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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09MOSCOW2248 | 2009-08-31 11:04 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO4883 RR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHMO #2248/01 2431104 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 311104Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4687 RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0348 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0291 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0545 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4289 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0564 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1223 RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 3691 RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 3338 RHMFIUU/DTRA CT WASHINGTON DC RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 002248 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP ENGR IAEA TSPL SENV KZ NO AM UP SW RS SUBJECT: Progress on the Russian International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) and the Fuel Reserve Initiatives REF: STATE 83455 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - Please protect accordingly ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy representatives visited the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC) uranium enrichment facility on July 15, 2009 and received a briefing in Moscow on August 3, 2009 on the status of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). The briefing was provided by representatives of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) and Tenex, the Rosatom company that sells uranium enrichment services and radioactive materials abroad. According to Tenex officials, the IUEC has received all necessary licenses for operation. In parallel to the IUEC, Russia is planning to make 120 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) available to the IAEA as a fuel reserve (fuel bank). The IUEC would be responsible for maintaining the fuel bank, and the material would remain the property of the Russian Government (GOR) until it is transferred to the IAEA. Tenex reported that the GOR and the IAEA had an understanding that safeguards would first be applied to the proposed fuel bank. The interagency review of the agreement between the IAEA and the Russian Federation that sets the conditions for establishment of the fuel bank is almost complete, and the agreement should be submitted to the IAEA at the September Board of Governors' meeting. End Summary. ------------------------------------- Site Visit and Background on the AECC ------------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) On July 15, 2009, representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy's Moscow Office (DOE-M) visited Angarsk, Russia, to take part in DOE-Rosatom discussions of post-Bratislava plans for emergency response cooperation and to observe an emergency exercise by Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC) response forces. Shortly before the trip, DOE-M requested a visit the Angarsk Enrichment Facility and a briefing on the status of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). Tenex ensured that the site visit took place even on relatively short notice. ¶3. (SBU) AECC is located about 60 kilometers north of Irkutsk in the city of Angarsk. AECC has both a uranium conversion plant (production of uranium hexafluoride from yellowcake or from uranium tetrafluoride) and a uranium enrichment plant. AECC has a significant amount of available space to install additional centrifuges, and plenty of power for future expansion of production capacity. AECC is the only Russian enrichment facility located in an open city. According to AECC hosts, AECC has never been used for production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and it is currently licensed to produce uranium hexafluoride enriched to up to five percent. AECC does not conduct any R&D for centrifuge technology development, unlike some of the other enrichment facilities. All of these factors combined make AECC the least sensitive and most easily accessible Russian enrichment facility. ¶4. (SBU) DOE-M representatives were shown a small portion of one of the centrifuge halls and uranium hexafluoride transport container filling station. In June 2007, Rosatom Director General Kiriyenko said that AECC's enrichment capacity was 2.6 million separative work units (SWUs) and that that Rosatom planned to expand AECC capacity to 4.2 million SWUs. During the course of the visit, DOE-M representatives were told about the Russia-Kazakhstan agreement that calls for establishment of a joint Russian-Kazakhstan Center for Uranium Enrichment (CUE) at AECC. (Note: The CUE is not to be confused with the IUEC as it is a totally separate bilateral commercial project between Russia and Kazakhstan on a 50/50 basis. End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) AECC representatives mentioned that they are working closely with local environmentalists to address concerns over AECC activities and expansion plans. Out of all four Russian enrichment facilities, AECC gets the most attention from environmental groups. The main reasons for this are AECC's relative proximity to Lake Baikal, significant media attention related to the IUEC initiative, and the fact that Angarsk is an open city, which makes it more accessible for nongovernmental organizations. ¶6. (SBU) AECC hosts confirmed that there are plans to build a Russian-designed tails conversion facility, to convert depleted MOSCOW 00002248 002 OF 005 uranium hexafluoride into the less dangerous form of uranium tetrafluoride, which would address the concerns of environmentalists. However, AECC management is clearly less than enthusiastic about operating such a conversion facility. It was obvious that the issue of operational costs for the conversion facility still needs to be addressed between AECC, Tenex and Rosatom. --------------------------------------------- -------- Status of the International Uranium Enrichment Center --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶7. (SBU) Because the AECC Director referred DOE-M representatives to Tenex for information about the IUEC, DOE-M and Environment, Science and Technology and Health section representatives held a follow-on meeting at Tenex on August 3. Tenex representatives explained that the IUEC was established based on the 2007 Russia-Kazakhstan Government to Government Agreement "On Foundation of the International Uranium Enrichment Center." (Note: Tenex provided the text of the agreement to DOE-M. End Note.) Per the Agreement, the IUEC was established as a Joint Stock Company incorporated in Russia in accordance with Russian laws and is located in Angarsk. There are currently two members - Russia and Kazakhstan - but by the middle of next year they will be joined by Ukraine and Armenia. ¶8. (SBU) According to the Tenex representatives, Russia views the IUEC as a political, rather than a commercial endeavor. It is viewed as a pilot project to test the concept and viability of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and fuel assurance mechanisms, and has the full backing of the Russian government. Since the IUEC is a unique international pilot project, Tenex had to do a significant amount of paperwork within the Russian government to enable the IUEC to operate in Russia. According to Tenex representatives, the IUEC is moving ahead at "full speed" and has now received all necessary licenses for operation. It has also been included in the list of Russian organizations authorized to own nuclear material. Tenex representatives commented that a great deal of work will be done in 2010-2011. ----------------------- Current IUEC Membership ----------------------- ¶9. (SBU) In addition to founding members Kazakhstan and Russia, the governments of Armenia and Ukraine have decided to join the IUEC. Although both agreements have received interagency approval within Russia, they must also be approved by the Government of Kazakhstan, which Tenex interlocutors characterized as notoriously slow in processing documents. Tenex expects to receive GOK approval of both agreements by the middle of 2010. The Rosatom representative stressed that the IUEC is open to interested countries that are in compliance with their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The legal basis for participation consists of bilateral government-to-government agreements with the founding Parties - Russia and Kazakhstan. Russia is currently having discussions with other states, and Tenex is hopeful that additional states will sign up soon. --------------------------------------------- -------- No Commercial Incentive - No Access to Enrichment Technology --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶10. (SBU) As noted above, Russia is not proposing any real commercial incentives for potential IUEC participants. Rather, at the initial stage of IUEC development, Russia is inviting those countries that want to demonstrate their good standing and commitment to the NPT and to the development of multilateral approaches and assurance of supply mechanisms. The near-term goal is to find partners from outside the former Soviet Union (FSU) to avoid the IUEC being viewed as a purely FSU arrangement. ¶11. (SBU) IUEC participating countries will not have access to enrichment technology. Moreover, current plans do not call for the IUEC to have its own enrichment capacity, as the IUEC will place orders for enrichment services at AECC. (Note: It is unclear how MOSCOW 00002248 003 OF 005 much enrichment capacity is currently available at AECC. We heard from Angarsk locals that at times the AECC enrichment plant was significantly underloaded. Given current expansion plans as well as GOR backing and political support for this effort, we expect that the IUEC would be given priority access to AECC's enrichment capacity. End Note.) ¶12. (SBU) Since IUEC does not have to invest in building its own enrichment capacity, the initial investment by participating countries is nominal. IUEC bylaws set IUEC capitalization at 26 million rubles (slightly less than $1 million). Russia owns 51 percent of the IUEC stock. The Kazakhstani share of 10 percent of the IUEC stock cost Kazatomprom less than $100,000. Other participating countries will have to invest $100,000, or less if they want to settle at five percent ownership. The IUEC is planning to pay dividends to the stockholders, and the dividends will be distributed according to the share each stakeholder holds in the IUEC. As the stakeholder investments are minimal, the dividends will not significant, but they will certainly be expected to cover initial investments. Tenex representatives noted that if there is more interest as the project progresses, the IUEC Board of Directors may make a decision to issue additional stock for purchase by authorized agents of IUEC member countries, but Russia will retain the 50 percent plus one share ownership. ¶13. (SBU) Current plans call for the IUEC to have commercial contracts for 500,000 - 600,000 SWUs per year, which would allow the IUEC to support itself. The goal is to sign the first contract for enrichment services with Kazakhstan in the first quarter of 2010. Orders from IUEC stockholder countries will take priority, but the IUEC is ready to supply services to other countries as well. According to the Rosatom representative, the only precondition of supply is compliance of each transaction with Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. ¶14. (SBU) If the IUEC eventually gets a steady flow of enrichment contracts, the IUEC may decide to buy stock at the AECC and, thereby, become a co-owner of the actual enrichment facility. If this were to take place, IUEC members would still not have access to any enrichment technologies. Such a situation would require certain regulations to be issued by Russian authorities, as it would constitute foreign investment into a so-called "strategic enterprise." However, Tenex representatives were confident this can be done given the strong GOR backing of the IUEC. ------------------------- IUEC Management Structure ------------------------- ¶15. (SBU) The IUEC management structure is typical of Russian joint � 00A;stock corporations. Tenex Deputy Director Aleksey Lebedev is IUEC Chairman of the Board and Director of IUEC Moscow representative office. All IUEC member countries get a seat on the Board. Currently, Rosatom and IUEC are working to transfer the controlling stake ownership in the IUEC from Tenex to Rosatom, so that Rosatom would control the Russian stake in IUEC directly, rather than via a chain of companies that own each other (Rosatom-Atomenergoprom-Tenex-IUEC). The transition is expected to be completed by the end of 2009. ¶16. (SBU) A Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) was established by the Russian-Kazakhstan Government to Government Agreement to resolve disputes between the parties and discuss implementation of the agreement. The JCC is the forum that will be used to decide on any issues that arise related to the IUEC. The Tenex representative noted that it is still early to discuss issues like marketing strategy, etc., but that the JCC would be used in the future to address such issues. Despite different amounts of IUEC stock ownership, each party gets the same number of members on the JCC. The agreement also provides for IAEA participation in the JCC in an observer capacity. The IAEA, Kazakhstan, and Armenia attended the last meeting of the JCC, which was one year ago. The next JCC will be held at the end of 2009. --------- Fuel Bank MOSCOW 00002248 004 OF 005 --------- ¶17. (SBU) In parallel with the establishment of the IUEC, Russia is planning to make 120 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) hexafluoride available to the IAEA as a fuel reserve (fuel bank). Russia has had an extensive discussion with the IAEA on both the IUEC and the fuel bank, and the necessary agreement and fuel supply contract with the IAEA. The material in the fuel bank will remain the property of the Russian Federation until it is transferred to the IAEA. The IUEC will be the agent responsible for maintaining the fuel bank. ¶18. (SBU) It is envisioned that when the Level III mechanism of supply assurance is invoked (that is when both existing market arrangements and backup commitments by suppliers fail to work), the material from the fuel bank will be sold to the IAEA at market price, or even at a premium to the market, to avoid disruption of commercial uranium sales. Such an approach will allow for the money received from the sale to re-stock the LEU hexafluoride in the fuel bank. The Rosatom representative noted that interagency review of the agreement between the IAEA and the Russian Federation that sets the conditions for establishment of the fuel bank was almost complete, and the agreement should be submitted to the IAEA at the September Board of Governors' meeting. ------------------------------ Application of IAEA Safeguards ------------------------------ ¶19. (SBU) The Rosatom representative explained that Russia included both the IUEC and AECC on the list of facilities to which IAEA can apply safeguards. However, IAEA is not staffed well enough and is leary of applying safeguards to an enrichment facility within a nuclear weapons state. Rosatom commented that the IAEA views AECC as not "safeguards friendly" and that applying safeguards would be "a big waste of money." So the current understanding between Russia and the IAEA is that safeguards will be applied first to the fuel bank that remains the property of the Russian government, as well as to any material owned by the IUEC. The GOR will assume all costs related to application of these safeguards. Rosatom estimated that the IAEA would need three to four full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) to implement the safeguards requirements. The IUEC is working to make arrangements to allocate workspace for the inspectors and to resolve equipment and access issues. ¶20. (SBU) In response to a question about whether the IAEA or Russia had any interest in using the AECC enrichment plant as a testbed for safeguards technologies for enrichment facilities in third countries, Rosatom said that a lot of work had been done in this area when Russia decided to build an enrichment plant in China. Since the Chinese enrichment facility was built using Russian technology and is now under IAEA safeguards, the IAEA has thoroughly tested safeguards application to a Russian-designed enrichment facility. Apparently the IAEA does not have an interest in further pursuing this type of work. ------------------- Fuel Bank and IAEA ------------------- ¶21. (SBU) The Rosatom representative noted that Rosatom was pleasantly surprised by how well the Russian fuel bank proposal was received by the IAEA, even when compared with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) proposal and especially the German proposal. The biggest concerns the IAEA expressed in discussions with Russia were liability, physical protection, and the cost of maintaining the fuel bank. It appears that the Russian proposal better addresses these concerns than the other proposals. The biggest issue for Russia in negotiating the fuel supply contract with the IAEA for deliveries to implement Level III assurances of supply was reaching an agreement on the transfer of title and liability for the material. Tenex's position was that the title transfer to the IAEA should occur at the St. Petersburg Seaport, while the IAEA wanted Tenex to deliver it directly to the end user, which violates a number of Russian customs and banking regulations. MOSCOW 00002248 005 OF 005 ¶22. (SBU) Rosatom commented that there was strong opposition generated by India among the non-aligned movement countries at the June 2009 Board of Governors' meeting toward assurance of supply initiatives in general. The Rosatom representative indicated that India has a problem with any document including mention of the NPT and India's non-nuclear status. The Rosatom representative was not able to predict what would be required to get the Russia-IAEA agreement for establishment of the fuel bank approved, whether it would require a Board of Governors' resolution, vote, or if it would have to be brought for IAEA General Conference consideration. ------- Comment ------- ¶23. (SBU) Russia is clearly moving aggressively to implement its IUEC and fuel reserve initiatives. On August 28, 2009, a Tenex representative confirmed to DOE-M that the Russian interagency review of the Russia-IAEA Agreement to establish a fuel bank is complete. The draft decree from the Russian Prime Minister authorizing an appropriate Russian representative (likely Rosatom Director General Kiriyenko) to sign the agreement on behalf of the Russian Federation is currently being reviewed, and it should issued in time for the September IAEA BOG meeting. The outstanding issue, therefore, is when and if the IAEA Director General will receive a uthority to sign on behalf of the IAEA. BEYRLE
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Wikileaks: Russia 