Monthly Archives: June 2008

08MOSCOW1837, NON-PAPER ON NASA – CNSA CIVIL SPACE COOPERATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1837 2008-06-27 15:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1837 1791504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271504Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8790
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4398
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 2022
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0715
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0187
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2117
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2098
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1911
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2966
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2739
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2208
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4182
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5148
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0526
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0433

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018 
TAGS: KSCA PARM PREL TPHY TSPA TSPL CH RS
SUBJECT: NON-PAPER ON NASA - CNSA CIVIL SPACE COOPERATION 
MEETING DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 67989 
 
Classified By: EST Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4 (a/d/e/g) 
 
 1.  (C)  On June 27 we delivered reftel non-paper regarding 
the June 30 - July 1 initial meeting on Earth and space 
science between NASA and the China National Space 
Administration (CNSA) to Georgiy Barsegov, Space Affairs 
Officer, Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament, MFA. 
 Barsegov said he was very pleased that we had notified the 
GOR prior to the meeting.  He asked several questions 
regarding the nature of the meeting and to clarify the 
proposed discussions.  Barsegov took particular note of the 
paper on the Chinese ASAT test that the U.S. would provide to 
Chinese counterparts.  Barsegov stated that he hoped the USG 
would continue to keep the GOR informed of the outcomes of 
any future NASA - CNSA meetings. 
 
2.  (C)  Moscow NASA representative also delivered the reftel 
non-paper to Alexander Medvedchikov, Deputy Head of 
Roscosmos.  Medvedchikov noted that China is too big and too 
important to ignore.  He thanked us for the non-paper and 
said that Roscosmos appreciated being informed in advance of 
NASA's discussions with the CNSA. 
RUSSELL

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08MOSCOW1836, SIBERIA SHOWS SUCESS, FAILURE OF APPOINTED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1836 2008-06-27 14:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1836/01 1791434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271434Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8786
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: SIBERIA SHOWS SUCESS, FAILURE OF APPOINTED 
GOVERNORS 
 
Classified By: Acting Political M/C Robert Patterson.  Reason:  1.4 (d) 
. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  The fate of two regions, Irkutsk Oblast 
and Krasnoyarsk Kray, encapsulates the success and failure of 
Putin's system of appointing governors.  In Irkutsk, Putin 
appointee Aleksandr Tishanin failed to consolidate the 
regional elite and resigned in disgrace for "personal 
reasons" in April following an ugly fight with the 
legislature over the regional budget.  Few have much hope for 
his successor -- Igor Esipovskiy -- who is also an "outsider" 
seen as lacking the requisite political heft to challenge the 
regional financial-industrial groups, linked to powerful 
Moscow business interests.  The fecklessness of the Irkutsk 
governors compares unfavorably with the successful 
administration of Aleksandr Khloponin in Krasnoyarsk, whose 
close relations to the Kremlin allowed him to corral the 
local elite and secure funding from the center, leading to 
unprecedented political stability and economic growth. 
Krasnoyarsk has eclipsed Irkutsk as the "capital" of Siberia 
and is poised to consolidate its position as the dominant 
region in that resource rich area.  During our June 23 - 24 
visit, some voiced concern that Krasnoyarsk's political 
stability is built on a less than secure footing, especially 
with the maneuvering around Norilsk Nickel, but none expected 
a return to the "aluminum" wars that had wracked the region 
in the 1990s.  END SUMMARY 
 
Tishanin's Failures 
------------------- 
 
2. (C) While few were surprised that Tishanin had to go, the 
timing of his resignation -- only a few weeks before 
Medvedev's inauguration -- caught some of our regional 
contacts off guard.  Sergey Levchenko, the head of the 
Communist Party faction in the local legislature, voiced a 
common complaint that dismissed Tishanin as a "stranger" 
loyal to Moscow, with little sense of the region's needs. 
Levchenko pointed to the budget crisis, in which both 
Tishanin and the legislature deadlocked, then ultimately 
promulgated their own budgets, as evidence of the former 
governor's inability to come to terms with the regional 
elite.  At its core, the fight was over the allocation of 
funds from the sale of shares in Verkhnechonskneftegaz 
(VChNG).  Tishanin had reserved those monies, totaling around 
$28 million, for a regional development fund.  As such, he 
alone had authority for its disposition and he used the money 
for renovating regional churches, launching sports programs 
and, according to analyst Oksana Goncharenko of the 
Moscow-based Center for Current Political Events, financing 
United Russia's election campaign.  The regional legislative 
assembly in its turn refused to pass a budget that did not 
include those funds.  Tishanin issued his own budget, but was 
embarrassed when the local prosecutor ruled that his 
activities were illegal:  according to the constitution he 
could only reject or accept the legislature's budget. 
 
3. (C) Oleg Voronin of Irkutsk State University, an observer 
on regional politics for the Moscow Carnegie Center, 
described Tishanin's problems as an integral part of a 
broader competition for assets and influence among the 
regional elite, backed by Moscow-based financial-industrial 
groups.  Tishanin, whose wife is the sister of Russian 
Railways head Vladimir Yakunin, was seen as representing the 
interests of his brother-in-law (who is reported to have 
influenced Putin to appoint Tishanin), as well as those of 
Rosneft and Gazprom. He reversed his predecessor's decision 
on the disposition of VChNG to oil company TNK and awarded 
part of it to Rosneft.  His decision put him at odds with 
legislative assembly chairman Viktor Kruglov, who Voronin 
described as linked to TNK's Viktor Vekselberg. Kruglov was 
unable to stop Tishanin from transferring control over VChNG 
to the state corporation, but he used the budget issue to 
undermine his opponent. 
 
4. (C) Voronin noted that Tishanin himself had been his own 
worst enemy, at least in his management of relations with the 
Kremlin. Voronin said that the governor did not show up for a 
regional economic exhibition in Vienna, leaving the Russian 
Ambassador to Austria holding the bag.  More serious, he 
failed to appear for a five-minute meeting with Putin at the 
St. Petersburg economic forum.  Ultimately, Putin and even 
Yakunin had come to the conclusion that Tishanin's 
appointment had been a mistake.  Tishanin was "encouraged" to 
step down, ostensibly for personal reasons, and has not yet 
been assigned a new position. 
 
Esipovskiy - The New Varangian 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Putin appointed Igor Esipovskiy as "acting governor" 
 
on April 15, once again picking an outsider with close ties 
to one of Moscow's financial-industrial groups. Esipovskiy 
had served as the president and general director of the 
Avtovaz company in Samara Oblast -- a major asset controlled 
by Putin pal Sergey Chemezov's Rosoboroneksport.  According 
to Aleksey Petrov of the regional Open Russia office, 
Esipovskiy first focused on removing Tishanin's cronies from &#x0
00A;positions of power, and replacing many of them with members 
of Tishanin's predecessor's team.  Indeed, Esipovskiy took a 
special trip to Mongolia where former governor Golovin serves 
as Russia's ambassador:  a move seen as an effort to align 
himself with the old guard.  He also sought to patch up 
relations with the legislative assembly by signing the budget. 
 
6. (C) Thus far, Esipovskiy remains an enigma for the Irkutsk 
elite.  Levchenko complained that the "acting" governor has 
not yet met with his faction, while Dmitriy Lyustritskiy, 
deputy editor of the regional newspaper Vostochno-Sibirskaya 
Pravda, commented that he has held no press conference with 
the regional media.  Lyustritskiy commented that a lack of 
information has fostered a host of rumors, including 
questions about Esipovskiy's future as the "real" governor. 
(Esipovskiy cannot be officially nominated as governor until 
after elections to the regional legislature this October. 
Owing to the change in the Irkutsk Oblast configuration from 
the assimilation of the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug, the 
legislature has lost its mandate as fully-functioning body.) 
Some suggest that the Kremlin will appoint somebody else to 
the position after the October elections.  In part, 
Esipovskiy's refusal to give up his position as a Duma deputy 
-- he was elected as a United Russia deputy in December 2007 
-- has been interpreted as evidence that even Esipovskiy 
himself has doubts about his chances.  One name that came up 
often as a potential rival was Sergey Sokol, who Esipovskiy 
recruited from Krasnoyarsk to serve as First Deputy Governor. 
 Sokol has a reputation as a capable administrator and is 
reputed to have close ties to Krasnoyarsk governor Khloponin. 
 
7. (C) The Chair of United Russia's regional executive 
committee Natalya Dengina dismissed rumors about Esipovskiy 
and offered her assurances that he would become the next 
governor.  Indeed, United Russia picked the "acting" governor 
to head the party's list for the December elections and his 
picture enjoys a place of prominence on Dengina's office 
wall, along with Medvedev and Putin.  Voronin also scotched 
rumors of an alternate candidate for governor, if only 
because the Kremlin does not want to look foolish in 
appointing Esipovskiy as "acting" governor. 
 
Krasnoyarsk - Comparatively, An Island of Stability 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8. (C) At first glance, Krasnoyarsk Kray appears to be a 
larger version of Irkutsk Oblast with a similar abundance of 
resources and the involvement of major financial-industrial 
groups.  Indeed, when asked about current political 
stability, all of our contacts reminded us that during the 
1990s Krasnoyarsk was riven by inter-elite fighting for 
resources during the bloody "aluminum wars."  However, under 
the leadership of Aleksandr Khloponin, the regional elite has 
put that behind them. 
 
9. (C) Even those who had lost the most, such as Speaker of 
the regional legislature and leader of the United Russia 
faction Aleksandr Uss, had positive words for Khloponin and 
emphasized the benefits of his administration.  Uss, a former 
professor of law and, in his own words, an accidental 
politician, was once seen as potential contender for 
governor's when there were direct elections. Now, he sings 
the praises of Khloponin's successes in, for example, 
garnering federal funding for a new heart center and a 
pre-natal care hospital; gaining Moscow's approval for the 
establishment of the new Federal Siberian University; and 
having the vision for the region, as evidenced by his 
ambitious plan for a 2020 international exhibition in the 
region.  Uss described his vision of the political 
environment as a "family" -- in which United Russia 
represented the elite, but maintained comradely relations 
with other parties. (He noted that he had initially hesitated 
to join the party, but took the plunge three years ago and 
was happy with his decision.) 
 
9. (C) Contacts outside the government concurred with those 
assessments of political stability.  Television host and 
journalism teacher Sergey Kim dismissed out of hand any 
"tremors" in the political system and underscored the 
population's general satisfaction with Khloponin's efforts. 
Sociologist Irina Muratov, whose firm "East Siberia" does 
both political and marketing polls, said that her research 
showed broad support for the governor and underscored that he 
was now considered "ours," rather than an outsider.  (Like 
 
Tishanin and Esipovskiy, Khloponin was appointed from outside 
the Krasnoyarsk political system.)  Viktor Isaev, of the 
Independent Information Agency, noted that Khloponin had come 
into office with a plan, set clear goals -- such as the 
unification of the region with the Envenk and Tamyr 
Autonomous Regions.  Five years later, those goals had been 
met and Khloponin continued to push new objectives for 
economic and political development. 
 
10. (C) Political stability has fostered economic growth, 
leading to a growing confidence that Krasnoyarsk Kray is 
destined to secure its position as the Siberian capital. 
Isaev praised Khloponin for reading the signals from Moscow 
concerning the creation of "macro-regions," seeing 
Krasnoyarsk -- the only "donor region" (meaning that it 
provides more resources to the Federal budget than it 
receives) in the neighborhood -- as the natural leader.  Uss 
smugly implied that the decision to build the Federal 
Siberian University in Krasnoyarsk, rather than the 
traditional academic centers of Tomsk or Novosibirsk, 
signaled a recognition from Moscow of Krasnoyarsk's rising 
star.  As such, the region would be better positioned to 
attract the best and brightest of Siberia's youth at the 
expense of the other regions. 
 
Problems?  What Problems? 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) Most of our contacts thought that rising prices, 
media freedom, and migration, most of our contacts thought 
that rising prices, lack of media freedom and migration would 
have little influence on the regional political and economic 
trajectory.  Muratov said that the urban population sees 
little to get worked up about over the inflation issue, which 
she says does not even register at the top of peoples 
grievances when polled.  Instead, they tend to be concerned 
about "everyday" issues, like trash pickup or cleaning the 
city. Uss explained away the inflation problem as far less 
critical for Krasnoyarsk, than for neighboring regions.  He 
argued that the higher wages paid in Krasnoyarsk mitigated 
public concern, although he admitted that housing prices 
continued to bedevil the administration's plans to control 
prices.  He noted that the region planned to sell its 40 
percent stake in the gasoline distribution company 
Krasnoyarsknefteprodukt to Rosneft in exchange for 
"preferences" for regional fuel needs, thereby 
creating some insurance against rising oil prices. 
 &#
x000A;12. (C) Uss similarly dismissed worries about the labor 
supply, explaining his vision of a more modern agricultural 
system providing a pool of labor for the ambitious industrial 
projects -- a "third wave" of industrialization for the 
region.  Noting concern that Krasnoyarsk provided a final 
"bulwark" against Chinese encroachment, Uss saw a risk in 
bringing in more migrants from China.  To strengthen the 
qualifications of "Russian" workers, he identified the main 
challenge as providing training for former rural workers to 
prepare them for work in the cities.  He proudly reported 
that the region had passed a milestone in 2007, in which 
population gains (births and immigration) were greater than 
losses. 
 
13. (C) Only Mark Denisov, the regional Ombudsman for Human 
Rights, raised the specter that even Khloponin's political 
future was rested on a soft foundation.  Denisov noted that 
the current maneuvering over control of Norilsk Nickel could 
change the balance of power within the region, particularly 
if Aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska ends up controlling the 
mining giant.  Further the state oil and gas companies, 
Rosneft and Gazprom, are only marginal players at this time 
but Denisov (and others) expect them to become much more 
influential over the next 3-4 years.  As such, the political 
landscape is expected to change and could challenge 
Khloponin's ability to act as arbiter. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) The issue of appointing, rather than electing, 
governors has become an issue of controversy in Moscow, 
following the call by Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiev 
to return to elections for picking regional leaders.  The 
experiences of Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk illustrate the varying 
results of Putin's regional policy. For Krasnoyarsk, the 
appointment of a strong, well-connected leader with the 
ability to bring home the Federal bacon for his region has 
created conditions for economic growth and political 
stability that his democratically elected predecessors failed 
to achieve.  Indeed, it seems that only an outsider without a 
"dog in the fight" among the groups could have assumed the 
role of impartial arbiter among the competing elites.  The 
 
Irkutsk experience shows the risks involved when the 
selection process is influenced by the players themselves and 
suggests that there may be problems finding strong candidates 
from the Kremlin's rather limited bench. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1835, DEMARCHE ON NTI PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1835 2008-06-27 14:04 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1835 1791404
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271404Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8785
INFO RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0525
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON NTI PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
DELIVERED 
 
