Monthly Archives: February 2007

07MOSCOW849, DPRK: MOSCOW REACTS TO SIX-PARTY RESULTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW849 2007-02-28 17:45 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0686
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0849/01 0591745
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281745Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7780
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP KN RS
SUBJECT: DPRK:  MOSCOW REACTS TO SIX-PARTY RESULTS 
 
REF: 06 MOSCOW 11698 
 
Classified By: Pol/Min Counselor Alice G. Wells.  Reasons: 1.4 (B/D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) Moscow's North Korea hands -- both official and 
unofficial --- welcomed the results of the February Six-Party 
Talks but remained critical of U.S. policies towards the 
DPRK.  While the MFA's terse announcement summarized the 
decisions made in Beijing, Foreign Minister Lavrov was more 
expansive in praising the U.S. for "flexibility" in salvaging 
the process.  However, the majority of Moscow experts 
continue to see a nuclearized North Korea as the product of 
U.S. policies.  While quick to criticize the U.S. approach, 
the Russian experts acknowledged that Moscow's role is 
limited and that Russia will continue to rely on U.S. and 
Chinese leadership in the negotiations.  End summary. 
 
Enthusiasm In Check 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) On February 13, with the conclusion of the fifth 
round of Six-Party Talks, the MFA issued a short announcement 
welcoming the agreement as giving a new impulse to Six-Party 
process.  On February 15, Foreign Minister Lavrov elaborated 
on the GOR's reaction by praising U.S. flexibility in 
achieving a compromise.  At the same time, he argued that 
U.S. financial measures ("unilaterally imposed sanctions") 
had earlier derailed the process.  He pledged that Russia 
would provide energy and humanitarian assistance to North 
Korea and would continue to negotiate on North Korea's debt 
to Russia.  (Note:  Moscow has recently announced that the 
Russia-DPRK intergovernmental commission will meet for the 
first time in six years in Moscow on March 22-23 to discuss 
debt and transportation ties.) 
 
3. (C) Oleg Davydov, a Senior Counselor on the MFA's Korea 
Desk, was less positive about the results of the talks.  He 
told us that the GOR would not make a "celebratory 
announcement," in order to avoid the possible embarrassment 
of having to retract it.  He cautioned that in dealing with 
North Korea, what was important was not an agreement but the 
way it was subsequently interpreted. 
 
Regime Change Not An Option 
--------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) DPRK hands in Moscow think tanks were quick to pocket 
the Six Party success, while accusing the U.S. of losing time 
because of our approach to North Korea.  Russians argued that 
U.S. policy lacked clarity -- did the U.S. want regime change 
or did it want a denuclearized DPRK?  Aleksandr Vorontsov of 
the Oriental Studies Institute suggested that as distasteful 
as the regime was, and despite much "wishful thinking," the 
DPRK was stable and would survive for the foreseeable future. 
 The only option was peaceful co-existence, because efforts 
to induce regime change had failed.  North Korea, in turn, 
having lost its traditional security guarantor, the Soviet 
Union, and faced with a hostile U.S. policy, had armed 
itself.  In the meantime, the South Koreans were threatened 
by U.S. willingness to choose a military option.  In the end, 
Vorontsov said, U.S. policy had created a nuclearized North 
Korea and an increasingly anti-U.S. South Korea.  Vorontsov 
welcomed the February meeting results although he warned that 
mutual mistrust between the U.S. and North Korea would 
necessarily make further progress difficult. 
 
DPRK Wins A Round? 
------------------ 
 
5.  (C) For Vasiliy Mikheyev at the Institute for World 
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the only 
positive feature of the February meeting was that it took 
place.  According to Mikheyev, the February agreement spelled 
success for North Korea, which had promised little but would 
now receive economic aid.  He judged that the agreement would 
only reinforce the North's inclination to play the nuclear 
weapons card.  Mikheyev supported an engagement policy but 
thought that incentives were misdirected; the North should be 
encouraged and rewarded for concrete steps toward reform, not 
just for closing nuclear facilities. 
 
Who's Unpredictable? 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Aleksandr Zhebin at the Institute of Far East 
Studies, who served in the Soviet Embassy in North Korea, 
attributed the nuclearization of North Korea to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and to what he termed the U.S.'s "wrong" 
 
MOSCOW 00000849  002 OF 003 
 
 
policy.  It was known during the Soviet era that North Korea 
was trying to acquire nuclear technology but it was a luxury 
then, not a necessity.  When the Bush Administration focused 
on regime change and invaded Iraq, North Korea "had to" go 
nuclear.  For Zhebin, North Korean thinking was predictable 
while U.S. policies were not.  Like many of our 
interlocutors, Zhebin stressed that the February results were 
essentially a return to the 1994 Agreed Framework, albeit in 
a multilateral guise. 
 
Verification: the Key 
--------------------- 
 
&#1
82;7.  (C) Experts unanimously agreed that verification remained 
the biggest problem.  Given that the February agreement did 
not cover the current stockpile of weapons or weaponized 
material, Anton Khlopkov, Deputy director of the Center for 
Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center), worried that North 
Korea could construct up to ten nuclear devices, using what 
it already presumably possessed:  40 - 60 kilograms of 
plutonium.  According to Khlopkov, it took the North's 
nuclear test to have the five parties focus on the main 
issue; how to de-nuclearize North Korea.  Kholpkov was free 
in sharing the blame for not preventing a nuclearized DPRK, 
pointing at the U.S. "obsession" with human rights and 
democracy, Japan's demand on abductees and China's refusal to 
use its "available" tools to influence the North.  Russia had 
not been wise to end its economic aid to North Korea because 
it removed leverage.  He urged that the Five coordinate 
closely to bring a joint vision and concrete, deliverable 
steps to the table. 
 
Sanctions:  Poor Substitute for Engagement 
------------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Like most other Russian officials and experts, 
Aleksandr Khramchikhin of the Political and Military Analysis 
Institute thought that sanctions only reinforced the regimes 
meant to be hurt by them.  Georgiy Kunadze, former Ambassador 
to South Korea, agreed and told us sanctions would not work. 
North Korea would never entirely give up its nuclear program. 
 The "economic strangulation" would affect the North Korean 
people but not the leadership. 
 
China, the Leading Force, and Russia, in the Rear 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9.  (C)  Aleksandr Lukin at the Center for East Asian and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), claimed that 
the Six-Party process had been derailed by the U.S. but 
salvaged by China.  The U.S. pursuit of a military option on 
the peninsula was simply unwise, said Lukin.  Now that the 
U.S. was preoccupied by Iraq, it had to follow China's lead. 
Lukin joined other experts in believing that Russia had 
neither the means nor the political will to lead the process. 
 Mikheyev concurred with Lukin that China had moved from a 
simple organizer of the Talks to a leader which could steer 
the process.  Aleksey Bogaturov, Dean of MGIMO, maintained 
that both Russia and the U.S. had failed in their dealing 
with North Korea.  According to him, Russia, happy to be a 
passive participant in the Talks, would most likely continue 
to follow China's lead. 
 
Next Steps:  NE Asia Architecture? 
---------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Vorontsov felt that the U.S. still had the greatest 
leverage over North Korea:  the prospect of diplomatic 
relations.  If the U.S. played its cards wisely, the North 
could be contained.  Mikheyev suggested that the Talks' fifth 
working group -- the Northeast Asia Peace and Security 
Mechanism -- could provide a serious impetus to the 
negotiations and to the region.  With or without the North's 
participation, the five could widen the agenda for collective 
security, he thought.  Bogaturov agreed.  He felt that the 
key missing element in the Six-Party process was a 
well-defined common aim, not just the rhetoric of 
de-nuclearization of North Korea.  An engagement policy based 
on a well-coordinated political dialogue combined with 
economic cooperation should be the guiding principle, he 
added. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) Moscow experts remain skeptical that the North will 
entirely abandon its nuclear program and concede that Russia 
has little to add to the discussions.  As quick as they are 
to criticize U.S. policy, they recognize that the U.S. and 
China must continue to lead the way in dealing with a 
nuclearized North.  That said, Russian discussions with the 
 
MOSCOW 00000849  003 OF 003 
 
 
North after a six year hiatus bear careful watching. 
BURNS

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07MOSCOW845, FOR A JUST RUSSIA” POSITIONS SELF AS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW845 2007-02-28 16:00 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0517
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0845/01 0591600
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281600Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7768
INFO RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1950
RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2237
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3823
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000845 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI PREL RS
SUBJECT: "FOR A JUST RUSSIA" POSITIONS SELF AS 
LEFTIST, OPPOSITION PARTY AS DUMA CAMPAIGN BEGINS 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000845  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The second, Kremlin-approved party, "For a 
Just Russia (SR)" at its inaugural congress February 
24-27 combined left-wing rhetoric, criticism of the 
GOR's performance, anger at its treatment in the 
regions, and patriotism in a credible effort to 
establish itself as an alternative to the governing, 
United Russia party. The often-lampooned SR Chairman 
Sergey Mironov delivered a keynote speech that hit 
all of the right notes.  While dampening 
expectations for extravagant results in the March 11 
regional elections, Mironov predicted that SR would 
cross the threshold to representation in each of the 
fourteen contests, leaving it positioned to contend 
with the reigning party, United Russia, in the all- 
important December State Duma elections.  End 
summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
SR:  Putin Present at the Creation 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The second, Kremlin-approved political 
party, "For a Just Russia (SR)" staged its first 
congress February 24-27 in St. Petersburg. SR was 
formed in October 2006 as a result of a merger of 
the Russian Party of Pensioners, the Russian Party 
of Life, and Rodina political parties.  The creation 
of SR was welcomed by President Putin who, it was 
widely assumed, believed a managed, two-party system 
would arrest flagging popular interest in Russia's 
overdetermined politics and puncture growing 
complacency among politicians ensconced in the 
reigning United Russia (YR) political party. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Socialist, Communist Internationals 
Burnish SR's Leftist Credentials 
----------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Congress organizers reported that 299 of 
the 328 invited delegates attended the event. (Each 
SR delegate allegedly represented about one thousand 
party members from 79 regions countrywide.  At one 
point during the plenary, Mironov claimed that SR 
was adding 40 thousand members to its roles each 
month.)  Also in attendance were observers from 
communist and socialist parties worldwide, many of 
whom were invited, at the February 26 plenary, to 
greet the congress as a way of establishing SR's 
left-wing bona fides. 
 
----------------------- 
St. Petersburg Governor 
Puts Stick in SR Spokes 
----------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) SR President and master of ceremonies 
Sergey Mironov followed endorsements from the likes 
of the communist parties of China, Cuba, and 
Transnistria with a message from President Putin 
approving the work of SR.  Notably absent was an 
endorsement from the congress's "host," St. 
Petersburg Governor Matvienko.  While publicly 
distancing herself from both YR and SR, Matvienko 
has channeled administrative resources to YR and has 
even, observers in St. Petersburg told us, gone so 
far as to deny SR representatives access to 
theaters, schools, and other venues.  Others in St. 
Petersburg report that, during the week of February 
19, teachers were ordered to meetings where they 
were told to vote YR.  (One contact told us her 
summons was the first such instance since the 
collapse of the USSR.  Her response, also a relic of 
the Soviet era, was to get a pink slip from her 
doctor.)  Still, Mironov noted in his introductory 
remarks that the city government was represented at 
the Congress by Deputy Governor Viktor Lobko, whose 
uncomfortable-looking face was then flashed briefly 
on the television monitors. 
 
--------------------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00000845  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Congress Themes:  Something 
For Everyone 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The Congress mixed healthy doses of 
patriotism (including two performances of the 
national anthem, attacks on Estonia's decision to 
remove its Soviet war memorial, and praise for 
Putin's Wehrkunde speech), left-wing rhetoric, 
schmaltz (boys and girls urging delegates to think 
of their future), and criticism of those in power 
(Putin excepted). In the audience with the delegates 
to rev up the crowd were members of SR's various 
youth groups brandishing Russian and party flags. 
 
-------------------- 
Mironov's Stemwinder 
-------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) In the plenary's keynote speech, Mironov 
sought to position SR as an "action-oriented" party 
with a "socialist perspective."  A successful SR 
would destroy "two monopolies": United Russia's hold 
on power and the Communist Party's "right to 
represent the interests of workers."  SR, Mironov 
said, "wants a real, two-party system."  He deplored 
the elimination of Yabloko from th
e ballot in St. 
Petersburg.  That sally, which managed to 
simultaneously criticize Matvienko and position SR 
to pick up the votes of disgruntled Yabloko voters 
in St. Petersburg, won Mironov applause from thuSl~N=T{ed candidly 
the problems facing the party.  SR was encountering 
"problems" in the regions, including difficulty in 
winning access to the media, blackmail, and the use 
of "dirty tactics."  "Many governors are in YR," 
Mironov said.  "And we know their relation to us." 
After noting sourly that the law gives an advantage 
to the incumbent party, Mironov promised delegates 
that, once in power, SR would work to eliminate the 
legal requirement for registered political parties 
to register for each election. 
 
8. (SBU) Also in Mironov's sights was that hardy 
perennial, corruption, which must be treated as 
"treason." Reform of the courts would be high on 
SR's agenda.  (Mironov's glancing reference to 
corruption was echoed by subsequent speakers.) 
Mironov then ticked off the four key economic points 
on the SR agenda:  a "just" pension, a progressive 
tax system, the just use of natural resources, and 
fair pay.  Mironov promised that teachers and 
doctors would receive "all of the benefits of state 
employees," and the stabilization fund would be used 
to that end. Pensions, Mironov said, should be at 
least fifty percent of the median salary.  Just as 
Russia had paid off its external debt, it must, 
Mironov said to applause, liquidate the 1992 voucher 
debt to its own citizens.  SR, Mironov summed up, 
offered a "new socialist perspective" which would 
have Russia, "like other rich countries," aid its 
citizens through the state sector. 
 
-------------------------- 
Local SR Chairman Sees 
"Fear" Returning to Russia 
-------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Mironov's well-delivered speech was 
followed by the reading of congratulatory telegrams 
from Accounting Chamber Chairman Sergey Stepashin 
and Kamchatka Governor Mashkovtsev (the only 
Governor to cast his lot with SR).  Nine other 
speakers followed Mironov, with remarks by Duma 
Deputy Oksana Dmitrieva, actress Rima Markova, and 
local SR Chairman Oleg Nilov (St. Petersburgers all) 
winning the loudest applause.  Dmitrieva, who heads 
SR's list in St. Petersburg, concentrated her fire 
on the GOR's failed pension reform, substandard 
housing programs, and lack of support for small 
business. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000845  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
10. (SBU) Nilov's indictment of the status quo was 
more sweeping.  An almost forgotten sensation, 
"fear," he said, was returning to Russia.  No member 
of the GOR was willing to join SR, and the current 
appearance of election legality cloaked the real 
state of affairs. Visibly sweating, Nilov asked, 
"did we really lose millions of lives (during WWII) 
only to again live in fear?  We need to return 
credibility to the political system.  I appeal to 
United Russia to join us in this task." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) Although many were prepared to see SR as a 
puppet opposition party, Mironov's sense of outrage 
at the obstacles encountered by his party in the 
regions seemed genuine, as did his efforts to 
present SR as an ideological and practical 
alternative to YR.  In a conversation after the 
plenary, delegate Oksana Dmitrieva was at pains to 
downplay the left-wing rhetoric that had studded 
many of the day's speeches.  "They talk, but we're 
the ones who will write the legislation," she said, 
and insisted that SR would pursue a moderate course 
should it win a respectable minority in the Duma. 
The chief threat to SR, Dmitrieva said, was not the 
left, but those currently in YR who may cast their 
lot with SR should it do well enough in the March 11 
regional elections.  Those opportunists, she 
thought, would undercut what she hoped was SR's 
sincere intention to address some of the problems 
described by speakers during the plenary. 
 
BURNS

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07MOSCOW842, RUSSIA: ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS OF IRANIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW842 2007-02-28 15:00 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0842 0591500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281500Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7765
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR T/FO, ISN/CPI, EAP/FO, NEA/FO, EUR/FO 
TREASURY FOR TFI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KNNP KN PARM RS IR
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS OF IRANIAN 
ENTITIES UNDER E.O. 13382 
 
REF: STATE 19366 
 
On February 22, Pol-MilOff delivered reftel points on 
additional designations of Iranian entities to Aleksandr 
Deyneko in the MFA's Department of Security and Disarmament 
Affairs (DVBR).  Econoff also delivered reftel points on 
February 22 to Nikolai Ostroukhov, Legal Advisor in the MFA's 
Department of New Threats and Challenges.  Neither Mr. 
Deyneko nor Mr. Ostroukhov offered any immediate comment on 
the additional designations. 
BURNS

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07MOSCOW841, RUSSIAN STOCK EXCHANGES STILL DOWN AFTER STORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW841 2007-02-28 14:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0040
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0841 0591459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281459Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7764
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/IFD 
TREASURY FOR BAKER/GAERTNER 
NSC FOR TRACY MCKIBBEN 
USDOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN STOCK EXCHANGES STILL DOWN AFTER STORM 
 
1.  This message is sensitive but unclassified, and not for 
internet distribution. 
 
2.  (SBU) The apparent sharp increase in emerging market risk 
aversion that sent Shanghai's stock market tumbling on 
February 27 was also manifest among Russian equity markets. 
The benchmark dollar-denominated RTS Index fell 3.28 percent, 
and the broader, ruble-denominated MICEX Index was down 4.1 
percent.  Trading volumes were 63 percent higher than the 
4-week average. 
 
3.  (SBU) Just before the end of trading on February 28, the 
major indices repeated the same general magnitude of the 
previous day's slide, with the RTS down 3.5 percent and MICEX 
down 3.8 percent.  Many of our market analyst contacts have 
called the share-price drop a "spring bull-market 
correction."  United Financial Group Chief Economist Yaroslav 
Lissovolik noted that the underlying fundamentals are 
generally sound and, in some cases, improving.  He said that 
steel producers, for example, have garnered stock 
recommendation upgrades among many investment houses as a 
result of their enhanced cost controls in recent months.  He 
characterized the price drop for Novolipetsk Steel (-6.8 
percent) and Severstal (-4 percent) as profit-taking.  Troika 
Dialog Chief Economist Evgeny Gavrilenkov echoed this 
assessment, equating the correction with the liqudity squeeze 
that caused a similar decline in Russian equities during May 
2006. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Ongoing questions about the underlying quality of 
emerging market assets could translate into a short-term 
selloff of Russian stocks during the next two months.  Retail 
investors in the country's growing mutual fund market may 
even lead the way down as they wait for the proverbial dust 
to settle.  Many of the analysts we talked with, however, 
maintain a bullish outlook for Russian stocks in 2007. 
BURNS

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07MOSCOW831, SIBBIOPHARM AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO COMMENCE NDF BW FACILITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW831 2007-02-28 06:31 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0831/01 0590631
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280631Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7747

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000831 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/PRA, AND ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM TBIO RS
SUBJECT: SIBBIOPHARM AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO COMMENCE NDF BW FACILITY 
ELIMINATION PROJECT 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 26-27 a State/Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund (NDF) delegation met with Sibbiopharm 
representatives to establish the scope and ground rules for an NDF 
project to eliminate former biological weapons (BW) building and 
equipment at Sibbiopharm's Berdsk facility.  The sides agreed to 
move ahead with work on buildings 32 and 34.  Sibbiopharm officials 
said that the firm would need either to retain the production 
capacity of Building 33 for future commercial needs or to receive 
assistance to expand capabilities at its current production 
facility.  They offered to provide a preliminary estimate of their 
needs during a meeting in Washington March 26.  End Summary. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
2. (SBU) NDF Senior Adviser Smith began by noting that the NDF is 
prepared to proceed with demolishing Building 32, and eliminating 
the specialized dual-use equipment in Building 34 and the fermenters 
in Building 33.   Sibbiopharm agreed in principle to green-field 
Building 32 and eliminate the dual-use equipment in Building 34, but 
noted that they were not prepared yet to take a decision on Building 
33.  Smith noted that the NDF believes that it has sufficient funds 
to complete work on all three buildings and wants, for reasons of 
cost effectiveness, to reach agreement to commence work on all of 
them simultaneously. 
 
BUILDINGS 32 AND 34 
------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Sibbiopharm Executive Director Nadezhda Orlova stated that, 
while Sibbiopharm is prepared to proceed with work on Buildings 32 
and 34, there remain a number of technical problems.  Orlova noted 
that Sibbiopharm wanted no debris to remain at the site after 
Building 32 is demolished that would hinder or raise the cost of 
building future infrastructure on the site.  She noted that 
Controlled Demolition, Incorporated (CDI) (the elimination 
specialists which the NDF intends to hire as prime contractor for 
this project) would not be familiar with Russian law and regulation. 
 Further, Sibbiopharm insists that the demolition technology 
employed be environmentally friendly.  For Building 34, Orlova 
required that the non-dual use equipment in the building (i.e. the 
electricity, water, and sewage) not be affected by the elimination 
project. 
 
4. (SBU) Smith noted that it would principally be CDI's 
responsibility to meet local requirements.  CDI normally discusses 
these requirements with all interested parties, including the 
proposed subcontractors and our international partner (e.g. 
Sibbiopharm.)  He stated that CDI was also responsible for providing 
the NDF with the lowest cost concomitant with effective work.  He 
stated that the two sides should agree in principle that CDI will 
have the right to solicit competitive bids from multiple Russian 
subcontractors.  While Orlova warned that only contractors in the 
vicinity of Berdsk and Novosibirsk would be cost-effective, the 
Sibbiopharm reps agreed with this principle.  Smith pointed out that 
any requirements based in Russian law or regulation that would raise 
project costs would have to be documented. 
 
BUILDING 33 (AND BUILDING 36) 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Orlova noted that Sibbiopharm had not considered Building 
33 as an object for elimination under the NDF project.  Sibbiopharm 
currently intended to use Building 33's fermentation capacity for 
commercial purposes.  Orlova noted that Sibbiopharm's sales enjoyed 
30-40 percent growth in recent years.  Sibbiopharm currently 
produced its products (enzymes for animal feed and food) using 
fermentation capacity in Building 36, whose capacity is identical to 
that of Building 33.  (COMMENT: This was the first discussion of 
Building 36 between Sibbiopharm and the NDF.  End Comment.) 
Sibbiopharm also intended to expand its product line into bioethanol 
production.  Sibbiopharm currently uses about 56-57 percent of 
Building 36's capacity, but at current rates of expansion will 
require use of Building 33's capacity in approximately two to three 
years.  Orlova said that Sibbiopharm could agree to destruction of 
the production capacity of Building 33 only if it received 
assistance in expanding capacity at Building 36 to meet anticipated 
needs. 
 
6. (SBU) Smith noted that the NDF did not have the authority to 
provide Sibbiopharm with additional fermentation capability.  Orlova 
asked whether other State Department resources could address this 
problem.  Smith stated that, if Sibbiopharm developed a proposal 
outlining their commercial requirements, the NDF would look into 
whether there is any Department interest in pursuing such a parallel 
project.  Smith reiterated that, for reasons of cost, the U.S. would 
like to eliminate the equipment in Building 33 simultaneously with 
 
the work done in Buildings 32 and 34.  Sibbiopharm requested that 
CDI provide a detailed description of its proposed destruction 
methodology prior to its visit as a basis for soliciting bids from 
Russian firms.  She noted that previous discussions between CD
I and 
a proposed Russian firm had foundered because the Russian firm did 
not understand CDI's proposed destruction method. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
7. (SBU) All participants agreed that the NDF will request CDI to 
come to Russia with the objective of seeking bids from Russian firms 
for work on Buildings 32, 34, and 33.  Recognizing that no decision 
has been taken on Building 33, CDI will provide two estimates for 
Building 33; one estimate for the work done as part of a project 
including Buildings 32 and 34; the second estimate for the work done 
on Building 33 as a separate project.  Sibbiopharm agreed to review 
its commercial requirements for Building 33, and provide by March 26 
a preliminary proposal to the NDF as to how it can address its 
commercial requirements while going forward with elimination work in 
33. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
8. (U) The participant list follows: 
 
U.S. Delegation 
 
Raymond Smith, Senior Negotiator, ISN/NDF 
John Conlon, Foreign Affairs Officer, ISN/NDF 
Aaron Fishman, Health Officer, Office of Environment, Science, and 
Technology, U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation 
Olga Borisova, Health Specialist, Office of Environment, Science, 
and Technology, U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation 
 
Sibbiopharm Delegation 
 
Aleksandr Nikolayevich Krichevskiy, General Director 
Nadezhda V. Orlova, Executive Director 
Maksim S. Benevolenskiy, Technical Director 
 
This cable was cleared by the delegation prior to departure. 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW829, SIBBIOPHARM AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO COMMENCE NDF BW FACILITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW829 2007-02-28 06:28 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0829/01 0590628
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280628Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7743

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/PRA, AND ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM TBIO RS
SUBJECT: SIBBIOPHARM AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO COMMENCE NDF BW FACILITY 
ELIMINATION PROJECT 
 
 
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 26-27 a State/Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund (NDF) delegation met with Sibbiopharm 
representatives to establish the scope and ground rules for an NDF 
project to eliminate former biological weapons (BW) building and 
equipment at Sibbiopharm's Berdsk facility.  The sides agreed to 
move ahead with work on buildings 32 and 34.  Sibbiopharm officials 
said that the firm would need either to retain the production 
capacity of Building 33 for future commercial needs or to receive 
assistance to expand capabilities at its current production 
facility.  They offered to provide a preliminary estimate of their 
needs during a meeting in Washington March 26.  End Summary. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
2. (SBU) NDF Senior Adviser Smith began by noting that the NDF is 
prepared to proceed with demolishing Building 32, and eliminating 
the specialized dual-use equipment in Building 34 and the fermenters 
in Building 33.   Sibbiopharm agreed in principle to green-field 
Building 32 and eliminate the dual-use equipment in Building 34, but 
noted that they were not prepared yet to take a decision on Building 
33.  Smith noted that the NDF believes that it has sufficient funds 
to complete work on all three buildings and wants, for reasons of 
cost effectiveness, to reach agreement to commence work on all of 
them simultaneously. 
 
BUILDINGS 32 AND 34 
------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Sibbiopharm Executive Director Nadezhda Orlova stated that, 
while Sibbiopharm is prepared to proceed with work on Buildings 32 
and 34, there remain a number of technical problems.  Orlova noted 
that Sibbiopharm wanted no debris to remain at the site after 
Building 32 is demolished that would hinder or raise the cost of 
building future infrastructure on the site.  She noted that 
Controlled Demolition, Incorporated (CDI) (the elimination 
specialists which the NDF intends to hire as prime contractor for 
this project) would not be familiar with Russian law and regulation. 
 Further, Sibbiopharm insists that the demolition technology 
employed be environmentally friendly.  For Building 34, Orlova 
required that the non-dual use equipment in the building (i.e. the 
electricity, water, and sewage) not be affected by the elimination 
project. 
 
4. (SBU) Smith noted that it would principally be CDI's 
responsibility to meet local requirements.  CDI normally discusses 
these requirements with all interested parties, including the 
proposed subcontractors and our international partner (e.g. 
Sibbiopharm.)  He stated that CDI was also responsible for providing 
the NDF with the lowest cost concomitant with effective work.  He 
stated that the two sides should agree in principle that CDI will 
have the right to solicit competitive bids from multiple Russian 
subcontractors.  While Orlova warned that only contractors in the 
vicinity of Berdsk and Novosibirsk would be cost-effective, the 
Sibbiopharm reps agreed with this principle.  Smith pointed out that 
any requirements based in Russian law or regulation that would raise 
project costs would have to be documented. 
 
BUILDING 33 (AND BUILDING 36) 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Orlova noted that Sibbiopharm had not considered Building 
33 as an object for elimination under the NDF project.  Sibbiopharm 
currently intended to use Building 33's fermentation capacity for 
commercial purposes.  Orlova noted that Sibbiopharm's sales enjoyed 
30-40 percent growth in recent years.  Sibbiopharm currently 
produced its products (enzymes for animal feed and food) using 
fermentation capacity in Building 36, whose capacity is identical to 
that of Building 33.  (COMMENT: This was the first discussion of 
Building 36 between Sibbiopharm and the NDF.  End Comment.) 
Sibbiopharm also intended to expand its product line into bioethanol 
production.  Sibbiopharm currently uses about 56-57 percent of 
Building 36's capacity, but at current rates of expansion will 
require use of Building 33's capacity in approximately two to three 
years.  Orlova said that Sibbiopharm could agree to destruction of 
the production capacity of Building 33 only if it received 
assistance in expanding capacity at Building 36 to meet anticipated 
needs. 
 
6. (SBU) Smith noted that the NDF did not have the authority to 
provide Sibbiopharm with additional fermentation capability.  Orlova 
asked whether other State Department resources could address this 
problem.  Smith stated that, if Sibbiopharm developed a proposal 
outlining their commercial requirements, the NDF would look into 
whether there is any Department interest in pursuing such a parallel 
project.  Smith reiterated that, for reasons of cost, the U.S. would 
like to eliminate the equipment in Building 33 simultaneously with 
 
the work done in Buildings 32 and 34.  Sibbiopharm requested that 
CDI provide a detailed description of its proposed destruction 
methodology prior to its visit as a basis for soliciting bids from 
Russian firms.  She noted that previous discussions b
etween CDI and 
a proposed Russian firm had foundered because the Russian firm did 
not understand CDI's proposed destruction method. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
7. (SBU) All participants agreed that the NDF will request CDI to 
come to Russia with the objective of seeking bids from Russian firms 
for work on Buildings 32, 34, and 33.  Recognizing that no decision 
has been taken on Building 33, CDI will provide two estimates for 
Building 33; one estimate for the work done as part of a project 
including Buildings 32 and 34; the second estimate for the work done 
on Building 33 as a separate project.  Sibbiopharm agreed to review 
its commercial requirements for Building 33, and provide by March 26 
a preliminary proposal to the NDF as to how it can address its 
commercial requirements while going forward with elimination work in 
33. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
8. (U) The participant list follows: 
 
U.S. Delegation 
 
Raymond Smith, Senior Negotiator, ISN/NDF 
John Conlon, Foreign Affairs Officer, ISN/NDF 
Aaron Fishman, Health Officer, Office of Environment, Science, and 
Technology, U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation 
Olga Borisova, Health Specialist, Office of Environment, Science, 
and Technology, U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation 
 
Sibbiopharm Delegation 
 
Aleksandr Nikolayevich Krichevskiy, General Director 
Nadezhda V. Orlova, Executive Director 
Maksim S. Benevolenskiy, Technical Director 
 
This cable was cleared by the delegation prior to departure. 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW828, AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS VISIT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW828 2007-02-27 16:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO9135
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #0828/01 0581637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271637Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7741
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 
TAGS: PREL KPAL EAID IS LE SY IZ SA RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS VISIT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ 
WITH DFM SALTANOV 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons:  1.4(B & D). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Deputy Foreign Minister Saltanov told the 
Ambassador February 27 that the MFA saw Hamas as evolving in 
its views on Israel following a February 26-27 Moscow visit 
by Hamas Politburo Chief Mishal.  While Mishal was not 
willing to directly address publicly the question of 
recognizing Israel, Saltanov was encouraged by positive steps 
in that direction in private meetings.  According to 
Saltanov, Mishal had told FM Lavrov that Hamas saw the Mecca 
Agreement as opening the path to negotiations with Israel. 
Saltanov said Russia believed that an end to the "blockade" 
on assistance to the Palestinians would be a necessary part 
of supporting the National Unity Government.  Moscow had 
coordinated its invitation to Hamas with Abu Mazen, but the 
Israelis continued to be critical of Russia's engagement. 
The Ambassador pressed Saltanov on Russian weapons sales to 
Syria and Iran and Saltanov responded by claiming that 
Russian end-user controls had been tightened.  Putin's trip 
to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia had been marked by consensus on 
regional political issues and heightened interest in energy 
cooperation.  End Summary. 
. 
HAMAS VISIT 
----------- 
 
2.  (C)  A four-member Hamas delegation led by Politburo 
Chief Khaled Mishal met February 27 with Russian FM Lavrov, 
following a February 26 meeting with DFM Saltanov.  No other 
meetings with Russian officials, including President Putin, 
are planned.  Saltanov told the Ambassador that the GOR had a 
positive impression after the meetings and saw Hamas' 
position on peace with Israel as "evolving."  Saltanov did 
not exclude that Hamas might continue to make sharp 
statements publicly, but at least privately there were 
positive signs.  Mishal told the Russians that he viewed the 
February 8 "Mecca Agreement" on a National Unity Government 
(NUG) as an opening which could lead to a path of 
negotiations with Israel because the Agreement provided a 
platform for such talks. 
 
3.  (C)  Saltanov said the MFA pressed Mishal for clarity on 
"the most important question -- was Hamas prepared to 
recognize Israel."  Mishal would not directly answer, but he 
underlined that Hamas was willing to accept the Arab League's 
2002 Beirut Summit decision that promised normal relations 
with Israel as well as UN Security Council resolutions that 
implicitly recognized Israel.  Pressed by the Ambassador as 
to whether Mishal was willing to express such views publicly, 
Saltanov counseled patience and again underlined that Hamas 
was evolving but was not likely to recognize Israel directly 
so soon after the Mecca Agreement.  This would be a careful 
process, but Hamas would be moving forward, if by small 
increments.  (NOTE:  In a February 27 press conference, 
Mishal would not respond directly to a question on whether 
Hamas would recognize Israel.) 
. 
QUARTET CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C)  Referring to the "blockade" on assistance to the 
Hamas-led government, Saltanov relayed Mishal's belief that 
implementation of the Mecca Agreement should be sufficient to 
allow the resumption of aid to the Palestinian Authority. 
Saltanov noted that Russia's views on ending the assistance 
ban paralleled the views of the seven Muslim like-minded 
countries who met in Pakistan on February 25; in Russia's 
view, relaxation of the ban depended in the first place on 
Hamas fully honoring the Mecca Agreement and working with Abu 
Mazen to establish the NUG.  According to Saltanov, Mishal 
had promised that Hamas would be "non-discriminatory" in 
forming a government and would seek out "internationally 
recognized persons."  Further Russian aid to the Palestinians 
would be held in abeyance, according to Saltanov, who 
stressed his hope that the Europeans would be able to further 
refine the temporary international mechanism at a March 13 
Brussels meeting. 
. 
COORDINATION WITH ABU MAZEN AND ISRAEL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Saltanov said that Russia had been encouraged by PA 
President Abu Mazen to pursue continued engagement with 
Hamas.  Abu Mazen was pleased by Moscow's support for the 
Mecca Agreement.  The Israelis (with whom Saltanov met in 
Jerusalem last week before the Hamas invitation was made 
public) continued to be critical of Russia's approach. 
Saltanov said the Israelis were unrealistic about what Hamas 
would be willing to do in the immediate aftermath of the 
Mecca Agreement.  In his view, the Israelis were making a 
 
MOSCOW 00000828  002 OF 002 
 
 
serious mistake by not recognizing the dangers of the 
situation, not only on their borders, but in the broader 
Middle East.  Saltanov did n
ote that the Russians had acted 
on an Israeli suggestion to use their influence with Hamas to 
urge a reduction in violence and had pressed Hamas on Kassam 
rocket attacks. 
 
6.  (C)  Saltanov said Russia strongly supported the 
Secretary's efforts to encourage talks between PM Olmert and 
 
SIPDIS 
Abu Mazen.  Moscow saw it as a success that the two met at 
all, and that they had agreed to meet again.  Saltanov 
briefly noted that the question of the Israeli soldier held 
prisoner by Hamas remained outstanding.  He said Lavrov had 
pressed Mishal on this issue, but had been careful not to get 
into the details, so as not to obstruct the effort of 
Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman. 
. 
SYRIA 
----- 
 
7.  (C)  Saltanov told the Ambassador that both Mishal and 
Abu Mazen had contended to the Russians that Syria was 
playing a helpful role in encouraging the Mecca Agreement and 
forming the NUG.  The Ambassador emphasized the dangers to 
regional stability of Russian weapons sales to Syria (and 
Iran), noting outstanding U.S. concerns and pointing to 
Congressman Lantos' focus on this issue in all his meetings 
during last week's visit.  Saltanov did not directly defend 
the sales, but said that Russia had put better end-user 
controls in place, and would welcome any concrete information 
that such controls were not be followed. 
. 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
8.  (C)  Saltanov was aware of the mid-March subministerial 
conference in Baghdad of Iraq's neighbors and P-5/G-8 
members, but had not yet received an invitation from the 
Iraqis.  Russia had long supported such a conference; it 
would not only allow increased international support for the 
Iraqi government, it would also provide an opportunity to 
engage with Syria and Iran on Iraqi security. 
. 
PUTIN IN THE GULF 
----------------- 
 
9.  (C)  Saltanov, who had accompanied President Putin during 
his mid-February visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, 
said that the meetings in Riyadh had been particularly 
useful.  The Saudis had offered their strategic perspective 
on the region and both Moscow and Riyadh shared the view that 
more needed to be done to resolve regional conflicts.  Much 
of the discussions in Qatar and Saudi Arabia had been focused 
on energy, but there had been no concrete projects agreed to 
in the leaders' talks.  However, a parallel business forum 
had spurred discussions on bilateral investments and joint 
projects in third countries.  Saltanov also noted continuing 
interest in the Gulf (and in Egypt) in developing peaceful 
nuclear energy programs. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW827, RUSSIA: THE CASE FOR LIMITED U.S. FUNDING OF RFFE

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW827 2007-02-27 16:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0827/01 0581627
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271627Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7739

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS 
USAID FOR D. LUTEN, J. ROBINSON, D. ATWOOD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2017 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PREL PGOV PHUM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: THE CASE FOR LIMITED U.S. FUNDING OF RFFE 
 
REF: STATE 20055 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The U.S. Mission strongly supports continued limited 
USG funding for the Russian Foundation for Free Elections 
(RFFE) under its existing grant.  U.S. monies would be used 
only to train election observers and to operate a voter 
hotline.  While RFFE does receive some government support, 
continued USG funding of its activities is backed by IRI, 
NDI, and key Russian NGOs.  These same organizations 
cooperate with the RFFE and view its work and access to the 
Central Election Commission as supportive of their own 
activities.  USG funding for RFFE helps to create the 
political space for American and Russian NGOs to carry out 
election monitoring activities, as well as to reinforce the 
perception of USG objectivity among Russian officials.  A 
mid-stream cutoff of USG support for RFFE would send the 
wrong signal and could endanger the operations of independent 
NGOs, which are crucial to carrying out our election 
monitoring strategy.   End summary. 
 
----------------- 
Why Support RFFE? 
----------------- 
 
2. (C) The RFFE is a GOR-sponsored NGO, which was formed 
initially by the Central Election Commission (CEC).  While 
the RFFE does not receive budgetary support from GOR 
ministries, it benefits from GOR subsidized office space and 
is the recipient of competitively awarded grants from the 
Public Chamber -- an arrangement that has raised questions 
about the appropriateness of USG funding.  Embassy 
understands that unease but, having met frequently with the 
RFFE, and seen it in action, we offer the following rationale 
for continuing funding of the organization: 
 
--  IRI, NDI, and independent Russian NGOs endorse U.S. 
funding of RFFE, since it is an organization that has access 
to and credibility with the GOR.  The Mission entered into 
this limited, two-year, USD 600,000 grant relationship with 
RFFE after consulting with IRI, NDI, and the three major 
Russian election monitoring and training NGOs that receive 
U.S. funding -- Golos, Transparency International, and the 
Fund for Information Policy Development (FIPD).  Each of the 
Russian NGOs had participated in RFFE conferences and events 
before the U.S. grant was signed in FY 2006.  All five 
organizations encouraged the U.S. to provide limited grant 
support to RFFE, as a means of encouraging enhanced 
engagement between a GOR-trusted organization and independent 
NGOs, and in recognition of the RFFE's connections to the 
Russian CEC.  The Mission judges CEC Commissioner Veshnyakov 
to be a positive force in advocating transparent and fair 
elections and NGO leaders generally judge that Veshnyakov has 
used his influence with some effect to push back against 
further legislative amendments to the electoral law. 
 
--  RFFE has a credible track record:  RFFE has demonstrated 
respect for international standards, an ability to cooperate 
with our traditional NGO partners, like Golos, and 
professionalism in executing its projects.  RFFE has been in 
operation since 2001 and performed substantial observation 
activity in the 2003 election cycle.  The report produced by 
RFFE after the 2003 elections identified deficiencies in the 
electoral process, including voter access.  Our NGO partners 
tell us that working with RFFE will provide them greater 
access to senior CEC officials, creating a "common space" in 
which they could interact with political parties to enhance 
the effectiveness of election monitoring and citizen 
complaint hotlines.  RFFE Head Andrey Przhezhdomskiy is not a 
GOR mouthpiece, but has been critical of official corruption 
in his capacity as Chairman of the Public Chamber's 
Anti-Corruption Committee.  At his instigation, the Committee 
has produced and distributed to key ministries an 
anti-corruption white paper.  In his dealings with Mission 
officers, Przhezhdomskiy has echoed the critique of many 
opposition politicians regarding Russia's electoral laws, and 
has underscored to us that Russia's democracy is nascent and 
falls short of international standards. 
 
-- USG support does not condone flawed elections or GOR 
restrictions on monitoring:  With over USD 6 million in FY07 
election related-assistance, the U.S. is supporting a variety 
of organizations, of which the RFFE is only one.  We are not 
in a position to prejudge the comments or conclusions that 
the RFFE may make -- to date, their commentary has been 
professional.  Moreover, our work with RFFE is technical 
only: the RFFE is undertaking a "train the trainers" program 
-- in conjunction with our traditional NGO partners.  These 
election observers are not RFFE employees, but 
representatives drawn from all registered political parties. 
Golos, Transparency, and FIPD all work within the same GOR 
restrictions.  Under GOR law, only political party members or 
journalists are allowed to monitor polling stations.  While 
not ideal, the Mission believes that it is better to work 
within these restrictions than to abandon election monitoring 
alto
gether, particularly since regional elections (e.g. 
Samara) have shown the ability of Golos and others to muster 
monitors on a broad scale. 
 
-- USG funding of RFFE is not at the expense of other 
independent NGOs:  The USD 300,000 grant to RFFE is only a 
small portion of the U.S. monies being spent to promote a 
more transparent electoral process, with FY07 2.05 million 
devoted to political process grantees and over 4.4 million 
for independent media.  Golos remains at the forefront of our 
election monitoring efforts, with a total of 2.3 million in 
grants (including, a FY06 1.3 million grant, a FY07 one 
million allocation, supplemented by an expected half million 
in 06 DA funds, and separate support from NDI).  Redirecting 
money away from RFFE and to Golos would certainly heighten 
its profile in an unhelpful manner.  When asked to reassess 
the desirability of U.S. funding for RFFE, Golos Director 
Lilia Shabanova reminded us that it was RFFE President 
Przhezhdomskiy who established an election coordinating 
council in which CEC and Public Chamber members participate, 
which has been instrumental in resolving problems and 
averting misunderstandings.  Shabanova underscored to us that 
Golos and the RFFE share the same objectives and goals for 
the upcoming elections.  Likewise, FIPD President Svetlana 
Kolesnikova asserted to us that "to support the RFFE is to 
support the electoral process in Russia."  Kolesnikova urged 
the U.S. to avoid a mindset that only viewed strongly 
oppositional organizations as legitimate.  She stressed that 
the RFFE strives to be independent and promote democratic 
values in its work. 
 
-- Support for RFFE does not contradict the Secretary's core 
principles in defense of NGOs, nor establishes a precedent 
that undermines longer-term democracy promotion efforts in 
Russia:  Support for the RFFE provides proof of our 
commitment to the openness and transparency of the electoral 
process, rather than to a partisan outcome.  It helps negate 
suspicions, expressed at the highest level of the GOR, over 
U.S. intent and refutes hard-line critics who seek to 
discredit NGOs as subversive or as foreign tools.  Since 
assistance programs in many countries work with government or 
government-related organizations, funding for RFFE sets no 
precedent.  The U.S. has a long history in Russia of working 
with the CEC in the 1990s. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Implications of Not Funding RFFE 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Refusal of the second tranche of funding provided for 
in the grant signed in July 2006 would have serious 
implications for our ability to execute an election 
monitoring strategy and would deprive the USG of the 
opportunity to establish credibility and exert influence with 
the GOR in an effort to open the election process.  Golos and 
our other partners, including IRI and NDI, have encouraged 
U.S. support for RFFE not only because they see it as a 
professional and cooperative partner, but also because it can 
be helpful in dealing with other elements of the GOR.  In the 
Mission's view, denying further funding to RFFE could perhaps 
deprive independent NGOs of an influential advocate of 
cooperation from the CEC; furthermore, it could confirm 
suspicions among some segments of the GOR that our support to 
these NGOs is politically motivated, leaving them vulnerable 
to unwanted scrutiny. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
4. (C) The bottom line is that a mid-stream cut-off of USG 
funding to RFFE could undercut both our overall election 
monitoring strategy and the political maneuvering room for 
independent NGOs -- both Russian and American -- involved in 
election monitoring.  Our top priorities include supporting 
independent NGOs and improving the electoral process.  In our 
view, continued support for RFFE helps to advance our 
objectives on both fronts and to preserve the appearance of 
USG objectivity. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

07MOSCOW825, RUSSIAN MFA CITES DIP NOTE ON SMUGGLED HEU SAMPLE

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW825.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW825 2007-02-27 15:10 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0825 0581510
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271510Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7737
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2994
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3802
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0619
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0449

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000825 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CTR (CURRY), AND EUR/PRA (FRIEDT) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC ENRG PARM ASEC
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA CITES DIP NOTE ON SMUGGLED HEU SAMPLE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 20742 
 
     B. TBILISI 269 
     C. MOSCOW 461 
 
Classified By: EST Counselor Daniel O'Grady.  Reasons: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (S) As instructed by REF A, we met February 26 with 
Mikhail Kondratenkov, of the MFA's Department of Disarmament 
and Security Affairs (DVBR), and asked him to clarify 
Moscow's purported request to the Georgian Government for an 
additional sample of the HEU that was seized in Georgia in 
February 2006.  We underscored that it would be useful to 
learn when this request had been made, whether it was in 
writing and what phrasing had been used -- to ensure there 
was no confusion.  Kondratenkov promised to find out the 
specifics and inform us. 
 
2.  (S) On February 27 DVBR's Aleksandr Bulychev, who had sat 
in the meeting, called us to report that the Russian Embassy 
in Tbilisi had delivered a diplomatic note on the HEU issue 
to the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 13. 
The diplomatic note had been addressed to A. Torondjadze, in 
the Department of Global Relations.  In the note, the Russian 
Embassy had requested a sample of "not less than 10 grams" of 
the smuggled HEU.  Bulychev said that the diplomatic note 
also asked for additional materials to be provided to the 
Procurator General's office in Russia, in support of a 
potential criminal case that might be opened here.  (NOTE: 
The Russian press has reported that the smuggling suspect's 
brother is a high-ranking customs official in North Ossetia, 
speculating that this could become an investigative trail. 
END NOTE) 
BURNS

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07MOSCOW777, BOSNIA: RUSSIANS NOT KEEN ON EXTENDING OFFICE OF

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To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MOSCOW777.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW777 2007-02-22 16:00 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4958
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0777 0531600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221600Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7663
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2045
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4091
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0308

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK RS
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: RUSSIANS NOT KEEN ON EXTENDING OFFICE OF 
HIGH COMMISSIONER 
 
REF: STATE 20031 
 
Classified By: D/Pol Colin Cleary.  Reasons: 1.4(B/D). 
 
1. (C)  Vadim Gorelov, Chief of the MFA's Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Affairs Section, told us February 21 that the GOR 
would not be able agree to extend the mandate of the Office 
of the High Commissioner (OHC) at the February 26-27 Peace 
Implementations Council's Steering Committee meeting. 
Gorelov said the GOR would be willing to consider extending 
the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner (OHC) 
until November 21, 2007, when the Security Council considers 
renewal of UNSCR 1722, but would not be willing to extend the 
OHC until the end of 2007 or until June 2008 unless a 
"compelling argument" to do so could be made at the PIC 
meeting. 
 
2. (C)  Gorelov said the GOR viewed the process of reform in 
BiH as well underway and challenged the U.S. assessment of 
the situation.  He said Russia would be willing to listen to 
"clear and concrete" arguments for extending the OHC during 
the February 26-27 meeting, but noted that the Russian 
delegation would not be able to respond on the issue at the 
meeting; the GOR would need more time ("days or weeks") to 
consider a response. 
 
3. (C)  Gorelov said the GOR was not alarmed by the sharpened 
rhetoric coming from the three main ethnic groups in BiH; 
such exchanges would continue to be a factor in BiH politics 
and were an improvement over the armed conflict in the 
nineties.  He rejected the argument that the need for police 
reform was a reason to extend the OHC, as this was being 
conducted under the purview of the European Union, not the 
OHC.  He added that Kosovo final status should not influence 
the situation in BiH.  In his view, a fair, negotiated 
settlement on Kosovo -- one that Belgrade could accept -- 
would not upset the political equilibrium in BiH. 
BURNS

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