Monthly Archives: August 2009

09MOSCOW2248, Progress on the Russian International Uranium Enrichment

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2248 2009-08-31 11:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4883
RR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2248/01 2431104
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RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0348
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0291
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0545
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4289
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0564
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1223
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3691
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 3338
RHMFIUU/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 002248 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: KNNP ENGR IAEA TSPL SENV KZ NO AM UP SW RS
SUBJECT: Progress on the Russian International Uranium Enrichment 
Center (IUEC) and the Fuel Reserve Initiatives 
 
REF: STATE 83455 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - Please protect accordingly 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:   Embassy representatives visited the Angarsk 
Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC) uranium enrichment facility on 
July 15, 2009 and received a briefing in Moscow on August 3, 2009 on 
the status of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). 
The briefing was provided by representatives of the Russian State 
Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) and Tenex, the Rosatom company 
that sells uranium enrichment services and radioactive materials 
abroad.  According to Tenex officials, the IUEC has received all 
necessary licenses for operation.  In parallel to the IUEC, Russia 
is planning to make 120 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) 
available to the IAEA as a fuel reserve (fuel bank).  The IUEC would 
be responsible for maintaining the fuel bank, and the material would 
remain the property of the Russian Government (GOR) until it is 
transferred to the IAEA.  Tenex reported that the GOR and the IAEA 
had an understanding that safeguards would first be applied to the 
proposed fuel bank.  The interagency review of the agreement between 
the IAEA and the Russian Federation that sets the conditions for 
establishment of the fuel bank is almost complete, and the agreement 
should be submitted to the IAEA at the September Board of Governors' 
meeting.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Site Visit and Background on the AECC 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On July 15, 2009, representatives of the U.S. Department of 
Energy's Moscow Office (DOE-M) visited Angarsk, Russia, to take part 
in DOE-Rosatom discussions of post-Bratislava plans for emergency 
response cooperation and to observe an emergency exercise by Angarsk 
Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC) response forces. Shortly before 
the trip, DOE-M requested a visit the Angarsk Enrichment Facility 
and a briefing on the status of the International Uranium Enrichment 
Center (IUEC).  Tenex ensured that the site visit took place even on 
relatively short notice. 
 
3. (SBU) AECC is located about 60 kilometers north of Irkutsk in the 
city of Angarsk.  AECC has both a uranium conversion plant 
(production of uranium hexafluoride from yellowcake or from uranium 
tetrafluoride) and a uranium enrichment plant.  AECC has a 
significant amount of available space to install additional 
centrifuges, and plenty of power for future expansion of production 
capacity.  AECC is the only Russian enrichment facility located in 
an open city. According to AECC hosts, AECC has never been used for 
production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and it is currently 
licensed to produce uranium hexafluoride enriched to up to five 
percent.  AECC does not conduct any R&D for centrifuge technology 
development, unlike some of the other enrichment facilities.  All of 
these factors combined make AECC the least sensitive and most easily 
accessible Russian enrichment facility. 
4. (SBU) DOE-M representatives were shown a small portion of one of 
the centrifuge halls and uranium hexafluoride transport container 
filling station. In June 2007, Rosatom Director General Kiriyenko 
said that AECC's enrichment capacity was 2.6 million separative work 
units (SWUs) and that that Rosatom planned to expand AECC capacity 
to 4.2 million SWUs.  During the course of the visit, DOE-M 
representatives were told about the Russia-Kazakhstan agreement that 
calls for establishment of a joint Russian-Kazakhstan Center for 
Uranium Enrichment (CUE) at AECC.  (Note: The CUE is not to be 
confused with the IUEC as it is a totally separate bilateral 
commercial project between Russia and Kazakhstan on a 50/50 basis. 
End Note.) 
5. (SBU) AECC representatives mentioned that they are working 
closely with local environmentalists to address concerns over AECC 
activities and expansion plans.  Out of all four Russian enrichment 
facilities, AECC gets the most attention from environmental groups. 
The main reasons for this are AECC's relative proximity to Lake 
Baikal, significant media attention related to the IUEC initiative, 
and the fact that Angarsk is an open city, which makes it more 
accessible for nongovernmental organizations. 
6. (SBU) AECC hosts confirmed that there are plans to build a 
Russian-designed tails conversion facility, to convert depleted

 
MOSCOW 00002248  002 OF 005 
 
 
uranium hexafluoride into the less dangerous form of uranium 
tetrafluoride, which would address the concerns of 
environmentalists.  However, AECC management is clearly less than 
enthusiastic about operating such a conversion facility.    It was 
obvious that the issue of operational costs for the conversion 
facility still needs to be addressed between AECC, Tenex and 
Rosatom. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Status of the International Uranium Enrichment Center 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
7. (SBU) Because the AECC Director referred DOE-M representatives to 
Tenex for information about the IUEC, DOE-M and Environment, Science 
and Technology and Health section representatives held a follow-on 
meeting at Tenex on August 3.  Tenex representatives explained that 
the IUEC was established based on the 2007 Russia-Kazakhstan 
Government to Government Agreement "On Foundation of the 
International Uranium Enrichment Center." (Note:  Tenex provided the 
text of the agreement to DOE-M.  End Note.)  Per the Agreement, the 
IUEC was established as a Joint Stock Company incorporated in Russia 
in accordance with Russian laws and is located in Angarsk.  There 
are currently two members - Russia and Kazakhstan - but by the 
middle of next year they will be joined by Ukraine and Armenia. 
 
8. (SBU) According to the Tenex representatives, Russia views the 
IUEC as a political, rather than a commercial endeavor.  It is 
viewed as a pilot project to test the concept and viability of 
multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and fuel assurance 
mechanisms, and has the full backing of the Russian government. 
Since the IUEC is a unique international pilot project, Tenex had to 
do a significant amount of paperwork within the Russian government 
to enable the IUEC to operate in Russia.  According to Tenex 
representatives, the IUEC is moving ahead at "full speed" and has 
now received all necessary licenses for operation.  It has also been 
included in the list of Russian organizations authorized to own 
nuclear material.  Tenex representatives commented that a great deal 
of work will be done in 2010-2011. 
 
----------------------- 
Current IUEC Membership 
----------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) In addition to founding members Kazakhstan and Russia, the 
governments of Armenia and Ukraine have decided to join the IUEC. 
Although both agreements have received interagency approval within 
Russia, they must also be approved by the Government of Kazakhstan, 
which Tenex interlocutors characterized as notoriously slow in 
processing documents.  Tenex expects to receive GOK approval of both 
agreements by the middle of 2010.  The Rosatom representative 
stressed that the IUEC is open to interested countries that are in 
compliance with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).  The legal basis for participation consists of bilateral 
government-to-government agreements with the founding Parties - 
Russia and Kazakhstan.  Russia is currently having discussions with 
other states, and Tenex is hopeful that additional states will sign 
up soon. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
No Commercial Incentive - No Access to Enrichment Technology 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
10. (SBU) As noted above, Russia is not proposing any real 
commercial incentives for potential IUEC participants.  Rather, at 
the initial stage of IUEC development, Russia is inviting those 
countries that want to demonstrate their good standing and 
commitment to the NPT and to the development of multilateral 
approaches and assurance of supply mechanisms.  The near-term goal 
is to find partners from outside the former Soviet Union (FSU) to 
avoid the IUEC being viewed as a purely FSU arrangement. 
 
11. (SBU) IUEC participating countries will not have access to 
enrichment technology.  Moreover, current plans do not call for the 
IUEC to have its own enrichment capacity, as the IUEC will place 
orders for enrichment services at AECC.  (Note: It is unclear how 
 
MOSCOW 00002248  003 OF 005 
 
 
much enrichment capacity is currently available at AECC.  We heard 
from Angarsk locals that at times the AECC enrichment plant was 
significantly underloaded.  Given current expansion plans as well as 
GOR backing and political support for this effort, we expect that 
the IUEC would be given priority access to AECC's enrichment 
capacity.  End Note.) 
 