REF: STATE 68313 
 
1.  On June 27, we delivered reftel demarche requesting GOR 
support for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) nuclear fuel 
bank proposal to Aleksandr Trofimov, Nuclear Affairs Officer 
in Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament, MFA. 
Trofimov asked if this was an effort to coordinate joint USG 
and GOR solicitations.  We clarified that it was simply a 
request for GOR support in soliciting contributions from 
potential donors consistent with our joint commitments to 
create reliable access to nuclear fuel.  Trofimov told us he 
would consult in the Ministry and get back to us with a 
response. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1832, FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM TO SOCHI COMMITMENTS: GOOD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1832 2008-06-27 11:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4871
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #1832 1791106
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271106Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8782
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV PHUM RS
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM TO SOCHI COMMITMENTS: GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
REF: STATE 67965 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell.  Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
(C) On July 26, Charge delivered to acting Deputy Foreign 
Minister Neverov (DFM Kislyak is in Japan) the US proposal 
for a follow up discussion on respect for the rule of law, 
international law, human rights, tolerance of diversity, 
political freedom and a free market approach to economic 
policy and practices as stated in the Strategic Framework 
Declaration announced during the presidential summit in 
Sochi.  Charge drew upon the points in reftel to explain this 
initiative in detail.  Neverov said that the US proposal 
would receive careful consideration by the Russian side and 
an answer would be forthcoming on scope, participants, agenda 
and timing.  While a formal Russian response would take some 
time, Neverov made several preliminary observations.  The 
Russian Government is quite satisfied with the results of the 
nongovernmental democracy and human rights dialogue between 
Russian Federation Ombudsman Lukin and the Carnegie 
endowment's Jessica Matthews.  Lukin and Matthews have 
convened the forum and made recommendations; Lukin has access 
to both the presidential administration and the President 
personally.  Neverov therefore expected Russian interlocutors 
to question the "value added" of a government-to-government 
track on largely the same issues.  He also questioned the 
inclusion of "a free market approach to economic policy and 
practices"; this would duplicate the work of another Sochi 
initiative, the government-to-government economic dialogue 
chaired by Under Secretary Jeffery and DFM Denisov.  On 
timing, Neverov doubted that a late July timeframe would be 
doable, given the G-8 Summit and the MFA,s heavy schedule of 
other international commitments. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1828, LINKS TO MOSCOW BOOST NIZHNIY NOVGOROD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1828 2008-06-26 23:14 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1828/01 1782314
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 262314Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8778
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM PINR RS
SUBJECT: LINKS TO MOSCOW BOOST NIZHNIY NOVGOROD 
 
REF: 06 MOSCOW 13071 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Bob Patterson.  Reasons:  1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Conversations with members of the regional 
government, journalists, NGO representatives, party members, 
and academics during a June 23 - 24 visit to Nizhniy Novgorod 
suggested that the city's economic fortunes were generally 
improving under Governor Valeriy Shantsev.  Most observers 
acknowledged that Shantsev, a former Moscow Deputy Mayor, had 
succeeded in luring Moscow-based businessmen to Nizhniy 
Novgorod since his appointment in August 2005. The arrival of 
Muscovites had given the local economy a shot in the arm, but 
created resentment among those Nizhniy Novgorod businessmen 
who had been forced to relax their stranglehold on the city's 
economy.  High-profile incidents, such as a crackdown on 
Other Russia-related elements in the last year, have gone 
hand-in-hand with a growing willingness, on the part of some 
in power, to work with some of their harshest critics.  Local 
Yabloko representatives, freshly returned from the June 21 - 
22 Congress in Moscow region, ironically likened party 
Chairman Yavlinskiy's decision to cede office to "clone," 
Sergey Mitrokhin, to Putin's decision to step aside in favor 
of Medvedev. Some interlocutors worried that the increasingly 
close economic links between Moscow and Nizhniy Novgorod, and 
the ever-larger number of Nizhgorodians working in Moscow, 
would inevitably turn their city into a satellite of the 
national capital.  Promises by Shantsev to reduce the travel 
time between the cities from its current four to three hours 
and, eventually, to one and one-half, seemed to give 
substance to their fears.  End summary. 
 
Governor Brings Moscow 
Ways to Nizhniy Novgorod 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Conversations during a June 23 - 24 visit to Nizhniy 
Novgorod suggested that Governor Valeriy Shantsev had used 
connections to Moscow, cultivated during his years as Deputy 
Mayor there, to lobby effectively for investment in Nizhniy 
Novgorod.  Regional Union of Journalists Deputy Chairwoman 
Irina Panchenko joined political scientist Andrey Makarychev 
and others in confirming that Shantsev's years in power had 
seen a construction boom in the city, and walks around the 
fringes of the city center revealed much new high-rise 
housing and many new malls.  The Moscow "invasion" had 
occurred at the expense of local businessmen who were, 
according to Makarychev, resentful of the big city 
interlopers. One by-product of the building boom, according 
to Stanislav Dmitrievskiy of the Tolerance Support 
Foundation, had been the disappearance of a significant 
number of "protected" buildings.  Others also worried that 
the character of the city was threatened by the unbridled 
development. 
 
3. (C) Shantsev's big city ways had reportedly pushed Mayor 
Vadim Bulavinov into the shadows.  Bulavinov, who was elected 
Mayor in September 2002 after a stint in the State Duma, then 
re-elected in October 2005 had, before Shantsev's appearance, 
succeeded in protecting the interests of home-grown 
businessmen.  Bulavinov's near total eclipse had only 
strengthened the impression that Nizhniy Novgorod was the 
object of a hostile takeover engineered in Moscow. 
Panchenko, while acknowledging that Shantsev had brought a 
number of Muscovites into his regional government and 
minimized the role of the Federal Assembly in regional 
politics, contended that the Governor was interested above 
all in recruiting capable people, regardless of provenance. 
She noted that Deputy Governor for Social-Economic Planning, 
Budgetary Relations and Investment Policy Vladimir Ivanov 
hailed from the regional city of Bor, which had been praised 
frequently for its excellent investment climate.  The Deputy 
Governor for Social Policy Gennadiy Suvorov, similarly, had 
been plucked from his job as Vice President of the Gorkiy 
Automobile Factory (GAZ).  Even local Yabloko Chairman 
Vyacheslav Tarakanov, after a glum recounting of the previous 
weekend's party congress, admitted that "Shantsov pries money 
(out of Moscow), and the city is improving." Tarakanov 
described Bulavinov as a "non-entity;" completely outclassed 
by Shantsev. 
 
SPS, Yabloko Sidelined 
---------------------- 
 
4. (C) Shantsev's prominence and the city's improving 
economic fortunes had the city's other politic parties on the 
ropes. Tarakanov and others noted that the city had been an 
SPS stronghold, thanks to the relatively successful tenure of 
Governor Boris Nemtsov, who had opened the formerly closed 
city of Gorkiy to the outside world and had introduced 
innovations, such as open competition for government jobs. 
The most recent SPS Chairman, the charismatic Aleksey 
Likhachyov, had been inveigled into United Russia.  Former 
Nemtsov confederate Aleksandr Kotyusov had been rumored to be 
toying with the idea of becoming Chairman of the SPS regional 
organization, but his business interests: he is the owner of 
the company "Pir" which runs two restaurant chains in Nizhniy 
Novgorod, had made him too vulnerable.  According to 
Makarychev, Kotyusov had in th
e end decided to stay out of 
politics. 
 
5. (C) Tarakanov thought that Yabloko was poorly positioned 
to replace SPS. With little access to the regional media, all 
of the regional membership in United Russia, and Yabloko's 
internal struggle on-going, he saw little future for his 
party.  Tarakanov laid part of the blame at the feet of 
Yavlinskiy who, he noted bitterly, had not visited Nizhniy 
Novgorod once in the last eight years.  Many of the regional 
Yabloko leaders had extracted a promise from Mitrokhin at the 
June 21 - 22 congress that he would do more grassroots work 
in the regions beginning in the fall.  "The problem," 
confessed Tarakanov, "is that Mitrokhin might be more active, 
but he lacks charisma, while Yavlinskiy is charismatic, but 
he has no energy." 
 
Incremental Improvement in 
Government Behavior 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Against the background of the region's largely inert 
political parties, two local NGOs appeared to be having some 
success in their efforts to reform the behavior of the 
Russian government.  The "Committee Against Torture," in 
addition to two high-profile victories in the European Court 
of Human Rights had, according to Chairman Igor Kalyapan, 
also won an impressive 60 percent of the cases it had brought 
against Russian law enforcement in the local courts.  More 
importantly, there were signs that frequent reversals in the 
courts were forcing law enforcement to examine its behavior. 
Among the positive developments cited by Kalyapan was the 
assignment to Nizhniy Novgorod of a "very accomplished" 
regional court chairman, Boris Konevskiy.  Under Konevskiy's 
leadership, each of his judges had been supplied with a 
handbook that summarized the international conventions to 
which Russia was a signatory. Each judge had also been given 
a primer on the European Court of Human Rights.  Kalyapan 
noted with pride Konevskiy's habit of returning, unopened, 
letters from regional Ombudsman Vasiliy Olnev that included 
well-meaning commentary on cases within his court's 
jurisdiction. Olnev had complained in the press that 
Konevskiy had refused to read Olnev's letters because he saw 
them, rightly in the view of Kalyapan, as an attempt to 
influence the outcome of cases. 
 
7. (C) Kalyapan also argued that "in the last few years the 
local legal culture had improved."  Decisions, he said, now 
occasionally included reference to international conventions 
and opinions.  Judges were gradually becoming more 
sophisticated.  "How can we complain of the absence of an 
impartial judiciary if we win sixty percent of our cases?" 
Kalyapan asked.  He noted as well that his assistant, Olga 
Sadovskaya had been invited to teach classes on international 
law to employees of the Prosecutor's Office.   Sadovskaya 
herself predicted to us that the sheer number of cases now in 
the pipeline at the European Court of Human Rights would in a 
few years produce an avalanche of negative judgments that 
would force the GOR to re-examine its practices, as had 
Turkey before it. 
 
8. (C) Kalyapan and Sadovskaya noted that these positive 
developments had been partially offset by the refusal of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to convene its Public Chamber 
since its second meeting on March 3, 2007.  Kalyapan, who was 
a Chamber member, suspected that the Ministry was unhappy 
with criticism leveled during the previous meetings.  Also, 
after years of testy cooperation, the prison administration 
seemed to be avoiding meetings with representatives of the 
Committee Against Torture."  Kalyapan thought that might be 
traceable to his Committee's decision to observe the two 
"marches of dissent" staged earlier in the year by Garry 
Kasparov's Other Russia.  Kalyapan was pursuing legal action 
against special forces troops because of their behavior 
during the first of the two attempted marches.  He had also 
taken the cases of two members of the National Bolshevik 
Party under his wing.  He suspected that his affiliation, 
however tentative, with "Other Russia" and the March of 
Dissent," might have been perceived by the authorities as an 
endorsement of street politics after years of attempting to 
work constructively with the authorities. 
 
NGO Law Not As Burdensome 
As NGO Whining About Law 
------------------------- 
9. (C) Sadovskaya dismissed the alleged additional burdens of 
the amended NGO law as "insignificant."  Many of the NGOs who 
claim the law imposes "inhumane reporting requirements" are 
simply disorganized, she said.  Sadovskaya claimed that 
compliance required that the Committee Against Torture spend 
only two workdays to assemble the necessary paperwork for the 
annual reports.  A recent, planned inspection of the 
"Committee's" offices had gone smoothly, and had resulted in 
only one minor administrative problem. 
 
10. (C) The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers Chairwoman Natalya 
Zhukova was also guardedly upbeat about prospects for change. 
 Although the "inertia is enormous," she thought that a 
genuine awareness of the need to improve the treatment of 
soldiers was beginning to appear, "but we have a long way to 
go."  As damaging as a general disregard for the lives of the 
young soldiers was endemic corruption in the Ministry of 
Defense, which drove continuing shortages in housing for 
officers and set the tone for too much that happened in the 
military.  As interesting as Zhukova's dogged determination 
to continue her efforts to reform the military's treatment of 
its recruits and its officers, was her lack of patience for 
street politics and its advocates.  The appearance of 
Stanislav Dmitrievskiy, formerly of the Russian - Chechen 
Friendship Society at the door of her office for a scheduled 
meeting with us prQced a heated exchange.  Zhukova accused 
Dmitrievskiy and "the Kasparovs of this world" of needlessly 
endangering naive Nizhgorodians by seeking confrontation 
with the authorities.  The correct path, Zhukova said, was to 
use the levers already present to induce change, 
step-by-step, and to set concrete goals. Slowing the process 
of change, she thought, was the continued unwillingness of 
Russians to get involved unless their interests were directly 
affected.  "Once their children no longer have to worry about 
the draft, the parents stop contacting us," she lamented. 
"Only sustained pressure brings change." 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1823, DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON POLIO ERADICATION IN NIGERIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1823 2008-06-26 12:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1823 1781228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261228Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8769
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0036
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2116
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2097
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1910
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2965
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4181
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0128
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5147

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001823 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/IHB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO SOCI PGOV KOCI KISL NI RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON POLIO ERADICATION IN NIGERIA 
 
REF:  STATE 65054 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) On June 25, we passed reftel information on polio 
eradication and vaccination in Nigeria to Alexander Zakharov, 
Counselor and Director of the Bilateral Relations Section of the 
MFA's North America Department, and to Vasiliy Pospelov, Deputy 
Director of the MFA's Department for External Policy Planning.  On 
June 26, we discussed with Zakharov U.S. efforts to encourage the 
Government of Nigeria (GON) to devote resources and high-level 
attention to polio eradication and vaccination efforts, and asked 
for Russia to reiterate this message with the GON.  Zakharov said he 
would need to discuss the issue further with the MFA's Departments 
for Africa, International Organizations, and External Policy 
Planning, before the MFA would be in a position to react to the U.S. 
request that Russia weigh in with the GON on polio eradication and 
vaccination. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1822, RUSSIA SUPPORTS STRONG MEASURES AGAINST PAKISTANI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1822 2008-06-26 10:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3682
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHMO #1822 1781028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261028Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8768
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2494

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001822 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF PK RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTS STRONG MEASURES AGAINST PAKISTANI 
EXTREMISTS 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Margaret Hawthorne for reason 
s 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) MFA Pakistan Desk Chief Andrey Starkov told us on June 
25 that Russia continued to advocate the use of strong 
measures against terrorists in Pakistan, and was concerned by 
the new government's "weak" approach to securing the tribal 
regions on the border with Afghanistan.  Starkov did not 
believe the Gilani government had a genuine plan to address 
the problem, and complained that making "gentlemen's 
agreements" with extremists ran counter to Pakistan's 
security interests.  He questioned Pakistan's reliance on the 
Frontier Corps, saying that they were insufficient to face 
Taliban and other insurgents that must be fought by the 
regular Army. 
 
2. (C) Starkov considered PM Gilani's reaction to the recent 
U.S. airstrike that killed Pakistani troops overly "harsh," 
and commented that such incidents were inevitable if Pakistan 
failed to take sufficient action against Taliban who used the 
country as a safe haven to launch attacks in Afghanistan. 
Starkov reiterated that whether in Pakistan or Afghanistan, 
the GOR supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
 
3. (C) Starkov thought the future of Gilani's coalition 
government was unpredictable - it faced internal problems and 
had become too focused on the possibility of removing 
President Musharraf.  He said Army Chief of Staff General 
Kayani was handling the current situation shrewdly by 
"sitting on the fence" regarding Musharraf's future, and 
predicted that Musharraf would "struggle to the end" to 
retain his position.  Starkov explained that the GOR 
continued to support Musharraf, who remained Pakistan's best 
hope for fighting extremists. 
 
4. (C) Starkov said Russia-Pakistan bilateral contacts 
remained limited.  Their counter-terrorism working group was 
expected to hold its fourth annual meeting by the end of 
2008, while ministerial level consultations, which were last 
held in Moscow in June 2006, might next take place in 
Islamabad in 2009. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1818, YABLOKO TURNS OVER A NEW LEAF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1818 2008-06-25 14:45 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1818/01 1771445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251445Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8761
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: YABLOKO TURNS OVER A NEW LEAF 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 909 
     B. 07 MOSCOW 4772 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bob Patterson.  Reason:  1.4 
(d). 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The fallout from founding father Grigoriy 
Yavlinskiy's decision at the 15th Yabloko Party Congress to 
resign as its head in favor of Sergey Mitrokhin is still 
being examined.  Yavlinskiy hoped that his resignation (while 
staying engaged as a member of a new 12-person Political 
Committee) and the party's restructuring would improve its 
chances to stay relevant during the four-year electoral 
hiatus.  While the party's mainstream seems satisfied with 
Yavlinskiy's decision and the accompanying structural reforms 
to the party, representatives of its more radical elements 
and political pundits are more skeptical.  End Summary. 
 
And Then There Were None 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) The 15th congress of the Russian United Democratic 
Party "Yabloko" took place in a Moscow suburb June 21-22. 
The congress brought together 125 voting delegates from 
throughout Russia.  Outsiders were surprised that Yavlinskiy, 
the party's leader for the past 15 years and one of its three 
founders (along with current Russian Federation Ombudsman 
Vladimir Lukin and Yuriy Boldyrev, who has now gone over to 
the pro-Kremlin Just Russia party) announced his resignation 
as leader of the party and supported the candidacy of his 
deputy, Moscow City Duma member Sergey Mitrokhin.  Mitrokhin 
later told reporters that Yavlinskiy had originally suggested 
that he take over the reins of the party after the December 
2007 Duma elections.  The congress was not without its drama, 
although it paled in comparison to the Russia-Netherlands 
European football quarterfinal with which it was competing 
for attention.  It quashed dissent within the party by 
minimizing the influence of Maksim Reznik, head of the 
party's active St. Petersburg branch, although it stopped 
short of expelling him and others who have co-operated with 
more-radical opposition groups. 
 
3.  (SBU) On the evening of June 21, the election of the 
party's leader began with six announced candidates: 
Yavlinskiy; Mitrokhin; Reznik; St. Petersburg representative 
Sergey Ivanenko; Head of the Federal Anti-trust Service Igor 
Artemyev and Kareliya Yabloko head Vasiliy Popov.  According 
to press reports, Artemyev and Ivanenko dropped out in favor 
of Mitrokhin, followed in short order by Yavlinskiy, who in 
announcing his decision, told the members that he had 
"dreamed" that the party would be able to exist without him. 
Mitrokhin received the support of 75 delegates, while Maksim 
Reznik, who had been nominated by Yabloko's 
independent-minded St. Petersburg branch, received 24 votes 
and Popov, 20.  Six ballots were declared invalid. 
 
4.  (SBU) In opening the party congress, Yavlinskiy said that 
it must introduce new people into leadership positions.  In 
addition to electing a new party chairman, the congress 
abolished the deputy chairman positions; it will now have 
secretaries who will cover different aspects of the party's 
life.  To make the party leadership "more horizontal" (an 
attempt to distinguish it from the "vertical of power" used 
to describe the current tandemocracy of Medvedev and Putin) 
the delegates approved the creation of a 12-member Political 
Committee.  This new body will not have a chairman.  Its 
members include Mitrokhin, Yavlinskiy, Popov, Artemyev, 
former deputy chairs Sergey Ivanenko and Aleksey Arbatov, 
party Central Committee member Yelena Dubrovina, Yabloko 
Party staff head Boris Bisnik, Yabloko Green faction head 
Aleksey Yablokov, St. Petersburg Yabloko representative 
Mikhail Amosov, human rights activist Sergey Kovalev and 
party member Viktor Sheynis.  According to press reports, the 
powers of the Political Committee are rather wide and 
include, among others, termination of the responsibilities of 
the party chairman and convoking extraordinary party 
congresses.  The Political Committee will also formulate the 
position of the party on key political issues and distribute 
financial resources.  It is expected to meet at least once 
every three months. 
 
5.  (SBU) Delegates also authorized staffing changes to the 
33-member party Bureau.  Seventy percent of the Bureau's 
members are to be new and 12 of them should be under the age 
of 35.  At the 15th Party Congress only 18 members received 
the required number of votes for election to the Bureau.  The 
third time proved lucky for Reznik, who had previously lost 
to Mitrokhin in his bid to become head of the party and was 
also not selected to join the party's Political Committee. 
Less fortunate was Moscow Yabloko youth leader Ilya Yashin. 
The St. Petersburg contingent of the party had recently taken 
a defiantly anti-Kremlin approach (ref A) and participated in 
the National Assembly organized by Garry Kasparov, Mikhail 
Kasyanov and the National Bolsheviks.  Moscow party 
representatives have favored a more accommodating path with 
the Kremlin and both Yavlinskiy and Mitrokhin had previously 
stated pub
licly that participation in the National Assembly 
is incompatible with Yabloko party membership. 
 
Many are Skeptical About the Party's Restructuring 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6.  (SBU) Yabloko members have found it difficult to 
determine how effective the new structure will be, especially 
how "horizontal" and progressive the new Political Committee 
will be.  Yabloko announced plans for a second session in the 
fall to review these structural changes.  Yashin did not 
think that refitting the party's Bureau with new, younger 
members would improve Yabloko's situation.  "The point is not 
how young the party's leaders are, but rather how 
independent," he lamented. 
 
7.  (SBU) Political experts and observers have been rather 
skeptical about Yabloko's possible re-animation.  Although 
most agreed that the change of leadership was welcome, many 
believed the party is in crisis, that a change in leadership 
is not enough, and that other steps should be taken to ensure 
the party's survival.  Alexander Kynev, an expert at the 
International Institute of Humanitarian and Political 
Studies, said that Yavlinskiy should have left as head of the 
party eight years ago.  Mikhail Vinogradov, General Director 
of the Center of Contemporary Politics did not believe 
Yavlinskiy's resignation would improve the process of 
unifying the democratic forces in Russia.  He thought that 
"the decay of the party is its more likely future," unless 
the Kremlin chooses Yabloko to become the major democratic 
party in Russia.  "The developments within the party are of 
secondary importance," he concluded.  Political scientist 
Konstantin Simonov said that Yavlinskiy had to leave, given 
the party's poor showing in the December 2007 parliamentary 
elections in which it only received 1.6 percent of the vote. 
Simonov told the Vedomosti newspaper that "Yabloko has no 
future, either with Yavlinskiy, or without him." 
 
8.  (SBU) Union of Right Forces (SPS) leader Nikita Belykh 
was more optimistic.  He thought that under Mitrokhin, 
interaction between Yabloko and SPS would improve.  Political 
scientist Dmitriy Oreshkin agreed with Belykh that with 
Mitrokhin as head of the party, changes can be expected, 
particularly along the lines of organizational and personnel 
work. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Conversations with party members and leadership over 
the past year have indicated weariness with Yavlinskiy, who 
had led the party since its inception.  Yabloko had struggled 
to find a strategy equal to the current Kremlin power 
structure.  Yavlinskiy's recent overtures to the Kremlin, 
including his comment at the Congress that the party is open 
to a dialogue with the Kremlin, as well as rumors that he 
would accept a government job if offered, show that the party 
favors accommodation and compromise with the government.  Its 
choice to work with the Kremlin may, in the end, be no more 
inspired that the inclination of some to fight it on the 
streets, and could be yet another phase in the party's 
continuing march to irrelevance. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1817, RUSSIA CONCERNED WITH UNSCR 1267 DELISTING OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1817 2008-06-25 13:03 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2810
PP RUEHPW RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #1817 1771303
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251303Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8760
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KTFN UNSC AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONCERNED WITH UNSCR 1267 DELISTING OF 
TALIBAN 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Robert Patterson for reasons 
1.4 (b/d). 
 
1. (C) MFA Department of International Organizations Director 
Gennadiy Gatilov told IO DAS Brian Hook on June 19 that 
Russia was concerned with the process of reconciling Taliban 
with the Afghan government and would continue to approach 
1267 delisting cautiously.  He explained that the GOR did not 
want individuals removed from the 1267 list without "serious 
grounds" for doing so and required guarantees from the 
countries requesting delisting that these people would not 
return to terrorism.  Gatilov said the GOR did not disagree 
with delisting per se, but moved slowly on each delisting 
request to ensure there would be "no mistakes."  When Hook 
asked why the GOR was willing to accept reconciliation in 
other countries, such as Iraq, but not in Afghanistan, 
Gatilov responded that Russia had a "good understanding" of 
the situation in Afghanistan. 
 
2. (C) Gatilov dismissed the suggestion that the Russian 
Ambassador in Kabul was particularly skeptical of delisting, 
joking that perhaps the Ambassador "just knows better." 
Gatilov resisted Hook's suggestion that the Russian 
Ambassador meet several individuals that have reconciled with 
the Afghan government and are proposed for delisting, 
explaining that the GOR relied on its Embassy to report on 
specific delisting requests but final decisions were made by 
"competent authorities" in Moscow. 
 
3. (C) Gatilov and Hook agreed on the necessity of listing 
narcotraffickers whose activities financed terrorists in 
Afghanistan, although Hook explained that without the 
prospect of eventual delisting there was little incentive for 
them to change their behavior.  Hook stressed the need to 
delist individuals, since keeping them on the list meant a 
"life sentence" that created problems with several European 
countries that were concerned about a lack of due process and 
resisted new listings.  Gatilov appeared unconvinced by this 
argument, but agreed to work on a case-by-case basis on 
delisting to see if progress could be made. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW1816, RUSSIA STILL WEIGHING OPTIONS ON MERCURY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW1816 2008-06-25 11:48 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1816 1771148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251148Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8759

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001816 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/ENV/HODAYA FINMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV AORC EAGR ETRD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA STILL WEIGHING OPTIONS ON MERCURY 
 
REF:  STATE 63943 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) On June 24, we discussed the October 2008 UNEP-hosted 
Mercury Working Group Meeting with Oleg Shamanov, Head of the Global 
Environment and Health Section of the MFA's International 
Organizations Department.  Shamanov said that the GOR had not yet 
formulated a definitive position on the best way to address mercury, 
including whether a binding agreement or a voluntary partnership 
would be the most appropriate international vehicle.  He said the 
MFA would need to discuss the issue further with the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Ecology.  He hoped the GOR would be in a 
position to discuss the issue more substantively within two weeks. 
We will continue to follow up with the MFA as the GOR works to 
develop a position on mercury. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks