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VZCZCXRO5511
OO RUEHDBU RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #4305/01 2431151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311151Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3481
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 004305
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2017
TAGS: ECON IS IZ LE PREL RS SY
SUBJECT: DFM SALTANOV ON QUARTET, MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE,
LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAQ, WESTERN SAHARA
REF: A. MOSCOW 3803
¶B. RIYADH 1691
¶C. MOSCOW 4051
¶D. MOSCOW 2985
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4 (b,d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 30 meeting with the Ambassador,
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Saltanov expressed strong
support for the upcoming Quartet meetings and the Middle East
Peace Conference. Saltanov proposed bilateral consultations
in Washington or New York following his planned September
8-15 trip to the Middle East and prior to the September 23
Quartet meetings. Saltanov urged the U.S. to review its
proposals for the peace conference at the Quartet, stressed
the importance of Syrian participation, and underscored the
need for a "breakthrough" in the Israel-Palestinian talks.
Saltanov confirmed Saudi NSA Prince Bandar's July trip to
Moscow focused on SAG diplomatic efforts in Lebanon and Iran,
but broke no new ground. The Ambassador welcomed GOR support
for UNIFIL's extension, but pressed for follow-up on USG
demarches on arms transfers to Syria, Iran, and Sudan. The
Ambassador pushed for GOR's cancellation of Iraq's debt,
which Saltanov said was still in progress and was connected
to GOR efforts to revive its energy cooperation. Saltanov
welcomed recent efforts by al-Maliki to build a consensus,
pushed for a U.S. timetable for withdrawal to defuse Sunni
radicalism, and praised U.S. efforts to increase the role of
the international community. On Western Sahara, Saltanov was
pessimistic about prospects for progress. End Summary.
Quartet Meetings, Middle East Peace Conference
--------------------------------------------- -
¶2. (C) In his August 30 meeting with DFM Saltanov, the
Ambassador previewed Secretary Rice's September trip to
Israel and Palestine before the commencement of UNGA.
Saltanov responded that, as early as September 8, he will
travel to the UAE, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, mainly to focus
on the political situation in Lebanon. He will return to
Moscow for a few days and then travel to the U.S. for UNGA as
early as September 19. Saltanov said he would then like to
have bilateral consultations with the U.S. either in New York
or Washington prior to the September 23 Middle East Quartet
meetings. The Ambassador noted that NEA A/S David Welch
might be unavailable during that window, as he would be
traveling with the Secretary to the region, but undertook to
convey the offer.
¶3. (C) Saltanov emphasized that the Quartet meetings should
focus on two objectives: 1) listen to and engage on Quartet
Special Envoy Tony Blair's report and 2) learn from the USG
its proposals for the Middle East Peace Conference in
November. Saltanov viewed the Quartet meetings and President
Bush's conference as "closely connected," and added that the
conference "has real significance." However, he underscored
the need for the Israelis and Palestinians to be prepared to
reach "substantive agreements" during the conference.
¶4. (C) Saltanov also stressed the importance of Syrian
participation, noting that the SARG is interested in a
successful conference and "would welcome an invitation." In
response to Ambassador's question on PA President Abbas'
comments to the Russians during his July 31 visit to Moscow,
Saltanov responded that Abbas did not insist on Syria's
participation in the conference (ref A). However, Abbas
urged the international community not to "forget the Syrians
and their role" in the peace process. The Ambassador
stressed that irresponsible Syrian behavior is not exactly
the best advertisement for their participation in the peace
conference.
¶5. (C) Saltanov commented that a successful conference,
which entailed a "breakthrough" in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, could solve problems in the entire region,
"including in Iraq." Saltanov added that "many radicals"
would take notice of such progress and their movements could
be undermined. He underscored the importance of all parties
taking full advantage of the two months prior to the
conference to prepare the groundwork for successful talks in
November.
More On Abbas' Trip to Moscow
-----------------------------
¶6. (C) Saltanov added that Abbas is in a particularly
difficult situation regarding his struggle with Hamas, but
agreed with Ambassador's assessment that Russia's public
support of Abbas has helped him in his efforts. Saltanov
stated that Russia does not hide "its unwavering support" for
MOSCOW 00004305 002 OF 003
Abbas. However, he asserted that early elections could be
beneficial to Abbas and the PA. Saltanov noted that FM
Lavrov explained to Abbas that it would be a "serious
mistake" to excl
ude Hamas and the Gaza sector from the
election process, especially given Abbas' "significant
popular support" in Gaza. Saltanov expressed concern that
Abbas' prospects for remaining PA president would be thrown
into serious jeopardy, if he failed to broker an agreement
with Hamas by the end of the year.
Lebanon
-------
¶7. (C) The Ambassador thanked Saltanov for Russia's role in
the unanimous passage of UNSC 1773 extending UNIFIL's
mandate. Saltanov commented that the situation in Lebanon
"has reached an impasse" and there is "serious risk of the
country dividing into two parts." He added that one part of
Lebanon could be "enveloped by radical ideas, which could
destabilize the entire region." Noting that Russia maintains
"good and objective relations" with all parties in Lebanon,
Saltanov argued that the current political conflict could
deteriorate into massive violence if a democratic solution to
the problem is not agreed upon soon. Saltanov's personal
view was that proposals for small changes to the
constitution, including a provision that would allow the
commander of the armed forces to become president, and the
convening of elections could serve as positive steps forward.
Saltanov stressed that Syria needed to play a role in the
Lebanon problem, "not only because Syrians have their
interests in Lebanon, but because a large part of the
Lebanese political establishment seeks Syrian involvement."
Bandar's Visit
--------------
¶8. (C) When asked about Saudi National Security Advisor
Prince Bandar's July 31 visit to Moscow, Saltanov confirmed
that Prince Bandar's trip focused on Saudi efforts to reach a
political settlement in Lebanon and a way forward on Iran
(ref B). Saltanov noted that the Saudis are working hard
with all parties to prevent Lebanon "from collapsing."
However, Saltanov noted Prince Bandar's lack of optimism on
the prospects for political stability in Lebanon and added
that the personal animosity between Saudi King Abdullah and
Syrian President Asad limits Saudi Arabia's effectiveness.
Arms Sales to Syria, Iran, Sudan
--------------------------------
¶9. (C) Recalling previous U.S. demarches on Russian arms
sales, the Ambassador reinforced U.S. concern over reports of
Russia's arms sales to SyriQnd Iran and the potential
transfer of weapons to Hezbollah (ref C). Citing as examples
sales of the surface-to-air missiles and the Kornet anti-tank
systems to Syria, the Ambassador stressed the USG regards
these transactions a source of serious concern. After
disputing the offensive nature of the mentioned weapons
systems, Saltanov promised to check into the possible
transfers. However, he reiterated Russia's position that the
U.S. needed to provide specific evidence of "leaks" of these
weapons systems from Syria to Hezbollah. Saltanov stated
that Russia's formal arrangement with Syria allows for
end-use inspections on Syrian territory, but only when
presented with credible data. He added that countries
besides Syria are supplying weapons to radical groups like
Fatah Islam and the Taliban, emphasizing that "Syria cannot
be blamed for everything."
¶10. (C) The Ambassador also conveyed USG concern over
Sudan's use of Russian helicopters in Darfur and reminded
Saltanov that the GOR was provided with additional evidence
backing up our claims (ref D). Saltanov acknowledged that
receipt Russia had received the additional information and
assured the Ambassador that the GOR is "working on it."
Iraq
----
¶11. (C) Noting Iraqi Oil Minister al-Sharastani's productive
trip to Moscow, the Ambassador urged Saltanov to abide by its
Paris Club commitments to cancel Iraq's debt. When asked
about the possibility of the GOR preparing the paperwork for
cancellation by September, Saltanov expressed doubt that the
Joint Economic Commission would be sufficiently prepared to
meet in September and thus the paperwork would not be ready
in time.
¶12. (C) Saltanov acknowledged that Russia is focused on
reactivating energy cooperation with Iraq and continues to
MOSCOW 00004305 003 OF 003
pressure the Iraqi Government to fulfill its "contractual
obligations" with Lukoil. The Ambassador emphasized that
al-Sharastani had had a positive impression of his visit to
Moscow and that the best the GOR could do now to strengthen
the atmosphere for Lukoil and other Russian businesses would
be to move ahead on debt cancellation.
¶13. (C) Commenting on Iraqi PM al-Maliki's "significant
steps" to reach an agreement among key political factions in
Iraq, Saltanov noted that without real progress in the
political process, Iraq will remain unstable. He agreed that
pressure needed to be maintained on the terrorists, but
stressed there would be no settlement if "all those with guns
in their hands" were excluded from the process. Saltanov
asserted that the Sunni opposition would be willing to cease
hostilities if the U.S. were to develop a timetable for troop
withdrawal. Saltanov argued that a timetable could be either
chronological or "pegged to political benchmarks." He added
that a withdrawal timetable would also motivate the al-Maliki
government to move more quickly on political and economic
development.
¶14. (C) On widening the international community's role in
Iraq, Saltanov noted that the most recent UNSC resolution on
Iraq was certainly a step in the right direction and welcomed
this "good initiative" from the U.S. The Ambassador and
Saltanov agreed that all parties must follow through on their
commitments made during the most recent Sharm el Sheikh
Summit. Saltanov stressed that the planned September meeting
of Iraq's neighbors serve as another opportunity to
consolidate international support for Iraq. He noted the
venue for the meeting had not been determined, but he
identified Istanbul as the only viable Arab location, as
Baghdad would be "problematic" for many participants.
Western Sahara
--------------
¶15. (C) The Ambassador solicited Saltanov's views on ways to
push forward the negotiations between Morocco and Polisario.
Saltanov reported that he will accompany Russian PM Fradkov
on a Fall trip to Algeria and Morocco and would provide the
Ambassador with a readout of the trip upon his return. The
DFM's initial impressions were that the August 10-11
negotiations in New York produced few concrete results.
However, he understood that there was some "mutual interest"
between Morocco and Algeria and Polisario in the development
of confidence building measures, noting that such measures
would positively influence discussions on the future of
Western Sahara. Saltanov commented that the "costly and
permanent position" of Algeria and Polisario of refusing to
consider Morocco's proposa
l for expanded autonomy for Western
Sahara only plays into Morocco's hands, as Morocco has
already "won on a political level." Saltanov added that
Morocco's claim to Western Sahara is a "matter of life or
death" for the Moroccans, which he agreed was not the case
for the Algerians. But Saltanov did not see any near-term
chances for Algerian flexibility, or significant movement on
Western Sahara.
Burns
Wikileaks: Russia 