Monthly Archives: August 2007

07MOSCOW4309, LATVIAN BORDER TREATY: DUMA RATIFICATION IN EARLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4309 2007-08-31 15:05 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5756
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #4309 2431505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311505Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3487
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV LG RS
SUBJECT: LATVIAN BORDER TREATY: DUMA RATIFICATION IN EARLY 
SEPTEMBER AND BEYOND 
 
REF: RIGA 647 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  The State Duma will likely ratify the 
border treaty with Latvia, but the MFA and the Latvian 
Embassy raised concerns about the treaty's passage in the 
Federation Council, where political grandstanding in an 
election year could possibly result in further delay.  FM 
Lavrov postponed his September 17 trip to Riga, preferring to 
wait until the border treaty passes through both legislative 
houses.  End Summary. 
 
Border Treaty Faces uphill Battle in Federation Council 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
2.  (C) The GOR's ratification process requires approval by 
both lower and upper houses and a final presidential decree 
before the treaty can be implemented.  The State Duma is 
scheduled to consider the border treaty with Latvia during 
its September 5 plenary session.  MFA Second European 
Department Deputy Director Sergey Puchkov told us August 31 
that the GOR expects the State Duma to approve it without 
much difficulty, but he was less certain about the Federation 
Council's vote on September 19.  According to Latvian Embassy 
DCM Janis Zlamets, the United Russia party in the State Duma 
will push the ratification forward, but the Just Russia 
party, whose Party Chairman Sergey Mironov heads the 
Federation Council, may block it.  He commented that Just 
Russia leader Mironov is unenthusiastic about the border 
treaty with Latvia and in an election year may choose to 
curry favor with nationalist voters by throwing an additional 
roadblock in the path of ratification.  If Just Russia 
blocked the vote on September 19, the Federation Council's 
next opportunity to consider the treaty will be during its 
October 17 session. 
 
Lavrov Visit Tied to Ratification of Border Treaty 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
3.  (C) Both GOR officials and the Latvian Embassy underlined 
that FM Lavrov's September 17 visit to Latvia has been 
postponed, not canceled.  MFA Latvia Desk officer Ekaterina 
Fyodorova affirmed that the Latvian border treaty is an 
important bilateral event to which Lavrov's visit would be 
timed.  Admitting that the new dates hinge upon the 
Federation Council's decision, GOR officials hope that the 
visit will take place in October. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
4.  (C) The characteristic volatility in Russian-Baltic 
relations may be fueled by other minor irritants.  The 
dispute over the "Russian March" organized by the 
ultra-nationalistic Russian minority in Latvia and scheduled 
for September 8 in Riga could affect the Federation Council's 
vote if it develops into a Tallin-like demonstration. 
Likewise, a new case before the European Court of Human 
Rights regarding an ethnic Russian's name spelling -- an 
effort to have a latvianizing "s" removed from his "Russian" 
name -- is another example of the emotionally charged 
Russia-Baltic field. 
Burns

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07MOSCOW4308, RUSSIA WILL ATTEND EXPERT-LEVEL NEIGHBORS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4308 2007-08-31 13:57 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5669
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMO #4308 2431357
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311357Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3486
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004308 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WILL ATTEND EXPERT-LEVEL NEIGHBORS 
CONFERENCE PREPARATORY MEETINGS SEPTEMBER 8-9 IN BAGHDAD 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2802 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
(C) Russia will attend the expert-level meeting the GOI plans 
to host September 8-9 in Baghdad to set the groundwork for 
the expanded neighbors ministerial scheduled for October in 
Istanbul.  MFA Middle East Department First Secretary Elbrus 
Kutraschev told us on August 30 that a GOR delegation 
consisting of staff from its Baghdad Embassy will attend. 
Citing security concerns,  Kutraschev stressed that the GOR 
would prefer that this and other international meetings be 
held outside of Iraq in order to avoid requiring Russian 
diplomats to travel in Baghdad. 
Burns

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07MOSCOW4307, RUSSIA/GEORGIA: BAKRADZE VISIT FAILS TO EASE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4307 2007-08-31 13:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5660
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #4307/01 2431351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311351Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3484
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MOPS OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA/GEORGIA:  BAKRADZE VISIT FAILS TO EASE 
TENSIONS 
 
REF: MOSCOW 4008 (EXDIS) 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells.  Reason:  1 
.4 (b, d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Russian MFA South Ossetia negotiator Yuriy Popov told 
us August 31 that visiting Georgian State Minister Bakradze 
did not hit it off well with DFM Karasin.  The Russians 
appear to take Bakradze seriously.  Popov worried that the 
planned "Peace March" to Tskhinvali could elicit a 
provocative military response from the "unreliable" Kokoity. 
Popov thought this might scupper the planned JCC meeting in 
September; he will travel to Georgia late next week.  Popov 
thought the Georgian arrest of two North Ossetian 
peacekeepers was another provocation that could cause a harsh 
reaction in the North Caucasus.  He reiterated that Russia 
would like to return South Ossetia to Georgia as they are 
"expensive clients," but admitted that there are strong 
forces in Russia that want to recognize South Ossetia, in 
part to "challenge" Washington, if Kosovo achieves 
independence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
"Only Moderately Offensive" 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Popov said he had dropped out of DFM Karasin's August 
30 meeting with Georgian State Minister for Conflict 
Resolution Bakradze and Manjgaladze.  He had to make room 
Deputy Security Council Secretary Nazarov and one of his 
deputies, Kolesnikov.  But he had learned the discussion was 
not productive.  "We recognize that we have to talk with them 
and not pretend that they don't exist," he said.  But Karasin 
and Bakradze had "widely different approaches," and did not 
hit it off in this, their first meeting since Bakradze 
assumed the Ministry.  Karasin appeared to understand that 
Bakradze is a serious player, describing him as 
"intelligent," "with a strong grasp of detail," and "only 
moderately offensive." 
 
3. (C) Underlying the meeting's fruitlessness was Russian 
sensitivity over the August 6 bombing incident in 
Tsitelubani, Georgia.  Popov said the U.S. "knows as well as 
 
SIPDIS 
we do that this was a Georgian plane."  We assured him that 
it would be impossible to convince the USG that the plane was 
not Russian, but our aim is not to politicize the incident: 
rather, our goals are to prevent a repetition of such 
provocations while getting the normalization of 
Georgian-Russian relations back on track. 
 
The Immediate Train-Wrecks... 
----------------------------- 
 
4, (C) Popov was not sanguine about progress.  Karasin and 
Bakradze agreed that the Joint Coordinating Commission 
plenary should go ahead as scheduled in Tbilisi in September. 
 But Popov thought the meeting would be derailed once again. 
He said the Georgian-organized "Peace March" to Tskhinvali 
would produce a harsh reaction from South Ossetian leader 
Kokoity, including the cancellation of the JCC and 
re-emplacement of roadblocks to block movement along highways 
used by Georgians to reach the areas of South Ossetia they 
administer.  He said Russia had previously prevailed upon 
Kokoity to cancel a provocative military parade he had 
planned for an anniversary in September; Kokoity was planning 
to import hardware from outside the zone of conflict for the 
march.  If the Georgian-organized "peace march" goes ahead, 
Kokoity may renege on his word.  Karasin is sending Popov to 
Tbilisi and Tskhinvali next week to calm the situation down 
(Abkhazia negotiator Chernov will also go, but later; South 
Ossetia is considered the more dangerous for the moment). 
 
5. (C) Popov also complained about the Georgian detention of 
two North Ossetian members of the Joint Peace-Keeping Force 
on charges of taking part in kidnappings.  Popov claimed the 
OSCE mission had determined the men were not involved, but 
the Georgians were still holding them -- sheer provocation, 
in the Russian view.  Worse, Popov had been receiving "harsh" 
telephone calls on the issue from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia. 
 Popov implied that the arrests could produce a strong 
reaction in Russia's restive North Caucasus. 
 
6. (C) Popov expressed dislike for Kokoity, saying the 
Russian MFA view is that he is unreliable and erratic. 
However, Kokoity has strong supporters in Moscow, some 
motivated by "material interests," others by political.  He 
said that in his view, Russia wants to unburden itself of 
South Ossetia and leave these "expensive clients" to Georgia. 
 He reiterated his preferred scenario for bringing this about 
 
MOSCOW 00004307  002 OF 002 
 
 
(reftel). 
 
...And The Big One Looming 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Popov recognized that Kosovo could derail all his 
hopes.  He said that some in Moscow are pushing for 
recognition of South Ossetia, should Kosovo achieve 
independence.  The primary motivation of recognition would be 
to "challenge" Washington. 
 
Burns

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4305, DFM SALTANOV ON QUARTET, MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4305 2007-08-31 11:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5511
OO RUEHDBU RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #4305/01 2431151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311151Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3481
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017 
TAGS: ECON IS IZ LE PREL RS SY
SUBJECT: DFM SALTANOV ON QUARTET, MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE, 
LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAQ, WESTERN SAHARA 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 3803 
     B. RIYADH 1691 
     C. MOSCOW 4051 
     D. MOSCOW 2985 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In an August 30 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Saltanov expressed strong 
support for the upcoming Quartet meetings and the Middle East 
Peace Conference.  Saltanov proposed bilateral consultations 
in Washington or New York following his planned September 
8-15 trip to the Middle East and prior to the September 23 
Quartet meetings.  Saltanov urged the U.S. to review its 
proposals for the peace conference at the Quartet, stressed 
the importance of Syrian participation, and underscored the 
need for a "breakthrough" in the Israel-Palestinian talks. 
Saltanov confirmed Saudi NSA Prince Bandar's July trip to 
Moscow focused on SAG diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and Iran, 
but broke no new ground.  The Ambassador welcomed GOR support 
for UNIFIL's extension, but pressed for follow-up on USG 
demarches on arms transfers to Syria, Iran, and Sudan.  The 
Ambassador pushed for GOR's cancellation of Iraq's debt, 
which Saltanov said was still in progress and was connected 
to GOR efforts to revive its energy cooperation.  Saltanov 
welcomed recent efforts by al-Maliki to build a consensus, 
pushed for a U.S. timetable for withdrawal to defuse Sunni 
radicalism, and praised U.S. efforts to increase the role of 
the international community.  On Western Sahara, Saltanov was 
pessimistic about prospects for progress.  End Summary. 
 
Quartet Meetings, Middle East Peace Conference 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  (C) In his August 30 meeting with DFM Saltanov, the 
Ambassador previewed Secretary Rice's September trip to 
Israel and Palestine before the commencement of UNGA. 
Saltanov responded that, as early as September 8, he will 
travel to the UAE, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, mainly to focus 
on the political situation in Lebanon.  He will return to 
Moscow for a few days and then travel to the U.S. for UNGA as 
early as September 19.  Saltanov said he would then like to 
have bilateral consultations with the U.S. either in New York 
or Washington prior to the September 23 Middle East Quartet 
meetings.  The Ambassador noted that NEA A/S David Welch 
might be unavailable during that window, as he would be 
traveling with the Secretary to the region, but undertook to 
convey the offer. 
 
3.  (C) Saltanov emphasized that the Quartet meetings should 
focus on two objectives: 1) listen to and engage on Quartet 
Special Envoy Tony Blair's report and 2) learn from the USG 
its proposals for the Middle East Peace Conference in 
November.  Saltanov viewed the Quartet meetings and President 
Bush's conference as "closely connected," and added that the 
conference "has real significance."  However, he underscored 
the need for the Israelis and Palestinians to be prepared to 
reach "substantive agreements" during the conference. 
 
4.  (C) Saltanov also stressed the importance of Syrian 
participation, noting that the SARG is interested in a 
successful conference and "would welcome an invitation."  In 
response to Ambassador's question on PA President Abbas' 
comments to the Russians during his July 31 visit to Moscow, 
Saltanov responded that Abbas did not insist on Syria's 
participation in the conference (ref A).  However, Abbas 
urged the international community not to "forget the Syrians 
and their role" in the peace process.  The Ambassador 
stressed that irresponsible Syrian behavior is not exactly 
the best advertisement for their participation in the peace 
conference. 
 
5.  (C) Saltanov commented that a successful conference, 
which entailed a "breakthrough" in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, could solve problems in the entire region, 
"including in Iraq."  Saltanov added that "many radicals" 
would take notice of such progress and their movements could 
be undermined.  He underscored the importance of all parties 
taking full advantage of the two months prior to the 
conference to prepare the groundwork for successful talks in 
November. 
 
More On Abbas' Trip to Moscow 
----------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Saltanov added that Abbas is in a particularly 
difficult situation regarding his struggle with Hamas, but 
agreed with Ambassador's assessment that Russia's public 
support of Abbas has helped him in his efforts.  Saltanov 
stated that Russia does not hide "its unwavering support" for 
 
MOSCOW 00004305  002 OF 003 
 
 
Abbas.  However, he asserted that early elections could be 
beneficial to Abbas and the PA.  Saltanov noted that FM 
Lavrov explained to Abbas that it would be a "serious 
mistake" to excl
ude Hamas and the Gaza sector from the 
election process, especially given Abbas' "significant 
popular support" in Gaza.  Saltanov expressed concern that 
Abbas' prospects for remaining PA president would be thrown 
into serious jeopardy, if he failed to broker an agreement 
with Hamas by the end of the year. 
 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador thanked Saltanov for Russia's role in 
the unanimous passage of UNSC 1773 extending UNIFIL's 
mandate.  Saltanov commented that the situation in Lebanon 
"has reached an impasse" and there is "serious risk of the 
country dividing into two parts."  He added that one part of 
Lebanon could be "enveloped by radical ideas, which could 
destabilize the entire region."  Noting that Russia maintains 
"good and objective relations" with all parties in Lebanon, 
Saltanov argued that the current political conflict could 
deteriorate into massive violence if a democratic solution to 
the problem is not agreed upon soon.  Saltanov's personal 
view was that proposals for small changes to the 
constitution, including a provision that would allow the 
commander of the armed forces to become president, and the 
convening of elections could serve as positive steps forward. 
 Saltanov stressed that Syria needed to play a role in the 
Lebanon problem, "not only because Syrians have their 
interests in Lebanon, but because a large part of the 
Lebanese political establishment seeks Syrian involvement." 
 