12. (SBU) Since IUEC does not have to invest in building its own 
enrichment capacity, the initial investment by participating 
countries is nominal.  IUEC bylaws set IUEC capitalization at 26 
million rubles (slightly less than $1 million).  Russia owns 51 
percent of the IUEC stock.  The Kazakhstani share of 10 percent of 
the IUEC stock cost Kazatomprom less than $100,000.  Other 
participating countries will have to invest $100,000, or less  if 
they want to settle at five percent ownership.  The IUEC is planning 
to pay dividends to the stockholders, and the dividends will be 
distributed according to the share each stakeholder holds in the 
IUEC.  As the stakeholder investments are minimal, the dividends 
will not significant, but they will certainly be expected to cover 
initial investments.  Tenex representatives noted that if there is 
more interest as the project progresses, the IUEC Board of Directors 
may make a decision to issue additional stock for purchase by 
authorized agents of IUEC member countries, but Russia will retain 
the 50 percent plus one share ownership. 
 
13. (SBU) Current plans call for the IUEC to have commercial 
contracts for 500,000 - 600,000 SWUs per year, which would allow the 
IUEC to support itself.  The goal is to sign the first contract for 
enrichment services with Kazakhstan in the first quarter of 2010. 
Orders from IUEC stockholder countries will take priority, but the 
IUEC is ready to supply services to other countries as well. 
According to the Rosatom representative, the only precondition of 
supply is compliance of each transaction with Nuclear Suppliers 
Group guidelines. 
14. (SBU) If the IUEC eventually gets a steady flow of enrichment 
contracts, the IUEC may decide to buy stock at the AECC and, 
thereby, become a co-owner of the actual enrichment facility.  If 
this were to take place, IUEC members would still not have access to 
any enrichment technologies.  Such a situation would require certain 
regulations to be issued by Russian authorities, as it would 
constitute foreign investment into a so-called "strategic 
enterprise."  However, Tenex representatives were confident this can 
be done given the strong GOR backing of the IUEC. 
 
------------------------- 
IUEC Management Structure 
------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) The IUEC management structure is typical of Russian joint &#x0
00A;stock corporations.  Tenex Deputy Director Aleksey Lebedev is IUEC 
Chairman of the Board and Director of IUEC Moscow representative 
office.  All IUEC member countries get a seat on the Board. 
Currently, Rosatom and IUEC are working to transfer the controlling 
stake ownership in the IUEC from Tenex to Rosatom, so that Rosatom 
would control the Russian stake in IUEC directly, rather than via a 
chain of companies that own each other 
(Rosatom-Atomenergoprom-Tenex-IUEC).  The transition is expected to 
be completed by the end of 2009. 
 
16. (SBU) A Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) was established by 
the Russian-Kazakhstan Government to Government Agreement to resolve 
disputes between the parties and discuss implementation of the 
agreement.  The JCC is the forum that will be used to decide on any 
issues that arise related to the IUEC.  The Tenex representative 
noted that it is still early to discuss issues like marketing 
strategy, etc., but that the JCC would be used in the future to 
address such issues.  Despite different amounts of IUEC stock 
ownership, each party gets the same number of members on the JCC. 
The agreement also provides for IAEA participation in the JCC in an 
observer capacity.  The IAEA, Kazakhstan, and Armenia attended the 
last meeting of the JCC, which was one year ago.  The next JCC will 
be held at the end of 2009. 
 
--------- 
Fuel Bank 
 
MOSCOW 00002248  004 OF 005 
 
 
--------- 
 
17. (SBU) In parallel with the establishment of the IUEC, Russia is 
planning to make 120 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) 
hexafluoride available to the IAEA as a fuel reserve (fuel bank). 
Russia has had an extensive discussion with the IAEA on both the 
IUEC and the fuel bank, and the necessary agreement and fuel supply 
contract with the IAEA.  The material in the fuel bank will remain 
the property of the Russian Federation until it is transferred to 
the IAEA.  The IUEC will be the agent responsible for maintaining 
the fuel bank. 
 
18. (SBU) It is envisioned that when the Level III mechanism of 
supply assurance is invoked (that is when both existing market 
arrangements and backup commitments by suppliers fail to work), the 
material from the fuel bank will be sold to the IAEA at market 
price, or even at a premium to the market, to avoid disruption of 
commercial uranium sales.  Such an approach will allow for the money 
received from the sale to re-stock the LEU hexafluoride in the fuel 
bank.  The Rosatom representative noted that interagency review of 
the agreement between the IAEA and the Russian Federation that sets 
the conditions for establishment of the fuel bank was almost 
complete, and the agreement should be submitted to the IAEA at the 
September Board of Governors' meeting. 
 
------------------------------ 
Application of IAEA Safeguards 
------------------------------ 
 
19. (SBU) The Rosatom representative explained that Russia included 
both the IUEC and AECC on the list of facilities to which IAEA can 
apply safeguards.  However, IAEA is not staffed well enough and is 
leary of applying safeguards to an enrichment facility within a 
nuclear weapons state.  Rosatom commented that the IAEA views AECC 
as not "safeguards friendly" and that applying safeguards would be 
"a big waste of money."  So the current understanding between Russia 
and the IAEA is that safeguards will be applied first to the fuel 
bank that remains the property of the Russian government, as well as 
to any material owned by the IUEC.  The GOR will assume all costs 
related to application of these safeguards.  Rosatom estimated that 
the IAEA would need three to four full-time equivalent employees 
(FTEs) to implement the safeguards requirements.  The IUEC is 
working to make arrangements to allocate workspace for the 
inspectors and to resolve equipment and access issues. 
 
20. (SBU) In response to a question about whether the IAEA or Russia 
had any interest in using the AECC enrichment plant as a testbed for 
safeguards technologies for enrichment facilities in third 
countries, Rosatom said that a lot of work had been done in this 
area when Russia decided to build an enrichment plant in China. 
Since the Chinese enrichment facility was built using Russian 
technology and is now under IAEA safeguards, the IAEA has thoroughly 
tested safeguards application to a Russian-designed enrichment 
facility.  Apparently the IAEA does not have an interest in further 
pursuing this type of work. 
 
------------------- 
Fuel Bank and IAEA 
------------------- 
 
21. (SBU) The Rosatom representative noted that Rosatom was 
pleasantly surprised by how well the Russian fuel bank proposal was 
received by the IAEA, even when compared with the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI) proposal and especially the German proposal.  The 
biggest concerns the IAEA expressed in discussions with Russia were 
liability, physical protection, and the cost of maintaining the fuel 
bank.  It appears that the Russian proposal better addresses these 
concerns than the other proposals.  The biggest issue for Russia in 
negotiating the fuel supply contract with the IAEA for deliveries to 
implement Level III assurances of supply was reaching an agreement 
on the transfer of title and liability for the material.  Tenex's 
position was that the title transfer to the IAEA should occur at the 
St. Petersburg Seaport, while the IAEA wanted Tenex to deliver it 
directly to the end user, which violates a number of Russian customs 
and banking regulations. 
 
MOSCOW 00002248  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
22. (SBU) Rosatom commented that there was strong opposition 
generated by India among the non-aligned movement countries at the 
June 2009 Board of Governors' meeting toward assurance of supply 
initiatives in general.  The Rosatom representative indicated that 
India has a problem with any document including mention of the NPT 
and India's non-nuclear status.  The Rosatom representative was not 
able to predict what would be required to get the Russia-IAEA 
agreement for establishment of the fuel bank approved, whether it 
would require a Board of Governors' resolution, vote, or if it would 
have to be brought for IAEA General Conference consideration. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
23. (SBU) Russia is clearly moving aggressively to implement its 
IUEC and fuel reserve initiatives.  On August 28, 2009, a Tenex 
representative confirmed to DOE-M that the Russian interagency 
review of the Russia-IAEA Agreement to establish a fuel bank is 
complete.  The draft decree from the Russian Prime Minister 
authorizing an appropriate Russian representative (likely Rosatom 
Director General Kiriyenko) to sign the agreement on behalf of the 
Russian Federation is currently being reviewed, and it should issued 
in time for the September IAEA BOG meeting.  The outstanding issue, 
therefore, is when and if the IAEA Director General will receive 
a
uthority to sign on behalf of the IAEA. 
 
BEYRLE

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09MOSCOW2242, DFM RYABKOV: GOR ENERGIZED ON SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2242 2009-08-28 14:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3549
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2242/01 2401423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281423Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4680
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON RS
SUBJECT: DFM RYABKOV: GOR ENERGIZED ON SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP, 
BILATERAL ISSUES 
 
REF: MOSCOW 2189 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In a lengthy and substantive discussion 
August 26, Ambassador reviewed with DFM Ryabkov a wide range 
of bilateral issues, including senior USG visits to Moscow in 
the coming months, high-level engagement on critical summit 
follow-up issues such as START follow-on and cooperation on 
Iran.  Ryabkov was enthusiastic about prospects for reaching 
a START follow-on agreement by the early December deadline, 
citing specifically and positively the text of U.S. proposals 
as a solid basis for work.  Ambassador and Ryabkov discussed 
Iran in depth, including a joint US-Russia briefing to the 
IAEA on transfer of LEU from Natanz. Ambassador also raised 
the importance we attach to the transfer of research reactor 
fuel from Poland to Russia. On the Bilateral Presidential 
Commission, he agreed that the number of working groups 
should be limited, but made a strong appeal for adding one 
devoted to sports. As for his involvement as co-chair of the 
foreign policy working group (with U/S Burns), he emphasized 
counter-terrorism as a key issue, and called for efforts to 
ensure close coordination with the U.S.-Russia 
Counter-terrorism working group.  Noting that the Afghanistan 
Lethal Transit Agreement has not yet been reviewed by the 
Duma, he declared the GOR's readiness to proceed with 
implementation, and welcomed the idea of publicizing the 
first flights.  End Summary. 
 
START - Ready to Get it Done 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador met for over an hour with DFM Ryabkov 
August 26. Plunging into a discussion of START follow-on, 
Ryabkov expressed gratitude for the advance copy of U.S. 
START follow-on proposals delivered August 25 (Reftel), which 
is already been reviewed by the Russian inter-agency, and 
which he himself has read in part.  The advance copy will 
enable the Russian delegation to the August 31-September 4 
Geneva talks to be able to respond substantively to at least 
some - though likely not all - of the U.S. proposals.  He 
recalled the 7 documents that the Russian delegation had 
presented to U.S. negotiators just prior to the summer break. 
 Those documents, informed by the new U.S. proposals, will 
form the basis for presentations to be made next week on key 
preamble and operative paragraphs of the draft agreement.  He 
acknowledged that U.S. and Russian views do not coincide on 
all elements of the agreement, including on the question of 
working groups, though he downplayed their significance and 
urged the U.S. and Russian teams not to let them become 
"stumbling blocks" for resolution of other issues.  He 
pledged that he and the Russian team, headed by Ambassador 
Antonov, would be working "24/7" to come to agreement on a 
text before the deadline of early December. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador thanked Ryabkov for his comments and 
reaffirmed U.S. readiness to meet the December deadline. 
Ryabkov added that the approach of using the existing START 
agreement text and working through to update was wise and 
efficient. 
 
Cooperation to Transfer Iranian LEU Back to Russia 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4. (C) Ambassador carefully outlined the imperative of 
reaching agreement on the substance of a joint U.S.-Russian 
briefing to the IAEA on how to respond to Iran with a way 
forward on transfer of low enriched uranium (LEU) from the 
Iranian research reactor at Natanz to Russia.  Beyond the 
importance of getting the LEU out of Iran, the Ambassador 
explained the political significance the joint U.S.-Russian 
effort would carry, demonstrating real cooperation and unity 
on a matter of utmost importance. Ryabkov paid close 
attention to the Ambassador's comments and began his response 
by noting that the U.S. and Russia were not far from an 
agreement on the substance of the briefing, though in a swipe 
at the Russian interagency he lamented that some key elements 
"had been made more ambiguous in the interest of agreement." 
Russia had engaged with the U.S. "quietly and 
confidentially," working on the substance while making clear 
that the political consequences of taking joint action also 
had to be evaluated. 
 
5. (C) However, Ryabkov continued, Russia was now concerned 
about the "negative linkage" being made by the U.S. by 
warning that a failure by Iran to agree to the terms of LEU 
 
MOSCOW 00002242  002 OF 003 
 
 
transfer would have to lead to consequences, including 
perhaps additional sanctions.  How the terms of the proposal 
are conveyed to Iran (including the question of whether Iran 
could continue to develop its research reactor if it 
transfers the LEU to Russia) would be critical.  Ryabkov went 
on to question the U.S. reluctance to allow IAEA to handle 
the assessment of the risks due to enrichment, arguing that 
the IAEA would provide an indepe
ndent analysis of the 
situation that would have solid credibility.  In short, the 
LEU presentation risked engendering a strong overall negative 
Iranian reaction and setting back efforts on any new 
incentive packages or even give Tehran an excuse to start to 
reconfigure the reactor at Natanz. 
 
6. (C) Ryabkov cited language agreed by G-8 ministers in 
statements from Trieste and L'Aquila as "extraordinary," and 
that there had not been any developments since that time to 
warrant taking any tougher action.  The Iranians were clever 
enough to take - or avoid - certain actions prior to meetings 
of the IAEA Board of Governors.  The Ambassador encouraged 
Russia to maintain unity with the U.S. and others on all 
matters related to Iran.  Ryabkov closed the discussion by 
stressing that Russia wants to "remain in the same 
wavelength" with its partners.  He said making the joint 
presentation to the IAEA would "buy time" and give further 
impetus to diplomatic efforts on Iranian nuclear fuel. 
 
Bilateral Presidential Commission 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Ryabkov conveyed the importance he places on 
forthcoming consultations in Frankfurt and Washington with 
U/S Burns. Ambassador explained in greater detail the U.S. 
concept of Bilateral President Commission (BPC) working 
groups, our desire to keep their numbers low and, in general, 
the proposals (forthcoming) for sub-groups under specific 
working groups.  With regard to the responsibilities he and 
U/S Burns will share as co-chairs of the Commission's Foreign 
Policy Working Group, Ryabkov recalled the work of the 
Counter-Terrorism Working Group (CTWG) and lauded the 
engagement of Russian C/T expert DFM Safonov. He confessed 
that the MFA had yet to come to a conclusion on 
recommendations as to how to coordinate the work of the BPC's 
FP WG with that of CTWG "so as not to lose the progress made, 
or cover the same ground again."  Ryabkov also wondered about 
U.S.-Russian engagement on Iran in the context of the BPC, 
and how that would mesh with such work already underway in 
other fora, including EU3 3, G-8 and at IAEA. 
 
8. (C) Ambassador reminded Ryabkov of the U.S. officials who 
would join U/S Burns for his meeting with Ryabkov in 
Washington September 21, focusing on Afghanistan, C/T and 
DPRK (sanctions).  Ryabkov said his team had yet to be 
assembled, but that since discussions were scheduled for just 
2 hours, he was debating the usefulness of bringing experts 
from Moscow. While recalling that the September 21 session 
would not be the first formal session of the FP WG, 
Ambassador explained the importance we place on having 
launched a discussion of the issues the group is charged with 
managing so that Secretary Clinton and FM Lavrov can make 
reference to it when they formally launch the BPC in October. 
 
9. (C) Ryabkov expressed mild disappointment that the U.S. 
fact sheets (issued at the summit) did not quite correspond 
with what the two presidents had agreed on the full range of 
working groups.  While agreeing with the Ambassador that 
fewer working groups were better, Ryabkov nonetheless raised 
the matter of adding a working group on Sports to the 
Commission.  Ambassador explained that we envisioned sports 
being dealt with under the Culture Working Group.  Ryabkov 
also raised the issue of launching the work of the 
intelligence working group.  He said that the GOR was not 
"asking for early clarity on the matter," recognizing that 
bringing intelligence services together is complicated.  He 
urged, though, that both sides begin to think about how the 
group would function. 
 
Afghanistan Lethal Transit 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Ryabkov was effusive about the Afghanistan transit 
agreement for lethal materiel, signed during President 
Obama's July visit to Moscow.  While the agreement has not 
yet been submitted for legislative review (given the Duma's 
summer recess), the GOR is fully prepared to begin 
implementing the agreement, as envisioned, as of September 6. 
 
MOSCOW 00002242  003 OF 003 
 
 
 Ryabkov said the GOR is particularly proud of the document, 
and would be pleased to work with the U.S. on publicizing the 
first flights that take place across Russian airspace.  He 
did not think publicity would in any way complicate eventual 
Duma ratification. Both he and the Ambassador agreed that the 
flights would be a solid demonstration of concrete 
cooperation on an issue of mutual concern. 
Beyrle

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09MOSCOW2241, SOLIDARITY LEADER MILOV DISCUSSES UPCOMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2241 2009-08-28 14:00 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3535
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2241/01 2401400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281400Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4678
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002241 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM RS
SUBJECT: SOLIDARITY LEADER MILOV DISCUSSES UPCOMING 
ELECTIONS, FUTURE 
 
 1. (U) Summary: Leading member of Solidarity and candidate 
for Moscow City Duma Vladimir Milov outlined for us his 
election platform and personal vision for the movement. Milov 
predicted overwhelming victory for ruling United Russia in 
city elections. He expects to lose election for his district 
but hopes to capture 20 percent of the vote and retain 
influence and personal political capital. He foresaw that the 
financial crisis would lead to tension within United Russia 
and popular disillusionment with government at the national 
level, allowing Solidarity to compete successfully in 
elections in Moscow and St. Petersburg at some point in the 
future. End Summary. 
 
------------------- 
City Duma Elections 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) Milov told us August 13th that he expects 25 to 30 
percent turnout for Moscow city elections, a majority of 
which will be older voters focused on quality-of-life issues. 
 There is little appeal for a broader campaign platform of 
comprehensive democratic change.  Milov is running electoral 
district 13 to the South of Moscow, his home of 26 years. A 
well-known and well-regarded economist, he is arguing for 
aggressive measures to combat the financial crisis, a major 
issue for opposition parties seeking to disparage United 
Russia.  Recognizing that by virtue of political intrigue or 
merely age Mayor Yuriy 
Luzhkov may leave politics before the next mayoral election, 
and that the city Duma would then appoint a 
successor, he has gained political traction by pointing out 
that the Duma would select a replacement, not citizens 
through direct voting. A United Russia-controlled Duma would 
confirm a close Medvedev or Putin associate nominated from St 
Petersburg instead of a Muscovite, Milov argued.  Milov hopes 
to earn 20 percent of the vote, and would call that a success. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Focus on Moscow and St Petersburg 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Based on his visits to 35 Russian regions in the last 
18 months, Milov remains deeply pessimistic about the 
opportunity for Solidarity to attract support. Media latched 
on to the political unrest in Vladivostok in late 2008 as an 
opportunity for opposition parties to make electoral inroads. 
 Instead, Milov argued, the situation is just the opposite. 
Local workers were striking out against the federal 
government, but were not attacking President Putin in spite 
of some placards calling for his resignation.  Reminiscent of 
petitions to the Tsar, the protestors requested that Putin 
intervene on their behalf with the corrupt bureaucracy. 
Solidarity has never successfully backed a regional protest 
because locals are 
wary of any political involvement. This fact, and weak 
finances, have almost completely confined the movement's 
electoral viability to Moscow and St. Petersburg. Milov sees 
no chance that a legitimate challenge to United Russia can 
come from the provinces. 
 
-------------------- 
Future of Solidarity 
-------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Acknowledging that no Solidarity candidate is likely 
to win election in Moscow, Milov maintained outward optimism 
about the future of the party in the long term. He sees 
himself as one of a cadre of strong leaders of a movement 
with no real activist base. Though the movement has 
approximately 900 members, he estimates that only 50 to 60 
are actively working to promote it in Moscow.  While 
leadership may envision a future as elected members of 
government, Solidarity as a potential political party has 
little popular support. The movement appears to be in stasis, 
waiting for a time undetermined when the economic crisis 
lowers approval ratings for United Russia and individual 
Solidarity leaders are able to gain office. Milov predicts 
that Solidarity could one day appeal to 20 to 30 percent of 
federal voters and join a coalition government. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment:  Milov identifies himself as an individual 
- with vision and supporters - who is "affiliated" with 
Solidarity. He suggested that association with Solidarity is 
not always personally useful. There is no internal 
discussion, he observed, of the movement coalescing into a 
registered political party, due in part to its depleted 
financial resources and a genuine lack of appeal to the 
general public.  Milov aims to maintain his public standing 
 
MOSCOW 00002241  002 OF 002 
 
 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg and capture 
enough of the vote in his district to remain a serious player 
within Solidarity.  The movement as a whole, however, plans 
to tread water and wait for United Russia to fall in public 
opinion polls. Without funding or public interest, it is 
unclear how Milov expects Solidarity to build a grass roots 
base over the coming years.  End Comment. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2240, PUTIN TO VISIT GDANSK TO MARK 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2240 2009-08-28 13:52 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3529
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2240/01 2401352
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281352Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4676
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG PL RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN TO VISIT GDANSK TO MARK 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF 
WWII'S OUTBREAK 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 1397 
     B. MOSCOW 1349 
 
Classified By: Acting Political MC David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) PM Putin will attend the commemoration of the outbreak 
of World War II in Gdansk, Poland on September 1.  During a 
meeting with PM Tusk, the sides are expected to sign 
agreements on cultural exchanges, transit of the Kaliningrad 
Bay, and the transfer of Polish HEU to Russia for 
reprocessing.  The MFA is concerned with how Poland will 
treat the role of the Soviet Union during commemoration 
events, with Polish diplomats quietly accusing the GOR of 
maximizing its leverage to ensure a smooth session.  Recent 
Russian documentaries and history materials marking the 
August 23 anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact have not 
calmed anxieties.  However, the GOR believes it holds all of 
the cards in the relationship and Poland must show restraint 
on contentious issues.  End Summary. 
 
Constructive Visit Planned 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) PM Putin will travel to Gdansk, Poland August 
31-September 1 to attend memorial events marking the Nazi 
invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.  Putin likely makes 
this visit with some trepidation, as Russia and Poland do not 
share a common view of the events that led to the conflict 
and a misstatement by either side could put at risk improving 
ties (Ref A). While in Poland, Putin is expected to meet with 
Ukrainian PM Timoshenko and Bulgarian PM Borissov, and may 
meet with German Chancellor Merkel, although his full 
schedule has not yet been finalized. 
 
3.  (C) According to the MFA's Polish desk, following the 
anniversary events, Putin, Energy Minister Shmatko, and 
Infrastructure Minister Levitin (co-chair of the 
Poland-Russia Commission on Economic Cooperation) will meet 
with their Polish counterparts to sign a three-year cultural 
exchange agreement, an agreement permitting Polish and 
third-party ships to transit the Kaliningrad Bay, and an 
agreement for the transfer of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
from Polish research reactors to Russia for reprocessing (see 
septel).  The MFA sees these agreements as concrete and 
welcomes progress in what has been a difficult relationship. 
 
But History May Get In the Way 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) The context of this meeting greatly troubles the MFA; 
in particular, the nature of the commemoration displays, 
through which the foreign delegates will walk, and any 
comments PM Tusk or President Kaczynski may make regarding 
the Katyn massacre.  While suspicious of remarks from the 
Polish side, the MFA's Polish Desk assured us that Putin 
intends to express regret and mourning for the victims. 
 
5.  (C) Polish diplomats here share the MFA's trepidation and 
have quietly accused the GOR of insisting the bilateral 
session follow the formal anniversary events as leverage to 
ensure Poland does not make anniversary too awkward for 
Putin.  They also charge that the GOR postponed negotiations 
between Russia's Gazprom and Poland's PGNIG on a new gas 
delivery contract to September 8-9, as a means to maximize 
pressure.  Should Putin judge Tusk's or Kaczynski's remarks 
as too pointed, Polish diplomats now fear that Russia will 
walk away from bilateral talks and make gas negotiations 
difficult.  This fear is not unfounded, as a German diplomat 
was told by MFA Deputy Director Polikov that Putin would be 
"ready to respond to any provocation." 
 
6.  (SBU)  The GOR's recent steps at revising official 
histories of the outbreak of World War II has done little to 
calm anxieties (Ref B).  On the seventieth anniversary of the 
signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact August 23, the MFA's 
official historian Konstantin Provalov justified the need for 
the Soviet Union to sign the agreement to buy time and 
pointed to the "Munich Compromise" as the real cause for the 
outbreak of the war.  This version comes on top of a new 
documentary run on state television making a similar charge 
and warning against viewing events outside their historical 
context.  An additional documentary to be run on 
government-owned NTV in the coming days is rumored to blame 
Poland's "plotting" with Germany as the real cause of the 
war, an assessment that reportedly coincides with an official 
SVR history that will be published on August 31, "Secrets of 
Polish Policy, 1933-1944," based on KGB archive material. 
 
MOSCOW 00002240  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) Commemoration events will be a severe test of Polish 
and Russian commitments to a renewed and positive 
relationship.  If commitments are insufficient, Russia is 
confident that it holds most of the cards in the bilateral 
relationship and that Poland will be compelled to show some 
modesty in how it handles the anniversary.  At risk for 
Russia is its warming relations
hip with Poland, for which 
analysts credit PM Tusk's tone, and removing Poland as an 
opponent in European fora; however, it is questionable 
whether these would be sufficient to curb Putin's response to 
any perceived slights.  Tension over history is one of the 
reasons why Russia and Poland formed the Commission on 
Difficult Matters in order to separate arguments of 
historical interpretation from high-level pragmatic 
discussions.  The commemoration reverses this tactic, with 
neither Russian nor Polish diplomats certain whether the 
issues have indeed been separated. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2238, GOR PLANS $10 MILLION DONATION TO PALESTINIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2238 2009-08-28 13:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3505
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2238 2401322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281322Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4673
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2239
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0335

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002238 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID KWBG PGOV OPDC PREL IS RS
SUBJECT: GOR PLANS $10 MILLION DONATION TO PALESTINIAN 
AUTHORITY...IN 2010 
 
REF: STATE 080039 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor David Kostelancik. 
Reason:  1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1. (C) We delivered reftel letter to Aleksandr Nikolayevich 
Rudakov, Palestine Desk Senior Counselor from the MFA's 
Middle East and North Africa Department.  Rudakov stated 
that, in March, Russia pledged a $10 million biannual 
donation to the Palestinian Authority (PA), but he also 
admitted that the discussions for the 2010 funding were 
ongoing and the money had not been committed.  He noted that 
in 2006 and 2008, Russia transferred $10 million to the PA, 
which, based on an agreement between Russia and the PA, could 
only be used for health programs, schools and programs for 
children.  He said that a Russian delegation would visit the 
PA later in 2009 to verify how the 2008 funds had been spent. 
 
2. (C) Rudakov stated that this year Russia had already 
donated 6 tons of flour to the PA through the World Food 
Program.  Russia also planned to donate two civilian 
helicopters, although negotiations with Israel made this gift 
difficult.  He added that Russian security forces made some 
donations to the PA but he would not elaborate. 
Additionally, last year Russia sent medical equipment and 
tents via Egypt to assist with refugees. 
 
3. (C) Rudakov said the MFA would consider reftel request but 
he could not comment on additional funding beyond that 
expected in 2010.  He brought up the difficult economic 
conditions in Russia and the world, adding that there was 
little money available for donations anywhere. 
 
4. (U) A copy of reftel letter was also delivered to the 
MFA's North America division, from whom we received no 
substantive comment. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2230, EMPLOYEES OF FAILING BUSINESSES SEEK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2230 2009-08-28 06:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3147
PP RUEHDBU RUEHHM RUEHJO
DE RUEHMO #2230/01 2400626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280626Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4665
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, DRL 
NSC FOR ELLISON 
DOL FOR BRUMFIELD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019 
TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PGOV SOCI RS
SUBJECT: EMPLOYEES OF FAILING BUSINESSES SEEK 
NATIONALIZATION 
 
REF: STPETERSBURG 68 
 
Classified By: A/ECON John Stepanchuk, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) On August 6, AvtoVaz workers rallied to demand the 
nationalization of their employer, which suspended production 
in August and planned to reduce the workweek in September. 
Demands for nationalization by workers and unions increased 
in frequency, particularly in industrial areas, owing to the 
inability of companies hardest hit by the crisis to meet 
their financial obligations.  Opinion polls indicated that a 
growing portion of the population supported nationalization. 
The inefficiency and slow pace of Russia's bankruptcy system 
left workers little recourse but to turn to the government. 
The GOR plans to pass new bankruptcy legislation by the end 
of 2009.  Unions lobbied for a new law on the nationalization 
of poorly managed enterprises, but limited political support 
and sharp criticism from experts diminished its chances of 
success.  Widespread nationalization would not only place an 
additional fiscal burden on the administration, but also fail 
to address the underlying issues inhibiting entrepreneurial 
activity in Russia.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
DISGRUNTLED WORKERS DEMAND NATIONALIZATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (U) On August 6, participants in a rally in Tolyatti, 
Samarskaya oblast, organized by the independent, AvtoVaz 
union, "Edinstvo," denounced AvtoVaz leadership for its 
incompetence and demanded the nationalization of the company, 
transparent management, and an Audit Chamber investigation 
into the company's use of funds.  (Note: AvtoVaz has already 
exhausted almost all of the 25 billion rubles in government 
assistance it received in June.  End Note)  Over 500 AvtoVaz 
employees, representatives of the company's suppliers, and 
city residents took part in the event, protesting the August 
suspension of production at the Tolyatti plant and the 
reduction in the workweek planned for September.  According 
to a public letter from Andrei Lyapin, Tolyatti Coordinator 
of the Interregional Union of Auto Manufacturing Workers, 
Tolyatti residents believed that only the government could 
solve such large-scale problems, not in the interests of 
owners' profits, but in defense of citizens' interests. 
 
3. (C) Workers' demands for nationalization have increased in 
frequency as a growing number of companies fail to meet their 
obligations to their employees owing to the financial crisis. 
 The question of nationalization immediately arose following 
the highly publicized blockade of a highway outside St. 
Petersburg by workers from the town of Pikalevo, see reftel. 
Workers have also drawn authorities' attention to their 
plight at the "Estar" metallurgical factory in Kemerovskaya 
oblast, Alekseyeva Defense TsBK in Nizhegorodskaya oblast, 
and Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill in Irkutskaya oblast. 
(Note: The Baikalsk board of directors has already voted in 
favor of transferring the company to public ownership, even 
without government legislation.  End Note)  Elena Gerasimova, 
Center for Social and Labour Rights Director, told us that 
workers see nationalization as the only way out of the 
difficult situations in which many companies now find 
themselves. 
 
4. (SBU) Russian citizens in general increasingly approve of 
nationalization and government intervention as appropriate 
measures to resolve the problems faced by companies severely 
affected by the financial crisis.  Forty percent of Russians 
approved of the government's direct intervention to address 
the situation in Pikalevo according to a June poll by the All 
Russian Center for Public Opinion Research.  Moreover, 44 
percent of those surveyed thought that the ordered renewal of 
production by Putin was only a temporary measure, and that 
lasting success required the nationalization of the 
enterprises involved. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
INEFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS LEAVES LITTLE CHOICE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5. (SBU) In addition to the traditionally patriarchal 
relationship between citizens and the state, the inefficiency 
 
MOSCOW 00002230  002 OF 002 
 
 
of Russia's bankruptcy system leaves employees little 
recourse but to turn to the government for nationalization. 
In an August interview with Rossiskaya Gazeta, Mikhail 
Shmakov, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Unions of 
Russia (FNPR), contrasted the multi-year duration of the 
Russian bankruptcy process with the relatively speedy U.S. 
process, noting that the Russian process usually ended in the 
destruction of the enterprise.  Presidential economic adviser 
Arkadiy Dvorkovich recently told the Financial Times that 
less than 10 of 100 Russian compan
ies that had recently gone 
through bankruptcy procedures had survived.  In addition, an 
International Management Problems Institute study on the 
protection of Russian employees' rights in insolvency noted 
that employees could not initiate bankruptcy proceedings to 
secure payment of debts owed them by their employer; 
preferential creditors experienced difficulty exercising 
their rights; local executive agencies inadequately 
implemented bankruptcy regulations; and liquidated companies' 
assets were often insufficient to settle arrears. 
 
6. (U) The government is pushing for reforms that would 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Russia's 
bankruptcy system.  Dvorkovich told the Financial Times that 
the government would present new bankruptcy legislation to 
the Duma, which would be passed into law by the end of 2009. 
The government's top priority is the prevention of companies 
from closing and leaving their workers unemployed. 
 
------------------------------------ 
UNIONS LOBBY FOR NATIONALIZATION LAW 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) In the absence of other alternatives, unions are 
lobbying for a law on the nationalization of troubled 
enterprises.  FNPR Chairman Shmakov told Rossiskaya Gazeta 
that his organization hoped to initiate the development of a 
bill in the Duma mandating the nationalization, 
restructuring, and sale to more effective management of 
poorly managed companies.  Duma deputies already introduced a 
similar, but case specific, bill in order to address the 
situation in Pikalevo, which has not yet been passed by the 
Duma.  (Note: Commentators speculated that BaselCement owner 
Oleg Deripaska actually favored nationalization in the case 
of Pikalevo as a way to transfer the burden of a problematic 
enterprise to the taxpayers.  End Note) 
 
8. (SBU) Efforts to promote nationalization as a standard 
solution for financially strapped companies lack support from 
both politicians and experts.  Members of the Duma property 
committee stated that nationalization should only take place 
on a voluntary basis.  Mikhail Tarasenko, author of the bill 
to nationalize the enterprises involved in the events in 
Pikalevo, told Gazeta.ru that each case had to be considered 
individually.  Evgeniy Gavrilenkov, Troika Dialog chief 
economist, stated that nationalization, "chopped away at the 
bases of the economy," and "indicated that we do not have any 
working institutions."  In addition, Igor Nikolaev, Director 
of the Strategic Analyses Department of the FBK, argued that 
"the authorities had already made enough mistakes," and that, 
"it would not do to multiply them." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) Despite unions' ongoing efforts to induce the 
government to nationalize Russia's troubled companies, the 
lack of political will and financial implications for an 
administration already facing significant budget deficits in 
the coming years diminish the likelihood of their success. 
Although nationalization and the implicit job security it 
would provide offer a short-term solution for the potential 
socioeconomic consequences of the failure of a company, it 
would be unlikely to improve its efficiency, solve the 
problem of decreased domestic demand, or address the 
underlying administrative barriers inhibiting Russia's 
entrepreneurial growth, which require less government 
intervention, not more.  End Comment. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2229, MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT VORONIN CALLS ON MEDVEDEV

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2229 2009-08-28 05:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3110
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2229/01 2400507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280507Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4663
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS MD
SUBJECT: MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT VORONIN CALLS ON MEDVEDEV 
 
Classified By: Acting M/C for Political Affairs David Kostelancik for r 
easons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary. The MFA downplayed Moscow's role in 
Moldova's coalition talks, saying Moldovan President 
Voronin's August 21 meeting with President Medvedev in Sochi 
was motivated instead by the upcoming CIS summit. 
Liberal-Democratic leader Filat's positions on NATO and the 
CIS do not worry Moscow, as they were intended solely for 
political consumption, and Moscow will respect the will of 
the Moldovan people.  Despite talk of a "5 plus 2" round in 
September, there will be no movement on Transnistria until 
the new government in Chisinau is formed; likewise, the visit 
produced no resolution on the USD 500 million loan, currently 
in the hands of the Ministry of Finance.  However, analysts 
see more discontent in Moscow over the recent developments in 
Moldova than the MFA let on.  End Summary. 
 
--------------- 
Coalition talks 
--------------- 
 
2.  (C) In an August 26 meeting, MFA 2nd CIS 1st Secretary 
Dmitriy Groshev disagreed with the notion that Moldovan 
President Voronin's main reason to meet with President 
Medvedev in Sochi August 21 was to discuss ongoing coalition 
talks in Moldova.  In particular, there could be no link 
between Voronin's visit and the Moldovan Communist Party's 
subsequent reversal of its negotiating position, now 
declining to participate in coalition talks with the Alliance 
for European Integration parties.  Moscow considered the 
coalition talks Moldova's internal affair, Groshev asserted, 
although Medvedev had certainly been interested to hear 
Voronin's report on the latest developments on the subject. 
 
---- 
NATO 
---- 
 
3.  (C) Groshev was not concerned about Liberal-Democratic 
Party leader Filat's announcement that Moldova under a new 
leadership would seek NATO membership.  While noting that a 
new ruling coalition had yet to be formed, and that Moldova's 
constitution enshrined that country's neutrality, Groshev 
nonetheless said that Russia would accept the Moldovan 
population's vote for NATO, if it were to happen. 
 
--- 
CIS 
--- 
 
4.  (C) The main purpose of Voronin's visit, according to 
Groshev, was to discuss preparations for the upcoming CIS 
summit, at which time Moldova will pass the CIS presidency to 
Russia.  It made sense for Voronin to raise the summit issue, 
Groshev said, as there was a "high probability" Voronin would 
still be in power at the time of the October summit.  Groshev 
dismissed comments by Filat that the CIS was a "stillborn 
organization," calling it "just a political re-statement" of 
one of his party's platform planks.  Groshev saw no risk that 
Moldova might actually leave the CIS, nonetheless conceding 
the Commonwealth's decreased importance as a "forum for 
discussion." Actual cooperation in the post-Soviet space is 
taking place bilaterally. 
 
------------ 
Transnistria 
------------ 
 
5.  (C) Medvedev and Voronin only briefly touched upon 
Transnistria matters, Groshev said, given that the conflict 
resolution process was practically suspended due to Moldova's 
domestic political .  He had no comment on the possibility of 
"5 plus 2" talks in September.  Groshev noted that the 
personal antipathy between Voronin and Transnistrian leader 
Smirnov had been a complicating factor so far, and suggested 
that the problems their dislike caused for Medvedev while 
organizing the March 18, 2009 "2 plus 1" talks between 
Voronin, Smirnov, and Medvedev would make Medvedev wary of 
offering a similar new round anytime soon.  However, given 
Moldova would soon have a new leader, and that the recent 
resignation of parliamentary speaker Yevgeniy Shevchuk showed 
Transnistria was no longer united behind Smirnov, the 
prospects for settlement might improve in the near future, 
Groshev wagered. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00002229  002 OF 002 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Before Voronin's visit, Itar-Tass August 21 quoted 
an unnamed Kremlin official accusing Moldova and the West of 
presenting Russia as "a party to the conflict," blaming 
Russia for the lack of progress in resolving the conflict, 
and for supporting Transnistrian separatism.  Instead, Russia 
was responsible for maintaining stability in the region, 
acting as a "guarantor and mediator" in the negotiations. 
 
---- 
Loan 
---- 
 
7.  (C) Newspaper reports that Russia's USD 500 million loan 
to Moldova is "on hold" until a new government is in place in 
Chisinau were untrue, Groshev said.  The loan resolution, 
which he had not seen, was at the Russian Ministry of Finance 
for negotiation.  Initially meant to stabilize Chisinau's 
budget, it was now meant to fund specific investment 
projects, he said. 
 
------- 
Pundits 
------
- 
 
8.  (SBU) Analysts see more discontent in Moscow over the 
recent developments in Moldova.  Tatyana Stanovaya in 
politcom.ru called Filat's comments on the CIS and NATO a 
sign that Moldova would soon choose between "pro-Russia and 
pro-Western vectors," but conceded that no Moldovan 
government could allow itself to get on Moscow's bad side. 
Svetlana Gamova in Nezavisimaya Gazeta said the prospect of 
Moldovan NATO membership would "shake Moscow's position in 
the region," while noting Filat's disdain of the CIS, an 
organization Russia dominates.  She asserted that Voronin had 
come to Sochi to consult with Medvedev about the Chisinau 
coalition talks.  Igor Glanin, however, surmised in Vremya 
Novostey that economic problems would keep any new Moldovan 
government from pursuing NATO ambitions, and noted Russia's 
importance both as a trade partner for Moldova, and as the 
source of USD 1 billion in remittances sent home yearly by 
Moldovan seasonal workers in Russia. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Despite MFA assurances to the contrary, it is hard 
not to link Voronin's Sochi visit to the Moldovan Communists' 
position in the coalition talks, particularly the decision to 
boycott coalition talks with the Alliance for European 
Integration parties, whose anti-CIS and pro-NATO statements 
are unacceptable to Russian ears. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2211, RUSSIA’S ALTAI REPUBLIC FACES ECONOMIC PROMISE AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2211 2009-08-27 14:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2502
RR RUEHAST RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHSL RUEHTM
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #2211/01 2391436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271436Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4648
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 5458
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3685
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 3332
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0285
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1673
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4515
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0307
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0517
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002211 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OES/PCI, EUR/ACE, EUR/RUS, EUR/PGI 
AIDAC STATE FOR USAID/E&E 
COPENHAGEN FOR ERIK HALL 
ASTANA ALSO FOR BRUCE HUDSPETH 
INTERIOR PLEASE PASS TO NPS AND USFWS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV ECON EAID SOCI PGOV KCRM KDEM PREL RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S ALTAI REPUBLIC FACES ECONOMIC PROMISE AND 
ECOLOGICAL THREAT OF TOURISM 
 
MOSCOW 00002211  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY: Rising tourism presents an economic opportunity for 
the Altai Republic's mostly rural population, but also threatens its 
unspoiled wilderness.  Threats include desecration of ancient 
cultural sites, poaching of endangered wildlife, and, to a lesser 
extent, illegal logging.  Development assistance, led by the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), has 
helped integrate local farmers into the tourism economy in 
environmentally sustainable ways.  It has also helped strengthen 
park management and created models of productive cooperation among 
businesses, government, NGOs, and local residents.  Although the 
regional government lacks financial resources, small-scale 
partnerships with the private sector have advanced environmental 
protection and green development.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TOURISM'S PROMISE... 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) Embassy representatives visited the mountainous Altai 
Republic in Russian Central Asia July 11-16 to study ecological 
challenges facing the region.  Altai's unspoiled wooded wilderness 
has drawn a rising wave of tourists in recent years.  (Note: The 
Altai Republic should not be confused with the neighboring Altai 
Krai.  End note.)  Its population of approximately 205,000 is 
scattered across a territory about the size of Maine, predominantly 
in villages of less than 1,000 inhabitants devoted mostly to 
subsistence livestock farming.  There are no railroads and virtually 
no heavy industry.  Nearly one-quarter of the republic is designated 
as protected territory of different types, from two strictly 
controlled federal nature reserves ("zapovedniki"), where tourism 
and all other economic activity is prohibited, to six poorly funded 
nature parks under regional jurisdiction that are protected more in 
theory than in practice.  Ancient Scythian and Turkic civilizations 
left a wealth of cultural artifacts here, including burial mounds 
and petroglyphs up to 2,500 years old. 
 
3. (U) The Altai Republic is one of Russia's poorer provinces.  As a 
"recipient region," it receives federal subsidies at the expense of 
more prosperous territories.  With no major deposits of mineral 
wealth and a sparse population, tourism is among the few economic 
stars to which Altai can hitch its development wagon.  Up to 75 
percent of tourists come from neighboring regions by car; their 
vehicles, tents, and barbecue grills line the Republic's riverbanks 
and lakeshores in summer.  Rustic lodges and family resorts are 
proliferating.  In villages large and small, families provide 
traditional yurt-like dwellings ("ayils") for tourists, and operate 
craft studios and souvenir shops.  Roads, even in remote and 
mountainous areas, are generally in excellent condition.  And in 
marked contrast to heavily trafficked tourist destinations in other 
parts of Russia, roadside litter is rare. 
 
4. (U) Basing economic growth on tourism is a risky venture, as 
discretionary tourist spending is usually among the first victims of 
an economic downturn.  However, according to Igor Kalmykov, Director 
of the Altai Zapovednik, tourism has not suffered in the past two 
years, judging by the number of visitors to the lakeside attractions 
bordering on the reserve.  (COMMENT: Tourist traffic might have 
remained strong in the current crisis simply because most tourists 
come short distances and spend little money during their visits. 
But Kalmykov's measure is also a tiny sample of the total tourist 
trade.  END COMMENT.) 
 
... AND THREAT 
-------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The most widely publicized threat to Altai's environment is 
the poaching of endangered wildlife.  The problem made national 
headlines this year when a helicopter crashed into a mountainside 
near the Mongolian border on January 9, killing several high-ranking 
federal and regional officials who had been on a hunting expedition. 
 The victims included Alexander Kosopkin, President Medvedev's 
permanent representative in the State Duma, and Viktor Kaimin, 
Chairman of the Altai Republic's Wildlife Protection Committee, 
 
MOSCOW 00002211  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
which is responsible for issuing huntin
g licenses.  Photos in 
national newspapers showed the wreckage surrounded by the carcasses 
of endangered Argali sheep, highly prized among trophy hunters, 
which had clearly not been killed by the falling helicopter. 
 
6. (SBU) Alexei Vaisman of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) told the 
English-language "Moscow Times" newspaper in a January 23 article, 
"Over the last decade, Altai has become a place where helicopter 
hunting has become rather common...  It's popular among high-level 
officials and so-called New Russians, who think they are above the 
law."  A reporter for the national newspaper Novaya Gazeta told us 
that such VIP hunting trips are common knowledge in Altai.  Igor 
Kalmykov told us that local environmental protection officials and 
the public particularly resent this phenomenon, because Moscow 
officials often coerce local bureaucrats to violate environmental 
laws in facilitating the expeditions.  A local administration head 
told us that because of public outrage over the incident, the 
federally appointed governor, Alexander Berdnikov, may not be 
reappointed when his current term of office expires next year. 
 
7. (SBU) Small-scale poaching and illegal logging by local residents 
also threaten wildlife and habitats.  Kalmykov told us that locals 
turn to poaching in depressed economic times to supplement meager 
incomes.  He explained that commercial logging is rare in Altai 
because, although Altai borders China, mountainous terrain and the 
absence of railroads make timber export difficult and unprofitable. 
He added that uncontrolled timber harvesting by locals for home fuel 
and building materials poses a greater threat.  One livestock farmer 
in central Altai corroborated Kalmykov's statement, but he 
complained that so much of Altai's forest land is restricted for 
ecological reasons that it is difficult to obtain wood legally. 
 
8. (U) Like elsewhere in Russia, Altai's environmental protection 
efforts are hampered by a lack of government resources and weak 
regulation.  While Altai's federally funded zapovedniki benefit from 
a strong cadre of wardens and a complete ban on tourism, the six 
nature parks under regional jurisdiction have virtually no effective 
protection.  The republic budget provides for only a handful of 
salaried staff; the Uch-Enmek Nature-Ethnic Park in central Altai 
covers 250 square miles and has only five employees, one of whom is 
responsible for park security.  We saw ancient petroglyphs defaced 
by graffiti in this and other parks, with staff powerless to 
regulate public access or prevent vandalism.  Park director Daniil 
Mamiyev told us that, despite laws providing for park protection, 
there is no implementing legislation that authorizes park staff to 
enforce the law. 
 
PROMOTING ENVIRONMENT-FRIENDLY GROWTH 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) Throughout Altai we found evidence of, and praise for, the 
work of international development and environmental organizations, 
most prominently the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF).  UNDP is managing a portfolio of ecology and 
development projects through its six-year, $16 million program, 
"Biodiversity Conservation in the Russian Portion of the Altai-Sayan 
Ecoregion," the current phase of which ends in 2010.  The program 
has funded new visitor centers for nature parks, training and 
equipping of park rangers to deter poaching, and developing of 
teaching materials for schools.  One example of UNDP's support is an 
innovative anti-poaching system, now being deployed in the Altai 
Zapovednik, in which remote hidden sensors detect the tell-tale 
vibrations of human activity and transmit alerts via satellite to a 
central computer system, thus giving wardens a new rapid-response 
capability.  At the Kalbak-Tash petroglyph complex in the Argut 
Nature Park, a UNDP grant made it possible for staff to build wooden 
barriers to help protect the ancient Scythian rock carvings at the 
site.  In 1998, WWF initiated a similar program, which is now 
prominent enough to merit a page on the Altai Republic's official 
website. 
 
10. (U) Travel programs have shown similarly encouraging results. 
The Fund for Sustainable Development of Altai, a nongovernmental 
partnership managed by U.S.- and Altai-based coordinators, has 
 
MOSCOW 00002211  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
facilitated exchanges with U.S. park managers, including at 
Adirondack Park in upstate New York and in Massachusetts.  The Open 
World Leadership Center of the Library of Congress has included 
several Altai environmentalists in its exchange programs.  Daniil 
Mamiyev of the Uch-Enmek Park, who has visited the United States 
under the auspices of both organizations, has since developed a 
comprehensive park management plan inspired by those of the U.S. 
National Park Service.  Ruslana Toptygina, director of the Chuy-Oozi 
Nature Park and an Open World program alumna, told us she was 
inspired by the logo souvenirs of U.S. parks to start a branding 
campaign of her own.  Svetlana Shchigreva, the Altai Zapovednik's 
director of public outreach, who traveled to Vermont on an Open 
World program in 2005, said she was particularly impressed with New 
England's public hearings and town hall meetings.  She brought this 
example to her work with the Lake Teletskoye Community Council 
(para. 12). 
 
11. (U) UNDP's program includes training, micro-grants, and 
micro-loans to encourage environmentally sustainable alternative 
livelihoods.  Natalya Olofinskaya, head of UNDP's environmental 
protection program in Russia, told us that UNDP has not encountered 
any more fertile ground for this type of community development than 
in Altai.  Livestock farmer Tonskoy Todukov proudly showed us his 
new guest cabins and visitor center on the banks of the Katun River 
near the village of Inegen, whose construction was financed by a WWF 
grant.  On the property, Todukov is also cultivating medicinal herbs 
for sale, with seedlings provided by the Central Siberian Botanic 
Garden in Novosibirsk.  UNDP and WWF have also nurtured a folk art 
industry that has sprung up to serve the tourist market.  Examples 
include three craft studios we visited, which are housed in wooden 
cabins in villages in northwest Altai's Chemal District.  Rimma 
Anchibayeva, head of the Inya Village Administration in central 
Altai, told us that schools have begun teaching folk crafts to give 
students marketable skills and an appreciation of their culture. 
WWF grants in Anchibayeva's district have also enabled farmers to 
establish workshops to manufacture marketable products from 
goatskins. 
 
COMMUNITY COUNCILS: AN EXPERIMENT IN LOCAL DEMOCRACY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
12. (U) Development organizations have also spawned an innovative 
experiment in local democracy at Teletskoye Lake in northeast Altai 
that has already brought practical benefits to the community and the 
environment.  Teletskoye is a slender mountain rift lake, one of 
Russia's deepest, bou
nded on its eastern shore by the Altai 
Zapovednik.  The area is popular among Russian tourists, many of 
whom cruise the lake in expensive powerboats.  In the lakeshore 
communities we spoke with several members of the Teletskoe Lake 
Community Council, a non-governmental association registered in 
April of this year.  The council is not intended to supplant 
official elected bodies; in fact, the village council itself is a 
member of the Community Council, along with local businesses, the 
managers of the Altai Zapovednik, and other stakeholders.  The 
group's task is to promote ecological and socio-economic development 
through public-private cooperation. 
 
13. (U) Igor Kalmykov, director of the Altai Zapovednik, is a member 
of the Community Council.  In his brief tenure he has distinguished 
himself from his predecessor in taking a more liberal approach to 
visitor access and community involvement.  Soon after taking office, 
he negotiated an agreement with local tour boat operators, 
facilitated by the Community Council, to allow controlled public 
access to the popular Korbu Waterfall on the edge of the lake.  The 
agreement ended a violent impasse that had begun when the previous 
park director raised access fees to prohibitive levels, choking off 
the tour operators' business and livelihood.  The Community Council 
also claims credit for the remarkably clean and litter-free state of 
the roads and lakeshores.  The head of the council, a young 
entrepreneur named Ivan Yuzhakov, recounted how the Council 
organized a cleaning spree lasting several months, in which 
schoolchildren gathered and bagged garbage from public lands around 
the lake, and tour boat operators hauled the bags to a central 
location for transport to a landfill. 
 
MOSCOW 00002211  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
CULTIVATING GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Our interlocutors in Altai agreed that, while park 
managers have traveled often to the United States on technical 
exchanges, more government officials should participate in these 
trips.  At present, some highly placed officials are largely unaware 
of such programs.  A case in point was Governor Berdnikov's 
assistant Dmitriy Shepel, a career civil servant who accompanied us 
for two days of our visit and admitted that our meetings with park 
managers gave him a new understanding of environmental issues.  On 
the other hand, officials who are aware of development programs and 
community initiatives tend to support them.  Rimma Anchibayeva, the 
popularly elected head of the Inya Village Administration, actively 
recruits participants for conferences and seminars organized by WWF 
and UNDP.  Local contacts told us that she won re-election last year 
based in part upon her record of enthusiastic involvement in 
sustainable development initiatives. 
 
COMMENT: ALTAI REPUBLIC - AN EXCEPTION WORTH STUDYING 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
15. (U) The Altai Republic is known throughout Russia for being 
among the most pristine, thanks to its remoteness and its lack of 
industry.  We saw no evidence of federal or regional environment 
monitoring, but residents clearly treasure their environment and are 
active in preserving it.  Although federal nature reserves had 
adequate staff to protect them from encroachment, regional protected 
lands were essentially unprotected - both by people and by the law. 
WWF and UNDP's small-scale micro-lending programs have given a vital 
impetus to local entrepreneurship and guided local businesses to be 
sensitive to environmental needs.  As these grants diversify rural 
economies away from an exclusive focus on farming, they also 
ameliorate the problems of poaching and illegal logging.  Exchange 
programs, particularly those with Native American tribes, have been 
especially useful for Altai's indigenous communities to preserve 
their cultures while safeguarding their environment.  Most important 
to successful conservation, however, was the engagement of local and 
regional officials with the private sector. 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2210, DEMARCHE DELIVERED: COMMENTS BY INGUSH PRESIDENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2210 2009-08-27 12:35 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2210 2391235
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271235Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4647

UNCLAS MOSCOW 002210 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: COMMENTS BY INGUSH PRESIDENT 
YEVKUROV 
 
REF: A. STATE 086152 
 
1. (SBU) On August 26, Ambassador delivered demarche (Ref A) 
to DFM Sergey Ryabkov regarding Ingush President Yevkurov's 
public claim that the United States supports instability in 
Russia. 
 
2. (SBU) In response, Ryabkov stated that the Government of 
Russia (GOR) greatly appreciated President Obama's statement 
after the Nazran truck bombing.  Ryabkov also commented that 
"you will never hear GOR say anything about the so-called 
West, or U.S., interest in promoting a weak Russia or 
Caucasus separatism."  In additon, he suggested that only 
statements from federal authorities should be considered when 
it comes to views about "the West" or specific countries. 
Ryabkov reported that he would pass along the concerns raised 
by the Ambassador regarding the Yevkurov statement. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2209, S) DEMARCHE DELIVERED: POTENTIAL HIZBALLAH-IRAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2209 2009-08-27 12:33 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #2209 2391233
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271233Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4646
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1017
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2238
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0516

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2029 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL PTER ECCT RS IR SY
SUBJECT: (S) DEMARCHE DELIVERED: POTENTIAL HIZBALLAH-IRAN 
ARMS TRANSFER 
 
REF: STATE 88978 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4 (b), 
 (c), and (d). 
 
(S) On August 27 we delivered reftel demarche to MFA North 
America Deputy Director Nikolay Safinskiy, who said he would 
immediately inform FM Lavrov.  Safinskiy said that Russia 
shared U.S. concerns, and stated that the GOR interagency 
process would immediately work to stop these flights from 
taking place.  He also requested any additional information 
the U.S. might have on the flights. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks