Category Archives: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

10MOSCOW391, RUSSIAN DUMA MEMBERS WANT US-RUSSIA RELATIONS BASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW391 2010-02-22 11:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9514
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHMO #0391/01 0531103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221103Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6550
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000391 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, H, EUR/RUS, VCI/SI 
 
E.O.  12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ECON ETRD RS
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DUMA MEMBERS WANT US-RUSSIA RELATIONS BASED 
ON TRUST AND DIALOGUE 
 
MOSCOW 00000391  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: At the invitation of Duma Foreign Relations 
Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev, the Ambassador met for 90 
minutes with a delegation of Duma members traveling with 
Kosachev to the U.S. to meet with members of Congress. 
Discussion topics ranged from imports of U.S. chicken to 
Afghanistan, with considerable attention focused on the recent 
announcement of deployments in 2015 of SA-3 missile systems to 
Romania.  Kosachev, joined by other members, was extremely 
critical of the announcement, questioning timing and 
justifications.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Ambassador Beyrle opened the 90-minute session, 
conducted in Russian but closed to the press, by giving an 
overview of U.S.-Russian relations since the inauguration of 
President Obama.  He emphasized achievements of the Bilateral 
Presidential Commission, and noted the importance of 
completing a START agreement, working closely to address the 
Iranian nuclear threat and instability in Afghanistan. 
Kosachev (United Russia) welcomed the Ambassador's comments, 
himself stressing the need for constructive results, not just 
discussion, on such matters as European security, non- 
proliferation, and energy markets.  He supports the idea of 
establishing a U.S. Congressional Caucus on Russia.  Kosachev 
and his delegation will meet with Rep. Howard Berman and other 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee the week of 
February 22. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Real Confidence and Cooperation Needed 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Duma Deputy Leonid Slutskiy (Liberal Democratic 
Party) questioned the real impact of the "reset."  He argued 
that comprehensive common goals have not yet been set by both 
governments.  He cited the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the 1-2-3 
Agreement, and the failure by U.S. poultry firms to meet 
Russian sanitary requirements.  He noted that the situation 
with poultry products has been improving, after U.S. firms 
acknowledged Russia's concerns over chlorine.  Slutskiy asked 
the Ambassador to study the initiative by Senators Kerry and 
Levin on eliminate the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in order to 
establish normal trade relations between the U.S. and Russia. 
He expressed interest in meeting with Kerry and LEvin when in 
Washington.  He urged the U.S. Trade Representative to study 
the proposal, commenting that outdated amendments adversely 
affect U.S. economic interests. 
 
4. (SBU) Deputy Andrey Klimov (United Russia) reinforced the 
initiative of Russian and EU MPs to invite members of the U.S. 
Congress to their joint European Parliament-Russian Duma 
sessions in order to remove any suspicions that Russia is 
attempting to foment discord between the U.S. and EU.  He 
reported that the next joint session with U.S. participation 
is scheduled for December 2010. 
 
5. (SBU) Deputy Semyon Bagdasarov (Just Russia) spoke about 
Afghanistan, and the involvement of Russian companies in 
support of Coalition Forces.  According to Bagdasarov, Russia 
is already providing a great deal of assistance to ISAF 
troops.  He cited the threat of terrorism and narcotic 
trafficking into Russia as increasing.  He argued that the war 
in Afghanistan will last long time and Coalition Forces should 
be more active in the northern parts of the country fighting 
the producers of heroin and destroying starting points of 
narco-trafficking.  Both sides should work together to prevent 
the emergence of new terrorist activity in Central Asia.  He 
argued passionately that Russia is not interested in Iran's 
nuclear capabilities.  He is concerned that Iran is actively 
arming under the group of religious radicals and we must 
prevent Iran from disintegrating by acting very carefully. 
 
------------------------- 
Missile Defense and START 
------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Chairman Kosachev asked the Ambassador about the 
"shocking uncooperativeness and secretiveness of U.S. Missile 
Defense (MD) plans in Romania and Bulgaria."   He lamented 
that Russian leaders, including FM Lavrov, learned of the news 
from media reports.  He recalled the September 2009 disclosure 
information about a second Iranian nuclear facility in Qom as 
a similar unilateral act that was incompatible with an overall 
atmosphere of "reset" and the improvement of trust and 
confidence between the U.S. and Russia.  Such acts by the 
U.S., he argued, threatened the gradual rapprochement of 
positions on Iran, Afghanistan and especially START. 
 
MOSCOW 00000391  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Other committee members agreed with Kosachev's 
concerns.  Bagdasarov questioned the timing of the 
announcement.  Why before START is finished?  He argued that 
Iran does not present a threat that would be mitigated by SA- 
3's (ignoring Ambassador
's explanation that the deployment was 
scheduled for 2015, and that we want to begin now to prepare 
for a possible threat down the road.) 
 
BEYRLE

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10MOSCOW353, Meeting Between the Russian Federal Drug Control Service

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW353 2010-02-18 12:34 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO6667
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0353/01 0491234
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181234Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0718
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3711
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2771
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0117
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 000353 
 
DEA SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
POST FOR DEA ONLY 
AMEMBASSY KABUL FOR DEA RD MARSAC, ARD BISHOP, SA DILLINGER, FIM 
HENDERSON 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FOR DEA RD DESTITO, FIM LOGUE 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD FOR DEA ARD DUDLEY 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE FOR DEA CA CALDWELL 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT FOR DEA CA MELINK 
DEA HQS FOR OGE/MENDOSA, SCHRETTNER 
DEA HQS FOR OSE/DISANTO, YASEVICH, SANCHEZ 
DEA HQS FOR NCT/CASTO 
DEA HQS FOR NCTE/UPP 
DEA HGS FOR NCI/BORDER 
DEA HQS FOR NCIE/LEHRER 
DEA HQS FOR SARI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: DEAX
 
SUBJECT: Meeting Between the Russian Federal Drug Control Service 
(FSKN) and the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police To Discuss Counter 
Narcotics Issues Related to Russia-Afghanistan; GFXI-10-0003/FSKN 
 
CCX: GFXI-10-9123/Afghanistan 
 
REF A: DEA Moscow CO TWX #00165 dated January 25, 2010 
 
1.(SBU) Summary: On February 11, 2010, the DEA Moscow CO and Kabul 
CO organized a meeting between the Russian Federal Drug Control 
Service (FSKN) and the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police to discuss 
counter narcotics issues related to Russia-Afghanistan. The 
following topics were discussed: exchanging drug intelligence more 
frequently between the FSKN and Afghan Counter Narcotics Police, 
identifying the top 10 Afghan traffickers who are responsible for 
sending opiate shipments to Russia via the Northern Route, the 
possibilities of conducting International Controlled Deliveries 
(ICDs) from Afghanistan to Russia, the possibilities of posting 
additional FSKN liaison officers in the northern provinces of 
Afghanistan, and organizing case coordination meetings between 
Russia, Afghanistan, DEA, and Central Asian countries to target 
Northern Route Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) more 
effectively. End Summary. 
 
2.(SBU) Following the DEA Mid East Region's mini IDEC conference, 
which was held in Bucharest, Romania the DEA Moscow CO and Kabul CO 
organized a meeting on February 11, 2010, between the FSKN and the 
Afghan Counter Narcotics Police to discuss counter narcotics issues 
related to Russia-Afghanistan. The following individuals 
participated in the meeting: FSKN General Alexander Kirushev, First 
Deputy Head of Operations, FSKN Colonel Alexey Milovanov [FSKN 
liaison officer posted to Kabul, Afghanistan], FSKN Major Inga 
Mayke, Deputy Head of Enforcement, and Afghan Colonel Asadullah 
Babakarkhel, Commander of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police. Also 
in attendance from the DEA were ARD John Dudley, Moscow CO CA 
Michael Nowacoski, and Kabul CO Acting GS Kelly Dillinger. 
 
3.(SBU) General Kirushev began the discussions by explaining that 
Russia's main drug threat stems from Afghanistan and that 
approximately 90% of all the drug addicts in Russia are abusing 
Afghan opiates. General Kirushev described the Afghan drug threat as 
not only a threat for both Russia and Afghanistan but also a threat 
for numerous other countries, including the United States. 
 
4.(SBU) General Kirushev stated that approximately one year ago, the 
Russian and Afghan governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) to exchange drug intelligence and to conduct joint narcotics 
operations between their countries. As a result of this, the FSKN 
posted Colonel Milovanov as FSKN's liaison officer in Afghanistan. 
 
5.(SBU) It is understood that since a majority of all the Afghan 
opiate shipments that are sent from Afghanistan to Russia transit 
through Central Asia (commonly referred to as the Northern Route), 
direct cooperation between the FSKN and Afghan Counter Narcotics 
Police may be difficult. Both the FSKN and the Afghan Counter 
Narcotics Police would like to utilize the DEA as a "common friend" 
to increase cooperation between each other in conducting joint 
investigations. 
 
6.(SBU) Colonel Babakarkhel stated that approximately 60% of all 
Afghan opiates are transported to Russia via the Northern Route, and 
that this amount will probably increase due to the construction of a 
new highway leading into Tajikistan from Northern Afghanistan. 
 
7.(SBU) General Kirushev and Colonel Babakarkhel both agreed that a 
way to increase cooperation between each country was to exchange 
drug intelligence more frequently between each agency. 
 
8.(SBU) As a first step, General Kirushev provided Colonel 
Babakarkhel with two referral letters that identified individuals 
who may be involved in narcotics trafficking. In the first referral 
letter, the FSKN alleged that the following individuals may be 
involved in orchestrating the production and smuggling of Afghan 
opiates to Russia via Central Asian countries located along the 
 
MOSCOW 00000353  002 OF 005 
 
 
Northern Route: 
 
Najib LNU; identified as an organizer of drug smuggling routes out 
of Tajikistan. Utilizes the following Tajik telephone numbers: 
992-919-966622 and 992-919-940008. 
 
Taj Mohammad; identified as a drug recipient based in Tajikistan. 
Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-966833. 
 
Nematullah LNU; identified as a drug recipient based in Tajikistan. 
Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-235219. 
 
Abdul WOZUZ; identified as an organizer of drug shipments from 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 
992-919-326298. 
 
Jamal LNU; identified as an organizer of drug smuggling routes out 
of Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-335674. 
 
Aminullah LNU; identified as a drug distributor based in Tajikistan. 
Utilize
s Tajik telephone number 992-919-225788. 
 
Abdulkhak LNU; identified as an organizer of drug shipments from 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 
992-919-64569. 
 
Abdulmatin LNU; identified as a drug distributor based in 
Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-60773. 
 
Kurbon LNU; identified as an organizer of drug shipments from 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 
992-919-60712. 
 
Shavgiz LNU; identified as an organizer of smuggling routes out of 
Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-40088. 
 
Mirzamin LNU; identified as a drug distributor based in Tajikistan. 
Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-40889. 
 
Wahed LNU; identified as an organizer of drug shipments to 
Kazakhstan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-40765. 
 
Hamed LNU; identified as an organizer of drug shipments from 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 
992-919-40765. 
 
Navid LNU; identified as an organizer of drug shipments from 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 
992-919-51123. 
 
Khan Zaman; identified as an organizer of drug shipments to 
Kazakhstan. Utilizes Tajik telephone number 992-919-50101. 
 
Agent's Note: The Moscow CO has submitted the above mentioned Tajik 
telephone numbers to SOD for further analysis via the DARTS system. 
The Moscow CO will verify with the FSKN if this information has 
already been shared with the Tajik Drug Control Agency (DCA). If 
not, the Moscow CO will request the Dushanbe CO to pass this 
information to the Tajik DCA for further investigation. 
 
9.(SBU) The second referral letter from the FSKN alleged that the 
following individuals are also involved in orchestrating the 
production and smuggling of Afghan opiates to Russia via Central 
Asian countries located along the Northern Route: 
 
Madad DJAN; identified as a drug lab owner in Nangarhar Province. 
Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-799002726. 
 
Nur RAHMAN; identified as the owner of multiple drug labs in 
Nangarhar Province. Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-775329432. 
 
MOSCOW 00000353  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
Gol BASHAR; identified as a drug distributor in Kabul.  Utilizes 
Afghan telephone number 93-706099066. 
 
Abdul VALI; identified as the owner of multiple drug labs in Takhar 
Province. Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-79692478. 
 
Haji RAHMAN; identified as a manager of a drug distribution network 
in Helmand Province. Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-796104853. 
 
Haji HAKIM; identified as a transporter of narcotics to Tajikistan. 
Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-795796028. 
 
Abdul DJABBAR; reportedly distributes drugs from Afghanistan to 
Tajikistan. Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-79377492. 
 
Ali KHAIDAR; identified as a heroin distributor in Kabul.  Utilizes 
Afghan telephone number 93-707412360. 
 
"Maftun" LNU; identified as the owner of several drug labs in Kabul. 
Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-798212789. 
 
Haji RAKHIMULLA; identified as the owner of several large drug labs 
in Helmand Province. Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-799379939. 
 
Haji HIKMATULLA; identified as a drug distributor based in Takhar 
Province. Utilizes Afghan telephone number 93-799204751. 
 
Agent's Note: On January 15, 2010, the FSKN provided the above 
mentioned information to the Moscow CO. For further details 
reference is made to REF A. The Moscow CO previously passed the 
above mentioned information to the Kabul CO for further 
investigation and submitted the above Afghan telephone numbers to 
SOD for further analysis. These names and telephone numbers have 
already been indexed. 
 
10.(SBU) General Kirushev and Colonel Babakarkhel discussed the 
possibilities of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police providing the 
identity of the top ten Afghan traffickers who are responsible for 
organizing shipments of Afghan opiates to Russia via the Northern 
Route in order that these individuals/DTOs could be more effectively 
targeted by Russian, Afghan, DEA, and Central Asian counterparts. 
The FSKN also requested the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police to share 
Central Asian telephone numbers, particularly Tajik telephone 
numbers that are identified in on-going investigations. The FSKN 
would then run these Central Asian telephone numbers in their own 
databases in an attempt to identify any contacts/connections to 
Russia. 
 
11.(SBU) The FSKN inquired about the possibility of conducting 
International Controlled Deliveries (ICDs) from Afghanistan to 
Russia. It was learned that Afghan laws would permit ICDs to Russia. 
One possible way to generate direct ICDs to Russia would be focusing 
on the direct flights that operate between Kabul and Moscow. It was 
explained that the Kabul CO is attempting to initiate a new Afghan 
Airport Task Force Group with the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police, 
which could then be utilized in targeting the direct Kabul-Moscow 
flights for opiate shipments bound for Russia. 
 
12.(SBU) In an effort to target Northern Route DTOs, Colonel 
Babakarkhel asked about the possibilities of the FSKN posting 
additional FSKN liaison officers in the northern provinces of 
Afghanistan. General Kirushev stated that he would pass this request 
to FSKN Director Viktor Ivanov. 
 
13.(SBU) General Kirushev and Colonel Babakarkhel both agreed that 
case coordination meetings between Russia, Afghanistan, DEA, and 
Central Asian countries should be held more frequently and that the 
first meeting should occur after the IDEC Conference, scheduled for 
late April 2010 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. General Kirushev offered 
 
MOSCOW 00000353  004 OF 005 
 
 
to research the date and venue for this first meeting. 
 
14.(SBU) Acting GS Dillinger briefed the FSKN on DEA's and the 
Afghan Counter Narcotics Police's operations and capabilities. It 
was explained that the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police consists of 
the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU) and the National Interdiction 
Unit (NIU). 
 
15.(SBU) The SIU consists of approximately 50 Afghan officers, which 
should be increased to approximately 100 Afghan officers by the end 
of 2010. Approximately 15 DEA agents support the SIU. The NIU 
consists of approximately 250 Afghan officers, which should be 
increased to 500 Afghan officers by the end of 2010. 
 
16.(SBU) It was further explained that the DEA has approximately 5 
agents posted in the Northern Afghan provinces, 6 agents posted in 
the Southern Afghan Provinces, 7 agents posted in the Eastern Afghan 
provinces, and 7 agents posted in the Western Afghan provinces. 
 
17.(SBU) Acting GS Dillinger also provided a briefing on the Afghan 
Finance Threat Center (AFTC), the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support 
Teams (FAST), the Afghan telephonic intercept program, and the Major 
Crime Task Force. 
 
18. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR THE KABUL CO: 
 
Please request the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police to conduct 
background/criminal checks on the individuals that are identified in 
paragraph #8 in an attempt to verify if th
ese individuals are 
involved in narcotics trafficking. Additionally, please run the 
Tajik telephones that are identified in paragraph #8 to determine if 
these telephone numbers are associated with any prior or current 
narcotics investigations conducted by the Kabul CO and Afghan 
counterparts. 
 
Please request the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police to identify the 
top 10 Afghan traffickers who are responsible for organizing 
shipments of Afghan opiates to Russia via the Northern Route so that 
these individuals/DTOs can be more effectively targeted by Russian, 
Afghan, DEA, and Central Asian counterparts. 
 
Please request the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police to share Central 
Asian telephone numbers that are identified in on-going 
investigations so that these telephone numbers can be checked in 
FSKN's databases in an attempt to identify any contacts to Russia. 
 
19.(SBU) This cable was prepared by CA Michael Nowacoski in lieu of 
a DEA-6 per DEA Agent's Manual Section 6242.11. Please direct any 
questions or comments to CA Michael Nowacoski at 7-495-728-5218 or 
by Firebird e-mail. Please note that Moscow CO is 8 hours ahead of 
Eastern Standard Time. 
 
INDEXING 
 
1. Najib LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Numbers: 992-919-966622 and 992-919-940008. 
Remarks: Identified as an organizer of drug smuggling routes out of 
Tajikistan. 
 
2. Taj Mohammad - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-966833; Remarks: Identified as a drug 
recipient based in Tajikistan. 
 
3. Nematullah LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-235219; Remarks: Identified as a drug 
recipient based in Tajikistan. 
 
4. WOZUZ, Abdul - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Numbers: 992-919-326298; Remarks: Identified as an 
organizer of drug shipments from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
 
MOSCOW 00000353  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
5. Jamal LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Numbers: 992-919-335674; Remarks: Identified as an 
organizer of drug smuggling routes out of Tajikistan. 
 
6. Aminullah LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-225788; Remarks: Identified as a drug 
distributor based in Tajikistan. 
 
7. Abdulkhak LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-64569; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of drug shipments from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
 
8. Abdulmatin LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-60773. Remarks: Identified as a drug 
distributor based in Tajikistan. 
 
9. Kurbon LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-60712; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of drug shipments from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
 
10. Shavgiz LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-40088; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of smuggling routes out of Tajikistan. 
 
11. Mirzamin LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-40889; Remarks: Identified as a drug 
distributor based in Tajikistan. 
 
12. Wahed LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-40765; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of drug shipments to Kazakhstan. 
 
13. Hamed LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-40765; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of drug shipments from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
 
14. Navid LNU - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-51123; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of drug shipments from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
 
15. Zaman, Khan - NADDIS Negative. Further identified as a male; 
Telephone Number: 992-919-50101; Remarks: Identified as an organizer 
of drug shipments to Kazakhstan. 
 
BERYLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW352, Identification of Vladimir KRASAVCHIKOV’s Current

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW352 2010-02-18 12:34 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0352 0491234
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181234Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0008
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3710
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2770

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000352 
 
DEA SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
POST FOR DEA ONLY 
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL FOR DEA RAC BRIGGS, SA VARNI 
AMEMBASSY QUITO FOR DEA CA GOLDBERG, SA WOLFF, IRS JOHNAKIN 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FOR DEA RD DESTITO 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD FOR DEA ARD DUDLEY 
DEA HQS FOR OGE/MENDOSA, SCHRETTNER, BARNES 
DEA HQS FOR OGL/KOLEN 
DEA HQS FOR OSE/YASEVICH, SANCHEZ 
DEA HQS FOR NCI/KOLEN 
DEA HGS FOR NCIL/TRAVERS 
DEA HQS FOR NCTE/UPP 
DEA HQS FOR NCTS/KROKE 
DEA HQS FOR NCIE/LEHRER 
DEA HQS FOR SARI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: DEAX
 
SUBJECT: Identification of Vladimir KRASAVCHIKOV's Current 
Ecuadorian Telephone Number; XI-07-0003/YEC1J, KRASAVCHIKOV, 
Vladimir (Priority Target) 
 
CCX: GFXI-10-8002/Operation Baltic Strike 
 ZP-09-0004/YEC1K, MITREVICS, Vladimir 
 
REF A: DEA Moscow CO TWX #00331 dated February 16, 2010 
 
This cable contains an action request for the Quito CO and the 
Guayaquil RO 
 
1.(SBU) In Ref A, on February 11, 2010, the Moscow CO took park in a 
case coordination meeting with Russian law enforcement counterparts 
on the Vladimir KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. During this meeting, it was 
learned that Russian counterparts are expecting to arrest the 
following members of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO: Valentin VOYNOVSKIY, 
Arthur ZAKARYAN, Gadzimurad NURMAFOMEDOV, Rishat STRELTSOV, and 
Andrey SHINDER. 
 
2.(SBU) The arrests will occur after the M/V Pietari Cloud arrives 
in the Russian seaport of St. Petersburg. It is believed that 
SHINDER, a steward on board the M/V Pietari Cloud, is transporting a 
cocaine shipment on behalf of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. The M/V Pietari 
Cloud is expected to arrive in St. Petersburg during the week of 
February 21, 2010. 
 
3.(SBU) Russian counterparts are also preparing to submit the 
necessary documents in order to obtain an Interpol Red Notice for 
KRASAVCHIKOV's arrest. KRASAVCHIKOV's current whereabouts are 
unknown but it is believed that KRASAVCHIKOV is currently residing 
in Ecuador and may even be residing with Lidia ESPINOZA-Quinteros. 
 
4.(SBU) The Moscow CO will assist Russian counterparts in 
coordinating KRASAVCHIKOV's arrest. As soon as KRASAVCHIKOV's exact 
whereabouts become known, the Moscow CO will contact the respective 
DEA country office/resident office to determine what is needed by 
the respective foreign counterparts to arrest KRASAVCHIKOV. 
 
5.(SBU) On February 18, 2010, the Russian Federal Customs Service 
(FTS) advised the Moscow CO that KRASAVCHIKOV is currently utilizing 
the following Ecuadorian cellular telephone number: 593-81132751. 
 
6.(SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR THE QUITO CO AND THE GUAYAQUIL RO 
 
Please request Ecuadorian counterparts to obtain subscriber and toll 
information on 593-81132751. Additionally please inquire if 
Ecuadorian counterparts have the technical capabilities to track 
KRASAVCHIKOV's cellular telephone via cell towers in order to locate 
his whereabouts. 
 
7.(SBU) This cable was prepared by CA Michael Nowacoski and LES 
Senior Investigator Vyacheslav Kurek in lieu of a DEA-6 per DEA 
Agent's Manual Section 6242.11.  Please direct any questions or 
comments to SA Patrick Apel or CA Michael Nowacoski 7-495-728-5218 
or by Firebird e-mail.  Please note that the Moscow Country Office 
is eight (8) hours ahead of US Eastern Standard Time. 
 
INDEXING 
 
1. KRASAVCHIKOV, Vladimir - NADDIS #6305832. Telephone Number: 
593-81132751. Remarks: Currently utilizing Ecuadorian cellular 
telephone number 593-81132751. 
 
BERYLE

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10MOSCOW335, RUSSIA HEALTH REGULATOR DISMISSED AFTER PUBLIC COMMENTS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW335 2010-02-16 19:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4932
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHMO #0335/01 0471924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161924Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6250
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNEEC/EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000335 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/PGI, OES/PCI, OES/IHB 
HHS FOR OGHA 
HHS PLEASE PASS TO NIH AND FDA 
USDOC 4231 
PTO FOR MLAMM 
WHITE HOUSE FOR USTR - HAFNER, CFIELD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TBIO PREL SOCI ETRD KIPR RS
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIA HEALTH REGULATOR DISMISSED AFTER PUBLIC COMMENTS ON 
DRAFT PHARMA LAW 
 
REF: MOSCOW 189 
 
MOSCOW 00000335  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 6, Prime Minister Putin dismissed 
Nikolai Yurgel, head of Russian pharmaceutical watchdog 
Roszdravnadzor, two days after Yurgel publicly criticized the 
government's draft "Law on the Circulation of Medicines," echoing 
numerous objections of the pharmaceutical industry and other 
stakeholders.  The USG has expressed concerns about the draft 
relating to intellectual property rights and drug testing 
requirements.  Yurgel also had a parochial reason to object to the 
bill: if passed, it would move drug and testing from Roszdravnadzor 
into a new agency.  Despite Yurgel's firing, the intellectual 
property rights issue may still be addressed through an amendment 
which has been drafted, but not submitted to the Duma.  But Yurgel 
has had difficult relations with Health and Social Development 
Minister Golikova for some time, and his criticism of the law may 
have been simply a convenient excuse for his dismissal.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
HEALTH REGULATOR SPEAKS OUT, LOSES JOB 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) On February 6, Prime Minister Putin dismissed Nikolai Yurgel, 
head of the Russian Federal Service for Surveillance in the Sphere 
of Health and Social Development (Roszdravnadzor), the agency 
responsible for supervision and regulation of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Yurgel has headed the agency since March 2007.  His 
dismissal came two days after he publicly criticized the 
government's draft "Law on the Circulation of Medicines," now in the 
Duma.  He commented on the draft law in an interview printed in the 
newspaper "Vzglyad," saying that the draft needed serious work.  He 
also agreed with the concerns raised by the private sector and other 
groups and warned that the law would open the doors to corruption. 
 
3. (U) The official justification for his sacking was "violation of 
the law on state service."  Article 17 of that law prohibits 
government officials from publicly commenting on the activities and 
decisions of state bodies and leaders.  Yurgel is the first federal 
official fired for violating this law.  In announcing the dismissal, 
the government press service explained that Yurgel "publicly 
expressed his disagreement with the position of the Ministry of 
Health and Social Development (MOHSD), allowing statements similar 
to positions of a number of experts who either didn't read the 
details of the text and didn't understand its novelty, or are openly 
lobbying somebody's interests." 
 
---------------------------------------- 
OBJECTIONS TO THE DRAFT LAW ON MEDICINES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The draft law was developed by the Ministry of Health and 
Social Development (MOHSD) with no involvement by Roszdravnadzor or 
outside trade and health experts.  It was submitted to the State 
Duma for consideration at the end of 2009.  The draft was approved 
by the State Duma in its first reading on January 29.  (NOTE: Before 
the bill can become law, it must pass two more readings in the Duma, 
and then be approved by a vote of the upper chamber of parliament 
and signed by the President.  END NOTE.) 
 
5. (SBU) The text has come under fire from the pharmaceutical 
industry, health experts, patients' rights groups, and the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service.  In December, Ambassador Beyrle explained U.S. 
concerns with the law to MOHSD Deputy Minister Veronika Skvortsova 
(reftel).  Specifically, the draft law does not provide six years of 
data exclusivity protection as agreed to in the 2006 IPR side 
letter, part of the U.S.-Russia bilateral agreement for Russia's 
accession to the World Trade Organization.  The bill also requires, 
if only by implication, that any new drugs undergo clinical testing 
in Russia in order to be registered in the country.  (NOTE: The 
draft requires that trial results presented at registration come 
from facilities and medical institutions accredited by the Russian 
 
MOSCOW 00000335  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
government; the government cannot accredit medical institutions 
outside of Russia.  END NOTE.) 
 
6. (U) Diverse stakeholders met with the ruling United Russia 
faction in the Duma on February 4 to discuss concerns about the 
draft law.  Their wide-r
anging complaints included the fear that the 
law would give excessive powers to MOHSD, and that a massive 
proposed hike in drug registration fees would raise drug prices for 
consumers and government health services and threaten producers of 
low-cost drugs and some innovative drugs.  According to health 
experts quoted in the media, the requirement for all drugs to be 
tested in Russian facilities would risk depriving Russian patients 
of critical medications that have already been successfully tested 
in other countries.  In a press quote, Timofey Nizhegorodtsev, a 
department director in the Federal Antimonopoly Service, called the 
law "weak" and expressed astonishment at the idea of requiring 
clinical trials in Russia for drugs already approved abroad. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
ROSZDRAVNADZOR VS. THE HEALTH MINISTRY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) Yurgel also had his own parochial reasons to object to the 
law, which reflect a rivalry between Roszdravnadzor and MOHSD, its 
parent ministry.  Although Roszdravnadzor is the lead agency on drug 
registration and quality control, it is almost not mentioned in the 
text of the draft law.  The law would create a new agency 
responsible for testing of new drugs, a function that now belongs to 
Roszdravnadzor. 
 
8. (U) Roszdravnadzor was established in 2004 as part of a 
government restructuring that separated public health policymaking, 
supervision, and implementing functions into three separate 
entities.  Roszdravnadzor, a supervision agency, received control 
over registration and quality control of drugs and medical devices, 
licensing of health care facilities, authorization of clinical 
trials, and other functions.  Aleksey Makarkin, Vice-President of a 
Russian think-tank, the Center for Political Technologies, was 
quoted in the newspaper "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" saying that Minister 
of Health and Social Development Tatyana Golikova has worked to 
gradually bring some supervision and implementing functions back 
under the Ministry's direct control.  Two implementing agencies 
created in the 2004 restructuring have already been eliminated, 
returning most of their functions to MOHSD. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: CONSEQUENCES OF YURGEL'S FIRING 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Despite Yurgel's dismissal, we understand from discussions 
with the Ministry of Economic Development that that ministry is 
working on amendments, either to the current Law on Medicines, or to 
MOHSD's new draft, to address the intellectual property provisions 
for compliance with the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs) Agreement.  But these amendments have not yet been 
submitted to the Duma.  In terms of our work with Roszdravnadzor, 
our senior contacts at the agency have indicated to us that Yurgel's 
departure will not affect those activities -- specifically, a 
proposed project with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration aimed at 
implementing Good Clinical Practice in Russia.  And judging from 
press comments on the difficult relationship between Yurgel and the 
Health Ministry, Yurgel's comments on the draft law may have been 
only a convenient excuse for his dismissal. 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW331, JOINT DEA AND RUSSIAN INTER-AGENCY OPERATION BALTIC STRIKE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW331 2010-02-16 09:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0331/01 0470912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160912Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0004
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 2416
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3704
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2764
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1701

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000331 
 
DEA SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
POST FOR DEA ONLY 
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL FOR RAC BRIGGS, SA VARNI 
AMEMBASSY QUITO FOR ARD GOLDBERG, SA WOLFF 
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA FOR GS RODRIGUEZ, SA SULLIVAN 
AMEMBASSY LIMA FOR SA HACKETT 
AMEMBASSY WARSAW FOR CA BRADLEY, SA PALM 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FOR DEA RD DESTITO, FIM LOGUE 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD FOR DEA ARD DUDLEY 
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN FOR CA MORAN, SA KOHUT 
DEA HQS FOR OGE/MENDOSA, SCHRETTNER, BARNES 
DEA HQS FOR OGL/KOLEN 
DEA HQS FOR NCI/BORDER 
DEA HQS FOR NCIL/TRAVERS 
DEA HQS FOR OSE/DISANTO, YASEVICH, SANCHEZ, ERDAHL 
DEA HQS FOR SARI 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: DEAX
 
SUBJECT:  JOINT DEA AND RUSSIAN INTER-AGENCY OPERATION BALTIC STRIKE 
COORDINATION MEETING ON FEBRUARY 11, 2010 OF MOSCOW CO PRIORITY 
TARGET CASE XI-07-0003, YECIJ, KRASAVCHIKOV, VLADIMIR 
 
CCX: GFXI-10-8002 OPERATION BALTIC STRIKE 
 ZP-09-0004/YEC1K, MITREVICS, Vladimir 
 
REF: (A)  DEA Moscow CO TWX #131 DATED JANUARY 19, 2010. 
 (B)  DEA-6 WRITTEN BY SA VARNI (GUYAQUIL RO) DATED    JANUARY 20, 
2010. 
 (C)  DEA-6 WRITTEN BY SA VARNI (GUYAQUIL RO), DATED    JANUARY 25, 
2010. 
 
THIS CABLE CONTAINS AN ACTION REQUEST FOR THE QUITO COUNTRY OFFICE, 
THE BOGOTA COUNTRY OFFICE, THE LIMA COUNTRY OFFICE, THE WARSAW 
COUNTRY OFFICE, AND THE GUAYAQUIL RESIDENT OFFICE. 
 
1.(SBU) On February 11, 2010, the Moscow CO took part in a case 
coordination meeting among multiple Russian law enforcement 
entities. Participants included; Sergey Muraviev, Cocaine Unit 
Chief, Federal Security Service, ("FSB"), Dmitry Abakumov, Cocaine 
Unit Chief, Ministry of Interior ("MVD"), Nikolay Kukharenko, 
Cocaine Unit Chief, Russian Federal Drug Control Agency ("FSKN"), 
Andrey Metsger, Division Head, MVD Investigative Committee, Denis 
Popov, Investigator, MVD Investigative Committee and Vitaly Fedotov, 
International Cooperation Department, FSB. 
 
2.(SBU) Background of Operation Baltic Strike: 
 
Since 2005, the Moscow Country Office has been conducting Operation 
Baltic Strike which targets the maritime movements of cocaine from 
South America to Russia.  This is a very successful joint operation 
that has resulted in the seizure of approximately 676 kilograms of 
cocaine, 26 arrests, and approximately $200,000 USD.  In 2009, the 
FSKN joined the operation.  As a result of Operation Baltic Strike, 
the Moscow CO and Russian counterparts identified the Vladimir 
KRASAVCHIKOV DTO as one of the most significant cocaine DTOs 
operating in Russia. 
 
3.(SBU) As reported in Reference (A), on January 14, 2010, the 
Moscow CO learned that Andrey SHINDER was expected to pick up a 
shipment of cocaine while in Guayaquil, Ecuador.    SHINDER is a 
steward onboard the shipping vessel M/V Pietari Cloud and has been 
identified as a member of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. 
 
4.(SBU)  As reported in Reference (B), on January 20, 2010, the M/V 
PIETARI CLOUD arrived in the Puerto Maritimo, Guayaquil, Ecuador. 
 
5. (SBU) As reported in Reference (C), on January 22, Guayaquil RO 
reported, SHINDER departed the ship and passed through port security 
in Guyaquil, Ecuador, with a group of crewmembers.  At the time, 
SHINDER was wearing a black polo type collard shirt, blue jeans, 
with dark collar length hair.  Later in the day, SHINDER returned to 
the port, and was observed passing through port security, carrying a 
black, weighted bag on his shoulder. 
 
Agents Note: Surveillance video was obtained by the Guyaquil RO as 
SHINDER passed through the ports entry/exit point.  A copy of this 
video was passed to the Moscow CO and was subsequently shared with 
Russian law enforcement. 
 
6.(SBU) On January 23, 2010, Guyaquil RO reported, Customs/Port K-9 
unit conducted a routine search of the ship, with negative results. 
The Port Unit did not know about the on-going investigation, as the 
Guyaquil RO and vetted Unit Commander deemed it necessary to 
 
MOSCOW 00000331  002 OF 004 
 
 
maintain the integrity of this investigation.  The customs search 
did not uncover SHINDER's bag as they searched crewmembers cabins, 
nor was the bag located anywhere else on the vessel. 
 
7.(SBU) On January 23, 2010, the M/V Pietari Cloud departed Guyaquil 
with its' final destination believed to be St. Petersburg, Russia. 
 
8.(SBU) On Monday, February 8, 2010, the Moscow CO was informed by 
the Russian Security Service (FSB) that the M/V Pietari Cloud, prior 
to arriving in St. Petersburg, Russia,  would travel to Gdansk, 
Poland on February 19, 2010. 
 
Agent's Note: It is believed that Gdansk, Poland may be a refueling 
point for the M/V Pietari Cloud. 
 
9.(SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR THE WARSAW CO: 
 
The Moscow CO requests the assistance of the Warsaw CO and Polish 
counterparts to assist in the surveillance of the PIETARI CLOUD 
while docked in Gdansk, Poland and conduct surveillance in the 
scenario if SHINDER attempts to off load the cocaine shipment in 
Gdansk.  The Moscow CO believes surveillance of the M/V PIETARI 
CLOUD, will aid in the subsequent Russian prosecution of members of 
the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. 
 
10.(SBU) Russian Customs (FTS) and the interagency working group 
including FSB, MVD and FSKN will prepare to conduct a thorough 
inspection of the commercial shipping
 vessel, M/V PIETARI CLOUD, 
upon its return to St. Petersburg, Russia. 
 
11.(SBU) In addition, the Joint DEA Russian Interagency Task Force 
will prepare for the arrest of the following individuals identified 
as members of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO and linked to this 
investigation: 
 
Valentin VOYNOVSKIY - NADDIS # 6640630 
 
Arthur ZAKARYAN - NADDIS # 6625894 
 
Gadzimurad NURMAGOMEDOV - NADDIS # 6634964 
 
Rishat STRELTSOV - NADDIS Negative 
 
Andrey SHINDER - NADDIS # 6364544 
 
12.(SBU) Following the arrest of the above mentioned individuals, a 
warrant and subsequent Interpol Red Notice will be prepared by 
Russian authorities, in anticipation of the arrest of Moscow CO 
Priority Target Vladimir KRASAVCHIKOV - NADDIS # 6305832. 
 
Agents Note:  Russian Law Enforcement believes KRASAVCHIKOV 
continues to reside in Ecuador.  Further, it is believed that 
KRASAVCHIKOV may be residing with Lidia ESPINOZA-Quniteros in Quito, 
Ecuador.  ESPINOZA-Quinteros is identified as a source of supply and 
broker for the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. 
 
13.(SBU)  On January 26, 2010, the Moscow CO received immigration 
records from the Guyaquil RO regarding country entry/exit records 
for KRASAVCHIKOV and his aliases.  According to immigration records, 
KRASAVCHIKOV was not in Ecuador at the time, but has had both air 
and land entries into Ecuador utilizing Bulgarian Passport # 
354800732 under the name, Krasimir Kirilov YOLOV and Russian 
Passport # 51N1910241 under the name Vladimir KRASAVCHIKOV. 
 
14.(SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR THE GUYAQUIL RO AND QUITO CO: 
 
MOSCOW 00000331  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
The Moscow CO is requesting the assistance of the Guyaquil RO and 
the Ecuadorian National Police, along with the Quito CO in an effort 
to locate and conduct surveillance of Vladimir KRASAVCHIKOV in 
anticipation of Russian authorities submitting an Interpol Red 
Notice for his arrest.  The Moscow CO has provided photographs of 
KRASAVCHIKOV along with information regarding KRASAVCHIKOV's aliases 
to the Guyaquil RO and Quito CO under separate communiqu. 
 
15.(SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR THE BOGOTA CO AND THE LIMA CO: 
 
The Moscow CO is requesting the assistance of the Bogot CO and the 
Lima CO to conduct border searches for KRASAVCHIKOV.  The 
KRASAVCHIKOV DTO has criminal contacts in Peru and Colombia and it 
may be possible that KRASAVCHIKOV may be residing in Peru or 
Colombia.  KRASAVCHIKOV and his aliases are listed below: 
 
Vladimir Vasilievich KRASAVCHIKOV, Date of Birth: 05/17/1949, 
Alternate Dates of Birth: 07/5/1951, 7/12/1956; Russian Passport # 
51N1910241. 
 
 
Krasimir Kirilov YOLOV, Date of Birth: 07/12/1956; Bulgarian 
Passport # 354800732. 
 
Vladimir Krasovskiy, Date of Birth: 05/17/1949, Alternate Dates of 
Birth: 07/5/1951, 7/12/1956 
 
Vladimir Krasavchiko, Date of Birth: 05/17/1949, Alternate Dates of 
Birth: 07/5/1951, 7/12/1956 
 
16.(SBU) The Moscow CO was advised that if the DTO suspects law 
enforcement operations are imminent, members of the DTO may flee to 
Poland.  The Moscow CO will coordinate with the Warsaw CO if such a 
scenario arises.  Further, one member of the DTO, Valentin 
VOYNOVSKIY was reported to have ties to corrupt officers within the 
FSKN in St. Petersburg, Russia. 
 
17.(U) This cable was prepared by SA Patrick Apel and FSN 
Investigator Slava Kurek in lieu of a DEA-6 per DEA Agent's Manual 
Section 6242.11.  Please direct any questions or comments to SA 
Patrick Apel or CA Michael Nowacoski at 7-495-728-5218 or by 
Firebird e-mail.  Please note that Moscow is 8 hours ahead of 
Eastern Standard Time. 
 
INDEXING 
 
1. KRASAVCHIKOV, Vladimir - NADDIS # 6305832 
 File Title of Investigation. 
 
2. VOYNOVSKIY, Valentin - NADDIS #6640630 
 DOB: 07/12/1956.  Ukrainian National 
 a.k.a. Valentine VOJNOWSKI. 
 Cell head of KRASAVCHIKOV DTO organizes distribution  of cocaine 
obtained from Ecuador to Russia.  Believed  to have ties to corrupt 
Russian Federal Drug Service  officers in St. Petersburg, Russia. 
 
3. Arthur ZAKARYAN - NADDIS # 6625894 
 Part of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. 
 
4. NURMAGOMEDOV, Gadzimurad - NADDIS # 6634964 
 Part of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. 
 
5. STRELTSOV, Rishat - NADDIS NEGATIVE 
 DOB: 09/23/1963 
 
MOSCOW 00000331  004 OF 004 
 
 
 Identified as part of the KRASAVCHIKOV DTO. 
 
6. SHINDER, Andrey - NADDIS # 6364544 
 Currently a steward about the M/V PIETARI CLOUD.   Expected to 
arrive in St. Petersburg, Russia in late  February 2010 with 
shipment of cocaine. 
 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW315, RUSSIAN PUBLIC REACTIONS TO UKRAINE ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW315 2010-02-12 13:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2543
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHMO #0315/01 0431352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121352Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6212
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000315 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RS
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PUBLIC REACTIONS TO UKRAINE ELECTIONS 
 
MOSCOW 00000315  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Russian press and analysts in public 
statements overwhelmingly welcomed Viktor Yanukovych's victory in 
the February 7 presidential run-off elections in Ukraine, although 
they do not expect Yanukovych to be a pro-Russian push-over.  Some 
see his victory as the end of Orange revolution ideas, while others 
enviously point to Ukraine's freedom of choice as a fruit of the 
revolution.  Almost all expect Yanukovych to continue Ukraine's 
course towards western integration (apart from NATO).  In the eyes 
of some, Yulia Tymoshenko's political career has passed its prime. 
End Summary. 
 
--------------- 
Congratulations 
--------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Despite the close result of the February 7 Ukrainian 
presidential run-off elections and allegations from second-placed 
Yulia Tymoshenko about fraud, Russia has recognized the results of 
elections.  On February 9, President Medvedev congratulated Viktor 
Yanukovych on what the Kremlin cautiously phrased as the "completion 
of the election campaign" and Yanukovych's success in the 
presidential elections.  The MFA issued a statement hoping that the 
new administration of "friendly Ukraine" will develop 
good-neighborly relations with Russia.  Patriarch Kirill, leader of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, congratulated Yanukovych on his victory 
and praised Yanukovych for having the talent and experience to 
justify the trust placed in him.  Although State Duma Speaker Boris 
Gryzlov suggested that Yanukovych should only be congratulated after 
his inauguration, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, was among the first to congratulate Yanukovych. 
He also sent a consolation letter to Tymoshenko. 
 
3.  (SBU) Russian political analysts such as Duma Deputy Konstantin 
Zatulin agreed with Presidential adviser Viktor Chernomyrdin that 
mass protests against the results of election were unlikely.  Former 
State Duma deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov stated publicly that if Russia, 
the U.S., and the EU all recognized Yanukovych's victory, there 
would be no chance for street protests. 
 
----------------- 
Orange Revolution 
----------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Pundits are divided over whether Yanukovych's victory 
spells the defeat of the Orange Revolution.  Ryzhkov thought the 
elections confirmed the principles of the Orange Revolution because 
it showed Ukraine possessed freedom of speech and competitive 
elections.  Matvey Ganapolskiy on the independent radio station Ekho 
Moskviy praised Ukrainians for being free to choose anyone they 
liked to be Ukrainian president. 
 
5.  (SBU) Zatulin said Yanukovych's victory showed the "orange color 
has lost appeal much faster than the red", and accused the Orange 
Revolution parties of splitting the country.  Pro-government daily 
Izvestia noted that the revolutionary fervor of five years ago was 
gone. 
 
--------------------- 
Yanukovych's policies 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Although the chairman of the Russian State Duma 
International Affairs Committee, Konstantin Kosachev, praised 
Yanukovych on Russian Defense Ministry-controlled Zvezda TV for 
"aspiring to become a national leader," analysts are not all 
starry-eyed about Yanukovych.  Former Head of Russian Presidential 
Administration Internal Policy Directorate Modesty Kolerov called 
Yanukovych a weak politician who will not be able to maintain his 
achievements, due to his need to balance between Western and Eastern 
Ukraine, Russia and the West, nationalists and Russian-speakers, and 
various business groups. 
 
7.  (SBU) Almost all experts and politicians expect Yanukovych to 
continue Ukraine's course towards western integration, albeit 
without anti-Russian rhetoric.  Chief editor of the academic journal 
"Russia in Global Politics", Fedor Lukyanov, believes that 
Yanukovych will continue former president Kuchma's policy -- "very 
careful movement toward the West, but with curtsies in the direction 
of Russia" -- in part to secure budgetary assistance from both 
sides.  General Director of the Center for Political Technologies 
Igor Bunin predicts renewed bargaining with Russia over gas prices, 
but agreed with Sergei Strokan's Kommersant op-ed that Yanukovych's 
"gas blackmail" will be less dramatic than Belarus'.  Deputy General 
Director of the Center for Political Technologies Boris Makarenko 
suggested that Russia could strengthen its relations with Ukraine by 
deepening its own cooperation with the EU. 
 
8.  (SBU) In contrast, Leonid Slutsky, First Deputy Chairman of the 
Committee on International Affairs of the Duma, went as far as to 
 
MOSCOW 00000315  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
suggest that Yanukovych might seek the "integration" of the Ukraine 
with Russia. 
 
---------- 
Tymoshenko 
---------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Kosachev said that Tymoshenko's unwillingness to concede 
was a test of her commitment to democracy.  He accused he
r, like 
President Yushchenko, of acting in the interest of her party and not 
Ukraine's national interest.  Many Russian experts agree that 
Tymoshenko used her administrative resources in Western Ukraine to 
inflate her vote.  Duma Deputy Sergey Markov, who was a member of 
the State Duma delegation of election observers, suggested 2.5 
percent of ballots in Tymoshenko's favor were fraudulent.  Igor 
Bunin believed her campaign was too aggressive, and focused on ideas 
only popular in Western Ukraine.  Examples are the glorification of 
Stepan Bandera and other nationalist movements.  Although Lukyanov 
said Tymoshenko has passed the peak of her political career due to 
excessive political maneuvering, she remains a force to be reckoned 
with.  Boris Nemtsov of the Solidarity opposition movement suggested 
Yanukovych would face a powerful opposition in the person of 
Tymoshenko, saying Tymoshenko is more at home in opposition than in 
the Cabinet of Ministers. 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW297, USAID MOSCOW DISCUSSES USG CONTRACTING WITH

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW297.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW297 2010-02-10 13:20 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0016
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0297 0411320
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD20C13D AMG1856-695)
P 101320Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6190
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0715

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000297 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
EMBASSY KABUL FOR USAID KABUL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS AF
SUBJECT: USAID MOSCOW DISCUSSES USG CONTRACTING WITH 
RUSSIAN OFFICIALS AND INDUSTRY 
 
REF: HOOD-SAVAGE FEB 9 EMAIL 
 
This information is Sensitive But Unclassified.  Do not 
release to Public Internet. 
 
1. (SBU) February 3 USAID Moscow briefed GOR officials and 
Russian business representatives on the USG contracting 
process.  They also discussed tenders in Afghanistan.  The 
presentation responded to requests from Russian officials who 
frequently cite the experience then-Soviet workers gained in 
Afghanistan as a potential contribution Russia could make to 
the current effort to rebuild Afghanistan.  Attendees 
included representatives from the Russian Afghanistan 
Business Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Afghanistan Desk and Russia Cooperation Agency), Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), 
as well as USAID-funded non-governmental organizations 
(Center for Fiscal Policy, Institute for Urban Economics and 
Russian Microfinance Center).  Private companies such as 
SojzVneshTrans, TechnoPromExport, ZarubezhTransStroi, and 
Zarubezhstroi also attended. 
 
2. (SBU) USAID's Acting Mission Director briefed the group on 
the history and structure of USAID and USG foreign assistance 
programs.  USAID Moscow's Contracting Officer next spoke in 
detail about USAID's project design and contracting 
procedures.  Participants were given a list of anticipated 
USAID competitive contracting opportunities in Afghanistan 
for FY2010, and names and contact information for USAID's 
implementing partners in Afghanistan.  The presenters also 
described Embassy Kabul's and U.S. Forces Afghanistan's 
"Afghan First" policy, which encourages local procurement of 
Afghan goods and services to benefit and improve the 
well-being of the Afghan people. 
 
3. (SBU) Several representatives from Russian firms expressed 
concern that they were disadvantaged bidding against 
companies that already had a presence in Afghanistan.  They 
asked if the USG could facilitate their access to contacts 
and information, including potential travel to Afghanistan, 
to help them write bids that are more competitive.  The 
Contracting Officer indicated that this assistance was not 
possible but did point out the potential benefits of 
sub-contracting with companies who were currently working in 
Afghanistan.  She also remarked that forming consortium 
companies was not prohibited.  She noted that substantial 
information was available online and that contact information 
for each opportunity was provided on the FY 2010 contracting 
forecast.  The Contracting Officer also advised against 
submitting unsolicited proposals, as it is difficult to meet 
the standard for uniqueness and innovation necessary to make 
such a proposal feasible under U.S. law. 
 
4. (SBU) In response to a question on the ability of 
government owned companies to bid on tenders, the Contracting 
Officer referenced USG law which states that firms cannot be 
wholly or partially government owned in order to participate 
in a bid.  The representative from the Russian Afghanistan 
Business Council noted that this stipulation would make it 
difficult for many Russian companies to compete because the 
GOR retained a small percent ownership in many companies when 
state companies were privatized in the 1990s.  The 
Contracting Officer noted that this question could be 
referred to USAID lawyers for a formal opinion.  The 
Contracting Officer also reminded the group that in addition 
to USG contracts, the Afghan government itself and 
inter-governmental organizations such as the World Bank also 
finance work in Afghanistan and operate under different 
requirements. 
 
5. (SBU) The representative from the Russian Afghanistan 
Business Council presented a list of projects for which 
Russian firms had specialized expertise because of their work 
at these sites in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (reftel).  On 
the issue of the Salang Tunnel, participants said that the 
Afghan government had indicated that further work on the 
tunnel was needed.  Additionally, Russian firms said they 
already had plans and the capability to do the work.  The 
only issue remaining is funding. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW293, DEA CHIEF OF OPERATIONS THOMAS HARRIGAN’S MEETING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW293 2010-02-10 08:15 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0251
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0293/01 0410815
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100815Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3697
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2757
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0708
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0108
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2764
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0413

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 MOSCOW 000293 
 
 
DEA SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
POST FOR DEA ONLY 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FOR DEA RD DESTITO, FIM LOGUE 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD FOR DEA ARD DUDLEY 
AMEMBASSY KABUL FOR DEA RD MARSAC, FIM HENDERSON 
AMEMBSSY DUSHANBE FOR DEA CA CALDWELL 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT FOR DEA CA MELINK 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK FOR AMB GFOELLER-GOLKOFF 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA FOR AMB HOAGLAND 
DEA HQS FOR OGE/MENDOSA, SCHRETTNER 
DEA HQS FOR OCX/MASUMOTO 
DEA HQS FOR OIX/DENEHY 
DEA HQS FOR NCT/CASTO 
DEA HQS FOR NCTE/UPP 
DEA HQS FOR NCIE/LEHRER 
DEA HQS FOR SARI 
 
E.O.  12958:  N/A 
TAGS: DEAX
 
SUBJECT: DEA CHIEF OF OPERATIONS THOMAS HARRIGAN'S MEETING WITH 
RUSSIAN FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL SERVICE DEPUTY DIRECTOR NIKOLAY AULOV; 
GFXI-10-4001/FSKN 
 
1.(SBU) Summary: On February 5, 2010, DEA Chief of Operations (OC) 
Thomas Harrigan and DEA Regional Director (RD) Mark Destito met with 
Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) Deputy Director Nikolay 
Aulov in Moscow, Russia. OC Harrigan and Deputy Director Aulov 
discussed the following topics: utilizing DEA's resources in 
Afghanistan to target Afghan based DTOs that are sending Afghan 
opiates to Russia; suggestion that the United States apply to become 
a "full fledged" country member of the Central Asian Regional 
Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) and the FSKN's support 
in this bid; increasing cooperation and conducting more joint 
investigations between the DEA and FSKN on Northern Route DTOs who 
are trafficking in Afghan opiates, South American based DTOs that 
are sending cocaine shipments to Russia, and DTOs that are involved 
in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals; the 
exchange of drug samples for further analysis; conducting financial 
investigations to identify the money movements; the emerging threat 
of Iran becoming a conduit of Afghan opiates and hashish shipments 
sent to Russia; and DEA and FSKN being seen as united in the eyes of 
third countries, specifically Central Asian law enforcement 
counterparts. It was agreed that implementation of all of these 
areas of cooperation will be a benefit to both the United States and 
the Russian Federation. End Summary. 
 
2.(SBU) On February 4, 2010, OC Harrigan and RD Destito participated 
in the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, Drug Trafficking 
Working Group headed by ONDCP Director Gil Kerlikowske and FSKN 
Director Viktor Ivanov. 
 
3.(SBU) Subsequent to the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential 
Commission, Drug Trafficking Working Group meeting, on February 5, 
2010, OC Harrigan met with FSKN Deputy Director Aulov to discuss 
DEA-FSKN bilateral cooperation and drug enforcement issues. Also in 
attendance from FSKN were Alexander Kirushev, First Deputy Head of 
Operations, Vasily Rogozin, Head of Enforcement Division, Oleg 
Koryagin, Head of Financial Investigations, Inga Mayke, Deputy Head 
of Enforcement, Ilya Malakhov, Deputy Head of Financial 
Investigations, Alexander Kurkov, Chief Inspector of International 
Cooperation Department. In attendance from DEA were RD Destito and 
CA Michael Nowacoski. US Embassy Moscow/Law Enforcement Section - 
Resident Legal Advisor Richard Daddario also attended this meeting. 
 
 
4.(SBU) Deputy Director Aulov began by discussing the Afghan opiate 
problem that the Russian Federation is facing. According to Deputy 
Director Aulov, from FSKN's and the Russian Government's point of 
view the trafficking of Afghan opiates and their abuse is considered 
a "weapon of mass destruction" for the Russian Federation, which is 
inflicting great harm to the country and its citizens. 
 
5.(SBU) Deputy Director Aulov explained every day there are 
approximately 80 to 150 drug related deaths of Russian citizens, 
which can be attributed to the abuse of Afghan opiates. The FSKN is 
not satisfied that last year the production of opium decreased to 
approximately 6,900 metric tons. The FSKN believes that much more 
can be done to decrease the opium production in Afghanistan. 
According to FSKN intel, there are enough opiates in storage in 
Afghanistan that can supply the demand for the next five years. 
 
6.(SBU) The FSKN stated that Central Asian law enforcement 
counterparts are not fulfilling their duties in combating the 
trafficking of Afghan opiates. The FSKN provided statistics for last 
year, which revealed the following: the Tajik Drug Control Agency 
seized approximately 1.5 metric tons less than they did in 2008, 
Kyrgyz law enforcement counterparts seized 10 times less drugs 
shipments than last year, and the situation is no different for 
 
MOSCOW 00000293  002 OF 007 
 
 
Kazakh and Uzbek law enforcement counterparts. The FSKN is 
disappointed with the work ethic and results of all the law 
enforcement agencies in the Central Asian countries. 
 
7.(SBU) Deputy Director Aulov requested DEA's assistance in 
combating the trafficking of Afghan opiates in Russia and throughout 
the region. Deputy Director Aulov echoed US Ambassador John Beyrle's 
statement during the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, 
Drug Trafficking Working Group meeting that the cold war does not 
exist and that today calls for "a new time and new relations" 
between our two countries. 
 
8.(SBU) Deputy Director Aulov explained that the FSKN is 
accomplishing a lot in combating the Afghan opiate problem but has 
realized that it is impossible to tackle this problem alone and 
without cooperat
ion from other countries, including the United 
States. Deputy Director Aulov stated that "Russia can't do the job 
by ourselves." 
 
9.(SBU) Deputy Director Aulov's personal opinion is that DEA is 
highly respected and influential throughout the world wide law 
enforcement community. This opinion is also shared throughout the 
FSKN. The FSKN hopes that DEA can use its influence in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia to curb the Afghan drug problem. 
 
10.(SBU) Deputy Director Aulov identified the following areas of 
cooperation that the FSKN is interested in conducting with the DEA: 
 
Utilizing DEA's resources and capabilities in Afghanistan to target 
Afghan based DTOs. FSKN would like a concentrated effort on 
conducting joint investigations with the DEA on Northern Route DTOs 
and targeting the Afghan based sources of supply. Deputy Director 
Aulov identified the Moscow CO-FSKN joint investigation of the 
Khairetdin RAKHIMOV DTO, which is sending hundred kilogram shipments 
of heroin and opium to Russia for distribution (DEA Case: 
XI-10-0003/UEH2F, RAKHIMOV, Khairetdin - pending PTARRS approval) as 
an example of the type of joint investigation that could be 
conducted more frequently between the two agencies. Deputy Director 
Aulov proposed conducting numerous other joint investigations with 
the DEA, which are similar in the size and scope of the RAKHIMOV 
DTO. 
 
Agent's Note: In January 2010, the FSKN proposed conducting a joint 
investigation on the RAKHIMOV DTO with the Moscow CO. The main 
target, RAKHIMOV, is residing in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 
is coordinating the drug trafficking activities from within the UAE. 
The Dubai CO is attempting to obtain assistance from their Emirate 
counterparts in targeting RAKHIMOV. Based upon toll analysis, 
RAKHIMOV is in contact with a criminal associate based in Germany 
who is receiving heroin shipments from RAKHIMOV for distribution 
throughout Europe. The Moscow CO has requested assistance from the 
Frankfurt CO and their German counterparts to target the German 
based associate. Toll analysis conducted on the German telephone 
number revealed that this number is also in contact with a Phoenix, 
Arizona based DTO member. The Phoenix FD investigation indicates 
that a Phoenix based member is sending cocaine shipments to 
RAKHIMOV's German based associate for distribution throughout 
Europe. Further toll analysis revealed that RAKHIMOV is in contact 
with a Tajik telephone number. This Tajik telephone number is 
connected to a key Afghan telephone number, which has been 
identified in SOD Operation Tajik Express. The RAKHIMOV DTO was 
presented as an IDEC Collective Target during the mini IDEC Central 
and South Asia Working Group Conference, which was held on February 
9, 2010, in Bucharest, Romania. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000293  003 OF 007 
 
 
The FSKN suggested as a method to target Afghan based sources and 
Russian based recipients that the DEA and FSKN attempt to conduct 
International Controlled Deliveries (ICDs) to Russia. 
 
In an attempt to effectively target Afghan based sources of supply 
and Northern Route DTOs, the FSKN proposed that the United States 
become a "full fledged" country member of the CARICC. Deputy 
Director Aulov proposed that the FSKN would not only support the 
United States' bid to become an "observer" country member with 
CARICC but would support the United States' bid to become a "full 
fledged" country member of CARICC. 
 
FSKN also places an emphasis on targeting DTOs that are sending 
cocaine shipments to the Russian Federation. Deputy Director Aulov 
stated that during last year, the FSKN seized five times the amount 
of cocaine than the previous year. The FSKN believes that cocaine 
trafficking will continue to increase in the future due to the 
lucrative Russian market. The average price for a kilogram of 
cocaine in Russia is approximately $60,000 to $100,000 USD per 
kilogram. Deputy Director Aulov thanked the Moscow CO for assistance 
provided in the Evgeniy SHEFATOV cocaine DTO (DEA Case: 
XI-09-0008/WEC1F, SHEFATOV, Evgeniy). Deputy Director Aulov stated 
that without the Moscow CO's assistance, the FSKN would not been 
able to disrupt and dismantle this DTO that was receiving cocaine 
shipments from the Dominican Republic for distribution within 
Russia. The FSKN requested to continue investigating the SHEFATOV 
DTO include the Dominican sources of supply and other Russian 
couriers who have not been arrested. 
 
Agent's Note: On February 3, 2010, FSKN Director Ivanov was on 
Russian TV and in the Russian press discussing the DEA-FSKN 
relationship and thanked the DEA's assistance in the above mentioned 
SHEFATOV investigation, which led to its successful outcome. 
 
The FSKN requested to utilize DEA's resources and capabilities in 
South America and the Caribbean to target DTOs that are sending 
cocaine shipments to Russia. Director Aulov proposed conducting new 
joint cocaine investigations with the DEA to include a DTO that is 
sending cocaine shipments from Brazil to Russia. 
 
Another area of joint cooperation that the FSKN would like to 
develop with the DEA is on targeting DTOs that are engage in the 
trafficking of synthetic drugs and precursor 
chemicals. The FSKN requested the DEA to provide information on the 
seizures of acetic anhydride (AA) shipments in Afghanistan and the 
subsequent results of the chemical analysis that may allow the 
identification of the source countries. 
 
Due to recent changes in Russian legislation, the FSKN is now 
allowed to exchange drug samples with foreign counterparts for 
further analysis. Deputy Director Aulov proposed the exchange of the 
results of the chemical analysis on the seized drugs for further 
comparative studies. Deputy Director Aulov also suggested the 
exchange of DEA and FSKN chemists in an attempt to learn new 
techniques and ideas from each other when analyzing drug samples. 
 
The FSKN is interested in conducting joint financial investigations 
with the DEA. The FSKN is very interested in starting the joint 
mapping exercise with the DEA to identify money movements and to 
share financial intel to target key narcotics traffickers. The US 
Treasury Department and Russian Financial Monitoring Service 
(Rosfinmonitoring Service) are currently finalizing the Terms of 
Reference (TOR) to start sharing financial information between the 
two agencies. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000293  004 OF 007 
 
 
Agent's Note: A new trend that FSKN in seeing is that drug proceeds 
are now being sent directly to Afghanistan instead of being sent to 
third countries (i.e. UAE, Europe, and Central Asia). During the 
US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, Drug Trafficking 
Working Group meeting, Deputy Director Aulov presented a PowerPoint 
presentation on the Ghullam Haidar AFSHAR's hawallah activities. 
Deputy Director Aulov supplied a hard copy of his PowerPoint 
Presentation to OC Harrigan. This hard copy is written in the 
Russian language. The Moscow CO will translate the hard copy into 
the English language. 
 
Another emerging threat that the FSKN has identified is  Afghan 
based DTOs utilizing Iran as a conduit to ship large shipments of 
Afghan opiates and hashish
 to Russia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian 
Sea. According to FSKN intel, more and more DTOs are now using 
Azerbaijan and Caspian seaports to ship large opiate and hashish 
shipments to Russia due to the lack of enforcement and inspections 
in these areas. To combat this problem the FSKN is attempting to 
develop better working relationships with Azeri law enforcement 
counterparts. As of right now, the FSKN has limited engagement with 
Iranian law enforcement counterparts. The FSKN knows that the US 
Government and the DEA does not have any relationship with the 
Iranian Government or Iranian law enforcement counterparts. The FSKN 
proposed on sharing Iranian intel with the DEA and vice versa to 
fill the intelligence gaps that each agency has related to Iran. 
 
The FSKN would like to be seen united with the DEA in the eyes of 
Central Asian law enforcement counterparts. The FSKN believes that 
if Central Asian counterparts see the DEA and FSKN united they will 
not be able to play off both countries as they have in the past. As 
noted above, the FSKN is very dissatisfied with the counter 
narcotics effort of Central Asian counterparts. The FSKN believes if 
these Central Asian counterparts see the DEA and FSKN proactively 
engaging in joint Northern Route investigations and sitting side by 
side with each in the CARICC this would send a loud and clear signal 
that the Afghan drug problem is a major issue for both the United 
States and the Russian Federation and that their lack of effort will 
not be tolerated. 
 
11.(SBU) OC Harrigan responded to Deputy Director Aulov's comments 
that DEA's main focus in this region is Afghanistan and that the DEA 
would assist the FSKN in every possible way to target the Afghan 
based sources of supply. OC Harrigan stated that any intel that is 
developed or obtained that could be shared with the FSKN would be 
shared with them. 
 
12.(SBU) OC Harrigan provided a briefing on DEA's operations and 
assets that are in Afghanistan. OC Harrigan stated that he would 
provide the FSKN with a written summary in the Russian language of 
DEA's current operations and staff levels in Afghanistan via the 
Moscow CO. 
 
13.(SBU) OC Harrigan reported that he may travel to Afghanistan in 
or about March and during this visit would attempt to personally 
meet with FSKN Colonel Alexey Milovanov, who is FSKN's liaison 
officer based in Kabul, Afghanistan. 
 
14.(SBU) OC Harrigan explained that DEA's main mission is to target 
the key individuals who are the "command and control" for the major 
DTOs. DEA utilizes world wide assets in an attempt to disrupt and 
dismantle DTOs by arresting and prosecuting the "high value targets" 
of the DTOs. 
 
15.(SBU) OC Harrigan handed Deputy Director Aulov with a target 
package that contains eight Afghan DTOs that were cleared by the 
 
MOSCOW 00000293  005 OF 007 
 
 
Kabul CO to pass to the FSKN. OC Harrigan requested the FSKN to 
conduct a search in their databases on these DTOs in an attempt to 
determine if the FSKN has any intel on these DTOs. OC Harrigan 
proposed conducting joint investigations with the FSKN on these 
targets. 
 
Agent's Note: The eight Afghan DTOs that were identified were the 
following: Haji Nasir SARAF, Sayed Wazir SHAH, Haji LAWANG, Ghullam 
Haidar AFSHAR, Ismael SAFID, JALALODEN, Commander Sayed Hassanali 
KAZEME, and Mohammad AZGHAR. 
 
16.(SBU) OC Harrigan advised that the DEA conducted an extensive 
search on the booklet that was provided by the FSKN that contained 
the 175 heroin markings and logos but the search was negative. OC 
Harrigan explained that the DEA does not seize significant 
quantities of Southwest Asian heroin in the United States and thus 
does not have a detailed database. OC Harrigan thanked the FSKN in 
providing this booklet and requested the FSKN to continue to provide 
details on heroin seizures to include, dates, locations, amounts, 
markings, and logos so that the database could be enlarged. OC 
Harrigan stated that the Moscow CO would translate the results of 
DEA's search on the heroin markings and logos into the Russian 
language so that it could be passed to the FSKN. 
 
17.(SBU) OC Harrigan briefed the FSKN on DEA's operations in Africa 
including information on Colombian DTOs who are establishing a 
presence in West Africa. These Colombian DTOs are receiving plane 
loads of cocaine shipments from Venezuela and Brazil for further 
distribution to Europe and possibly to Russia. 
 
18.(SBU) OC Harrigan identified that the DEA has offices  in the 
following African countries: Lagos, Nigeria, Cairo, Egypt, Pretoria, 
South Africa, and Accra, Ghana but the DEA is quickly developing a 
close working cooperation with the respective host country 
counterparts. As an example, OC Harrigan described the recent joint 
investigation between the DEA and Ghana counterparts that led to the 
arrest and the extradition of three Al-Qaeda associates who were 
involved in cocaine trafficking to the United States for 
prosecution. 
 
19.(SBU) OC Harrigan also provided a briefing on Hezbollah's 
presence in East Africa and their activities in trafficking in 
precursor chemicals. OC Harrigan related that more DTOs are now 
involved in narco-terrorism activities. 
 
20.(SBU) OC Harrigan agreed with all of Deputy Director Aulov's 
proposals and is very interested in DEA and FSKN fostering closer 
working relationships and conducting numerous other "joint" 
investigations. 
 
21.(SBU) During the meeting, RD Destito provided a briefing on DEA's 
operations and presence in Central Asia. 
 
22.(SBU) RD Destito explained that the Dushanbe CO is working joint 
investigations with the Tajik Drug Control Agency, the Tajik MVD, 
and the Tajik Border Guard Services. RD Destito described the 
working cooperation with Tajik counterparts is difficult due to 
corruption issues. 
 
23.(SBU) RD Destito advised that DEA has recently re-opened the 
Tashkent CO and that the DEA is now allowed to work with the 
previous Uzbek SIU unit. 
 
24.(SBU) RD Destito discussed the status of opening of the Almaty 
CO, which will cover Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and work directly with 
 
MOSCOW 00000293  006 OF 007 
 
 
the CARICC. RD Destito used the SECI Center as an example of how the 
CARRIC could be utilized in counter narcotics investigations. RD 
Destito explained that in the beginning the SECI Center encountered 
difficulties Since then, the SECI has been provided outstanding 
contributions to joint multi lateral investigations. RD Destito 
described the recent seizure of a ton of cocaine made by Romanian 
counterparts, which was then shared with the SECI Center. The SECI 
Center was able to provide timely intel that resulted in the seizure 
of an additional 3.5 metric tons of cocaine in Brazil. RD Destito 
believes that the CARICC will be able to follow in the foot steps of 
the SECI Center in providing quality case support. 
 
25.(SBU) Both OC Harrigan and RD Destito thanked the FSKN for its 
suggestion on supporting the United States on becoming a "full 
fledged" country member of the CARRIC instead of an "observer" 
country member. 
 
26.(SBU) RD Destito explained his disappointment with
 the 
disbandment of the Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency (KDCA) and that this 
will be a set back for the entire region on curbing the flow of 
Afghan opiates. RD Destito stated that the DEA is waiting on the 
final decision from the Kyrgyz Government on the reorganization of 
the Kyrgyz Ministry of the Interior (MVD). RD Destito suggested that 
both the DEA and FSKN should be on "same page" when dealing with the 
Kyrgyz Government. 
 
27.(SBU) RD Destito provided a briefing on DEA's operations in 
Turkmenistan and the previous DEA TDY assignments in that country. 
RD Destito explained that the newly established Turkmen Drug Control 
Agency (DCA) needs international support and proposed that FSKN 
provide assistance in joint NATO-Russian Training for the Turkmen 
DCA. 
 
28. (SBU) Both OC Harrigan and RD Destito proposed that FSKN liaison 
officers who are posted in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan meet with the respective DEA agents who are or who will 
be posted to those countries in an attempt strength the relationship 
between the DEA and FSKN and to show Central Asian counterparts that 
the DEA and FSKN are committed in working together in a common goal 
on disrupting and dismantling Northern Route DTOs. Deputy Director 
Aulov agreed with this proposal but added that the high level of 
corruption that are involved in those countries can not be 
dismissed. 
 
29.(SBU) At the end of the meeting, Deputy Director Aulov allowed 
General Alexander Kirushev and General Vasily Rogozin to provide 
comments. 
 
30.(SBU) General Kirushev stated that the FSKN has agreed to allow 
the Moscow CO to work directly with regional FSKN offices and not 
just FSKN Headquarter sections. The FSKN is in the process of 
analyzing seven additional investigations that could be proposed as 
joint investigations to be conducted with the Moscow CO. 
 
31.(SBU) General Kirushev requested that since Afghan sources of 
supply are not in direct contact with Russian based DTOs, if the DEA 
would be able to provide identified Afghan and other Central Asian 
telephone numbers that could then be used to identify Russian 
telephone numbers. Lastly, General Kirushev explained that since the 
break up of the Soviet Union, there are a lot of Russian nationals 
who are residing world wide who may be involved in shipping drug 
shipments to Russia. General Kirushev requested that the DEA share 
intel developed or obtained on any Russian nationals who are 
involved in shipping drug shipments to Russia. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000293  007 OF 007 
 
 
32.(SBU) General Rogozin stated that the FSKN is closely working 
with the Kyrgyz MVD since the disbandment of the KDCA. General 
Rogozin explained that the Kyrgyz MVD does not have a lot of funds 
and that the FSKN pays for all the costs related to any ICDs that 
the FSKN works with the Kyrgyz MVD. 
 
33.(SBU) This meeting confirmed the trend that the Moscow CO has 
noticed over the last several months with FSKN's cooperation and 
their willingness to conduct joint investigations. Recently the 
Moscow CO and the FSKN has been conducting weekly meetings with each 
other. These meetings resulted in the following: FSKN providing a 
list of 11 Afghan targets that are based in Afghanistan and who are 
involved in heroin trafficking, the proposal of conducting two new 
joint investigations, the sharing of the details of intercepted 
telephone calls in the RAKHIMOV investigation, and their eagerness 
to meet with Moscow CO agents on short notice and at the US Embassy. 
The Moscow CO believes that one of the main items to come out of the 
meeting between OC Harrigan and Deputy Director Aulov is FSKN's 
initiative to support the United States in a bid to join the CARICC 
as a "full fledged" country member. The Moscow CO will continue its 
effort to strengthen the relationship with the FSKN in an attempt to 
make the relationship more open and productive in conducting quality 
joint investigations. 
 
34.(SBU) This cable was prepared by CA Michael Nowacoski in lieu of 
as DEA-6 per DEA Agent's Manual Section 6242.11.  Please direct any 
questions or comments to CA Michael Nowacoski at 7-495-728-5218 or 
by Firebird e-mail. Please not that the Moscow Country Office is 
eight (8) hours ahead of US Eastern Standard Time. 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW273, RUSSIAN SHERPA SEEKS SMOOTH NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW273.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW273 2010-02-05 15:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHMO #0273/01 0361524
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6173
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0555
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0591
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UNCLAS MOSCOW 000273 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/CTR FOR BJENKINS, NSC FOR LHOLGATE AND JCONNERY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARK AORC EAID ENRG IAEA MNUC TBIO UNGA NPT
RS 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SHERPA SEEKS SMOOTH NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 
 
REF: SECSTATE 7493 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY-QIvQQG:kov lamented that involving 
non-NPT signatories India and Pakistan in the Summit will 
lead to an agreed text which is "devoid of important things." 
 Stressing the importance of a smooth summit, he said that 
resulting documents based on the lowest common denominator 
will still be better than nothing.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (SBU) On January 28, ESTH Counselor and Dutch DCM, joined 
by nuclear affairs officers from both embassies, delivered 
jointly reftel invite to the third Sherpa meeting in The 
Hague on February 9-11 to Ambassador Grigoriy Berdennikov, 
Russian Sherpa for the Nuclear Security Summit.  Berdennikov 
confirmed that his team had already registered, including 
Mikhail Lysenko, Director of International Cooperation of 
Rosatom, and Aleksandr Boluchev from the MFA's Department of 
Security and Disarmament.  A fourth person from the Russian 
Embassy at The Hague may also take part.  Berdennikov 
confirmed he was aware of the three person delegation limit, 
adding that the Russian delegation would not make itself 
burdensome. 
 
3. (SBU)  Berdennikov described the Summit communique as 
"more or less there," while the work plan is "more 
problematic."  He noted there was little enthusiasm at the 
December Sherpa meeting in Tokyo for a follow-on meeting 
after the Summit, adding that some do not clearly understand 
the purpose of the Summit.  He said the GOR was fine with no 
further meetings, instead stressing the importance of a 
"smooth" Summit in April. 
 
4. (SBU)  Noting that the GOR was not consulted on the list 
of participants, he said the  composition of the summit would 
make it difficult to accomplish much. Illustrating his point, 
Berdennikov said the GOR welcomed language in previous work 
plan drafts in favor of increasing the membership of the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention.  However, because some of the 
invited participants are not members of the Convention and 
opposed such language, the language is no longer in the 
draft, which Russia regrets.  Berdennikov further lamented 
the lack of a quid pro quo, as the draft work plan does ask 
the G-8 for something, but does not ask the other states to 
reciprocate with action.  He recalled that the G-8 text was 
able to be much more ambitious because it was crafted by 
likeminded nations.  Berdennikov stressed that it is 
difficult involve non-NPT signatories India and Pakistan in a 
non-proliferation forum based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).  He clarified that although the Summit is not billed 
as being NPT-based, for all intents and purposes it is.  He 
added,  that it's important for non-NPT signatories' voices 
to be heard.  But including them in this Summit leads to very 
bland text, "devoid of important things." 
 
5. (SBU)  Given that India and Pakistan will want to "bargain 
until the end," Berdennikov emphasized that the GOR's primary 
goal is for the Nuclear Security Summit to be "as ruly as 
possible."  He said that the resulting documents may be based 
on a lowest common denominator which is very low indeed, but 
the LCD is still desirable as it is better than nothing, and 
far better than a fight.  Briefly animated, he stated that a 
fight in Washington should be avoided at all costs as that 
would be a "major blow" to the non-proliferation cause. 
 
6. (SBU)  Finally, Berdennikov noted that the GOR had wanted 
Armenia and Belarus to be invited to the Summit.  Armenia, he 
explained, is the only country in its region with an ongoing 
nuclear program and a good record on fighting nuclear 
terrorism.  Armenia feels left out as Georgia is in "and it 
has nothing."  Belarus, he continued, has nuclear research 
reactors, has just signed an agreement with DOE for HEU 
removal, and has a good record on anti-terrorism.  Belarus is 
"offended" that Ukraine is in and it is not. 
 
7. (SBU)  Comment:  Despite Berdennikov's complaints, the 
meeting was very cordial in tone.  He appeared personally 
committed to a smooth summit, even if the final results must 
be watered down in order to reach consensus.  End 
Comment. 
 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW261, U.S.-RUSSIA ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP: ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY

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10MOSCOW261 2010-02-04 13:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000261 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, OES/PCI, EUR/PGI 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID/E&E 
INTERIOR FOR KIM MAGRAW 
INTERIOR PLEASE PASS TO NPS, FWS, AND USGS 
FWS FOR STEVE KOHL, JANET HOHN, GEOFF HASKETT 
NPS FOR SUE MASICA AND RUDY D'ALESSANDRO 
NOAA FOR RENEE TATUSKO AND JENNIFER DUPONT 
OSTP FOR JOAN ROLF 
USDA FOR FAS/OCRA NINA HORGAN 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
AIDAC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV PREL ECON TSPL SOCI EFIS KGLB RS
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA ENVIRONMENT WORKING GROUP: ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY 
POSITIVE, BUT SEEKS MORE DETAILS ON U.S. DRAFT AGENDA 
 
REF: A. 09 MOSCOW 3013 (NOTAL) 
 B. 09 MOSCOW 2538 (NOTAL) 
 
MOSCOW 00000261  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On January 27, officials of the Russian Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Ecology (MNRE) gave their initial reaction 
to the U.S.-proposed agenda for the Environment Working Group of the 
Bilateral Presidential Commission.  They suggested that OES DAS 
Daniel Reifsnyder head a USG delegation to Moscow in March for the 
first Working Group meeting.  They warmly accepted a proposal for 
cooperation on management of mercury and other toxic chemicals -- 
and were particularly eager to learn from the U.S. Superfund 
experience -- and they promised a more detailed proposal soon.  They 
cautioned that accelerating cooperation on a Beringia shared 
cross-border protected area should wait until Russia creates a 
federal park in Chukotka, a process that has dragged on longer than 
expected.  They were open to discussing the other proposals on the 
USG list, but asked for further clarification on most of them.  They 
did not embrace the idea of interagency and multidisciplinary 
cooperation on issues like climate change and illegal logging, but 
preferred to focus on the particular aspects of these issues that 
fall under their own ministry's jurisdiction.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Working Group Meeting Time and Participants 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On January 27, Igor Zotov, Deputy International Relations 
Director, and Andrey Peshkov, Head of the Office of Cooperation in 
the area of Nuclear Industry Safety and Waste, of the International 
Department of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MNRE) gave us their initial reaction to the USG's proposed agenda 
for cooperation under the Environment Working Group (EWG) of the 
Bilateral Presidential Commission.  Zotov said that Deputy Minister 
Igor Maydanov has designated him as MNRE's chief point of contact on 
the Environment Working Group.  The Russian side will determine its 
participants once the EWG agenda is agreed.  Responding to Under 
Secretary for Global Affairs Maria Otero's letter to Minister 
Maydanov, they tentatively agreed to a mid-March visit by OES DAS 
Daniel Reifsnyder.  They hoped that Under Secretary Otero could 
visit Moscow in April for an initial meeting of the Working Group 
co-chairs.  They noted that the Russian government schedule in May 
would be too busy for such a meeting. 
 
------------------ 
Arctic Cooperation 
------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Regarding the proposed Beringia cross-border joint 
protected area, Zotov and Peshkov said that Russia is still 
conducting environmental feasibility studies on establishment of a 
federal park on the Russian side of the Bering Strait.  (NOTE: The 
MNRE department responsible for national parks -- not represented at 
this meeting -- had predicted last September that these studies 
would be finished by December 2009 - ref. B.  END NOTE.)  They said 
the Beringia proposal is very attractive and should not be rushed. 
Our interlocutors indicated that we need to wait until these studies 
are finished before agreeing on concrete steps to increase future 
 
MOSCOW 00000261  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
cooperation.  In view of FM Lavrov and Secretary Clinton's interest 
in the topic, they agreed to check on when the feasibility study is 
expected to be completed and will aim to tell us more in the coming 
days.  In response to our question, they agreed to verify that April 
would be a propitious time for an anticipated visit of National Park 
Service officials to discuss the protected area.  (NOTE: We 
described the difference in urgency between the MFA and MNRE on 
January 28 t
o MFA North America Department Bilateral Affairs Office 
Counselor Azar Dzhioyev, who seemed frustrated that MNRE had not 
provided the MFA with any reaction to the U.S. proposal for the EWG. 
 He took on board the suggestion that it would be useful for MFA to 
clarify the timing for Russian government designation.  END NOTE.) 
 
4. (SBU) On the proposal for cooperation on salmon river 
conservation, MNRE proposed redefining this area as "conservation of 
rare and endangered salmonids [as defined under Russian 
endangered-species legislation] and their spawning grounds," as 
these are the only types of salmon and salmon habitat over which 
MNRE has jurisdiction.  Commercial fish and fisheries fall under the 
Federal Fisheries Agency, a separate federal agency.  They requested 
more detail on what specifically the USG has in mind in this area. 
(COMMENT: Limiting this cooperation to only endangered salmonids may 
mostly limit it to joint academic research.  END COMMENT.) 
 
5. (SBU) The Russians are eager to cooperate in the management and 
cleanup of contaminated sites, but they wish to define the issue 
more precisely.  The United States and Russia have cooperated in 
this area under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and the Arctic 
Council's Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP).  MNRE is very 
interested in U.S. Superfund experience and hopes our countries can 
realize projects that we began discussing four years ago.  They 
proposed that this cooperation complement existing cooperation 
within ACAP, where a financing mechanism and history of U.S.-Russian 
cooperation in this area already exist.  Peshkov stressed that 
Russia sees the United States as its strategic partner in these 
areas and would like to greatly increase joint activities and 
rebuild a "unified front" in ACAP vis-a-vis other member states 
that, according to Peshkov, do not share our joint vision.  He 
promised to give us concrete proposals for areas of cooperation and 
potential joint funding for joint projects in the coming days.  In 
an aside, Peshkov asked that the United States support renewing 
Russia's -- and specifically his -- chairmanship of ACAP for the 
next two years, noting that the first ACAP Chair, an EPA 
representative, served two terms. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Chemicals Management and Illegal Logging 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The Russians are eager to cooperate on mercury management 
and promised to give us a more detailed proposal in the coming days, 
including possible joint financing for joint projects.  Peshkov 
stressed that Russia is interested in an equal partnership and 
intends to allocate funds comparable to the U.S. contribution. 
 
7. (SBU) On issues related to the Montreal Protocol and 
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) phaseout, the Russians prefer to define 
this area in terms of "introducing best available ozone-friendly 
technologies" and are interested in further discussion.  They also 
 
MOSCOW 00000261  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
asked if the Working Group would discuss the Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants.  Peshkov requested to add an area for 
discussion: a strategic approach to chemical management that would 
combine commitments under the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the 
Stockholm Convention, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, and the Global Mercury Partnership. 
 
8. (SBU) On issues of illegal logging and forest fires, Zotov and 
Peshkov emphasized that MNRE only has jurisdiction over forests in 
national parks, federal nature preserves, and other federally 
protected lands and the federally designated buffer zones 
surrounding them, which cover a total of around 10 percent of 
Russia's land.  Forested lands that are open to commercial logging 
fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Forestry Agency, part of 
the Ministry of Agriculture.  Zotov and Peshkov insisted that 
cooperation on illegal logging in commercially logged forests must 
take place under the Agriculture Working Group in direct cooperation 
with the Agriculture Ministry.  Nonetheless, they pointed out that 
working to combat illegal logging on federally protected lands and 
buffer zones could be a viable area for cooperation in the EWG, 
since illegal logging is a significant problem there. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Climate Change and Other Cooperation 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Since MNRE's takeover of the state hydrometeorological 
service Roshydromet in the 2008 government shakeup that followed 
President Medvedev's election, MNRE now has jurisdiction over a wide 
spectrum of issues in the area of climate change, including state 
policy on climate change, climate monitoring and research, as well 
as regulating emissions.  However, Peshkov and Zotov said that 
cooperation on alternative energy and energy efficiency must take 
place within the working groups on science and technology or energy. 
 Peshkov did not take on board the suggestion to work jointly with 
these groups. 
 
10. (SBU) In the area of "environmental institutional development," 
the Russians asked that the USG clearly define these terms.  They 
did not understand what was meant by this category and could not 
respond to it.  Peshkov interjected sharply that if this term was 
the U.S. way of criticizing how Russia has organized its 
environmental agencies, that subject is not up for discussion. 
(NOTE: Peshkov himself suggested cooperation in this area in July 
2009 at an environmental roundtable following the presidential 
summit, when he suggested bilateral cooperation on "harmonizing 
environmental legislation and standards."  END NOTE.)  We reassured 
them that we understood this to mean broader issues such as civil 
society engagement in environmental preservation and environmental 
education programs such as GLOBE (Global Learning and Observations 
to Benefit the Environment), but agreed to check. 
 
11. (SBU) On the issue of invasive species, Peshkov and Zotov said 
they were aware of U.S. struggles with invasive Asian carp in the 
Great Lakes; however, they averred that Russia does not have a 
problem with invasive species.  They asked that the U.S. side 
further clarify the topics of wildlife and marine conservation. 
Peshkov suggested that this title be changed to "biodiversity." 
 
MOSCOW 00000261  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
They also asked that "wetlands and watersheds" be further clarified, 
and they asked for further specifics on proposed cooperation in the 
area of transboundary air pollution, though they are in principle 
open to discussion on these topics. 
 
12. (SBU) COMMENT: High-level U.S. contacts with Russian 
environmental policymakers have been rare in recent years as Russia 
has weakened the authority of government agencies that craft 
environmental policy and that enforce enviro
nmental regulations. 
NGOs tell us frankly that there is hardly anyone in the Russian 
government left with whom to work.  MNRE, overwhelmingly focused on 
natural resource extraction, is notorious among Russian government 
agencies for its lack of coordination, with one MFA official calling 
it a "black hole."  For all these reasons, MNRE's cautious response 
was surprisingly positive.  Of our MNRE contacts, Peshkov has shown 
by far the most interest in the Working Group.  Zotov, who is 
unknown in environmental circles, deferred throughout the meeting to 
Peshkov, who came to MNRE from the Federal Service for 
Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor) 
and is an expert in toxic waste and chemicals management.  These 
areas had the most detailed discussion and were the only areas in 
which MNRE showed unreserved enthusiasm and willingness to counter 
with a detailed proposal for cooperation.  MNRE so far has 
consistently refused to consider joint work with other Russian 
agencies.  Although this view is discouraging and inefficient, MNRE 
is unlikely to change it unless other ministries approach it with 
proposals for joint work.  It is not customary for Russian 
ministries to coordinate with each other.  But the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which has the lead on illegal logging, has already 
shown a willingness to do exactly that.  At the USG's urging, that 
ministry will likely allow representatives from the Ministry of 
Health and Social Development to work on food safety, an approved 
topic for the Agriculture Working Group. 
 
BEYRLE

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