Bandar's Visit 
-------------- 
 
8.  (C) When asked about Saudi National Security Advisor 
Prince Bandar's July 31 visit to Moscow, Saltanov confirmed 
that Prince Bandar's trip focused on Saudi efforts to reach a 
political settlement in Lebanon and a way forward on Iran 
(ref B).  Saltanov noted that the Saudis are working hard 
with all parties to prevent Lebanon "from collapsing." 
However, Saltanov noted Prince Bandar's lack of optimism on 
the prospects for political stability in Lebanon and added 
that the personal animosity between Saudi King Abdullah and 
Syrian President Asad limits Saudi Arabia's effectiveness. 
 
Arms Sales to Syria, Iran, Sudan 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Recalling previous U.S. demarches on Russian arms 
sales, the Ambassador reinforced U.S. concern over reports of 
Russia's arms sales to SyriQnd Iran and the potential 
transfer of weapons to Hezbollah (ref C).  Citing as examples 
sales of the surface-to-air missiles and the Kornet anti-tank 
systems to Syria, the Ambassador stressed the USG regards 
these transactions a source of serious concern.  After 
disputing the offensive nature of the mentioned weapons 
systems, Saltanov promised to check into the possible 
transfers.  However, he reiterated Russia's position that the 
U.S. needed to provide specific evidence of "leaks" of these 
weapons systems from Syria to Hezbollah.  Saltanov stated 
that Russia's formal arrangement with Syria allows for 
end-use inspections on Syrian territory, but only when 
presented with credible data.  He added that countries 
besides Syria are supplying weapons to radical groups like 
Fatah Islam and the Taliban, emphasizing that "Syria cannot 
be blamed for everything." 
 
10.  (C) The Ambassador also conveyed USG concern over 
Sudan's use of Russian helicopters in Darfur and reminded 
Saltanov that the GOR was provided with additional evidence 
backing up our claims (ref D).  Saltanov acknowledged that 
receipt Russia had received the additional information and 
assured the Ambassador that the GOR is "working on it." 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
11.  (C) Noting Iraqi Oil Minister al-Sharastani's productive 
trip to Moscow, the Ambassador urged Saltanov to abide by its 
Paris Club commitments to cancel Iraq's debt.  When asked 
about the possibility of the GOR preparing the paperwork for 
cancellation by September, Saltanov expressed doubt that the 
Joint Economic Commission would be sufficiently prepared to 
meet in September and thus the paperwork would not be ready 
in time. 
 
12.  (C) Saltanov acknowledged that Russia is focused on 
reactivating energy cooperation with Iraq and continues to 
 
MOSCOW 00004305  003 OF 003 
 
 
pressure the Iraqi Government to fulfill its "contractual 
obligations" with Lukoil.  The Ambassador emphasized that 
al-Sharastani had had a positive impression of his visit to 
Moscow and that the best the GOR could do now to strengthen 
the atmosphere for Lukoil and other Russian businesses would 
be to move ahead on debt cancellation. 
 
13.  (C) Commenting on Iraqi PM al-Maliki's "significant 
steps" to reach an agreement among key political factions in 
Iraq, Saltanov noted that without real progress in the 
political process, Iraq will remain unstable.  He agreed that 
pressure needed to be maintained on the terrorists, but 
stressed there would be no settlement if "all those with guns 
in their hands" were excluded from the process.  Saltanov 
asserted that the Sunni opposition would be willing to cease 
hostilities if the U.S. were to develop a timetable for troop 
withdrawal.  Saltanov argued that a timetable could be either 
chronological or "pegged to political benchmarks."  He added 
that a withdrawal timetable would also motivate the al-Maliki 
government to move more quickly on political and economic 
development. 
 
14.  (C) On widening the international community's role in 
Iraq, Saltanov noted that the most recent UNSC resolution on 
Iraq was certainly a step in the right direction and welcomed 
this "good initiative" from the U.S.  The Ambassador and 
Saltanov agreed that all parties must follow through on their 
commitments made during the most recent Sharm el Sheikh 
Summit.  Saltanov stressed that the planned September meeting 
of Iraq's neighbors serve as another opportunity to 
consolidate international support for Iraq.  He noted the 
venue for the meeting had not been determined, but he 
identified Istanbul as the only viable Arab location, as 
Baghdad would be "problematic" for many participants. 
 
