Relations (IMEMO), claimed that Ukraine's 
most important asset was its location on the European Union's 
frontier.  Ukraine's strategic position made it impossible 
for Russia to ignore Ukraine's drift to Europe.  The 
Ukrainian Embassy's Political Counselor Myroslava Scherbatyuk 
noted that with that realization, unhelpful rhetoric had 
abated, and both parties were eager to put the relationship 
back on track. 
 
After a Busy Round of Meetings, Putin to Kyiv 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Scherbatyuk noted that the uncertainty over the 
formation of the Ukrainian government had slowed bilateral 
contacts to a crawl.  However, since the August meetings in 
Sochi between Putin and Yanukovich, the tempo had picked up. 
All but two sub-commissions of the Putin-Yushchenko 
Commission have now met.  The October meeting between Prime 
Ministers Fradkov and Yanukovich produced a Russian agreement 
to sell gas to Ukraine for USD 130 per 1,000 cubic meters, 
which Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin 
termed a "gift."  Black Sea Fleet talks took place on October 
27-28 in Sevastopol.  The November 7-8 meeting between 
Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Tarasyuk was considered by 
Moscow observers as the real launch of a renewed political 
dialogue. 
 
5.  (C) Two remaining sub-commissions -- humanitarian issues 
(chaired by Education Ministers Fursenko and Nikolayenko) and 
security issues (chaired by Defense Ministers Ivanov and 
Hrytsenko) -- will meet in early December.  At the conclusion 
of the Security Council sub-commission in November between 
Igor Ivanov and Vitaliy Hayduk, the two parties announced 
that Putin would visit Kyiv on December 23 for the 
long-awaited Putin-Yushchenko Commission Summit. 
 
NATO/EU 
------- 
 
6.  (C) While there are solid reasons to believe that a focus 
on practical cooperation could propel the relationship 
forward, experts we spoke to underlined that Ukraine's 
potential membership in NATO remained a potential flash 
point.  The MFA's Sorokin succinctly described the Russian 
 
MOSCOW 00012666  002 OF 003 
 
 
position on Ukraine and NATO as: "Cooperation yes, entry no." 
 Ukraine's entry into NATO would indicate to Russia that 
Ukraine felt threatened and Moscow wanted Kyiv to spell out 
what specific threats were posed to Ukrainian security.  NATO 
for Russia, Sorokin said, was a "destabilizing" force. 
Ukrainian Embassy Political Counselor Scherbatyuk said that 
NATO membership was an inevitable geopolitical choice for 
Ukraine; a necessary part of its effort to move out of the 
Russian orbit and establish a balance of forces in the 
region.  However, Scherbatyuk acknowledged the low level of 
support NATO enjoyed in Ukraine, and that Russia was using 
this factor to argue against Ukraine's entry. 
 
7.  (C) Ukraine's continued interest in pursuing integration &#x000
A;into Euro-Atlantic institutions produced a sense of 
bewilderment among some of our Russian interlocutors. 
Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS Institute characterized 
Ukrainian leaders as "naive" and "provincial," prone to 
corruption and clan politics.  He added contemptuously that 
Ukraine entertained aspirations for the EU that were not 
reciprocated.  IMEMO's Alexey Bogaturov described many in the 
Russian elite as almost indifferent to Ukraine's European 
aspirations. "If Ukraine wanted to be with Europe, then let 
Europe pay for it," Bogaturov concluded dismissively.  Yet, 
some experts expressed envy for Ukraine's thriving media and 
freer political movements. 
 
Ukraine:  Handle with Care? 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) When the conflict between Tbilisi and Moscow was at 
its sharpest this past fall, several of our contacts 
predicted that the "Ukrainians would be next."  However, in 
the aftermath of the dispute, IMEMO's Ryabov suggested that 
Georgia had unexpectedly helped Ukraine.  Embarrassed by the 
negative reaction to its handling of Georgia, he thought 
Russia might be trying harder to avoid a conflict with its 
western neighbor.  All interlocutors agreed that the ties 
between the two countries were too strong to allow efforts to 
create artificial barriers to succeed.  Still, old 
stereotypes abound.  Sorokin advised that special care be 
used in dealing with the "young" government in Kyiv because 
it was bound to exhibit contradictory behavior. 
 
Language and Religion:  Ties that Bind 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Experts we talked to flagged the use of the Russian 
language and the shared heritage of the Orthodox Church as 
cross-cutting issues that would gain prominence in bilateral 
relations.  Scherbatyuk saw Moscow's relentless efforts to 
have Russian become the second official language of Ukraine 
as "ominous."  She noted that the issue was again raised at 
the November 7 Lavrov-Tarasyuk meeting.  IMEMO's Ryabov 
suggested that there were many regional-level projects to 
promote "Russification" -- particularly in the Donetsk region 
and Crimea -- where the government in Kyiv had failed to 
"Ukranianize" populations.  He claimed that the Ukrainian 
government lacked the political will to fight Russian efforts 
at "integration."  The BBC's Konstantin Eggert told us that 
in the future, Moscow could create trouble for a weakened 
Ukrainian government in these regions; only money and 
organization were needed to stir up pre-existing separatist 
tendencies.  However, while most observers agreed that there 
were fault lines in Ukraine that the GOR could readily 
exploit, no one believed there was strong support for a move 
in this direction from top decision-makers.  For now, Russia 
seems to be pleased with the turn in relations since 
Yanukovich's return and has no reason to pressure him in this 
manner. 
 
10.  (C)  Religion poses other challenges.  Informed 
observers we talked to, including Scherbatyuk, said Moscow 
was strongly resisting Yushchenko's plan -- endorsed by the 
Constantinople Patriarchate -- to unify Orthodox Ukrainians 
in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate).  Russia 
backs the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church, which has special ties to religious communities in 
Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv and Odesa. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (C)  Now that the Yanukovich government is in place, 
Russia is focused on resuming active engagement.  The energy 
deal has put one of the most contentious issues in the 
relationship on hold for another year.  Difficult issues lie 
ahead, however, with Ukraine's continued interest in NATO 
membership.  While no one seems to think the relationship can 
return to its cozy, pre-Orange Revolution days, the improved 
tone and a focus on practical issues should help lay the 
groundwork for a productive Putin-Yushchenko Summit. 
 
MOSCOW 00012666  003 OF 003 
 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12646, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW12646.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12646 2006-11-28 05:44 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2646 3320544
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280544Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5462
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 012646 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/DMUSLU/MHAMES 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
FEDERALNAYA SLUZHBA OHRANY, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, LICENSE 
NO: D348852 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 04152 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Federalnaya Sluzhba Ohrany, Moscow, Russia. The 
company was listed on BIS license number: D348852 as 
the ultimate consignee of one Thermovision system, 
model Security HD, ECCN: 6A003.B.4. These commodities 
are controlled for national security and regional 
stability reasons. The exporter is Indigo Systems 
Corporation, 70 Castilian Dr., Goleta, CA 93117. 
 
3. On November 22, 2006, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with Federalnaya 
Sluzhba Ohrany (Russian abbreviation FSO) at the 
offices of Pergam Engineering,3A, pr. Olminskogo., 
office 830, Moscow, Russia. The export control team 
met with Pavel Ushakov, FSO Chief Inspector, Sergey 
Ivanov, FSO Chief Engineer and Dmitry Korneyev from 
Pergam Engeneering. 
 
4. FSO is an agency of the Government of Russia (GOR) 
tasked with the protection of the President of the 
Russian Federation and other state officials.  The 
agency is also responsible for the security of certain 
state property, such as the Kremlin. 
 
5. The camera in reftel will be used to upgrade the 
surveillance system of a facility under the 
jurisdiction of the FSO. The camera has not yet been 
installed; the upgrades to other systems are being 
completed first.  Until it is installed, the camera 
system is being stored in a high-value area of the 
Pergam warehouse.  Access to the warehouse is limited 
to authorized personnel and a security officer guards 
the high-value area at all times. Once installed, no 
more than ten people will have direct access to the 
system.  Pergam has trained the FSO staff on the use 
of the camera. 
 
6. The team was shown a Flir Systems ThemoVision 
camera, 427-00087100, S/N 2062 SHP23 CAGE code 064Y2. 
The camera and accessories were in a hard-sided case 
as shipped from the factory.  FSO was notified in 
writing of the license conditions by the exporter, and 
signed an end-user agreement which restated the 
license conditions. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends Federalnaya 
Sluzhba Ohrany, Moscow, Russia, as reliable recipients 
of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW12643, DEMARCHE ON DEPORTATION OF UZBEK ASYLUM SEEKER

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW12643.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW12643 2006-11-27 14:50 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2643 3311450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271450Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5459
INFO RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 4927

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 012643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UZ RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON DEPORTATION OF UZBEK ASYLUM SEEKER 
DELIVERED TO MFA 
 
REF: STATE 185048 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.  Reasons: 1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C)  We met November 22 with MFA Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Cooperation Department Deputy Director Mikhail 
Lebedev and his staff to discuss the deportation of Rustam 
Muminov to Uzbekistan and to underline U.S. concerns about 
deportation of other asylum seekers to Uzbekistan given 
Tashkent's record on torture.  Lebedev was aware of Muminov's 
case and attributed the deportation to a lack of coordination 
between Russian government agencies.  He pointed out that his 
limited staff did not usually get involved in individual 
cases, which they were often unaware of until there was a 
complaint from another government or a human rights 
organization. 
 
2.  (C)  Turning to the question of Uzbekistan's record on 
torture, Lebedev said that Russia did not agree with the 
conclusions of the U.N. Special Rapporteur.  While Moscow did 
have concerns in some cases, the MFA could not conclude that 
torture in Uzbekistan was systemic. 
BURNS

Wikileaks