Monthly Archives: March 2007

07MOSCOW1434, RUSSIA: THE HARSH IMPACT OF DEMON VODKA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1434 2007-03-30 14:17 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0242
RR RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD
DE RUEHMO #1434/01 0891417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301417Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8828
INFO RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 4700
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2336
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2020
RUEHZN/EST COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES/IHA AND EUR/RUS 
USAID FOR GH, E&E 
HHS FOR OGHA 
USDA FOR FAS/OCRA FLEMING, THOMAS OGA CHAUDHRY VELTHIUS 
COMMERCE FOR ITA/EDWARDS 
STATE PASS USTR FOR MOLNAR, KLEIN, DWOSKIN AND OWEN 
BERLIN ALSO FOR LABOR COUNSELOR HAGEN 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO EAGR ETRD SOCI RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: THE HARSH IMPACT OF DEMON VODKA 
 
REFS: A. 06 Moscow 9824 
      B. 06 Moscow 12348 
  C. Moscow 563 
 
MOSCOW 00001434  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Leading European and Russian addiction and 
demographics experts met recently in Moscow to discuss alcohol 
consumption and policy in Russia.  Binge drinking causes an 
estimated three percent drag on GDP and leads to about half a 
million premature deaths every year.  The lack of a national center 
to study alcohol addiction hinders the collection of solid data that 
could guide politicians, who battle corruption within law 
enforcement circles and hard lobbying by domestic alcohol producers. 
 The brief presence of two senior Kremlin policy-makers at the 
conference suggests that the Russian Government recognizes that 
widespread alcohol abuse is fueling the overall demographic crisis 
by contributing to Russia's low life expectancy and high preventable 
mortality among working-age men.  Despite the attention to the 
issue, however, we do not expect any major policy initiatives in the 
near term, given upcoming Duma and Presidential elections, and the 
lingering bitter memories from Gorbachev's attempts to regulate 
alcohol consumption in the mid-80s.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) Leading addiction and demographics experts from Russia and 
Europe held a two-day conference in Moscow March 1-2 to discuss 
Russian drinking habits and ways of crafting an effective alcohol 
policy.  The conference, entitled "Developing an Effective Alcohol 
Policy for Russia: Worldwide Experience and the Russian Realities," 
attracted leading Russian and international demographics and 
addiction experts from Great Britain, and from Norway, Sweden, and 
Finland (cold, northern countries with a historical legacy of heavy 
hard alcohol consumption similar to Russia's). 
 
Hard Drinking, Hard Life 
------------------------ 
 
3. (U) Nikolay Gerasimenko, Deputy Head of the Duma Health 
Committee, cited several grim estimates of alcohol consumption in 
Russia, though he cautioned that data collection was poor in this 
area.  Annual per capita alcohol consumption in Russia is estimated 
at 14-15 liters per year (equal to 180 bottles of vodka for every 
adult Russian male).  Hard alcohol constitutes 60-75 percent of all 
consumed alcohol, one of the highest percentages in the world. 
(Note: According to the WHO, Russia ranks 19th worldwide in per 
capita consumption of alcohol, but almost all of the countries 
ranked higher than Russia are predominantly beer or wine-drinking. 
Russia is ranked third worldwide in per capita consumption of 
spirits after Moldova and Reunion. END NOTE)  More than two million 
people are officially registered as alcoholics, and some 80 percent 
of young people aged 11-24 drink regularly.  Alcohol has also become 
steadily more affordable in the past 15 years.  A bottle of vodka 
now costs around three dollars and is roughly equal to the price of 
three bottles of beer.  The estimated economic loss from heavy 
alcohol consumption is 500-700 billion rubles per year, or three 
percent of GDP.  The situation is most critical in small towns, 
where poor economic conditions and high unemployment drive many men 
to drink. 
 
Alcohol-Related Deaths Drive the Demographic Crisis 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4. (U) Vladimir Shkolnikov, a well-known Russian demographer now 
working at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in 
Rostok, Germany, and Aleksandr Nemtsov, the pioneer of Russian 
alcohol epidemiology research from the Moscow Institute of 
Psychiatry, presented data showing the major contribution of alcohol 
to overall mortality.  Nemtsov attributes 22 percent of male 
mortality and 15 percent of female mortality to alcohol consumption. 
 According to Nemtsov's estimates, 365,000 men and 128,000 women, 
almost 500,000 total, died every year from the consequences of 
alcohol consumption in the years 1990 to 2001.  Shkolnikov 
attributes 82,000 deaths a year to the direct effects of alcohol 
consumption, including violent deaths, suicides, traffic accidents, 
and traumas.  These deaths are supplemented by deaths from 
cardiovascular diseases, cirrhosis of the liver, and 
gastro-intestinal diseases, in all of which alcohol is a 
 
MOSCOW 00001434  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
contributing factor. 
 
Alcohol Consumption Needs Better Study 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Many participants emphasized the need to collect solid data 
to characterize Russia's alcohol p
roblem.  The renowned Russian 
demographer, Anatoliy Vishnevskiy, Director of the newly established 
Institute of Demography at the Higher School of Economics, lamented 
that there is no national research center on alcoholism and alcohol 
abuse.  Such a center could collect basic data and more sharply 
define the level of drinking and the resulting health-related 
consequences and economic losses, to better guide policy-makers. 
 
Battling Illegal Sales and Alcohol Surrogates 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) Duma Deputy Yevgeniy Roizman, well-known for his anti-drug 
campaign in Yekaterinburg, spoke about his experiences fighting 
illegal alcohol sales.  He claimed that Yekaterinburg was losing 
2,000 people annually due to acute alcohol poisonings.  He noted 
that several local investigations revealed that the local police 
were either involved in unregulated sales, or offered protection to 
sellers of illegal product.  Roizman also complained of the 
resistance he has faced in introducing legislation to criminalize 
sales of spirits to minors, noting that many legislators have 
commercial interests in vodka ventures or alcohol production plants. 
 
 
7. (U) Roizman also noted that inexpensive medicines containing 
alcohol constitute a significant portion of the alcohol consumed by 
Russia's poor.  A well-known, non-prescription Russian concoction 
for heart problems ("nastoika boyaryshnika") is produced in 
quantities that far exceed any reasonable medical demand.  This 
product is also sold in 50-100 milliliter bottles, apparently to 
market it to drinkers.  Likewise, Russia has 15 plants producing 
alcohol for technical and industrial uses, though most experts 
believe one plant would be sufficient to satisfy domestic demand. 
These alcohol surrogates, as well as other solvents and cleaning 
solutions, led to a spate of widely publicized alcohol poisonings in 
2006 (Refs B, C). 
 
Finding a Way to Shift Consumers to Beer 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) Many speakers noted Russia could reduce hard alcohol 
consumption either through heavy taxation of spirits or severely 
restricting points of sale.  Poland (historically, a vodka-drinking 
country) in 1996 increased prices for spirits by introducing a heavy 
tax, which led to a massive shift to beer drinking.  By 2001, male 
life expectancy increased by four years, and consumption of hard 
alcohol dropped from 65 percent to 20 percent of overall alcohol 
consumption.  Finland and Sweden introduced beer sales in 
supermarkets, but severely restricted the retail outlets for hard 
alcohol, which also led to a reduction in spirits consumption.  Some 
experts also argued that reintroducing the Soviet-era state monopoly 
on alcohol production would reduce consumption, though others 
disagreed and felt a state monopoly would not influence drinking 
habits. 
 
Alcohol Deaths Still Serious But Declining 
------------------------------------------ 
 
9. (U) There were 138,000 fewer deaths in Russia in 2006 compared to 
2005, and deaths from alcohol poisoning dropped by 20 percent.  Some 
demographers argued that the decline resulted from legislation that 
led to supply disruptions, including a law increasing the pre-paid 
capital of alcohol producers and retail sellers, and the rocky 
introduction of a unified automated accounting system for alcohol 
production (Ref C).  Other experts were more reluctant to link the 
decline in mortality from alcohol poisonings to alcohol shortages, 
and noted that the number of these deaths had been gradually 
declining over the last two years. 
 
10. (SBU) COMMENT:  Many remarked at the notable absence of Ministry 
of Health and Social Development officials.  The conference also 
paid little attention to alcohol awareness and measures to address 
alcohol demand, an issue which is almost never mentioned by Russian 
 
MOSCOW 00001434  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
policy-makers.  Western alcohol companies are adapting their 
international awareness campaigns to Russia by emphasizing the need 
to educate consumers about responsible drinking, such as how many 
Russians do not seem to recognize that beer is an alcoholic beverage 
like wine and spirits (Ref C).  A medical officer from the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs who did attend the conference, told us drinking 
on the job is increasingly a problem within the police, and asked 
about the experiences of U.S. police forces in managing alcohol 
prevention and treatment programs.  Conference participants intend 
to present their conclusions and recommendations to the Presidential 
Administration and to First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev, but as 
one well-known demographer told us, his own detailed reports on the 
role of alcohol on Russia's demographic situation had been sitting 
in the Presidential Administration for a year and a half with no 
reaction. 
 
11. (SBU) COMMENT CONT'D: Two officials from the Presidential 
Administration briefly appeared: Nelli Naigovzina, Deputy Head of 
the Expert Department, and Elvira Nabiullina, Head of Experts 
Council for the National Priority Projects.  Their presence suggests 
that the Russian Government recognizes that widespread alcohol abuse 
is fueling the overall demographic crisis.  Despite the attention to 
the issue, we do not expect the government to introduce any major 
anti-alcohol measures, given upcoming Duma and Presidential 
elections, and the still bitter memories of Gorbachev's anti-alcohol 
campaign in the mid-80s.  Gorbachev introduced a series of stringent 
anti-alcohol measures in May 1985 that lasted until December 1987. 
Although Russian mortality dramatically improved during this period, 
the measures made Gorbachev extremely unpopular, and led to 
shortages of sugar as a result of widespread moonshine production. 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

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07MOSCOW1431, MARCH 11 REGIONAL ELECTIONS: FINAL SNAPSHOT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1431 2007-03-30 13:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0152
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1431/01 0891343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301343Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8823
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3927
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2333
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2017

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM RS
SUBJECT: MARCH 11 REGIONAL ELECTIONS: FINAL SNAPSHOT 
 
MOSCOW 00001431  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary: The results of the March 11 regional 
elections suggest that the success of the Kremlin's 
experiment in managed democracy has come at the (minor) 
expense of the United Russia (YR) party.  For A Just Russia 
(SR) (the other Kremlin-backed party) and the Communist Party 
(KPRF) emerged from the regional contests satisfied with 
their comparatively strong, and in the case of the KPRF, 
surprising, results.  Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR was 
broadly weaker than in the last Duma election, but still on 
the board in most contests, leaving it, YR, SR, and the KPRF 
virtually certain to cross the threshold to representation in 
the December Duma elections.  The prospects of the Union of 
Right Forces (SPS) are less certain, although the party's 
new-found populism and, some argue, a green light from the 
Kremlin allowed it to gain representation in four of the 
fourteen contests held March 11. Although SPS is contesting 
the results of some of the regional elections, decisions on 
its appeals are unlikely to cause major adjustments in the 
make-up of the regional legislatures.   End summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
United Russia: Victorious, But... 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Instead of elation, the Kremlin-sponsored United 
Russia's (YR) March 11 sweep of all fourteen regional races 
has produced some disappointment in the party.  Regional 
leaders in Orel and Stavropol, where YR did worse then 
predicted, have been criticized and some have termed YR's 
lower than predicted numbers a "defeat" for the party. 
Despite 615.8 million rubles in financing (50 percent more 
than its most serious competitor, For A Just Russia) and near 
unfettered access to administrative resources, YR did more 
poorly in four regions (Leningrad, Orel, Samara, and 
Stavropol) than in the 2003 State Duma elections. 
 
--------------------------- 
Just Russia: Pleasing Debut 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU)  With a first place finish in Stavropol (although 
YR's strong showing in the region's single-mandate races 
ultimately allowed it to claim victory) and a second-place 
finish in five other regions, the Kremlin-sanctioned party 
For A Just Russia (SR) has positioned itself to be YR's chief 
rival in the December State Duma elections.  Helping SR get 
on the scoreboard just four months after being created were 
established membership lists (SR was fashioned from three, 
pre-existent parties -- Rodina, the Russian Party of 
Pensioners, and the Russian Party of Life), ready access to 
the media, prominent national and regional politicians, deep 
pockets, and limited access to administrative resources. 
 
4. (SBU)  In a post-election conversation, SR International 
Department Director Mikhail Demurin told us that votes for 
his newly-fledged party had come from former YR supporters 
and those opposed to YR's continued dominance.  Demurin 
agreed that SR had failed to accomplish part of its mission, 
which reportedly was to subtract votes from the Communist 
Party (KPRF). 
 
------------------------ 
KPRF: Strategy Validated 
------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The KPRF was buoyed by its higher-then-expected 
election results (reftel).  Mercator Group President Dmitriy 
Oreshkin agreed that KPRF's performance had been the one 
election surprise.  KPRF Deputy Chairman Ivan Melnikov 
asserted that the party on March 11 had increased its share 
of the vote from 10 - 15 percent to 15 - 20 percent.  KPRF's 
improvement in the polls has been variously traced to protest 
votes, the party's traditionally disciplined voters, and a 
degree of success in getting young people to the polls. 
KPRF's forceful protests of the initial results in Dagestan, 
where it was originally reported to have won 6.79 percent of 
the vote, led to a recount, which got it over the seven 
percent threshold and into the regional legislature, making 
it the only party to join YR in all fourteen legislatures. 
 
------------------- 
LDPR: Not "Too Bad" 
------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  LDPR Duma Deputy Aleksey Mitrofanov summarized the 
party's results as "not bad." (The party won representation 
in 11 regional legislatures, but polled somewhat more poorly 
than it had in earlier elections.)  Mitrofanov was pleased, 
 
MOSCOW 00001431  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
however, that LDPR had exceeded ten percent in most contests 
and nudged the 14 percent mark in others.  The one shock had 
been Moscow region, where LDPR polled 6.81 percent. 
Mitrofanov termed the tally "suspicious," since early returns 
had suggested LDPR would win eight percent. 
 
-------------------------- 
SPS: Not Quite a Contender 
-------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The Union of Right Forces (SPS) narrowly failed to 
cross the seven percent threshold in three of the nine &#x
000A;regions in which it was registered and won representation in 
four.  Its mixed results on March 11 leave SPS's prospects 
for representation in the Duma after the December elections 
uncertain.  SPS insiders attribute the party's improved 
performance to its newfound emphasis on social issues. 
Others argue that the party success is traceable to an 
understanding with the Kremlin.  If so, the mysterious 
disappearance of votes in the Leningrad region re-count and 
the party's electoral problems in Moscow and Orel suggest 
that the nature of that understanding is not well understood 
by all. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU)  The March 11 results suggest the successful 
realization of the Kremlin's plan for a managed democracy, 
although it appears at this juncture to be five parties, not 
two, that are being managed.  Shaping the March 11 races were 
2006 changes to the electoral law that constrained political 
debate, eliminated minimal voter turnout requirements, and 
toughened party registration requirements.  Also critical to 
the outcome were the decisions of regional election 
commissions not to register parties for the elections, 
sometimes on somewhat flimsy grounds.  YR was forced to pay a 
price -- although the cost was modest -- of being the 
governing party.  SR's respectable finish should end some of 
the local squabbling that has accompanied its appearance, and 
turn it into a draw for local politicians and officials not 
admitted to YR's inner circle. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Results by Region in Moscow Consular District 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) Percentages in the party list votes for regions in the 
Moscow Consular District are below: 
 
Dagestan Republic (fluid results): 
 
United Russia           63.67 
Just Russia             10.68 
Agrarian Party           9.12 
KPRF                     7.22 
Patriots of Russia       7.07 
----------- 
LDPR                     0.81 
 
 
Komi Republic 
 
United Russia           36.18 
Just Russia             15.49 
KPRF                    14.26 
LDPR                    13.60 
SPS                      8.80 
 
 
Moscow Region 
 
United Russia           49.57 
KPRF                    18.61 
Just Russia              8.86 
----------- 
SPS (contesting result)  6.90 
LDPR                     6.81 
Yabloko                  4.09 
Patriots of Russia       2.05 
 
 
Orel Region 
 
United Russia           39.02 
KPRF                    23.78 
Just Russia             12.60 
 
MOSCOW 00001431  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
LDPR                     7.34 
----------- 
SPS (contesting result)  6.98 
Patriots of Russia       3.06 
People's Will            2.09 
Democratic Party         1.31 
   of Russia 
 
Samara Region 
 
United Russia           33.54 
KPRF                    18.98 
Just Russia             15.14 
LDPR                    11.59 
SPS                      8.11 
Green Party              7.62 
----------- 
Patriots of Russia       1.38 
 
 
Stavropol Region 
 
Just Russia             37.64 
United Russia           23.87 
KPRF                    14.13 
LDPR                    11.80 
SPS                      7.73 
 
 
Tomsk Region 
 
United Russia           46.79 
KPRF                    13.37 
LDPR                    12.87 
Just Russia              7.90 
SPS                      7.78 
----------- 
Patriots of Russia       3.75 
Yabloko                  3.65 
Unity                    1.06 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1414, RUSSIA NOTIFIED ABOUT BANK SEPAH, STILL NO DECREE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1414 2007-03-30 10:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1414 0891035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301035Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8798
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0329
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001414 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, IO/FO, EEB/ESC/TFS 
STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/CPI 
TREASURY FOR BAKER, ALIKONIS, EDDY 
NSC FOR KLECHESKI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: KNNP IR RS PARM EFIN KTFN
SUBJECT: RUSSIA NOTIFIED ABOUT BANK SEPAH, STILL NO DECREE 
ON UNSCR 1737 
 
REF: A. STATE 38553 
 
     B. MOSCOW 1262 
     C. MOSCOW 1249 
 
Classified By: ECON M/C Pam Quanrud, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (C) Econoff delivered a copy of Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Robert M. Kimmitt's statement (provided in Reftel A) on UNSCR 
1747's designation of Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International 
to Vladimir Prokhorov, Senior Legal Counsel for the MFA's 
Department of New Threast and Challenges.  Delivery of the 
Deputy Treasury Secretary's statement allowed for a follow-up 
meeting with the MFA to discussions that Treasury Assistant 
Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes 
 
SIPDIS 
Patrick O'Brien had with Russian officials during his March 
12-13 visit to Moscow. 
 
2.  (C) During that visit, O'Brien relayed the USG's concerns 
about Bank Sepah, as well as Bank Saderat, to the Russia's 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly 
Safonov (Reftel B), Deputy Central Bank Chairman Viktor 
Melnikov, and Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Russia's 
FIU) Director Viktor Zubkov (Reftel C).  O'Brien also urged 
the presidents of the Association of Russian Banks and the 
Russian Association of Regional Banks to alert their members 
to requests for transactions from these banks. 
 
3.  (C) Prokhorov said that the interagency effort to draft a 
Presidential Decree that would allow for implementation of 
the previous resolution on Iran, UNSCR 1737, remained a work 
in progress.  He offered no timeframe for implementation of 
UNSCR 1747. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1413, RUSSIA TO REVIEW TALIBAN LIST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1413 2007-03-30 10:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1413 0891035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301035Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8797
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0445
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1953
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1780
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0328
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, SCA/FO, IO/PSC 
TREASURY FOR BAKER, ALIKONIS 
NSC FOR KLECHESKI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: AF RS EFIN ETTC KTFN PGOV PREL PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: RUSSIA TO REVIEW TALIBAN LIST 
 
REF: STATE 36625 
 
Classified By: ECON M/C Pam Quanrud, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
(C) Econoff delivered reftel points on updating the Taliban 
sanctions list to Vladimir Prokhorov, Senior Legal Counsel in 
the MFA's Department of New Threats and Challenges. 
Prokhorov said the GOR would review its previous Taliban 
designation submissions and its Taliban designations 
currently under consideration.  Nevertheless, he said the MFA 
harbored reservations that this updating effort could be the 
first step in a process to delist existing Taliban 
designations, a move that Moscow has instructed its UN 
Mission to oppose. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1396, KPRF: PEOPLE POLITICS THE KEY TO SUCCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1396 2007-03-30 06:55 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9640
RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1396/01 0890655
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300655Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8767
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3922
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2328
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 2015

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: KPRF: PEOPLE POLITICS THE KEY TO SUCCESS 
 
REF: MOSCOW 1067 
 
MOSCOW 00001396  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  The Communist Party of Russia's (KPRF) 
broad-based and somewhat unexpected success in the March 11 
regional elections (reftel), despite a minuscule campaign 
budget, is attributable to the survival of its party machine 
and a socialist message that resonates with voters.  Although 
likely to be increasingly pressed by For A Just Russia (SR -- 
the Kremlin's left wing party) and to a lesser extent the 
newly-populist Union of Right Forces (SPS), KPRF has become 
more appealing to voters disillusioned with United Russia's 
monopoly on power.  The KPRF's popularity is especially 
visible in cities, where United Russia's (YR) administrative 
resources are less effective.  Even if KPRF can capitalize on 
growing dissatisfaction, it has no chance to de-throne United 
Russia in the December Duma elections, but it may nibble at 
SR's numbers.  Although the KPRF improved its standing on 
March 11, that is unlikely to do much for party Chairman 
Gennadiy Zyuganov's third run at the presidency in 2008.  End 
summary. 
 
-------------------- 
KPRF's March Success 
-------------------- 
 
2. (SBU)  Although estimates vary, it is clear that in the 
March 11 regional elections, the KPRF enjoyed a noticeable 
increase in support in almost all regions when compared to 
the 2003 Duma elections.  On March 11, KPRF averages 
increased to 15 - 20 percent across the fourteen regions from 
the 10 - 15 percent it received in 2003.  (KPRF's better 
numbers in March are partially explained by the traditionally 
lower turnout for the regional elections.  This is thought to 
work to the advantage of the KPRF, which is believed to have 
more disciplined voters.)  A campaign budget of just 25.4 
million RUR (USD 1 million) -- 24 times smaller than that of 
the Kremlin-sponsored United Russia party -- forced the KPRF 
to rely on disciplined regional deputies and central 
committees to get the KPRF message to the regions. As Orel's 
KPRF representative Vasiliy Ikonnikov underscored to us on 
March 15, KPRF's relative success was a tribute both to its 
superior organizational skills and a sign of people's 
unhappiness with YR's track record in areas such as housing 
services and pensions. 
 
3. (SBU)  KPRF leadership was particularly pleased with its 
success in cities.  In Omsk and Orel, the party snagged over 
thirty percent of the vote, while in the Komi Republic's 
second city, Ukhta, it polled 17 percent (2.5 times its 2003 
results).  All, according to Ukhta KPRF head and 
newly-elected legislator Anatoliy Ostroglazev, without the 
benefit of money and administrative resources.  While KPRF 
won just 24 percent of the vote to YR's thirty percent in 
Samara, it easily bested SR's sixteen percent to finish 
second.  KPRF Central Information Technology Center Head Ilya 
Ponomarev reported that the KPRF had done much better across 
the fourteen regions in cities, and less well in rural areas; 
a difference he sourced to the more effective use of 
"administrative resources" by Kremlin parties in the 
countryside.  Mercator Group Director Dmitriy Oreshkin 
concurred that the less manageable cities had blunted United 
Russia's edge in administrative resources. 
 
4. (SBU)  SR International Department Director Mikhail 
Demurin told us that he had been "very impressed" with KPRF's 
performance on March 11. He was convinced that the KPRF had 
won a significant part of the youth vote.  Young KPRF 
sympathizers came from families whose parents were academics 
or intellectuals and whose status had dropped considerably 
during the 1990s transition, he said.  Demurin surmised that 
the youth who are suffering the effects of "botched" 
education reform voted KPRF, as well.  Komi's Ostroglazev 
also traced KPRF's success to the youth vote, claiming that 
50 - 55 percent of KPRF's Komi's totals had come from 18 - 30 
year olds.  KPRF interlocutors all see increasing support 
from young people, who are having difficulty educating their 
children, finding housing, and who face poor employment 
prospects. 
 
---------------------- 
Not Resting on Laurels 
---------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)  At its March 24 party convention, KPRF Deputy Chief 
Ivan Melnikov enumerated the party's goals in the lead-up to 
the December Duma elections.  Melnikov described the 
left-positioned SR as the KPRF's chief challenge, and 
exhorted members to target it by highlighting its support of 
 
MOSCOW 00001396  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
United Russia policies.  With forty percent of voters backing 
Kremlin parties and twenty percent already committed 
"protest" voters (KPRF and LDPR supporters), Melnikov tasked 
the KPRF faithful to proselytize among the remaining, 
economically-straitened forty percent of the electorate by 
convincing it that the KPRF will better serve their interests 
than SR Chairman Sergey Mironov. 
 
---------------- 
KPRF's Obstac
les 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU)  Voters' Club Strategic Head Stanislav Kulakov 
disagreed that KPRF's success could be traced to superior 
organizational skills and disaffected youth.  He instead 
cited the Kremlin's desire to provide a manageable release 
valve for disgruntled voters. KPRF was "harmless."  It had 
been in the Duma for years and had accomplished nothing, 
which made it acceptable to the powers-that-be. 
 
7. (SBU) KPRF interlocutors are guardedly positive in 
conversations with Embassy about Chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov, 
but there are frequent rumors that he is seen by insiders as 
a drag on the party. Demurin suggested that the KPRF may have 
peaked with the March 11 elections, a possibility he traced 
to the Chairman's limited public appeal and the party's 
failure, under Zyuganov, to fully exploit traditional bases 
of support, like the trade union movement. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU)  If the accounts of interlocutors are correct, the 
March 11 elections suggest that KPRF may be in the middle of 
a limited revival, fueled by voters opposed to United Russia 
and, to a much lesser extent, dissatisfaction among youth. 
Earlier assertions by KPRF contacts that the party was 
recovering in the cities may have been borne out on March 11. 
 Still, KPRF urban voters are neither sufficiently numerous 
nor notably very loyal, and might be co-opted by even a 
slight improvement in living conditions before the next 
elections.  Also arguing against a further surge in KPRF's 
popularity is the alleged intention of the "managers" of 
Russia's democracy to see SR further improve on its March 11 
election performance, which saw it over the seven percent 
threshold in 13 districts a mere four months after being 
created. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1394, DAGESTAN: “IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE PEOPLE KNOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1394 2007-03-29 15:14 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9086
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1394/01 0881514
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291514Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8760
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 001394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: DAGESTAN:  "IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE PEOPLE KNOW 
THERE WAS AN ELECTION" 
 
 
Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice G. Wells.  Reason:  1.4 (b, d) 
 
"It is enough that the people know there was an election. 
The people who cast the votes decide nothing.  The people who 
count the votes decide everything." 
 
-- Soso Jugashvili, Caucasus Philosopher 
 
Introduction and Summary 
------------------------ 
 
1. (C) Dagestan went to the polls March 11, as did many 
localities in Russia, but the elections bore little relation 
-- both in process and in meaning -- to what happened 
elsewhere in the country.  The elections were a way for the 
four main power groupings to test their strength for the 
first time since former leader Magomedali Magomedov -- "the 
Grandfather" retired last year and Putin appointed a 
full-fledged President, the reforming technocrat Mukhu 
Aliyev, in his place.  In addition, the elections represent a 
compromise by local groups with the trappings of democracy 
and party politics foisted upon them by Moscow; the elections 
are a veneer over the real system, not unlike a Halloween 
costume a child might put on for one day to please its 
parents.   Mukhu Aliyev is standard bearer for United Russia, 
but leaders of the other three power groups were all on the 
United Russia ticket as well, all the while supporting 
candidates in opposing parties -- the factions transcend 
party bounds.  The results were carefully calculated to 
please Moscow while finding a middle point based on the 
relative strengths of the four factions.  But the basic 
problems of inter-factional strife remain.  End Summary. 
 
Warlord Democracy 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) Time was, Dagestan held the fairest elections on 
earth.  That was after the 1992 collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the retreat of Moscow from the affairs of the small 
mountain republic.  In February 1998, for example, Said 
Amirov -- a warlord confined to a wheelchair by a 1992 
assassination attempt, one of the 14 he has survived -- ran 
for mayor of Makhachkala, Dagestan's capital.  Amirov is of 
the Dargins, the second largest of Dagestan's 39 official 
ethnic groups.  Amirov's main opponent was a warlord of the 
Avars, Dagestan's largest ethnic group. 
 
3. (C) Both realized that using the normal techniques for a 
Caucasus election -- buying votes, stuffing ballots, 
falsifying the count -- would unleash a clan war that could 
kill hundreds or even thousands.  So they agreed to hold an 
honest election, because only an election without a hint of 
falsification would allow the loser to concede defeat without 
losing dignity.  Before the election, both sides had thugs 
out on the street ensuring that votes were not bought (all 
ethnic groups are represented in Makhachkala, and no one 
group predominates).  Both sides had thugs at the entrance to 
polling precincts, checking passports to ensure that only 
those entitled to vote in a particular polling place was 
allowed to enter it.  Both sides had thugs observing the 
voting, to ensure there was not ballot-stuffing or multiple 
voting.  And both sides had thugs watching over the vote 
count.  Amirov won, and remains mayor to this day -- and the 
most powerful warlord in Dagestan. 
 
4. (C) Dagestan was run in Moscow's absence, in the years 
following the Soviet collapse, by a curious ethnic balancing 
system.  Dagestan's centuries-old unit of power was the 
"jamaat," best translated as "canton."  This was a 
self-governing group of clans living in one small 
geographical area.  There are several hundred of these, each 
with its own dialect.  When the Russians arrived in the 19th 
century they couldn't deal with that many different peoples, 
and grouped those speaking closely related languages together 
-- all those speaking dialects close to Avar became Avars, 
etc.  That reduced the number of peoples to 39, and these 
were further reduced for political purposes to 14 by 
subsuming small related groups into the Avars and Dargins. 
After Moscow's influence disappeared from Dagestan in the 
early 1990s, the locals formed a Presidential Council -- 
rather than a one-person Presidency -- composed of one 
representative from each of the 14 groups.  At the same time, 
government ministries and senior bureaucratic posts were 
carefully doled out to ensure that each group got its fair 
share of the top jobs. 
 
5. (C) The competition between jamaats remained and even 
intensified now that, for example, all of the Avar jamaats 
were competing for the one Avar seat on the Council.  This 
tension produced a free-wheeling political system in which 
each jamaat or bloc of jamaats had its own "ethno-party" 
 
MOSCOW 00001394  002 OF 006 
 
 
capable of calling on significant armed force to back up its 
political claims.  Parties banded together in ad hoc 
alliances to promote their own interests and defend the 
interests of the wider ethnic group (when these did not 
conflict).  Magomedali Magomedov, "The Grandfather" and Chair 
of the Presidential Council, kept the peace by brilliantly 
playing all off against all, acting as the peacemaker.  Any 
one party could exercise a veto by calling its ethnic milit
ia 
down from the mountains, guns at the ready, to take over the 
main square of Makhachkala.  Magomedov received their 
delegations, made promises and concessions, and kept the 
balance.  Of course, sometimes warlords insisted on demands 
that all the others thought were excessive.  The others would 
talk to him.  If he still would not see reason, well, a large 
and very public explosion usually put an end to the demands. 
As Soso Jugashvili also said, "No man, no problem." 
 
The New Order 
------------- 
 
6. (C) But much has changed in Russia, and perforce in 
Dagestan.  Under Putin, Moscow has returned with a vengeance. 
 It took six years to force out "The Grandfather," but 
Magomedov finally retired in 2006.  Putin chose the 
technocratic speaker of Dagestan's parliament, Mukhu Aliyev, 
to be President, replacing the entire Presidential Council 
system.  Aliyev seems to have been the choice of the 
"Grandfather," and also seems to have been acceptable to the 
reformist Presidential Representative for the Southern 
Federal District, Dmitriy Kozak.  In 2007, now under close 
scrutiny from Moscow, Dagestan could not avoid the party 
system imposed from the center.  The Dagestani elites have 
had to find other ways to resolve disputes.  Elections become 
a tool in the process, but not the process itself. 
 
7. (C) Not that the parties of the Center have any illusions 
that Dagestan politics have much to do with national party 
politics.  As the leader of the Union of Rightist Forces 
(SPS) told us after his party was disqualified from running 
in the March 11 election for the Republic's Parliament, "We 
picked the wrong warlord."  Moscow's main interest has been 
to ensure that there is a veneer of national politics -- 
however thin -- over the power struggles internal to Dagestan. 
 
8. (C) Seven parties nominally competed in the elections. 
However, all members of the four main factions vying for 
power -- and everyone else who matters -- were members of 
United Russia, the Kremlin's party of power.  The factions 
break down as follows: 
 
-- First is Said Amirov, still Mayor of Makhachkala and still 
the most powerful warlord in the country.  But he is under 
threat.  He was the main muscle for "Grandfather" Magomedali 
Magomedov, like Amirov an ethnic Dargin.  "The Grandfather" 
faced opposition from the Avars, who believed that as the 
largest ethnic group they should have had the presidency. 
Amirov defended Magomedov.  But tensions arose between the 
two of them, as Amirov made it plain that he thought "The 
Grandfather" had agreed to repay the favor by stepping aside 
in a timely way and letting Amirov take over.  Magomedov had 
no such plans. 
 
-- Thus there is friction between Amirov and the second 
group, the faction nominally headed by "The Grandfather's" 
son Magomedsalam Magomedov, now speaker of Parliament, but 
with "The Grandfather" in the wings as consigliere.  The two 
groups are vying both for the leadership of the Dargins and 
the political legacy of "The Grandfather."  Meanwhile, now 
that there is an Avar President, Amirov is gradually being 
deprived of his access to "budgetary resources" (i.e., direct 
theft from subventions paid from Moscow), rent-seeking 
opportunities, and patronage. 
 
-- The third group is that of the current president, Mukhu 
Aliyev.  Aliyev is a strange character for Dagestan: 
technocratic, not corrupt, not willing to play the political 
game the way "The Grandfather" used to.  As one of our guides 
to Dagestani political life put it, under Magomedov, life was 
simple.  You wanted a lucrative government job, you paid 
Magomedov the agreed price, and the job was yours.  Now, 
under Aliyev, those who have jobs are supposed to work at 
them, not just make money by using their office.  Those who 
work badly are replaced.  Rent-seekers find this innovation 
disquieting.  Aliyev is the head of United Russia in 
Dagestan, and he controls the United Russia ticket.  His is 
the only group using only one party.  Those he picked for 
parliament are, like him, technocrats. 
 
-- The fourth force is the so-called "Northern Alliance." 
This is a group of powerful Avar warlords from the northern 
tier of the Avar country - the non-mountainous 
 
MOSCOW 00001394  003 OF 006 
 
 
Khasavyurt-Kizlyar region, as opposed to the original Avar 
homeland in the high mountains of the country's west.  The 
Alliance was deeply opposed to Magomedov, and its members are 
eager to show their loyalty to and support for their 
fellow-Avar, Mukhu Aliyev, even though he was not their 
candidate for president.  They are so eager, in fact, that 
they perform services for him that he has not even asked for. 
 
 
9. (C) Aliyev tries to keep his distance from the Alliance. 
In the current elections, one of the Alliance's strongmen, 
Sagid Murtazaliyev, was running for district chief of 
Kizlyar.  Murtazaliyev really is a strongman, having been an 
Olympic and World Champion weightlifter.  Aliyev, conscious 
that Moscow is always looking over his shoulder, opposed 
Murtazaliyev's election:  Kizlyar is a largely ethnic Russian 
district, it has always had Russian district chiefs, and 
Aliyev declared that he would prefer to see a Russian elected 
this time as well.  But Murtazaliyev not only won in Kizlyar; 
he also got a kinsman elected district chief of the Tsumada 
district, in the western mountains, from which his clan 
stems. 
 
10. (C) In addition, Aliyev is responsible to Moscow for the 
quality of his party list.  So, for example, it would have 
looked bad for the two brothers of Northern Alliance grandee 
Gadzhi Makhachev, Duma representative for Makhachkala, to run 
on the United Russia  ticket.  Neither they nor Gadzhi fit 
the technocratic mold that Moscow wants to see.  So Gadzhi 
put them on the Just Russia ticket, running against his own 
party.  There was another reason Gadzhi did this:  he ran his 
younger brother in Amirov's home district, trying to use his 
influence to reduce Amirov's vote. 
 
11. (C) The elections held on March 11 served a purpose for 
these four factions, not just for Moscow.  They were the 
first chance the factions have had to demonstrate their 
relative strength in the new power alignment that came into 
being with the retirement of "The Grandfather."  True to the 
dictum of Soso the Sage of the Caucasus, their strength is 
shown not in the numbers of those who cast votes, but in the 
numbers of ballots that are counted. 
 
The Casting, the Counting... 
---------------------------- 
 
12. (C) The elections proceeded in four phases.  First, the 
clans infiltrated their candidates into all the party lists 
and start to gain support for their own candidates and 
destroy their opponents' support.  Amirov, while himself 
firmly on the United Russia ticket (all factions want Kremlin 
support), started financing candidates on the Union of 
Rightist Forces (SPS) ticket (he wa
s the "wrong warlord" to 
whom the party's Moscow leader referred above).  The Northern 
Alliance made a successful countermove:  through a 
combination of pressure, influence, disincentives (some of 
them involving automatic weapons) and incentives, three SPS 
candidates were disqualified.  This wiped the entire ticket 
off the ballot for parliament, though SPS remained on the 
ballot for local councils and district chiefs.  And then 
there were six. 
 
13. (C) At this point we should describe the six: 
 
-- As mentioned, United Russia (YeR) is the Kremlin's party 
of power and also the party of the president of Dagestan.  As 
the party of power, most of the powerful belong to it, 
regardless of what ticket they run on. 
 
-- Just Russia (SR) is the second Kremlin Party of power, and 
has the advantage that Dagestan's president does not control 
the ticket.  Thus it is a home for warlords, grandees and 
other powerful folks who might be an embarrassment on the YeR 
ticket.  As we mentioned, Gadzhi Makhachev ran his two 
brothers on this ticket.  Another colorful figure of SR is a 
Mountain Jew from Derbent named Sergey Pinkhasov; Makhachev 
appears to be a patron of the Derbent Jewish community, one 
having been among the boys he financed to attend a military 
high school in San Diego. 
 
-- The Agrarians and Communists are traditional parties in 
Dagestan.  The Agrarians still have some strong figures in 
their party, but the communists have lost steadily since 
1996, when Zyuganov, the Communist candidate, received 70 
percent of Dagestan's vote in the first round of the election 
(he only received 30 percent in the run-off against Yeltsin, 
leading most observers to conclude that the second round of 
the election had seen the application of traditional Caucasus 
political technologies).  The Communists are left with party 
activists, but no money; however, they appeared to have some 
money in the final days of the campaign, and observers 
 
MOSCOW 00001394  004 OF 006 
 
 
strongly suspected this came from Amirov. 
 
-- The Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), like the SPS, was 
initially disqualified from the race for parliament. 
However, that decision was reversed after Zhirinovskiy made a 
personal plea to Makhachev.  That was a safe move, since a 
Great Russian chauvinist party had no chances of making 
inroads in overwhelmingly non-Russian Dagestan. 
 
-- The Patriots are a largely regional party, known to 
represent the interests of the Lezgins and related 
nationalities in the usually overlooked southern part of the 
country.  Representing a disgruntled electoral base, the 
Patriots were a good vehicle for all disgruntled Dagestanis 
in a Republic whose social injustice and gap between rich and 
poor is high even by Russian standards.  The Patriots were 
impoverished, but suddenly received massive infusions of 
cash, known to be from Makhachkala Mayor Amirov (by 
unofficial count, the Patriots appear to have taken 20% of 
the vote in Makhachkala, drawing on support much broader than 
the Lezgin diaspora there). 
 
14. (C) After the first phase, before election day, came the 
elections themselves on March 11.  The usual abuses were 
reported - bought votes, busloads moving from precinct to 
precinct and voting in all of them, ballot stuffing, etc. 
The third phase was the counting and preparation of the vote 
protocols in the precincts.  These provided an opportunity 
for party machine hacks to show their loyalty to their bosses 
by ensuring that the "right" party or parties got an 
appropriate vote count.  The fourth phase was the preparation 
of the republic-wide results, in which the original protocols 
were amended to reflect the results of post-counting 
negotiations among the principal forces. 
 
15. (C) But here a new, fifth phase has interjected itself: 
the negotiation with Moscow.  Results must be acceptable to 
the Kremlin, and this means making sure that they don't look 
ridiculous and that they satisfy (i.e., silence) the outraged 
complaints of national parties such as the Communists.  This 
phase seems to have taken at least a week, as the final 
results came out well after those of the rest of the regions 
that voted.  In the initial vote count, neither the 
Communists nor the Patriots passed the 7% barrier for 
representation in Parliament (Communists were given 5.47%, 
Patriots 6.1%), though both undoubtedly did better.  A Lezgin 
expert was convinced, for example, that in this phase Said 
Amirov would "trade" the performance of the Patriots for 
concessions on the conduct and results of the State Duma 
elections at the end of this year.  In the event, however, 
the Patriots were allowed to squeak through with 7.07% of the 
vote, and the Communists received 7.12%.  This was done by 
shaving percentages off other parties.  In the preliminary 
count, YeR received 65.67%; the final count gave them 63.81%. 
 SR went from 11.48% to 10.74%; and the Agrarians from 9.16 
to 9.12. 
 
...And the Accounting 
--------------------- 
 
16. (C) But what of the real results - changes in the balance 
of power among the leading political groupings?  Amirov came 
out slightly down.  He managed to get the Patriots into 
Parliament, but lost heavily on his backing of SPS.  Though 
he won in his district (turning his seat down to retain his 
executive position), his majority (in the preliminary count) 
"only" approached 70%, well below most of the unchallenged 
YeR stalwarts.  This was due to competition from the younger 
brother of Amirov's blood rival, Gadzhi Makhachev, running on 
the JR ticket.  Amirov may also have lost out to the other 
Dargin faction, the one headed by the "Grandfather's" son, 
Magomedsalam Magomedov.  In one race for district chief, 
Amirov's protg lost big to a supporter of Magomedov.  This 
conclusion must be treated gingerly, however, because the 
report of this race comes in an anti-Amirov newspaper; 
perhaps it played up the defeat for Amirov while glossing 
over his victories elsewhere. 
 
17. (C) Northern Alliance grandee Gadzhi Makhachev managed to 
elect a second brother in Khasavyurt, also running on the SR 
ticket - a demonstration that even running in opposition to 
his own party he could deliver votes loyal to himself 
personally.  As we mentioned, Makhachev's fellow Ally in the 
Northern Alliance, Sagid Murtazaliyev, had a very good day. 
On the whole, the Northern Alliance seems to have done well. 
 
18. (C) It is unclear how President Mukhu Aliyev came out. 
His technocrats will fill the majority of parliamentary 
seats, which is perhaps all he cares about:  his obvious goal 
in the elections was to ensure a base of support independent 
from the clan systems either of his fellow Avars or of other 
 
MOSCOW 00001394  005 OF 006 
 
 
ethnic groups. 
 
19. (C) How did Moscow come out?  On the whole, not too 
badly.  As mentioned above, Moscow had no illusions that &#
x000A;Dagestani politics could be made to resemble national 
politics.  The Center just wanted to keep the place out of 
the news, keep the voting non-violent, and at the end of a 
day be able to say that local officials, councils and a 
parliament were elected; this modest ambition was achieved. 
The inclusion of the Communists in Parliament seems to have 
silenced national press coverage, and few in Moscow pay 
attention to the Dagestani media. 
 
One Man, One Problem 
-------------------- 
 
20. (C) But one of the main power problems of Dagestan 
remains unresolved and unaddressed by the elections: 
longtime Minister of Internal Affairs Adilgirey 
Magomedtagirov.  Magomedtagirov is a colorful figure, a 
high-mountain Avar from the west, big and strong, with great 
presence, who long ago made a name for himself as police 
chief in the ethnically Azeri trading city of Derbent, near 
the Azerbaijani border.  Derbent's culture was, like the 
Azeris, softer and more commercial than the rest of Dagestan, 
and Magomedtagirov proved extremely effective in ridding the 
town of known criminals.  His technique was simple:  he 
picked them up, planted narcotics on them, threw them in 
jail, and let them rot.  No man, no problem.  As Minister of 
Internal Affairs, his current targets are Islamic radicals, 
for whom he has devised different tactics:  he has vowed that 
their cases will be terminated before they ever get to court. 
 But that is not the cause of the current problems in the 
power structure. 
 
21. (C) Magomedtagirov, an Avar, was perfect as Minister 
under the Dargin leader "Grandfather" Magomedov. 
Magomedtagirov was "The Grandfather's" counterweight to the 
Dargin warlord and Makhachkala Mayor Amirov.  But 
Magomedtagirov also protected "The Grandfather" against the 
Northern Alliance, who represented a different part of the 
Avar lands.  That delicate balance changed once Mukhu Aliyev, 
an Avar, became President.  Having two Avars in such high 
posts is considered an unsustainable disbalance of the 
system.  So Aliyev prepared to demand Magomedtagirov's 
resignation and put in his place his Dargin deputy, another 
strong personality.  By pure coincidence, however, the deputy 
was targeted by two assassination attempts, the second of 
which succeeded.  No man, no problem. 
 
22. (C) This left Magomedtagirov in place, and finding a 
successor now grew problematic.  So various methods have been 
employed to force him out.  First, an unprecedented strike 
and demonstration took place in Makhachkala:  the MVD's OMON 
regiment walked out and demanded Magormedtagirov be sacked. 
It is generally assumed that the only person who could have 
arranged this action is Makhachkala mayor Said Amirov.  When 
this didn't work, a more direct solution was attempted.  In 
the last few months Magomedtagirov has been the target of 
several assassination attempts, all of which he has survived. 
 One was a complicated plot by people who evidently had 
enormous amounts of power and money:  the local MVD chief in 
the Buynaksk district was assassinated, and as expected 
Magomedtagirov and his associates got in their cars and 
rushed off to the scene of the crime.  The main road to 
Buynaksk being just by chance closed for repairs, the convoy 
had to use a more circular road through the mountains, where 
they ran into an ambush:  a huge mine blasted one of the cars 
apart and gunmen were waiting to shoot the survivors. 
Unluckily for the plotters, they blew up the wrong car and 
Magomedtagirov shot his way out. 
 
23. (C) So Dagestan still has the men, and still has the 
problem.  The elections seem to have left the basic power 
struggle unaffected, but analysts believe the cards are 
stacked against Makhachkala Mayor Amirov.  He is not only 
faced with opposition from all the Avar factions - the 
Northern Alliance, the President, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs - but also with competition against Magomedsalam 
Magomedov for leadership of the Dargins.  Amirov has two 
things going for him, however.  First, he is considered the 
most ruthless warlord in Dagestan, which is really saying 
something.  Second, he knows that the moment he leaves office 
there is nowhere on the face of the earth that can hide him - 
and his entire family - from the murderous blood revenge of 
his many enemies.  Amirov has absolutely nothing to lose to 
fight to the death.  And Dagestani politics, for some time to 
come, will be ruled less by elections than by the first part 
of the philosopher Soso Jugashvili's dictum: "Death solves 
all problems." 
 
 
MOSCOW 00001394  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1392, MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON NUG, IRAQ, LEBANON, WESTERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1392 2007-03-29 14:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMOA #1392 0881439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCE0570 0881427
O 291439Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ LE MO WI SU RS
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST:  MFA ON NUG, IRAQ, LEBANON, WESTERN 
SAHARA AND SUDAN 
 
REF: MOSCOW 828 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL M/C ALICE G. WELLS.  REASONS: 1.4(B/D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  THE MFA STRESSED IN A RECENT MEETING THAT 
THE FORMATION OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT 
REPRESENTED A MILESTONE IN HAMAS' SLOW EVOLUTION AND 
SUGGESTED THE QUARTET SHOULD REVISIT ITS POLICIES ON CONTACTS 
AND ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY.  MFA DIRECTOR 
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SERGEY VERSHININ TOLD US 
THAT THE NUG HAD ALREADY REDUCED INTRA-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE 
AND CRITICIZED ISRAEL FOR HASTILY REJECTING CONTACTS WITH THE 
NEW GOVERNMENT.  HE SAID RUSSIA STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE 
SECRETARYS EFFORTS TO RESTART TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE 
 
SIPDIS 
PALESTINIANS AND SUGGESTED THAT SAUDI ARABIA COULD PLAY A 
USEFUL ROLE IN MODERATING HAMAS.  RUSSIA CONTINUED TO 
ADVOCATE FOR A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE IN IRAQ BUT 
WELCOMED RENEWED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NEIGHBORS AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL PARTIES.  HE CLAIMED THERE WAS NO URGENT NEED 
TO ESTABLISH A HARIRI TRIBUNAL AND ARGUED THAT ONLY LEBANESE 
CONSENT COULD PROVIDE THE TRIBUNAL WITH THE NECESSARY 
LEGITIMACY.  VERSHININ WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR 
PROGRESS IN WESTERN SAHARA AND STRESSED RUSSIA'S OPPOSITION 
TO SANCTIONS ON SUDAN AFTER BASHIR'S REJECTION OF PLANS FOR 
THE DARFUR PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
GOR AND NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  MFA MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR VERSHININ EMPHASIZED THAT 
RUSSIA SAW THE FORMATION OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL UNITY 
GOVERNMENT (NUG) AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY TO ENGAGE WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND FIND A WAY 
FORWARD TO ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.  HE EXPLAINED 
THAT MOSCOW WAS SURPRISED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE 
PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO TRANSLATE THE MECCA AGREEMENT 
INTO A WORKABLE GOVERNING COALITION.  RUSSIA HAD QUICKLY 
HAILED THIS DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE THE NUG PROVIDED THE QUARTET 
AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES "WITH A CHANCE, IF WE'RE ABLE TO 
USE IT" TO MOVE BEYOND THE EXISTING STALEMATE.  HE SAID THAT 
ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF THE NUG WAS A MISTAKE AND THAT THE 
ISRAELI LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO ADAPT TO A FAST CHANGING 
SITUATION. 
 
3.  (C)  TURNING TO QUARTET PRINCIPLES, VERSHININ 
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RUSSIA HAD A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF 
STATEMENTS MADE BY PALESTINIAN LEADERS WHEN THE NUG WAS 
FORMED AND WAS PREPARED TO POCKET THE AMBIGUITY PROVIDED BY 
HAMAS "RESPECT" FOR PREVIOUS PEACE AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL. 
HE STRESSED THAT THE MECCA AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY PRODUCED A 
REDUCTION IN INTRA-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE.  HE SAID THAT THE 
EUROPEANS WERE REVIEWING THEIR POLICIES ON INTERACTING WITH 
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY GOVERNMENT IN LIGHT OF THE NUG AND 
MECCA AGREEMENT, AND WELCOMED U.S. WILLINGNESS TO DIFFER WITH 
ISRAEL ON CONTACTS WITH FATAH MEMBERS OF THE NUG. 
 
4.  (C)  ON THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT IN RIYADH, VERSHININ SAID 
THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SALTANOV WOULD ATTEND AND WOULD 
LIKELY MEET WITH PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS.  (NOTE:  PRESS 
REPORTS INDICATE THAT HE DID SO ON MARCH 28.)  HE WAS 
SKEPTICAL THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD PRODUCE ANY "BIG 
BREAKTHROUGHS" BUT HOPED THAT THE ARABS WOULD BE ABLE TO 
RECAPTURE THE "FRESH SPIRIT" REFLECTED IN THE 2002 SAUDI 
INITIATIVE.  VERSHININ NOTED RUSSIA'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR 
SECRETARY RICE'S EFFORTS TO START A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PM 
 
SIPDIS 
OLMERT AND PRESIDENT ABBAS (WHICH A MARCH 28 MFA STATEMENT 
"POSITIVELY" ASSESSED.)  VERSHININ FLAGGED RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO 
ENCOURAGE THE RELEASE OF KIDNAPPED ISRAELI SOLDIER GILAD 
SHALIT, WHICH VERSHININ AGREED WAS CRITICAL TO PROVIDING 
STIMULUS TO AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TRACK.  HE CHARACTERIZED 
COOPERATION AT THE WORKING LEVEL BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PA ON 
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS "TERRIBLE" AND ARGUED THAT ISRAELI 
ACTIONS CONTINUED TO UNDERCUT ABBAS' POSITION BECAUSE THEY 
RESTRICTED HIS ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE IMPROVEMENTS IN 
DAY-TO-DAY LIFE. 
. 
SAUDI ARABIA'S ROLE 
------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  REVIEWING RUSSIA'S IMPROVED TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA 
AS REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT PUTIN'S RECENT VISIT TO RIYADH 
(REFTEL), VERSHININ SAID THAT THE SAG PLAYED AN INCREASINGLY 
IMPORTANT ROLE ON ALL REGIONAL ISSUES.  THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT 
MOVED VERY SLOWLY, BUT IT HAD DEMONSTRATED A DEFT TOUCH IN 
BROKERING THE MECCA AGREEMENT BETWEEN PALESTINIAN FACTIONS. 
HE THOUGHT THE SAUDI MONARCHY COULD HELP IN INFLUENCING HAMAS 
TO EVOLVE IN A MORE PEACEFUL (AND ACCOMMODATING) DIRECTION. 
VERSHININ CONCEDED THAT THE PACE OF CHANGE IN HAMAS' POSITION 
WAS TOO SLOW, BUT STRESSED THAT HAMAS WAS EVOLVING AND THAT 
ITS LEADERS WERE LEARNING TO BALANCE THEIR IDEOLOGICAL 
INCLINATIONS WITH THEIR NEED TO GOVERN. 
 
. 
IRAQ:  ENGAGEMENT IN NEIGHBORS PLUS 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  VERSHININ WELCO
MED THE MARCH 10 NEIGHBORS PLUS 
MEETING THAT TOOK PLACE IN BAGHDAD AND SAID THAT IT WAS 
IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP THE IDEAS THAT CAME OUT OF THE MEETING 
TO CHART A NEW PATH FOR IRAQ.  RUSSIA CONTINUED TO SEE A NEED 
FOR A CONFERENCE THAT FOSTERED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. 
VERSHININ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RUSSIA'S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
WITH IRAQ HAD NOT MET EXPECTATIONS, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO 
CONTINUING INSTABILITY IN IRAQ AND A LOW LEVEL OF POLITICAL 
CONTACTS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BAGHDAD.  RUSSIA CONTINUED TO 
HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN 
IRAQ, BUT DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT PROGRESSED FAR.  (A SUBSEQUENT 
MFA STATEMENT NOTED THAT DFM SALTANOV'S MEETING IN RIYADH 
WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT TALIBANI FOCUSED ON TRADE AND ENERGY 
DIPLOMACY.) 
. 
LEBANON:  NO NEED FOR HARIRI TRIBUNAL (YET) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  VERSHININ WAS COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT UNIIC CHIEF SERGE 
BRAMMERTZ'S MOST RECENT REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 
CALLING IT BALANCED AND "UNPOLITICIZED" AND NOTING THAT 
BRAMMERTZ WAS FOCUSED ON COMPLETING THE INVESTIGATION.  HE 
WOULD NOT SPECULATE ON HOW LONG THAT MIGHT TAKE, BUT STRESSED 
THAT ESTABLISHING A TRIBUNAL WAS NOT AN URGENT TASK. 
VERSHININ ARGUED AGAINST A CHAPTER VII AUTHORIZATION FOR THE 
TRIBUNAL, STATING THAT ITS LEGITIMACY DEPENDED ON ACCEPTANCE 
BY THE LEBANESE, WHO WERE NOT READY TO COME TO AGREEMENT.  HE 
TOOK THE POINT THAT BRAMMERTZ HAD COLLECTED SIGNIFICANT 
EVIDENCE ALREADY, BUT NOTED THAT THE UNIIC CHIEF HAD NOT 
CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIBUNAL.  HE 
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ONGOING POLITICAL TURMOIL IN 
LEBANON, WHICH COULD EASILY SLIP INTO A CIVIL WAR AND WOULD 
BE EXACERBATED BY "FOREIGN PARTICIPATION." 
. 
WESTERN SAHARA:  PROGRESS UNLIKELY 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  ACCORDING TO VERSHININ, DURING EARLY-MARCH 
CONSULTATIONS WITH MOROCCAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
FASSI-FIHRI, THE MOROCCANS PREVIEWED A PROPOSAL FOR AUTONOMY 
FOR WESTERN SAHARA, BUT HAD NOT SHARED DETAILS OF THE PLAN. 
VERSHININ WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS IN THE 
DISPUTE.  RUSSIA SUPPORTED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOM AND 
THE POLISARIO, BUT BELIEVED THESE WERE UNLIKELY.  IN HIS 
ANALYSIS, WESTERN SAHARA WAS AN EXISTENTIAL QUESTION FOR THE 
MOROCCANS, WHO COULD NOT COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION OF 
INDEPENDENCE, WHILE ALGERIA LACKED ANY INCENTIVE TO COME TO A 
RESOLUTION.  THE ZERO-SUM MENTALITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS MEANT 
THAT LITTLE COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND THERE 
WAS NOTHING ON THE HORIZON WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE EXISTING 
DYNAMIC.  THE BOTTOM LINE, VERSHININ SAID, WAS ALGERIA'S 
CALCULUS THAT MOROCCO WOULD "WIN" IF WESTERN SAHARA WAS 
SETTLED. 
. 
SUDAN:  KEEP WORKING ON BASHIR 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C)  REFLECTING ON SUDANESE PRESIDENT BASHIR'S MARCH 6 
REJECTION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE UN-AU PLAN FOR DARFUR 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, VERSHININ SAID THAT THE UN WOULD 
NEED TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GOS TO ACCEPT 
THE TROOPS.  VERSHININ SAID THAT BASHIR HAD NOT 
UNCONDITIONALLY AGREED TO THE ENTIRE PEACEKEEPING PACKAGE. 
IN THE MFA'S VIEW, BASHIR FEARED THAT PERMITTING UN TROOPS ON 
THE GROUND IN DARFUR WOULD POSE A THREAT TO HIS REGIME. 
THIS, COUPLED WITH FEARS OF CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT INDICTMENTS OF SUDANESE OFFICIALS, WOULD MAKE GAINING 
AGREEMENT FROM BASHIR THAT MUCH HARDER.  VERSHININ REJECTED 
THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF 
BRITISH SUGGESTIONS OF ESTABLISHING A "NO-FLY" ZONE IN SUDAN, 
ARGUING THAT THIS WAS A NON-STARTER. 
. 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  RUSSIA CONTINUES ITS HIGH-VISIBILITY DIPLOMACY IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH PUTIN'S FEBRUARY VISIT TO THE GULF AND 
JORDAN FOLLOWED BY A STEADY STREAM OF MID-RANKING ARAB 
OFFICIALS.  WE SHOULD EXPECT MOSCOW TO CONTINUE TO PUSH ITS 
VIEWS ON HAMAS' EVOLUTION AND SEEK TO NARROW OR REINTERPRET 
QUARTET PRINCIPLES. 
RUSSELL

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1383, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1383 2007-03-29 12:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0047
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1383 0881251
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291251Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8746
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
AMEMBASSY KYIV FOR RSTEFFENS 
AMEMBASSY KYIV FOR DKRAMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
ELVATECH LTD, KIEV, UKRAINE, LICENSE NO. NLR 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 00696 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Elvatech Ltd, Kiev, Ukraine. The company is 
listed on a Shipper's Export Declaration as the 
ultimate consignee of ionizing radiations detectors, 
instrument and apparatus for measuring-ECCN 0x000 - no 
license required. The exporter is Amtek Inc., 14 De 
Angelo Drive, Bedford, MA 01730-2204. 
 
3. On March 13, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with Elvatech 
Ltd, Kiev, Ukraine. The export control team met with 
Alexander Filippov, Director and Viktor Martyniuk, 
Deputy Director. 
 
4. Elvatech was founded in 1991 as a manufacturer of 
analytical devices.  The company specializes in x-ray 
spectrometers for determination of the composition of 
samples.  The company sells to a wide variety of 
metallurgical and industrial clients in Russia, 
Europe, Korea and the United States.  Elvatech employs 
15 at its office and shop, rented from a factory 
located in the industrial section of Kyiv.  Elvatech 
is privately held, and incorporated as a closed joint- 
stock company. 
 
5. The detectors in reftel are used in the fabrication 
of the x-ray spectrometer.  The detectors are stored 
in a bin in the fabrication area of the workshop.  The 
team was able to observe serial numbers 41004, 41008, 
and 41011.  Other devices have been installed in 
detectors.  As orders are filled, the detectors are 
added to the bin.  As there is no need to account for 
each detector, there are no records as to which device 
any specific detector is installed in. 
 
6. The landlord provides around the clock security at 
the facility.  The factory, a former military 
operation, currently produces gas meters for utilities 
providers.  The offices and production areas have 
cipher locks on the doors, and only employees have 
access to the production facility. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends Elvatech Ltd, 
Kiev, Ukraine as reliable recipients of U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1382, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION:

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1382 2007-03-29 12:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0042
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1382 0881251
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291251Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8745
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 001382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
AMEMBASSY KYIV FOR RSTEFFENS 
AMEMBASSY KYIV FOR DKRAMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: 
INFOPULSE-UKRAINE, KIEV, UKRAINE, LICENSE NO. NLR 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 00695 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Infopulse-Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine. The company is 
listed on an NLR SED as the ultimate consignee of an 
oscilloscope, parts and accessories, ECCN 5B991 and 
EAR99. The licensee is Mindspeed Technologies, 4000 
Macarthur blvd., Newport Beach, CA 92660. 
 
3. On March 14, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with Mindspeed 
Technologies Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine. The export 
control team met with Yevgeny Novikov, Director. 
 
4. In November 2006, Infopulse Ukraine was split into 
two corporate entities, known as Infopulse Ukraine and 
Mindspeed Technologies Ukraine.  The Remote Design 
Center of Infopulse was transferred to the newly 
created Mindspeed Technologies Ukraine.  Infopulse 
still provides logistics services for Mindspeed 
Technologies Ukraine. 
 
5. Mindspeed Technologies Ukraine provides chip design 
services, research and development, and specialized 
software integration for Voice-Over-Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) products for its U.S. based partner, Mindspeed 
Technologies.  NOTE: according to the Mindspeed 
Technologies website, prior June 27, 2003, Mindspeed 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Conexant Systems, 
Inc. Conexant was launched as an independent entity in 
January 1999 after Rockwell International Corporation 
spun off its Rockwell Semiconductor Systems business 
to stockholders.  Mindspeed designs, develops and 
sells semiconductor networking solutions for 
communications applications in enterprise, access, 
metropolitan, and wide-area networks. END NOTE.  The 
company employs 60 at its offices located in a 
corporate tower in Kyiv.  The company has no sales, no 
marketing responsibilities, and does not conduct 
exports. 
 
6. The equipment in reftel is used in the Remote 
Design Center of Mindspeed Technologies Ukraine.  The 
team observed the laboratories utilized by the Remote 
Design Center.  Due to the integration of the product 
into the equipment in the laboratory, the team was not 
able to verify a serial number for the Terradyne 
Hammer product referenced in the documentation.  The 
EAR99 commodities consisted of connectors and cables, 
and cannot be verified as they do not have identity 
plates or serial numbers. 
 
7. Recommendations: Post recommends Infopulse-Ukraine, 
Kiev, Ukraine as reliable recipients of sensitive U.S. 
origin commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW1377, YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW1377 2007-03-29 11:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0017
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1377/01 0881137
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291137Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8742
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR SECRETARY GUTIERREZ FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS 
USDOC FOR 1000/SEC/SECRETARY GUTIERREZ 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2015 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV OVIP
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW 
 
REF: MOSCOW 434 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.5 (b/d 
). 
 
 
1. (C) On behalf of the Ambassador, we look forward to your 
arrival, and offer the following overview of our commercial 
relationship with Russia.  You may want to read also the 
Ambassador's scenesetter for Foreign Minister Lavrov's last 
visit to Washington (referenced above), which provides 
insight into the overall bilateral relationship, Putin and 
the political scene, and the challenges before us.  Now in 
its ninth year, Russia's economic boom continues to impress, 
as evidenced by the record number of American businesses 
entering the Russian market, driving our trade and investment 
relationship strongly forward.  Against this backdrop, we 
find the Russian Government in the midst of an effort to 
finish the work of President Putin's economic agenda in the 
twelve months remaining in his administration.  At the top of 
the list is Russia's entry into the WTO, which Putin has 
personally advanced at critical moments over the past year. 
A close second, in the context of our bilateral relationship, 
has been Putin's desire to push ahead with U.S.-Russian 
civilian nuclear cooperation.  No less pressing for the 
Kremlin has been the desire to see Russian firms establish 
themselves as international players. 
 
2. (C) These three themes will play again and again in your 
meetings here.  On WTO, your interlocutors are looking for 
signs of USG support for the accession process, even as we 
push for IPR protection and a more predictable basis for 
trade in agricultural and other products.  On civilian 
nuclear cooperation, efforts to complete the uranium 
suspension agreement will be seen as important progress 
towards a headline Presidential goal.  Our message of openess 
to investment (including Russian investment) pairs nicely 
with an equally blunt message that it is time for Russia to 
put its own house in order, be it the completion of the legal 
framework for investment, restraint in the administration of 
tax and environmental regulation, or the need to slow 
corruption's steady advance here.  Despite the often 
difficult discussions surrounding trade and investment, 
bilateral commercial relations remain one of the strongest 
forces for positive change in Russia as well as ballast in 
our challenging political relationship.  2007 is the year we 
should push our bilateral trade well past the $25 billion 
mark, and your visit gets us off to a good start. 
 
3. (C) The Numbers and the Firms Behind Them.  U.S. trade and 
investment is expanding rapidly across Russia, boosting 
prosperity and disseminating American business values. 
Bilateral trade grew by 20 percent last year, and investment 
was up more than 50 percent.  In an important shift, energy 
no longer dominates our trade and investment story to the 
exclusion of all else.  Among the more notable recent U.S. 
successes in Russia are Amway, whose sales reached $250 
million after only two years here; Alcoa, with over $300 
million invested in two aluminum fabricating facilities; P&G, 
which employs over 20,000 Russians; AmGen, who recently 
marked the entrance of U.S. biotech pharmaceuticals to 
Russia; International Paper, which is investing an additional 
$400 million here in a 50/50 joint venture with Ilim Pulp; 
Ford, with over $500 million already in its St. Petersburg 
auto plant; and even Ralph Lauren, the first U.S. fashion 
house to launch its brand in Russia. 
 
4. (C) WTO.  The push is on inside the Russian Government to 
bring Russia's decade-long bid for the WTO to a close in the 
next twelve months, and there are few events more likely to 
help our exporters than getting Russia into this organization 
on terms we can live with.  The Russians have an enormous 
amount of work left, including a potentially indigestible 
level of political concessions they will need to face soon. 
We have tough WTO-related issues that must be raised, but you 
may also wish to take this opportunity to signal our support 
for their aspirations and our intention to keep pace with 
them this year.  Your primary interlocutor, Minister Gref, is 
fully engaged in the negotiations and shares Putin's resolve 
that the issue be decided during his tenure.  Other 
interests, particularly in the agriculture sector, are 
however clearly working to avoid accession altogether. 
 
5. (C) Challenges to Our Trade and Investment Relationship. 
Investors have long been awaiting a clearer understanding of 
where they can and cannot invest in Russia.  Your visit comes 
 
just as the draft Law on Foreign Investment in the Strategic 
Sectors finally shows signs of moving ahead.  There is much 
in the draft we can live with, the bigger point being that 
some rules would be better than the free-for-all firms face 
now.  Same goes for long awaited amendments to the Subsoil 
Law, which will make clear whi
ch deposits foreigners may own. 
 The subsoil restrictions would align that legislation with 
the current non-legislated practice of prohibiting foreign 
firms from holding majority stakes in projects with fields 
over 510 million barrels of oil or 50 billion cubic meters of 
gas.  The two efforts appear to be on a parallel and linked 
passage track, and could use a nudge from our quarter. 
 
6. (C) Energy as a Special Case.  Despite increased Russian 
Government control over the sector, it is worth noting that 
U.S. majors are involved in several high-profile deals and 
that below-the-radar deals are becoming more common.  We 
suspect that behind all this activity is a renewed awareness 
here of Russia's need for western expertise -- most urgently 
on the gas side -- as it moves to exploit the offshore and 
the eastern half of the country, as well as the enormous 
Barents Sea gas field, Shtokman.  Nothing is easy, of course 
-- Caspian Pipeline (CPC) expansion has been elusive and the 
Sakhalin-2 firesale worried many.  Nevertheless, our 
companies tell us that they can work as minority 
stakeholders, and there are promising signs marking the way 
forward: domestic gas prices are set to rise to European 
levels by 2011 (a move we have long advocated); Chevron and 
Gazprom Neft have formed a joint venture to work in West 
Siberia; Lukoil and ConocoPhillips continue to expand their 
partnership; smaller oil companies have increasing room to 
grow; and energy service companies are doing very/very well. 
 
 
7. (C) Aircraft Manufacturing and Sales as Another Special 
Case.  We are already into our sixteenth month of Boeing 
advocacy, and hard as it may be to believe, this game just 
got more interesting.  The government is knee deep in an 
effort to revive Russia's once-proud aviation sector, but 
knows companies like Aeroflot can't wait forever to renew 
their aging fleets.  Last week's quasi "purchase" by Aeroflot 
of 22 A350s, rather than closing the door on Boeing, is being 
characterized to us by senior officials as a new opportunity 
to make the 787 sale.  That sale alone is worth nearly the 
entire volume of U.S. exports to Russia in 2006.  Your visit 
to the Boeing design center and advocacy signals our 
understanding of this odd, but not necessarily bad, 
situation, and will help pave the way for the Russians to 
allow Aeroflot to buy Boeing, too. 
 
8. (C) Nuclear Cooperation.  Beyond the immediate issues of 
Iran and North Korea, there continues to be real potential 
for broader U.S-Russia nuclear cooperation.  The President's 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership tracks conceptually with 
Putin,s own proposal for an international network of fuel 
enrichment centers; both envisage expanding nuclear energy 
while minimizing proliferation risks.  Negotiations continue 
on a civilian nuclear cooperation framework agreement 
(commonly known as a "123" agreement) that Rosatom Director 
Kiriyenko optimistically hopes to initial during his May 
visit to Washington.  Negotiations are also ongoing to amend 
the existing "suspension" agreement in order to work out new 
terms for Russian access to the U.S. uranium market.  David 
Spooner will try to close on the latter during your visit. 
 
 
9. (C) Your Interlocutors.  You need no introduction to your 
primary interlocutors - Ministers Gref, Khristenko, Kudrin, 
and Rosatom's Kiriyenko are by now all familiar faces for 
you.  Natural Resources Minister Trutnev is central to our 
energy relations, given the role his environmental watchdog 
agency played in the Sakhalin II situation, and the pending 
environmental inspection of ExxonMobil's Sakhalin I 
operations.  Just below the layer of top leadership we have 
asked for you to see are the two most "almost declared" 
candidates for Presidency here, Sergey Ivanov and Dmitriy 
Medvedev.  The latter is fresh from his international coming 
out party at Davos, but has yet to project the aura of 
authority that would garner the support of some of the 
shadowy hard-liners close to Putin.  Sergey Ivanov has just 
had his palate considerably widened to include most 
industrial policy, and while he is forceful, he isn't exactly 
a man of the people.  Your meetings are an important 
opportunity to try and continue to vest each of them with a 
stake in our broader bilateral relations. 
RUSSELL

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