Western Sahara 
-------------- 
 
15.  (C) The Ambassador solicited Saltanov's views on ways to 
push forward the negotiations between Morocco and Polisario. 
Saltanov reported that he will accompany Russian PM Fradkov 
on a Fall trip to Algeria and Morocco and would provide the 
Ambassador with a readout of the trip upon his return.  The 
DFM's initial impressions were that the August 10-11 
negotiations in New York produced few concrete results. 
However, he understood that there was some "mutual interest" 
between Morocco and Algeria and Polisario in the development 
of confidence building measures, noting that such measures 
would positively influence discussions on the future of 
Western Sahara.  Saltanov commented that the "costly and 
permanent position" of Algeria and Polisario of refusing to 
consider Morocco's proposa
l for expanded autonomy for Western 
Sahara only plays into Morocco's hands, as Morocco has 
already "won on a political level."  Saltanov added that 
Morocco's claim to Western Sahara is a "matter of life or 
death" for the Moroccans, which he agreed was not the case 
for the Algerians.  But Saltanov did not see any near-term 
chances for Algerian flexibility, or significant movement on 
Western Sahara. 
Burns

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4289, NEW LEGAL TROUBLES AROUND FORMER RUSSIAN-CHECHEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4289 2007-08-31 06:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5251
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #4289/01 2430626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 310626Z AUG 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3460
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM RS
SUBJECT: NEW LEGAL TROUBLES AROUND FORMER RUSSIAN-CHECHEN 
FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 4114 
 
     B. MOSCOW 0276 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b and d). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Regional officials in Nizhniy Novgorod are 
conducting investigations of organizations affiliated with 
Stanislav Dmitrievskiy, the head of the banned 
Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS), including the 
seizure of computers from the Nizhniy Novgorod Foundation to 
Support Tolerance, the independent local paper Novaya Gazeta, 
and the Nizhniy Novgorod NGO Human Rights Alliance.  These 
actions follow legal action to place new restrictions on 
Dmitrievskiy's parole, following his involvement in the April 
"Dissenters' March," which took place without an 
administrative permit (reftel).  Dmitrievskiy publicly 
decried the investigations as yet another example of the 
local government's pressure on him and others affiliated with 
the "Other Russia" opposition movement.  In Moscow, Embassy 
raised Dmitrievskiy's case with Russian Deputy Ombudsman for 
Human Rights Georgiy Kunadze, who said that his staff was 
aware of the case, including the new restrictions on 
Dmitrievskiy's parole, but would follow established practice 
and would not get involved without an explicit request from 
Dmitrievskiy.  END SUMMARY 
 
------------------ 
New Investigations 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On the evening of August 29, officers from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) regional bureau raided 
the offices of the Nizhniy Novgorod Foundation to Support 
Tolerance, a local human rights organization headed by 
Dmitrievskiy's close comrade, Oksana Chelysheva. 
(Dmitrievskiy and Chelysheva founded the organization in 2006 
as a Russian-registered entity as they prepared to move the 
headquarters of the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society to 
Finland.)  Initially, the MVD officers asked for 
Dmitrievskiy, mistakenly believing him to be the 
organization's director, but then announced that they would 
conduct a complete review of the organization's financial and 
administrative records.  The investigation uncovered 
allegedly unlicensed software on the Foundation's computers, 
which the inspectors took away for further scrutiny.  Local 
employees, however, negotiated an arrangement to copy the 
information on the hard drives before turning the computers 
over to the inspectors.  Chelysheva claims that the Fund had 
licenses for all the software, but had lost the documentation 
during frequent moves over the past year. 
 
3. (SBU) On August 30, the regional authorities investigated 
the local offices of the newspaper Novaya Gazeta and seized 
their computers.  Chief Editor Zakhar Prilepin told us that 
the paper is "not rich" and that the computers were the 
personal property of the users.  In contrast to the actions 
at the Foundation to Support Tolerance, workers at the paper 
were unable to copy their data before the computers were 
removed -- effectively shutting down operations.  Both 
Dmitrievskiy and Chelysheva have published articles in the 
paper, which takes a sharply critical approach to the 
regional and federal government.  Prilepin, a member of the 
Eduard Limonov's banned National Bolshevik Party, has been 
active in the "Other Russia" opposition movement and helped 
to organize the April "Dissenters March" in Nizhniy Novgorod. 
 
4.  (SBU) Also on August 30, local officials carried out a 
similar investigation of financial, business, and 
administrative practices at the Nizhniy Novgorod NGO Human 
Rights Alliance.  According to Chelysheva, the staff at the 
Human Rights Alliance provided the investigators with 
evidence that the computers in use were not the property of 
the organization, forcing the police to seek a new court 
order to confiscate them. Staff members claim that the police 
have conducted four other investigations of the NGO over the 
past week. 
 
5.  (SBU) Chelysheva reported that the authorities were also 
investigating the Nizhniy Novgorod Center to Support Migrants 
and have directed the center's director, Almaz Choloyan, to 
remain in the city.  The investigation involves accusations 
that Choloyan illegally using a stolen or counterfeit 
Ukrainian border stamp on an immigrant's passport -- charges 
that Choloyan denies.  Investigators have searched Choloyan's 
apartment and office, confiscating materials including the 
passports of several immigrants.  According to Chelysheva, 
FSB officers questioned Choloyan for several hours and asked 
about her relations to Dmitrievskiy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Human Rights Ombudsman Observing from the Sidelines 
 
MOSCOW 00004289  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
6.  (SBU)  Before news of this week's investigations was made 
public, the Deputy Ombudsman for Human Rights Grigoriy 
Kunadze told Embassy that he was aware of Dmitrievskiy's case 
and the legal process to impose new restrictions on his 
parole.  He noted that the Ombudsman's office had considered 
making a statement, but decided against such a
move, 
primarily because Dmitrievskiy had not asked to have the case 
reviewed. (The Ombudsman's office generally requires a 
request from alleged victims before acting.)  He later mused 
that some activists purposely do not appeal to the Ombudsman 
office because they prefer to play the role of victim -- 
perhaps an indirect reference to Dmitrievskiy. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
7.  (SBU) Dmitrievskiy and Chelysheva now face the challenges 
of finding computers to revive the Foundation's work; 
formulating their appeal to the MVD against what they see as 
a violation of legal procedures; and waiting for what they 
expect to be further legal action.  Dmitrievskiy expects more 
pressure as the December 2 Duma elections approach, with the 
Nizhniy Novgorod Governor taking additional steps to 
undermine the "Other Russia" opposition movement in his 
region.  Prilepin's Novaya Gazeta also faces the challenge of 
buying computers and restoring operations, without the 
benefit of the broader support that Dmitrievskiy and 
Chelsyeva enjoy in Russia and abroad. Chelysheva also told us 
that because the RCFS is now headquartered in Helsinki, she 
and Dmitrievskiy enjoy good, supportive relations with the 
Finish government, which could help to bring international 
attention to their situation. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  We have not seen similar campaigns to 
target organizations linked to the "Other Russia" opposition 
movement in other regions, suggesting that these 
investigations are independent actions by the regional elite 
to silence what they may see as a particularly "problematic" 
local adversary -- Dmitrievskiy and his allies.  By seizing 
the computers of Novaya Gazeta and the Foundation to Support 
Tolerance, the regional officials effectively triangulated 
Dmitrievskiy. If these tactics are successful in neutralizing 
the opposition over the longer term, we may well see them 
deployed by other regional elites.  Past practice suggests, 
however, that the local authorities may ultimately relent 
somewhat, now that they have served warning with these raids 
on the eve of the official election campaign. 
Burns

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4287, The “For A Just Russia” Party Stages Primary

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4287 2007-08-31 02:46 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5117
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #4287 2430246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310246Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3456
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2383
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2673
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 4454

UNCLAS MOSCOW 004287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT:  The "For A Just Russia" Party Stages Primary 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  For a Just Russia (SR) held a series of public 
primaries throughout Russia on August 26 in preparation for the 
December Duma elections.  Far from being a well-run, effective 
sampling of voter preferences, the primaries seemed to have been 
slapped together in an effort to keep pace with the rival United 
Russia political party and to provide SR with additional publicity 
on the eve of the official kick-off of the election campaign.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------- 
PREMATURE PRIMARIES 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) On August 26, the Kremlin-launched party For a Just Russia 
(SR) continued its campaign for the December Duma elections by 
staging national primaries in 53 subjects of the Russian Federation. 
 According to SR Chairman Sergey Mironov, about 383 thousand voters 
had ultimately cast their votes either by internet or at one of the 
683 polling stations open around the country. To date, only 
twenty-six of the regions have posted results. 
 
3. (SBU) Embassy efforts to determine the locations of the primaries 
in Moscow were unsuccessful.  Newspaper reports indicated that 
journalists had similar difficulties.  (The national daily 
Kommersant reported that of the eighteen planned polling places in 
Voronezh, only three seemed to be open on primary day.)  Press 
reports suggested little voter interest in the primaries, and only 
half-hearted attempts by SR activists to induce passers-by to 
participate. 
 
4. (SBU) Inna Nelyuba, the SR Moscow organization's director of the 
Moscow primaries told us -two days before the primary date-- that 
she did not have all the necessary permits and could not say where 
the contests would be held.  Information about the location of 
polling places was also not available on the internet. 
 
5. (SBU) Nelyuba said that the SR primaries were open to all Russian 
citizens who were eligible to vote.  A description of each of the 
candidates and his/her biography would be available at the relevant 
polling place and write-ins were allowed. 
 
6. (U) The Moscow SR branch had arranged for voters to cast their 
ballots via internet.  Although the list of candidates was available 
on August 24, by August 27 a mere sixty-five internet votes had been 
cast.  Sergey Loktinonov, a party worker and the president of the 
Russian parachutists organization in Moscow, was in first place 
among internet voters, with thirty-three percent of the vote, while 
incumbent Duma deputies were each garnering barely five percent. 
(In the end, Duma Deputy Aleksandr Lebedev won the Moscow race with 
39.5 percent of the vote.  Duma Deputy Oksana Dmitrieva won the St. 
Petersburg contest, with 50.5 percent of the 12 thousand, five 
hundred votes cast.) 
 
7. (SBU) SR Press Secretary Aleksandr Morozov told us that the 
primaries were one in a series of assessments that SR was conducting 
in the process of refining its final party lists.  According to 
Morozov, SR had already done four voter surveys and would commission 
a fifth before the national party conference.  The surveys and the 
primary results would be used by the party leadership in crafting 
SR's final lists, which would be confirmed at the party conference, 
to be held either September 16 or 23. 
 
8. (SBU) Per Morozov, the regional lists used in the primaries 
featured only local candidates.  Excluded were SR heavy hitters, 
whose places on the list would be decided only at the September 
party conference. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) The primaries appeared less an attempt to gauge the 
electorate's preferences for lists that are, in any event, nearly 
finalized, than an effort by SR to generate publicity before the 
beginning of the official campaign in September.  The haste with 
which the August 27 contest was cobbled together (it was announced 
by Chairman Sergey Mironov on only August 17) suggested that the 
primaries were part of an effort to remain at parity with the United 
Russia party, which has been engaged in primaries of its own. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4285, RUSSIA WILL RESPOND TO UNESCO ILLITERACY MEASURES SURVEY

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW4285.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4285 2007-08-30 14:36 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4285 2421436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301436Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3453

UNCLAS MOSCOW 004285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/UNESCO/ESPENCER 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SCUL SOCI UNESCO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WILL RESPOND TO UNESCO ILLITERACY MEASURES SURVEY 
 
REF:  STATE 119840 
 
Per reftel instructions, on August 28, we shared reftel survey on 
measures against illiteracy with Deputy Director Pankin in the MFA's 
International Organizations (IO) Department and with Deputy Director 
Smirnov in the MFA's North American Department.  On August 30, the 
IO Department advised they had asked the Ministry of Education and 
Science to complete the brief survey.  The IO Department expects to 
be able to submit the survey to UNESCO before September 14. 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4267, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: SPECIAL

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW4267.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4267 2007-08-30 09:53 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4267 2420953
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300953Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3437
RUEAORC/USCBP WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 004267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: SPECIAL 
PURPOSE CENTER OF FSB, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, D379757 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, 
Special Purpose Center of FSB, Moscow, Russia. The 
company is listed on BIS license application D379757 
as the ultimate consignee of eight thermal imaging 
cameras. These items are controlled for national 
security and nuclear non-proliferation reasons under 
ECCN 6A003. The licensee is L3 Communications Infrared 
Products, 13532 N.Centeral Expressway MS37, Dallas, TX 
75243. 
 
3. On August 15, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted a pre- 
license check at the International Relations Center of 
the Federal Security Service (Russian acronym FSB), 7 
Izmailovsky Val, Building 1, Moscow, Russia. The 
export control team met with Dmitry Gruzkov, Officer 
of the FSB Arms Service, and Yury Patrin, FSB Officer, 
International Relations Department. 
 
4. The FSB is the principal federal criminal and 
counterintelligence investigative organization of the 
Russian Federation.  The FSB is charged with the 
operation of several specialized units which are 
active in antiterrorist operations throughout Russia. 
The Special Purpose Center (SPC) was founded in 1992 
to support the hostage rescue and antiterrorist teams 
known as "Alfa" and "Vympel" by providing equipment 
and training for the team's operators.  SPC is 
participating in cooperative training programs with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Academy and 
its Hostage Rescue Team (HRT).  The program is a "Top- 
Down" concept, with senior management at FSB and the 
FBI Academy working alongside HRT and Alfa/Vympel 
operators as they compare experiences and establish 
best practices for hostage rescue situations.  SPC 
employs around 20 specialists, and is posted at the 
FSB headquarters in Moscow. 
 
5. SPC chose the L3 product for procurement due to its 
high quality and superior level of technology over 
other similar units.  Its capabilities and size make 
it an excellent unit for close-quarters situations. 
Sixteen operators will be trained in the use of the 
cameras, with six cameras being in an operationally 
ready state at all times and two in reserve.  All high 
technology equipment is stored at the FSB 
headquarters, in a specialized equipment locker 
designed for storage of weapons at SPC.  The storage 
area is under 24 hour guard, and is protected by an 
electronic alarm and video surveillance system. Mr. 
Gruzkov is familiar with the anticipated conditions of 
the license, and noted that although Alfa units 
sometimes deploy outside of Russia, that the thermal 
imagers will not be exported outside of Russia at any 
time. 
 
6. Recommendations: Post recommends Special Purpose 
Center of FSB, Moscow, Russia, as a reliable recipient 
of sensitive U.S. origin commodities. It is requested 
that post be notified of final disposition of the 
application, and of any shipments for this 
organization in order to conduct appropriate FCS 
follow-up and statistical reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4264, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW4264.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4264 2007-08-30 09:26 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0018
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4264 2420926
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300926Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3431
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 004264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/DMUSLU 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
KAMENSK-URALSKY CITY ADMINISTRATION, KAMENSK-URALSKY, 
RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D362161 
 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Kamensk-Uralsky City Administration, Kamensk- 
Uralsky, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application D362161 as the ultimate consignee of a 
spectrometer, Air Sentry-IMS ion mobility gas 
analyzer.  This item is controlled for national 
security and regional stability reasons under ECCN 
2B351. The licensee is Particle Measuring Systems 
Inc., 5475 Airport Blvd., Boulder, CO 80301. 
 
3. On August 21, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with Kamensk- 
Uralsky City Administration, Kamensk-Uralsky  and 
Center of Ecological Monitoring and Control (CEMC), 
Yekaterinburg, Russia. The export control team met 
with Aleksandr Yeremin, Director of Sverdlovsk 
Regional State Organization "Center of Ecological 
Monitoring and Control" Yekaterinburg and Elena 
Pshinitsina, Head of Ecology Department of Kamensk- 
Uralsky City Administration, Kamensk-Uralsky. 
 
4. The CEMC was founded in February, 2001 as the 
official environmental monitoring and reporting 
service for the region.  The organization has no 
commercial activities, and works only on government 
tasks.  The principal activity of CEMC is the analysis 
of environmental conditions in the region, and annual 
reporting of the environmental conditions and their 
potential impact on health.  The organization employs 
116, and is headquartered in Yekaterineburg with 
personnel and equipment deployed throughout the 
region. 
 
5. The commodity in reftel is utilized to monitor the 
level of Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) present in ambient air 
samples in the city of Kamensk-Uralsk, a city located 
approximately 40 km East of Yekaterineburg.  The city 
is home to eight industrial factories and metal works. 
 
6.  The team was shown a Molecular Analytics Air 
Sentry IMS HF analyzer, serial number 1188AN, which is 
rack-mounted with similar equipment in a monitoring 
shack.  The shack is located on a hill approximately 
2km from the city center in a small field adjacent to 
a multi-story housing complex. Only two specialists 
have access to the shack.  The shack has a motion- 
sensor electronic security system that is monitored by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russian acronym MVD) 
Militsia, who will respond in the case of unauthorized 
entry.  NOTE: MVD Militsia is the principal law 
enforcement organization in the Russian Federation. 
END NOTE. Mr. Yeremin and Ms. Pshinitsina are familiar 
with the conditions of the license. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends Kamensk-Uralsky 
City Administration, Kamensk-Uralsky and Sverdlovsk 
Regional State Organization "Center of Ecological 
monitoring and control" Yekaterinburg, Russia as 
reliable recipients of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW4263, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: JSC

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW4263.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW4263 2007-08-30 09:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4263 2420925
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300925Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3430
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 004263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/DMUSLU 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: JSC 
INSTITUTE ENGINEERING SCIENCE URAL BRANCH RAS, 
YEKATERINBURG, RUSSIA, LICENSE NO. D352204 
 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, JSC Institute Engineering Science Ural Branch 
RAS, Yekaterinburg, Russia. The company is listed on 
BIS license application D352204 as the ultimate 
consignee of a thermal imager, model: TH9100.  This 
item is controlled for national security and regional 
stability reasons under ECCN 6A003. The licensee is 
Mikron Infrared Inc., 16 Thornton Road, Oakland, NJ, 
07436. 
 
3. On August 21, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with Joint Stock 
Company Institute Engineering Science Ural Branch, 
Russian Academy of Science, 34 Komsomolskaya St., 
Yekaterinburg, Russia. The export control team met 
with Sergey Smirnov, Deputy Director. 
 
4. The Institute was founded in 1986 as a division of 
the Urals branch of the Russian Academy of Science 
(RAS).  The institute focuses on fundamental research 
in topics such as mechanical engineering, machine 
construction, transportation, and information 
technology systems.  The Joint Stock Company conducts 
research and development for private clients wishing 
to utilize the design and mechanical experience of the 
faculty of the Institute.  Funding for the Institute 
is provided by RAS and from the profits of the JSC. 
The Institute employs 180, including 80 researchers 
and professors on staff. 
 
5. The commodity in reftel is used in the study of 
machine and mechanical systems.  The camera allows 
researchers to precisely map thermal stress and 
friction points in a machine or device, and allows for 
a careful examination of the failure of devices to 
improve design and fabrication of parts.  The camera 
allows the researcher to observe the destruction of 
parts, in real time, while noting the dynamics of the 
failing device. The purchase of the camera was funded 
by a government grant to RAS. 
 
6. The team was shown an NEC Thermo-Tracer TH 9100WL, 
serial number 6021101.  When not in use the camera is 
stored in a safe located on the fifth floor.  Mr. 
Smirnov is personally responsible for the camera, 
issuing it to the operators when required.  Along with 
Mr. Smirnov, there are two other operators who are 
trained and authorized to use the camera.  Mr. Smirnov 
is familiar with the conditions of the license. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends JSC Institute 
Engineering Science Ural Branch RAS, Yekaterinburg, 
Russia as reliable recipients of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks