Monthly Archives: January 2010

10MOSCOW227, THREE DAYS OF HIGH LEVELS TALKS- BEEF CAN COME IN,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW227 2010-01-29 16:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1639
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0227/01 0291610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291610Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6114
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0027
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
COMMERCE FOR BROUGHER/EDWARDS 
WHITE HOUSE ALSO FOR USTR HAFNER, FIELD AND MURPHY 
GENEVA FOR WTO REPS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2020 
TAGS: ETRD EAGR ECON PREL RS
SUBJECT: THREE DAYS OF HIGH LEVELS TALKS- BEEF CAN COME IN, 
WE'LL TALK MORE ON CHICKEN, CLOSE ON PORK 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 104 
     B. 09 MOSCOW 3054 
 
Classified By: ECON M/C Matthias Mitman 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  From January 19-21 a USG delegation met 
with their Russian counterparts to find a solution to 
Russia's actions which have effectively shut down all U.S. 
exports of chicken and pork.  Two days of discussions 
centered on the Russian ban on use of chlorine in poultry 
processing, the chemical used by the majority of the U.S. 
poultry industry.  While no agreement was achieved, both 
sides agreed to exchange letters on their positions and 
continue discussions in the near future.  The third day of 
meetings focused on discussions regarding the recent Russian 
delisting of 98% of U.S. pork production facilities (Ref B), 
as well as veterinary export certificates for pork, beef and 
other agricultural products.  These talks made significant 
progress in the discussions of pork and beef.  The two sides 
have now exchanged letters laying out their positions on the 
use of chlorine and the Ambassador has followed-up with 
letters to high-levels Russian officials.  We will continue 
to engage Russia on these issues.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) From January 19-21, a 12 person USG delegation led by 
USDA Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural 
Affairs James Miller and A/USTR for Agricultural Affairs 
James Murphy held extensive discussions with Russia's Head of 
the Federal Service for Supervision and Consumer Rights 
Protection and Human Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor) Gennadiy 
Onishchenko and Head of the Federal Service for Veterinary 
and Phytosanitary Surveillance (VPSS) Sergey Dankvert.  The 
objective of the USG delegation was to find a solution to 
Russian actions which have effectively shut down all U.S. 
exports of chicken and pork (Ref B). 
 
The First day of Talks 
---------------------- 
3. (C) The first day of talks on the use of chlorine in 
chicken processing took place at the Rospotrebnadzor offices 
and began with each delegation laying out their general 
positions.  Onishchenko stated he would allow entry of the 
two poultry shipments that the U.S. side mentioned during the 
discussions.  Onishchenko then led the charge challenging 
U.S. processes for poultry production rather than discussing 
the safety of U.S. poultry meat itself.  He categorically 
stated that any use of chlorine by poultry processors in the 
slaughter process was prohibited in Russia.  He noted that, 
as of a December 2009 survey, some small Russian producers 
and processors were still using chlorine, although this was 
less than 10% of total processors.  Onishchenko appeared 
genuinely surprised, but pleased, to learn that chlorine was 
only one of 18 chemical-based antimicrobial treatments (or 
pathogen reduction treatments) authorized for use in the U.S. 
 U/S Miller and Daniel Engeljohn, Deputy Assistant 
Administrator for the Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS), attempted to refocus the discussion on safety by 
asking about the science behind Russia's decision to ban the 
use of chlorine and reviewing the science establishing the 
safety and efficacy of chlorine as used in the U.S.  The 
Russians clarified that they take issue with any use of 
chlorine and not the chill bath process itself.  The Russian 
side also indicated at least some of the 17 alternative 
chemical-based antimicrobial treatments authorized for use in 
the U.S. are approved in Russia; however, the Russian side 
was, and continues to be, unable to provide full details 
regarding such a Russian list. (Note: several of these 
alternative treatments have a chlorine-based element and 
their acceptability for Russia is an open question. End note.) 
 
4. (C) U/S Miller and A/USTR Murphy met separately with 
Onishchenko (who took with him MFA North America Deputy 
Director Nikolai Smirnov and Agriculture Deputy Minister Oleg 
Aldoshin) to see if they could come to a resolution and way 
forward.  During the 3  hours of talks, U/S Miller and A/USTR 
Murphy kept trying to shift Onishchenko's focus from the 
production process (regarding the use of specific 
antimicrobial treatments) to the finished poultry product and 
any possible chemical residues on the carcasses.  They 
attempted to get Onishchenko to agree to establish maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) for chlorine and chlorine by-products 
on poultry as a way to resolve the opposing positions. 
 
MOSCOW 00000227  002 OF 005 
 
 
Onishchenko responded that Russia did not need to establish 
an MRL as Russian producers no longer used chlorine.  He also 
kept circling back to the 17 other chemicals the U.S. 
allowed.  Smirnov stressed that the GOR gave the U.S. more 
than a year's notice on the chlorine ban and now "the
 U.S. 
needs to accept that the law is the law."  (Note  This 
statement ignores the fact that Onishchenko refused to meet 
with industry experts or Embassy staff on this issue until a 
December meeting with the Ambassador or to accept 
documentation and studies done on the use of chlorine. End 
Note.) 
 
5. (C) While the small group discussions took place, others 
in the U.S. met with Nikolay Vlasov, Russia's Chief 
Veterinary Officer.  The USG delegation attempted to learn 
more about any risk analyses and other scientific studies the 
Russians had used to support their decision to ban the use of 
chlorine in poultry processing.  But the Russians would not 
reference any specific analyses or studies to support their 
decision.  The USG delegation was able to determine that the 
Russians were not concerned with any organic compounds 
possibly created by the use of chlorine (such as chloroform), 
just with the use of chlorine. In addition, the Russians made 
clear that they were not pursuing use of air chill only 
production processes, as reported in the press, and would 
allow water bath chilled poultry.  The Russians also 
emphasized that they did not view food safety as something 
with many separate components, supervised by different 
entities.  They said a discussion of process is essential 
because, for Russia, if you control the process from the farm 
to finished product, you can control the safety of the 
product and do not need to use chlorine. 
 
Developing a New Strategy 
------------------------- 
6. (C) During an extended meeting with representatives of 
U.S. poultry producers (USAPEEC) the evening of January 19, 
the U.S. delegation agreed to pursue a two-pronged strategy 
with Onishchenko the next day.  The first -- Option One --, 
the preferred outcome, would be an agreement on a maximum 
residue level (MRL) for chlorine for the finished poultry 
product, rather than the current outright ban on the use of 
chlorine in processing poultry.  This solution would require 
some follow-up technical talks as the U.S. and Russia would 
first have to set an interim standard, and then hold 
technical talks to derive an appropriate science-based level. 
 The U.S. delegation would suggest that Russia's MRL for 
chlorine in potable water could serve as the interim MRL 
standard. 
 
7. (C) Option Two was developed when USAPEEC changed its 
long-standing position that use of another pathogen reduction 
treatment was economically and technically impossible. 
USAPEEC now posited that it would consider using pathogen 
reduction treatments other than those involving 
hypochlorination.  Overnight, USDA and USAPEEC confirmed that 
the companies on USAPEEC's board of directors could live with 
this option, if necessary to continue access to the Russian 
market.  However, industry would require a phase-in period to 
ensure that replacing chlorine in the process would not 
result in an inability to meet U.S. food safety standards, 
which are expected to become stricter with regard to 
salmonella and other microbials in the near future. 
Acceptability of Option Two would also require Russia to 
agree to several conditions.  Industry requested that the USG 
proposal (and any final agreement): a) secure a phase-in 
period of at least six months while U.S. poultry processors 
shift away from the use of hypochlorous solutions (though 
imports would need to be permitted for a total of eight 
months to allow for customs clearance); b) allow water in 
chill baths to be in line with U.S. potable water standards, 
not Russian potable water standards (U.S. allows 4 parts per 
million (ppm) and Russia allows 0.3-0.5 ppm); c) allow ALL 17 
alternative chemical treatments (some of which are 
chlorine-based compounds); d) allow hypochlorous solutions to 
be used for the cleaning of equipment in the facilities and 
for reconditioning inadvertently contaminated carcasses; e) 
address positive findings of microbial contamination through 
the requirement of heat treatment rather than restrictions on 
processing establishments; and, f) create a working group 
during the phase-in period to discuss the safety, use, and 
efficacy of pathogen reduction treatments used in both 
 
MOSCOW 00000227  003 OF 005 
 
 
countries.  USTR expressed concern that any agreement along 
these lines not undercut the U.S. case against the EU on 
poultry processing before the WTO, i.e. that we not allow the 
Russians to restrict our use of four key chemical compounds 
that are the focus of the WTO case (included in the 17 
alternative chemicals.) 
 
8. (C) During the small group meeting USTR pointed out to the 
Russians that Option One involving the establishment of a MRL 
for chlorine on poultry, would be an approach consistent with 
the WTO SPS Agreement whereas Option Two would likely not be 
consistent with the Agreement -- a factor that Russia might 
want to consider as it was applying to join the WTO. 
Onishchenko's response made clear, however, that consistency 
with WTO rules was of no concern to him. 
 
The Second Day ) Not Much Give From the Russians 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
9. (C) During the second day of discussions, Onishchenko 
dominated the meeting from the Russian side, not allowing 
anyone else to speak on his side.  He immediately took U/S 
Miller's presentation of Option Two, which was presented as a 
hypothetical, to mean that the USG had finally agreed to 
renounce the use of chlorine.  When he went through the 
commitments the USG wanted in exchange for this change in 
poultry processing, Onishchenko would either say they were 
not necessary or would not commit to them, moving them to the 
"U.S.-Russia technical working group" on poultry.  (Note: The 
"U.S.-Russian Working Group on Study and Assessment of Modern 
Poultry Processing Technologies" was set up last year to 
study the chlorine and water content issues, but the Russian 
side refused to address chlorine, based on Onishchenko's 
instructions to his staff, and Onishchenko has ignored the 
group's work on moisture content. End Note.) 
 
10. (C) Onishchenko then began to speak as if we were 
finalizing an agreement where the U.S. would renounce 
chlorine in processing and the Russians would concede nothing 
to us.  U/S Miller and A/USTR Murphy intervened and clarified 
that this had only been a hypothetical proposal to see if the 
Russians would agree to the conditions needed on the U.S. 
side, and re-emphasized our desire for Option One (the 
establishment of MRL levels).  Onishchenko reacted strongly, 
claiming he did not see them as two options because he had 
refused to discuss MRLs the day before.  Therefore, the two 
sides resolved to continue the dialogue through letters, to 
be sent within a week, which would lay out how we viewed our 
positions and possible solutions to the current impasse.  U/S 
Miller promised to consult with the U.S. poultry industry 
regarding Option Two.  Depending on the outcome of these 
letters, U/S Miller and Onishchenko agreed
to meet again, 
within a month (location TBD.) 
 
11. (C) Both sides also agreed to brief non-committal press 
points which focused on both sides continuing to work 
together with the goal of finding a solution and that further 
meetings will take place in the near future.  This agreement 
has succeeded in reigning in the inflammatory statements we 
saw coming from Russian leaders including PM Putin, Deputy PM 
Zubkov, and Onishchenko in the days before these discussions 
(Ref A). 
 
Beef Can Come ) Pork and Other Products Can Wait 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
12. (C) On January 21, the leaders of the USG delegation 
started with a 30-minute meeting with Minister of Agriculture 
Yelena Skrynnik, who was accompanied by VPSS Head Sergey 
Dankvert and MFA Deputy Director for North America Nikolay 
Smirnov.  Minister Skrynnik and U/S Miller commented on the 
successful DVC on December 14 between the coordinators of the 
Agricultural Working Group (AWG) under the U.S.-Russia 
Bilateral Presidential Commission.  U/S Miller concurred with 
the Minister's assessment of planned AWG agenda items and 
highlighted U.S. interest in food safety and food security. 
He also explained that working to resolve the current 
agricultural trade issues with poultry and pork, which 
account for $1.2 billion in exports and represent about 65% 
of U.S. agricultural exports to Russia, is one way to ensure 
that the two countries are on a path toward improving 
relations, which benefits both countries.  U/S Miller 
reviewed the discussions of the past two days and said that 
he believed agreement had been reached on allowing U.S. 
 
MOSCOW 00000227  004 OF 005 
 
 
poultry from 2009 contracts to be sold in Russia without 
restrictions.  Minister Skrynnik said that the Russian 
position was quite clear and that to continue exporting to 
Russia the U.S. would have to stop using chlorine.  She added 
that she supported technical discussions as a way to proceed 
on the issue. 
 
13. (C) The USG delegation then engaged in in-depth meetings 
with the Head of the Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Surveillance (VPSS) Sergey Dankvert, his Deputy 
Nikolay Vlasov, and his staff.  While these talks focused 
primarily on recent Russian restrictions, such as the 
delisting of 98% of U.S. pork production (Ref B) and efforts 
to agree on a pork veterinary export certificate, the 
delegations also discussed issues surrounding veterinary 
certificate requirements and approved establishment lists for 
the importation of U.S. beef, dairy, pet food, feed and feed 
additives, and processed meat.  Dankvert used his 
introductory remarks to complain about his lack of a single 
point of contact with the U.S.  U/S Miller effectively 
sidestepped this diversion and took the discussions straight 
to the primary issue, which was finalizing the details on a 
pork veterinary export certificate.  Several issues related 
to the pork certificate were resolved in the main meeting and 
the two sides agreed to continue these discussions at the 
technical-level, which took place after the main meeting. 
 
14. (C) During the meetings, Dankvert highlighted that the 
Russians have repeatedly requested -- without response-- 
lists of U.S. dairy, pet food, feed and feed additives, and 
processed meat establishments which are certified as able to 
export to Russia.  Dankvert stated that according to Russian 
law, as of March 1, Russia could not accept imports of these 
goods from any plants which are not on a list published in 
the Russian Federal Register.  He added that while the list 
can be updated in the future, a preliminary list of certified 
and inspected plants needs to be in the Federal Register. 
(Note: Over the past 2 years USDA and USTR have asked 
repeatedly for the law requiring these lists; Russia has yet 
to produce such a law. End Note.)  U/S Miller responded that 
the USG has provided the lists of U.S. dairy shippers and 
dairy industry companies.  He emphasized that more relevant 
lists could only be produced when both sides agree on 
veterinary export certificates for dairy, processed meat, and 
feed and feed additives, which will lay out the standards 
U.S. exporters need to meet.  Dankvert responded that the 
lists should be first because the most important thing is for 
firms to be registered, if they are not registered they 
cannot export.  He added that these firms can use the 
existing general export certificate until sector specific 
ones can be negotiated, a process which "takes time." 
 
15. (C) During the technical-level follow-on meeting, the two 
sides were able to resolve or clarify their respective 
positions on the pork certificate issues.  The U.S. side will 
be sending a letter with a revised certificate to Dr. Vlasov 
setting out proposed language.  The focus of this part of the 
discussion was on paragraph 4.8 of the draft certificate 
relating to U.S. exports meeting Russia's requirements. 
Regarding U.S. pork establishments restricted for trace 
findings of antibiotic tetracycline residues, Dr. Vlasov 
agreed to revisit actions taken against establishments with 
findings below 7.2 parts per billion (ppb).  The U.S. side 
indicated a need to review those facilities that tested at 
12.8 ppb since, according to VPSS' interpretation of its 
regulation, a confirmatory test would be needed to determine 
if the original finding was truly a violation of the Russian 
standard of 10 ppb. 
 
16. (SBU) On beef, Vlasov said he considered the recently 
received letter from FSIS acceptable.  He had no further 
questions that otherwise indicated VPSS has plans to delist 
beef facilities in the near future. 
 
17. (SBU) The U.S. side also took the opportunity to discuss 
access for U.S. process egg products and dairy export 
certificates. 
 
Comment and Update 
------------------ 
18. (U) By January 27, both sides had exchanged the letters 
on chlorine promised at the meetings.  The Ambassador will be 
 
MOSCOW 00000227  005 OF 005 
 
 
following up this exchange with letters of his own to Deputy 
Prime Ministers Shuvalov and Zubkov, and Presidential Advisor 
Dvorkovich. 
 
19. (C) At this point, we believe that Russia's actions on 
poultry, pork and other agricultural products are 
protectionist decisions -- especially on poultry -- that will 
require senior level political agreements to resolve.  On 
chlorine, we are beyond purely technical discussions.  We 
will continue to engage the Russians here in Moscow and 
recommend that senior level USG officials continue to raise 
the importance of resolving this issue with their GOR 
counterparts to demonstrate that the re-set is yielding 
positive benefits to our bilateral economic relationship. 
 
20. (U) This cable was cleared by USDA and USTR in Washington. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW226, SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 4 U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW226 2010-01-29 15:33 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1600
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0226/01 0291533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291533Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6110
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000226 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE FROM AMB. BEYRLE 
EUR-RS FOR CAROLINE SAVAGE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM RS AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 4 U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL 
PRESIDENTIAL DRUG TRAFFICKING WORKING GROUP MEETING 
 
This information is Sensitive But Unclassified.  Do Not 
Release to Public Internet. 
 
1.    (SBU) Summary: The U.S. and Russia have powerful 
reasons to work together to combat illicit trafficking of 
narcotics.  As you heard in September from your counterpart 
on the working group, Viktor Ivanov, Director of Russian 
Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN), his priority is engaging 
you on Afghanistan and specifically suppressing the flow into 
Russia of Afghan-origin heroin.  Heroin from Afghanistan 
floods Russia leading to high rates of addiction;   money 
from the heroin trade finances terrorist organizations 
fiercely hostile to the U.S. and Russia.  Ivanov and others 
in the Russian government take issue with the new U.S. 
whole-of-government approach which emphasizes interdiction 
over eradication of poppy fields to reduce the production and 
distribution of Afghan heroin.  The U.S. and Russia also have 
different approaches on how to best reduce demand for heroin 
within Russia. Although our principal policies on combating 
the Afghan narcotics trade differ, however, the establishment 
of this inter-agency working group has provided new 
opportunities to discuss counternarcotics cooperation in 
Afghanistan as well as prevention and treatment of substance 
abuse, financial controls, and international best practices. 
In addition, the working group has paved a political opening 
for increased peer-to-peer exchanges and cooperation on the 
enforcement front.  The adverse consequences of inaction or 
non-cooperation are too severe, particularly for Russia. End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Heroin Trafficking into Russia 
------------------------------ 
 
2.    (SBU) Trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan 
(primarily opium and heroin) and their abuse are major 
problems facing Russian law enforcement and public health 
agencies. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported 
in October 2009 that Russia has become the largest single 
market for Afghan-origin heroin, consuming approximately 
75,000-80,000 kilograms per year (20 percent of the annual 
production of Afghan heroin).  Russia has one of the highest 
rates of opiate abuse in the world.  Opiates (and hashish to 
a lesser degree) from Afghanistan are smuggled into Russia 
through the Central Asian states along the "Northern Route." 
Russians at all levels routinely blame the U.S. for its 
failure to curb opium production in Afghanistan, some even 
seeing in this failure a plot to undermine Russia.  FSKN 
Director Ivanov has repeatedly and publicly called on the 
U.S. to carry out broad eradication of poppy fields in 
Afghanistan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Scope of Drug Addiction Problem and the Treatment of Drug 
Offenders 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
3.    (SBU) The Russian Ministry of Health estimates that up 
to six million people (4.2 percent of the population) take 
drugs on a regular basis in Russia; according to official 
estimates, 30,000-40,000 people die annually of drug 
overdoses and another 70,000 deaths are considered 
drug-related.  Health experts estimate that nearly 65 percent 
of newly detected HIV cases can be attributed to drug use and 
that, among HIV-positive injecting drug users, about 85-90 
percent are Hepatitis C positive.  The FSKN reports that 
there are 400,000 officially registered drug addicts in 
Russia's treatment centers.  A Human Rights Watch study 
concluded, however, that the effectiveness of treatment 
offered at state drug treatment clinics "is so low as to be 
negligible" and constitutes a "violation of the right to 
health."  New models of cognitive therapy are being 
implemented in treatment centers in St. Petersburg, but 
substitution therapy (such as programs using methadone, 
buprenorphine, and naltrexone) has not been fully explored. 
Methadone remains illegal and politically sensitive. 
 
4.    (SBU) Director Ivanov has expressed interest in 
studying the drug court systems used in the U.S. to divert 
non-violent, substance abusing offenders from prison and jail 
 
MOSCOW 00000226  002 OF 004 
 
 
into treatment.  A decade of research indicates that drug 
courts reduce crime by lowering re-arrest and conviction 
rates, improving substance abuse treatment outcomes, and 
reuniting families, and also produces measurable cost 
benefits.  Court reform is an extremely complex subject, and 
Russia lacks the social service infrastructure that supports 
drug courts in the U.S.  However, Ivanov's interest in drug 
courts is encouraging, and your working group can foster 
cooperation and information exch
anges between judges, 
lawyers, public health experts and social service 
professionals to assist Russia in moving towards alternatives 
to the criminal prosecution of drug addicts and substance 
abusers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Domestic and International Drug Enforcement Policy and 
Activities 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
5.    (SBU) The State Anti-Narcotics Committee is a 
governmental steering body for developing proposals for the 
President on national anti-narcotics policy, coordinating the 
activities of various government agencies, and participating 
in international drug enforcement cooperation efforts.  The 
Committee is chaired by Director Ivanov and comprises seven 
federal ministers, 14 heads of federal services, a Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs representative, members of the Duma and 
the Federation Council, and other officials.  The State 
Anti-Narcotics Committee was tasked with developing a new 
national drug control strategy by President Medvedev in 2009. 
 A draft of a ten-year strategy was recently released; once 
finalized and adopted, it will be in force through 2020.  The 
strategy takes its own whole of government approach as it 
calls on regional anti-narcotQ commissions, local 
governmenQ community organizations, and religious 
associations to be involved.  Its objectives: reduce the 
supply of illegal Qugs, develop and strengthen intQational 
cooperation in counternarcotics, create and implement 
nationwide measures to curb the illegal distribution of 
narcotics, develop effective measures to counter drug 
trafficking, ensure reliable state control over the illicit 
movement of drugs and their precursors, and drug abuse 
prevention. 
 
6.    (SBU) The FSKN is Russia's only law enforcement agency 
dedicated solely to enforcing the narcotics laws.  The FSKN, 
which has approximately 35,000 employees and branch offices 
in every region of Russia, has the responsibility of 
coordinating the narcotics enforcement activities of other 
Russian law enforcement agencies. The U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) has a working relationship with the 
FSKN, but cooperation on cases and sharing information is 
sporadic and needs to be improved.   Despite FSKN's size and 
coordinating authority over other police agencies, it has not 
conducted significant cases of heroin distribution 
organizations within Russia.  In addition, although FSKN has 
publicly stressed the importance of addressing money 
laundering and other financial aspects of the drug trade, its 
relationship with Rosfinmonitoring has not been productive. 
Seizures and forfeitures of drug proceeds are insignificant 
compared to the volume of heroin sales within Russia. 
However, FSKN's participation in December in the Illicit 
Finance Working Group, whose work compliments that of the 
Drug Trafficking Working Group, is a positive development 
which may lead to more effective financial investigations of 
drug trafficking organizations.  The FSKN has made efforts to 
implement effective monitoring of the chemical industry. 
Prior to the creation of the FSKN, precursor chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals were governed by a patchwork of regulations 
enforced by different agencies.  Production, transportation, 
distribution, and import/export of controlled substances now 
require licensing from the FSKN. 
 
7.    (SBU) The Central Asian Regional Information and 
Coordination Center (CARICC), based in  Almaty, serves as a 
regional focal point for communication, analysis, and 
exchange of operational information in "real time" on 
cross-border crime, as well as a center for the organization 
and coordination of joint operations.  In September 2009, 
President Medvedev agreed to Russian participation at CARICC, 
 
MOSCOW 00000226  003 OF 004 
 
 
which may encourage greater commitment from Central Asian 
nations.  However, Russia sees the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), comprising Russia and Central Asian 
countries as an alternative to CARICC and the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC), and has spoken of establishing a coordination 
center like CARICC within CSTO.  Twice per year, the CSTO 
conducts operation "Canal", a week-long interdiction blitz on 
the Northern route based on shared intelligence among member 
states.  The effectiveness of this approach is questionable. 
The U.S. believes that multilateral efforts through the 
NATO-Russia Council and CARICC should be the primary means 
for advancing our shared goals though we are willing to 
consider proposals made by the CSTO. 
 
8.     (SBU) In 2006, then-President Putin authorized the 
FSKN to station 50 officers in foreign states to facilitate 
information sharing and joint investigations.  The FSKN has 
opened, or plans to open, liaison offices in at least ten 
countries, including four of the five Central Asian 
republics.  Russia has indicated that its drug liaison 
officer in Kazakhstan will also work with CARICC. 
 
9.     (SBU) Since 2006, roughly 1,000 officials from Central 
Asia and Afghanistan have been trained on various aspects of 
counternarcotics work through the NRC.  While Russia has been 
reluctant to pursue practical cooperation with NATO in many 
areas, this program has consistently stood out as an area 
where NATO and Russia can work together to achieve common 
objectives.  This joint training initiative is one of the 
most practical and useful of the Council's various 
activities.  The Russian training center at Domodedovo 
Airport is an important, but not principal, forum for 
providing training.  Russia has asked the U.S. to encourage 
Afghan drug enforcement personnel to train at Domodedovo. 
While the U.S. is supportive of the training, whether to send 
Afghan Police agents for counternarcotics training at 
Domodedovo is a decision for the Afghanistan Ministry of 
Interior. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
U.S. Support for Russia's Anti-narcotics Activities 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
10.   (SBU) The U.S. government provides foreign assistance 
to expand Russia's ability to combat narcotics trafficking, 
especially along Afghan drug routes, reduce drug abuse, and 
increase access to drug prevention and treatment facilities 
for those at risk of or infected by HIV/AIDS, the majority of 
whom are injecting drug users.  The U.S. has contributed at 
least $100,000 for several years for direct participation of 
DEA trainers at the Domodedovo training center and $2.8 
million to support CARICC.  Programs like those of the 
Healthy Russia Foundation, a Russian NGO funded by State's 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and 
USAID, contribute to preventing drug abuse by Russian youth, 
by raising awareness, knowledge, and understanding on drug 
use prevention and mitigating risks of contracting HIV/AIDS. 
With support from USAID, the Healthy Russia Foundation is 
also working to help expand the spectrum of
 drug treatment 
services available and to improve the treatment outcomes in 
select facilities in St. Petersburg and Orenburg. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.   (SBU) The Drug Trafficking Working Group provides an 
opportunity to establish constructive relationships leading 
to real cooperation and information exchanges to further the 
interests of the U.S. and Russia in fighting the Afghan 
heroin trade and the scourge of drug addiction in Russia. 
Director Ivanov, as the head of FSKN and the State 
Anti-narcotics Committee, has broad authority over Russia's 
domestic drug treatment and demand reduction policies and its 
drug enforcement operations domestically and internationally. 
 While he appears open to discussing drug courts and other 
approaches to dealing with the problems of drug addiction in 
Russia, it is not yet clear whether he is prepared to offer 
significant operational and intelligence cooperation to the 
U.S. for combating the Afghan heroin trade.  Progress toward 
 
MOSCOW 00000226  004 OF 004 
 
 
this objective would be a significant outcome of your visit. 
I look forward to welcoming you to Moscow February 3. 
 
 
 
 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW225 2010-01-29 15:23 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0225/01 0291523
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RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0413
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0016
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6888

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) PLENARY SESSIONS AND WORKING GROUPS, JANUARY 22, 2010 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (h 
). 
 
1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-007. 
 
2. (U) Meeting Date:  January 22, 2010 
              Times:  10:00 A.M. - 5:30 P.M. 
              Place:  MOD, Moscow 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
3. (U) 
 
Russian Federation 
------------------ 
 
--General of the Army Nikolai Yegorevich Makarov, Chief of 
the General Staff, Ministry of Defense 
--Major General Alexey Petrovich Sukhov, Acting Director of 
the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, 
Ministry of Defense 
--Major General Sergey Petrovich Orlov, Deputy Director of 
the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, 
Ministry of Defense 
--Major General Viktor Viktorovich Poznikhir, Main Operations 
Directorate of the General Staff, Ministry of Defense 
--Colonel Yevgeniy Yuryevich Ilyin, Main Directorate for 
International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense 
--Colonel Aleksandr Alekseyevich Novikov, Main Directorate 
for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense 
--Mr. Anatoliy Ivanovich Antonov, Director of the Department 
for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Mr. Sergey Mikhailovich Koshelev, Deputy Director for 
Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--Col. Sergei Ryzhkov, Ministry of Defense 
--Ms. Violetta Evarovskaya, MFA, Translator 
--Mr. Vladmir Alexandrovich Gaiduk, Translator 
--Dmitry Nikolayevich Gusev, Translator 
--Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Translator 
 
United States 
------------- 
 
--Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
--General (ret.) James Jones, National Security Advisor 
--Ambassador John Beyrle, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian 
Federation 
--Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Department of State 
--Mr. Gary Samore, Coordinator for Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation, National Security Council 
--Mr. Michael McFaul, Senior Director, National Security 
Council 
--Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, Department of State 
--Deputy Assistant Secretary Marcie Ries, Department of State 
--Colonel (USA) Kenneth Chance, Acting Defense Attache, U.S. 
Embassy Moscow 
--Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, Director J5, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
--Dr. Ted Warner, Representative of the Secretary of Defense 
to the START Follow-on Negotiations 
--Mr. Michael Elliott, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's 
Representative, START Follow-On Negotiations 
--Mr. Kurt Siemon, Director for Dismantlement and 
Transparency, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
Department of Energy 
--Mr. Richard Trout, Department of Defense 
--Dr. Lani Kass, Department of Defense 
 
--Dr. Susan Elliott, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. 
Embassy Moscow 
--Dr. James Timbie, Senior Advisor, Department of State 
--Captain (USN) Michael Gilday, Executive Assistant to the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
--Ms. Leslie Hayden, Director, National Security Council 
--Mr. Nickolas Katsakis, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow 
--Mr. Matthew Eussen, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow 
--Mr. Nikolai Sorokin, translator, Department of State 
--Ms. Marina Gross, translator, Department of State 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
4. (S) Draft protocol language on telemetry that the U.S. 
conveyed to the Russian side on January 18 was agreed, with 
some Russian-proposed changes.  Russia will propose 
additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on 
telemetry in Geneva when the new round opens.  The U.S. and 
Russia agreed to a limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed 
Launchers, on the condition that deployed and non-deployed 
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers would be included in the 
total.  The two sides also agreed to count one nuclear 
warhead for each nuclear-equipped heavy bomber.  The U.S. and 
Russia agreed to a central limit of 1550 warheads.  In a side 
meeting, CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen reached agreement on 
Unique Identifiers (UID) in principle, with the understanding 
that the details in the Treaty and Protocol will be 
negotiated and agreed in Geneva.  (Note: U.S. agreement to 
counting bombers in the launcher limit and the 1550 limit on 
warheads is linked to the agreement in principle on UIDs.) 
The U.S. and Russia agreed to a total of 18 inspections:  10 
Type 1 inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections.  Inspections on 
monitoring el
imination will be included in Type 2 inspections 
with the condition that Russia will accumulate a substantial 
number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a 
six-month period.  These eliminated items would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm elimination.  They would be sent 
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of 
conducting a Type 2 inspection of them. 
 
5. (S) Subject Summary:  Telemetry, Unique Identifiers, 
Monitoring/Elimination of Systems, Separate Limit on 
Launchers, Total Limit on Warheads.  End summary. 
 
------- 
Plenary 
------- 
 
6. (S) Russian CHOD Makarov welcomed the delegation by 
recognizing that much had been done already to move the 
agreement forward and that he looked forward to the 
consultations to resolve the outstanding issues.  He noted, 
however, that while the U.S. side had raised issues regarding 
Senate ratification, he believed he would face similar issues 
with the State Duma. 
 
7. (S) National Security Advisor Jones said that the 
President had asked the U.S. delegation to come to Moscow to 
resolve the core remaining issues of the START Follow-on 
Treaty.  He commented that in his meetings with Presidential 
Advisor Prikhodko and National Security Advisor Patrushev, as 
well as a brief opportunity to talk with President Medvedev 
on the evening of January 21, he had underlined that 
President Obama had listened to Medvedev's comments in 
Copenhagen on December 18.  The President had instructed the 
U.S. delegation to "act accordingly," with our latest 
proposals taking into account those Russian concerns. 
 
8. (S) NSA Jones noted that these important but discrete 
issues, and what we do with them, reflect a pivot point in 
U.S.-Russian relations.  He continued that as the 
negotiations proceed, we should consider the vast strategic 
potential of the relationship in positive terms.  The START 
Follow-on treaty opens the door to a path where the U.S. and 
Russia can positively address other issues.  For this to be 
possible, NSA Jones asked that both sides show flexibility 
and make some trades, affirming that the U.S. side was 
prepared to do that and noting that Medvedev had said that 
the Russian side was equally prepared. 
 
9. (S) NSA Jones outlined five principle issues on the 
agenda:  telemetry; unique identifiers; monitoring of the 
elimination of systems; a separate limit on deployed and 
non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers; and the limit on 
warheads. 
 
10. (S) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, 
underlined that the approach should be one that reflected a 
U.S.-Russian twenty-first century partnership:  the agreement 
should be fair, meet each side's interests, and reflect our 
global security responsibilities.  He offered that a 
finalized treaty would be received by the international 
community as a demonstration of real progress in arms 
control.  CJCS Mullen highlighted the agreed language in the 
draft agreement's preamble stating that the Treaty "builds on 
mutual trust."  This statement recognizes that both sides 
must face difficult strategic circumstances. 
 
------------------------------ 
Telemetry Deal All But Reached 
------------------------------ 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
11. (S) CJCS Mullen opened the telemetry discussion by saying 
the U.S. and GOR were close to an agreement, especially after 
POTUS and Medvedev discussed the issue in Copenhagen on 
December 18.  He said the USG had made modest, but important 
 
changes to the GOR's December 12 proposals, and asked if the 
GOR had any reactions to them. 
 
12. (S) CHOD Makarov reminded the U.S. side that at the start 
of SFO negotiations, Russia had completely rejected the idea 
of telemetry data exchanges.  He said he understood the U.S. 
Senate would not ratify SFO if there was no mention of 
telemetry.  He added, however, that the Russian State Duma 
was opposed to exchanging telemetry data, and anyone who 
agreed to this would be branded a criminal and traitor. 
Regardless, the Russian side was ready to exchange telemetry 
data with the United States. He then turned to General 
Pozhikhir to make the Russian presentation. 
 
13. (S) General Poznikhir started out by stating that the 
U.S. wanted an exchange of telemetry information in order to 
obtain Russian missile data for perfecting its missile 
defense (MD) systems.  Nevertheless, the Russian Federation 
was prepared to proceed with a telemetry exchange.  He said 
it would involve exchanging telemetry data on no more than 
five launches per year, as proposed by Medvedev.  He 
continued that while the U.S. proposal of January 15 was a 
big step forward, it was problematic because the U.S. still 
insisted on changing Medvedev's proposals. 
 
14. (S) Gen. Poznikhir said that ambiguities arose from the 
U.S. proposal to exchange telemetry data on "a variety of" 
ICBM and SLMB launches, and wanted to delete this language 
from the treaty text.  He stated that telemetry data could be 
 
exchanged on "no more than five" ICBM and SLBM launches each 
year, but clarified this point as follows:  These exchanges 
would be done on a parity basis, meaning that the GOR would 
share telemetry data with the U.S. on the same number of 
launches as the U.S. shared with Russia, but no more than 
five launches in a year.  If the U.S. conducted only four 
test launches and shared telemetry data on these launches 
with Russia, then Russia would provide telemetry data on four 
of its launches that year as well. 
 
15. (S) The Russian side also agreed to review the telemetry 
data exchange every year in the BCC for the life of the 
treaty.  Any changes made to the telemetry sharing regime 
would have to be agreed by both sides; no one side could 
unilaterally make any changes.  If the U.S. and Russia could 
not agree to changes, then data exchanges would continue as 
before. 
 
16. (S) The GOR also dropped its insistence that telemetry 
data from UK Trident SLBM launches be reported by the United 
States.  The GOR also agreed to a treaty Annex on telemetry, 
and to providing additional language on telemetry for the 
Protocol, which would become Part Seven of the Protocol. 
Gen. Poznikhir also said the translation of their telemetry 
"answers to questions" done by the Russian embassy in 
Washington had misrepresented several items, including the 
matter of transmitting data only through the reentry vehicle. 
 He said that the Russian side had done more complete answers 
to the "questions on telemetry," which they would be willing 
to discuss in the next negotiating session in Geneva. 
 
Working Group 
------------- 
 
17. (S) At this point CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mul
len asked 
General Poznikhir and Mr. Siemon to lead a small group to 
discuss the Russian telemetry proposal in more detail.  The 
conclusions of their discussion are summarized below. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
18. (S) The GOR agreed to the following language for the 
Telemetry Protocol: 
 
--From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall 
exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no 
more than five launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
--The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out 
for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted 
by the sides, and in an agreed amount. 
 
--On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions 
and method of further telemetric information exchange on 
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission.  Additional details on the 
telemetry exchange are contained in the Annex on Telemetry 
Exchange Procedures. 
 
19. (S) The Russian side indicated it intends to table 
additional Telemetry Protocol language in Geneva, and 
discussed the following elements from their current working 
draft: 
 
--The side conducting the test launch would determine the 
five telemetric exchanges on a parity basis. 
 
--Each party would have the right to raise concerns about the 
exchanged telemetric information. 
 
 
--The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches 
with an agreed volume of information.  Both the volume and 
type of exchanged information would be agreed in the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). 
 
--A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be 
exchanged within the first 65 days of each calendar year. 
 
--The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to 
review the conditions for the exchange of telemetric 
information. 
 
--A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric 
information exchange agreement. 
 
--The exchange of telemetric information would include all 
information broadcast during flight tests and from 
encapsulated information.  Data denial techniques would be 
banned.  Recording and broadcasting data on the functioning 
of the stages and self-contained dispensing mechanism from a 
reentry vehicle would also be banned. 
 
--Interpretative data would be provided by the testing party 
and would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the 
identification number, the date of launch, recording 
frequencies, and modulation methods. 
 
--The party conducting the test launch would determine the 
method for recording telemetric information. 
 
--Each party would provide the means to acquire playback 
equipment to reproduce telemetric information from recorded 
media. 
 
------------------------- 
Unique Identifiers (UIDs) 
------------------------- 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
20. (S) CJCS Mullen stressed President Obama's comments in 
Copenhagen on the importance of UIDs and noted that President 
Medvedev had accepted this concept in principle.  He said 
that the U.S. side had provided a non-paper earlier in the 
week that proposed assigning unique numbers and identifiers 
for each strategic delivery vehicle or heavy bomber for the 
purposes of the treaty.  He stressed that the use of UIDs, as 
demonstrated by fifteen years of practice, could be done with 
no operational impact and would provide confidence in the 
data. 
 
21. (S) The GOR lead on UIDs, Air Force Major General Orlov, 
said that in negotiations, the Russian side was instructed to 
remove any discriminatory language, particularly regarding 
monitoring of mobile ICBMs.  The use of UIDs was directly 
related to monitoring mobile ICBMs, and Gen. Orlov said the 
GOR opposed it.  He complimented the latest U.S. proposal, 
and called it "revealing" in how it specifically identified 
locations on various systems to place UIDs and also allowed 
for placement on silo doors if no appropriate location on the 
missile could be found.  However, he said that the GOR would 
have to carefully study the proposal, including the necessity 
of UIDs.  In closing, Gen. Orlov commented that the state of 
improved relations made UIDs unnecessary. 
 
22. (S) CHOD Makarov emphasized that in his careful study of 
the discussions of the presidents, they had stressed that 
relations should be based on confidence and trust.  He 
 
promised that the GOR would look into the U.S. proposal but 
countered, "we don't see the necessity for the use of UIDs." 
He said that all these points reflected a lack of confidence 
held by military staff and civilians, which could serve as an 
obstacle.  "If we don't learn to trust one another, we won't 
be able to move forward," CHOD Makarov said.  He attempted to 
defer the issue, saying that he was not in a position to give 
a decision today.  However, given U.S. insistence, he 
promised that the GOR would review the proposal, although the 
U.S. should clarify the need. 
 
23. (S) CJCS Mullen emphasized the importance that President 
Obama placed on UIDs and that President Medvedev had already 
agreed in principle to the concept in Copenhagen.  CJCS 
Mullen underlined that the purpose was to verify based on the 
concept and history of START, "trust but verify." 
 
24. (S) Mike Elliott briefly outlined the U.S. concept to 
utilize the existing serial numbers on the missiles or 
bombers, to track the systems over their lifetime.  If the 
serial number would not be readily visible to inspectors, 
then the U.S. proposed the existing serial number be 
replicated in a place on the missile or launcher where it 
would be readily visible.  Elliott highlighted the benefits 
that such a procedure would give the GOR in tracking the 
Trident II and Minuteman III missiles systems, as the stages 
are assembled and mixed over time.  He emphasized that the 
use of UIDs would allow the GOR to track stages from 
production or storage to launch tube or silo to elimination, 
an important consideration, as the treaty will account for 
the status of deployed and non-deployed systems over their 
lifetime.  He added that UIDs would be part of the treaty 
database and simplify the work of inspectors over the life of 
the treaty. 
 
25. (S) NSA Jones added that the use of UIDs will be an 
important factor for the U.S. Senate when it considers 
ratification of the treaty, as it was a minimum requirement 
for many of the members. 
 
26. (S) CHOD Makarov responded by saying "very interesting, 
but not very convincing."  He said that there were many 
measures the sides can take regarding control and inspection, 
including UIDs, but that they related to the central issue, 
the lack of trust.  He said that he could not agree in 
principle on UIDs, and he again told the delegation that he 
was not prepared to reso
lve this today, but said that the GOR 
was ready to discuss all but the political decision regarding 
UIDs at a lower level.  CHOD Makarov underlined that the GOR 
wanted to avoid the use of UIDs in the text of the treaty and 
that it was necessary for the parties to discuss the issue 
and the need for such a measure. 
 
27. (S) CJCS Mullen again underscored the importance of this 
issue to President Obama and that President Medvedev had 
already agreed in principle, with the hope of being able to 
move forward on this issue today.  CJCS Mullen said that the 
U.S. had already accepted the Russian position that all 
systems, not just mobiles, have UIDs and that tracking was 
part of openness and trust.  He also reminded CHOD Makarov 
that the U.S. had dropped its insistence on continuous 
monitoring at Votkinsk, "a major concession," when the GOR 
had agreed to notification of movement of missiles from 
missile production facilities and the use of UIDs on each 
missile.  CJCS Mullen commented that in the totality of the 
treaty, UIDs were not a major issue.  CHOD Makarov took the 
opening on Votkinsk to ask why it was necessary to have UIDs 
when the U.S. knew all solid fuel systems were produced in 
one plant? 
 
28. (S) NSC Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Michael 
McFaul asserted that the use of UIDs did not threaten the 
national security interests of Russia, and was simply an 
accounting device.  He said that it was the responsibility of 
the U.S. intelligence community to verify the treaty before 
Congress, and that this provision would help them do their 
job with no cost to Russia "with the exception of the price 
of the paint."  He emphasized that the U.S. also wanted to 
build trust, not just assume that that it was there.  Drawing 
on his experience in the country, McFaul said that he knew 
there were doubters in Russia that were suspicious of the 
U.S., as there were those in the U.S. suspicious of Russia. 
He said that the painted numbers would increase transparency, 
thereby building trust. 
 
29. (S) CHOD Makarov concurred that mutual suspicion existed 
but as our presidents have said, we should not miss the 
opportunity to build trust.  While the GOR did not see UIDs 
as a threat, CHOD Makarov did not see their necessity.  He 
also countered that this could become an issue for the Duma, 
if UIDs were not seen as applying equally.  Having raised the 
Duma, however, he dismissed the concerns of legislators, 
saying that while many of the members may object, they cannot 
say why. 
 
30. (S) In leaving the issue, the delegations agreed to a 
break-out session to discuss UIDs. 
 
Working Group/Principals Discussions 
------------------------------------ 
 
31. (S) Mike Elliott met with his Russian counterpart 
following the plenary.  The Russian participants dug in on 
the issue, saying they could not understand why UIDs were 
needed, and commenting that, once again, it seemed to be a 
way for the U.S. side to try to get at Russian mobile ICBMs. 
However, while the Russian side identified some technical 
challenges, these were not a roadblock to an agreement.  CHOD 
Makarov and CJCS Mullen met separately on the matter in the 
afternoon, and CJCS Mullen eventually broke the log-jam by 
agreeing to 1550 nuclear warheads as the central limit of the 
treaty, and including bombers in the deployed and 
non-deployed launcher limit.  In return, CHOD Makarov agreed 
in principle to UIDs, leaving it to the negotiators in Geneva 
to finalize the details. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
32. (S) The parties agreed in principle to pursue text for 
UIDs in the Treaty and Protocol, which would be negotiated 
and agreed in Geneva.  The U.S. agreement to count bombers 
under the launcher limit and acceptance of the 1550 limit on 
warheads was explicitly linked to the agreement in principle 
on UIDs. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Monitoring/Elimination of Systems 
--------------------------------- 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
33. (S) CJCS Mullen said the best solution to monitor the 
elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers was 
the U.S. proposal for an agreed statement that was proposed 
in December.  The U.S. was prepared to use terms such as 
"demonstration" or "exhibition" rather than "inspection" to 
describe the process.  It was important to meet the need 
adequately to monitor the elimination process without being 
 
intrusive.  He pointed out that the draft agreed statement 
suggested two demonstrations at each elimination site each 
year.  The draft agreed statement did not, however, mention 
mobile missile launchers, but the U.S. believed two 
demonstrations per year would be a good idea. 
 
34. (S) Colonel Ilyin agreed that there should be an 
inspection regime in the treaty.  The GOR agreed during talks 
in Geneva to increase the number of annual inspections from 
10 to 18.  The GOR also agreed to ten Type 1 and eight Type 2 
inspections per year.  The GOR also increased the number of 
inspection team members permitted to ten.  Eliminated items 
should be left out to be monitored by national technical 
means for a period of at least 60 days, he said. 
 
35. (S) CHOD Makarov encouraged the U.S. side to accept the 
GOR offer, as Russia (or the Soviet Union) had not violated 
arms control treaties, and now the U.S. wanted to conduct 
even more inspections than during the Cold War. 
 
36. (S) When CJCS Mullen said he thought on December 18 in 
Copenhagen that POTUS and Medvedev agreed that both sides 
could conduct 12 Type 1 inspections and six Type 2 
inspections (for a total of 18 inspections), Col. Ilyin 
replied this was never agreed.  He said the number of 
inspections originally discussed in Geneva was 16, with eight 
Type 1 and eight Type 2 inspections.  Col. Ilyin said that 
Medvedev agreed to raise the limit to 18 inspections, and the 
U.S. could decide if it wanted two more Type 1 or Type 2 
inspections.  In the end, Russia agreed to permit 10 Type 1 
inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections. 
 
37. (S) Ted Warner countered that the U.S. did not have a 
sufficient number of type 2 inspections at its disposal to 
inspect non-deployed weapons observe the results of 
elimination.  He pointed out that, under START, there were 
separate elimination inspections, allowing the two sides to 
observe the whole process of elimination. He admitted that 
START procedures were lengthy and intrusive, but the U.S. and 
Russia had informally worked out ways to simplify the 
inspections and limit the number of inspectors.  The current 
negotiations were preparing procedures that would also be 
simplified, he argued. 
 
38. (S) Warner continued, saying that the Russian side had 
talked about burni
ng out the solid rocket fuel and cutting 
holes in the rocket motors, which would be visible from space 
and thus could not be re-used.  While satellites cannot tell 
if an engine has been burned out, they can tell if holes have 
been drilled in them. The U.S. now wanted to augment these 
procedures with inspections.  An inspection team of five 
people could conduct such an inspection in one day, and the 
U.S. side would be prepared to pay for the expenses on the 
ground of its inspectors.  CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen 
agreed that this issue would be discussed further in a small 
group meeting to be chaired by Mr. Warner and Col. Ilyin in 
the afternoon. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
39. (S) After extensive discussions in a small group led by 
Ted Warner on the U.S. side, the Russians agreed to 
accumulate a substantial number of eliminated solid fuel 
ICBMs or SLBMs over a six-month period; they would have large 
holes cut in them to confirm that they had been eliminated. 
This would be done in exchange for the right to conduct 10 
Type 1 inspections and eight Type 2 inspections, for a total 
of 18 inspections. 
 
40. (S) These accumulated eliminated items would be sent from 
the rocket motor elimination facilities at Perm or 
Krasnoarmeysk to Votkinsk, and the U.S. side would have the 
option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of them at Votkinsk. 
 The U.S. side would also have the option of conducting a 
separate inspection of eliminated transporter erector 
launchers (TEL), which would be accumulated in large batches 
periodically at Pibanshur.  For each of these facilities, the 
U.S. would be able to conduct two inspections per year, for a 
total of four.  The details of these arrangements will have 
to be negotiated, and will be recorded in section 7 of the 
Inspection Protocol. 
 
--------------------------- 
Separate Limit on Launchers 
--------------------------- 
 
Plenary Discussions 
------------------- 
 
41. (S) CJCS Mullen began the discussion on the separate 
limit for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and 
SLBMs, stating that the U.S. had agreed with the Russian 
proposal that a launcher was only considered as "deployed" 
when it carried a missile.  However, this counting measure 
created the potential for the unlimited possession of 
launchers.  CJCS Mullen asserted that without a 
treaty-imposed limit, there would be no requirement to 
eliminate launchers and no urgency to do so.  He tabled the 
U.S. proposal to impose a limit of 800 on deployed and 
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs.  He underscored 
that this limit would mostly affect the U.S., forcing 
elimination of a number of launchers; it could also address 
Russian concerns on the potential of converting silos for 
missile defense purposes.  CJCS Mullen highlighted that this 
would enhance the international assessment of the treaty and 
the prospects for ratification in the U.S. Senate. 
 
42. (S) CHOD Makarov countered that the GOR had originally 
proposed a combined launcher limit of 500.  He asked how the 
U.S. proposed allocating the total of 800 among different 
types of launchers.  CJCS Mullen assured him that each side 
would be able to allocate according to their own priorities. 
CHOD Makarov agreed to the launcher limit, but Gen. Orlov, 
Gen. Poznikhir and Col. Ilyin quickly interjected to clarify 
that the 800 would include all bombers, deployed and 
non-deployed in the 800 limit.  Ted Warner clarified that 
this would be a new GOR position, as talks in Geneva had only 
touched on incorporating ICBMs, SLBMs, and non-deployed heavy 
bombers within the 800 limit. 
 
43. (S) CJCS Mullen asked CHOD Makarov to confirm whether the 
heavy bombers would be counted for one or three warheads 
against the aggregate warhead ceiling.  CHOD Makarov stated 
the Russian position, one warhead, which CJCS Mullen 
accepted.  CJCS Mullen stated that the U.S. side would need 
time to confer on whether to accept incorporating all bombers 
into the 800 limit on launchers.  CHOD Makarov assented. 
 
44. (S) In transitioning to the issue of the limit on total 
warheads, CJCS Mullen predicted that there would be intense 
international scrutiny of the total number of deployed 
warheads permitted under the new treaty.  CJCS Mullen 
proposed that the limit be 1500, arguing it was a nice round 
number and represented a seventy-five percent reduction from 
the original START warhead limit of 6000. 
 
45. (S) CHOD Makarov replied that the GOR had originally 
proposed 1675, while the U.S. had proposed 1500.  He argued 
that 1550 was a huge step toward the U.S. position and 
 
absolutely as far as the Russian Federation could go.  He 
stressed that it was a good number for the GOR as it sought 
to reconfigure its nuclear forces.  (Comment:  In side 
conversations during the afternoon, several of the Russian 
military representatives claimed that 1550 was an important 
number for the Russian missile forces because of the 
particular nature of their planned MIRV deployments. End 
comment.)  CHOD Makarov expressed skepticism that 1500 was a 
critical figure for the U.S. and argued that 1550 was also a 
round number and very close to 1500.  CHOD Makarov said that 
he would have to ask for U.S. assistance in justifying the 
lower number to his State Duma, to which CJCS Mullen replied 
that he would also request CHOD Makarov's help before the 
Senate. 
 
46. (S) In summing up the results of the overall negotiations 
over the morning, CHOD Makarov concluded that Russia had 
given quite a bit of ground to the U.S.  He said that on the 
issues of telemetry, inspections and the separate launcher 
limit, the GOR had moved toward the U.S. position; on UIDs 
that the GOR had reversed its position and that there was now 
an understanding to study the matter; and on the total number 
of deployed warheads that the GOR had reduced the number but 
that the U.S. had not budged from 1500.  CHOD Makarov claimed 
that the GOR had given more and that he had nothing with 
which to defend himself from critics.  He offered to split 
the difference between the sides' opening proposals limiting 
the number of deployed warheads to 1588.  CJCS Mullen 
countered offering 1525, but the two agreed to return to the 
issue, and to the issues of UIDs and monitoring elimination, 
in the afternoon. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
47. (S) After expert discussions in the afternoon, and a 
one-on-one discussion between CJCS Mullen and CHOD Makarov, 
CHOD Makarov accepted CJCS Mullen's proposal that in exchange 
for an agreement in principle on UIDs, the U.S. would accept 
counting deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers within the 
separate launcher limit of 800.  The parties also agreed to 
set the total limit of deployed warheads at 1550.  However, 
the total limit of 1550 deployed warheads, as well as the 
incl
usion of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers under 
the separate launcher limit of 800, was explicitly packaged 
in exchange for the inclusion of UIDs in the treaty and 
protocol. 
 
--------------- 
Closing Plenary 
--------------- 
 
48. (S) CHOD Makarov thanked the delegations for their 
efforts and for the negotiating stances of the U.S.  He said 
that he was "fully convinced that we will conclude, sign, and 
ratify the START Follow-on treaty, which would play a role in 
global security and stability."  CHOD Makarov said that he 
expected that following the new treaty's signature, the U.S. 
and Russia would move on to solving the problems of the CFE 
Treaty, and "all the problems of the countries that want to 
join the nuclear club."  He also remarked, "the next time we 
meet, we will already be moving on to a new negotiating 
process, based on the issues that we have solved today." 
 
49. (S) CJCS Mullen thanked CHOD Makarov for his hospitality, 
and he agreed that concluding this treaty opened the door to 
more opportunities.  CJCS Mullen said he looked forward to a 
bright partnership between our two countries, as evidenced by 
the signing of the joint work plan for military-to-military 
cooperation (signed immediately prior to the closing 
 
plenary).  He concluded that as two global powers with global 
responsibilities, there are special aspects of openness and 
fairness and that the U.S. and Russia had moved forward on 
the basis of trust. 
 
50. (S) NSA Jones joined CJCS Mullen in thanking CHOD Makarov 
for his hospitality.  He said "what happened today 
demonstrated that we can talk to one another but also listen 
to one another."  NSA Jones summed up that the sides had 
achieved a general agreement on the START Follow-on Treaty, 
which would serve as a "harbinger of good things to come in 
bilateral relations in a world looking to challenge us in the 
coming months." 
 
51. (S) CHOD Makarov finished the session, "we will conclude 
this treaty between our two sides, but neighboring countries 
which are successfully developing these weapons should also 
be bound by limits."  CHOD Makarov deferred on agreeing to 
travel to the U.S. in the spring, but said he would discuss 
it with CJCS Mullen in Brussels next week. 
 
52. (U) A/S Gottemoeller and NSC Senior Director Mike McFaul 
cleared this message. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW224, INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW224 2010-01-29 14:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1517
PP RUEHDBU RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0224/01 0291438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291438Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6095
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, DRL/ILCSR FOR SMORGAN, G/TIP FOR LCDEBACA 
DOL/ILAB FOR LSTROTKAMP, RRIGBY, TMCCARTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PGOV SOCI RS
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR 
DOL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 131995 
 
------------ 
Task 1/TVPRA 
------------ 
 
1. (U) Post does not have information on additional goods for 
the Russia TVPRA list. 
 
---------- 
Task 2/TDA 
---------- 
 
2A. Prevalence and Sectoral Distribution of Exploitive Child 
Labor 
1. (U) Child labor in Russia encompasses not only Russian 
children, but often children from neighboring countries. 
Some children are brought to Russia for the purpose of 
exploitation, while others come with migrant worker parents. 
In urban areas, children can be found working primarily in 
the informal sector in retail services, street hawking, 
washing cars, repairing automobiles, making deliveries, 
collecting trash, and begging.  In rural areas, children are 
more commonly involved in agricultural work.  Among street 
children, boys are usually involved in hard, physical labor, 
while girls are more likely to work in trade and 
prostitution.  However, child prostitution involving boys 
does exist in Russia, particularly among homeless and 
orphaned children.  Homeless and orphaned children on the 
streets are engaged in prostitution as a means to survive. 
Child sex tourism and commercial sexual exploitation remain a 
concern, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also 
for other large Russian cities.  Domestic trafficking of 
children from rural areas to urban centers and between 
regions also occurs.  (Note: Information gathered from public 
documents and statements by the GOR Children's Ombudsman, 
UNICEF, and child protection NGOs.  End Note.) 
 
2. (U) In 2008, the Federal Labor and Employment Service 
(FLES) reported 10,000 violations of child labor laws, noting 
that the victims often received little pay and suffered from 
unsafe working conditions.  FLES found the largest incidence 
of exploitive child labor in the industrial, trade, and 
agricultural sectors.  Employers paid 1.5 million rubles (USD 
52,000) in administrative fines for violations of child labor 
laws.  In addition, labor inspectors corrected more than 300 
labor agreements for minors encumbering positions legal for 
workers of their age and restored to work more than 250 
minors who had been illegally terminated. 
 
2B. Laws and Regulations 
1. (U) In December 2008, the GOR created a Child Support Fund 
(CSF) to protect the social welfare of children, providing 
specific assistance to orphans and disabled children.  The 
Fund also develops programs for the social rehabilitation of 
children (e.g. finding homes for orphaned children and 
treating victims of abuse) and the prevention of child 
homelessness.  In 2009, the Fund implemented 58 regional 
programs with 630 million rubles (USD 21 million) in its own 
financing, 4.5 billion rubles (USD 152 million) in regional 
government funds, and 362 million rubles (USD 12 million) in 
donations from businesses and NGOs. 
 
In July 2009, the GOR strengthened the Criminal Code for 
crimes against the life, health, and sexual inviolability of 
minors.  Criminals guilty of sexual assault on a minor are 
now subject to sentences of 8-15 years, as opposed to 4-10 
previously.  If the victim is under the age of 16, the range 
of possible sentences increases to 12-20 years.  Previously, 
the age at which the range of possible sentences increased 
was 14, but possible sentences ranged from only 8-15 years. 
In addition, criminals guilty of engaging in sexual 
intercourse with a minor may be prohibited from working in 
certain professions for a period of up to 20 years.  After 
receiving such a sentence, the guilty person would not be 
eligible to appeal for parole until he or she had served at 
least three-fourths of his or her sentence. 
 
In addition, the GOR increased the range of possible 
sentences from up to six years to up to eight years for 
criminals found guilty of disseminating pornography that 
depicts minors.  If the minor involved is under the age of 
14, the sentencing range increased from up to eight years, to 
a minimum of three and a maximum of ten years. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000224  002 OF 004 
 
 
In September 2009, the GOR created the office of the 
Children's Ombudsman at the federal level.  The Children's 
Ombudsman will serve as an information clearinghouse at the 
federal level for activities that promote and protect 
children's rights.  Regional affiliates of the federal 
Children's Ombudsman already exist in 28 regions of the 
Russian Federation.  The GOR hopes to establish similar 
offices in the remaining regions in the near future.  In 
addition, the Children's Ombudsman will create a national 
center for missing children which, among other functions, 
will serve as a resource center for parents, law enforcement 
officials, and members o
f the public seeking information on 
the sexual exploitation of children. 
 
2. (U) The legal and regulatory framework of the Russian 
Federation is adequate for addressing exploitive child labor. 
 However, it is worth noting that Russia still has not 
ratified the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution, and Child Pornography of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. 
 
2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement. Section I: 
Hazardous Child Labor. 
1. (U) FLES and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child labor. 
 
2. (U) Official data on information exchange mechanisms is 
not available. 
 
3. (U) Workers, employers, and labor inspectors are able to 
issue complaints about hazardous child labor violations. 
Official data is not available. 
 
4-14. (U) Official data on funding for inspections, staffing 
levels, the number of inspections, the number of children 
involved, the number of prosecutions, the number of cases 
closed, the number of convictions, case length, penalties, 
and trainings regarding hazardous child labor is not 
available. 
 
 
2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement. Section II: 
Forced Child Labor. 
1. (U) FLES and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to forced child labor. 
 
2. (U) Official data on information exchange mechanisms is 
not available. 
 
3. (U) Workers, employers, and labor inspectors are able to 
issue complaints about forced child labor violations. 
Official data is not available. 
 
4-14. (U) Official data on funding for inspections, staffing 
levels, the number of inspections, the number of children 
involved, the number of prosecutions, the number of cases 
closed, the number of convictions, case length, penalties, 
and trainings regarding forced child labor is not available. 
 
2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. 
Section I: Child Trafficking 
1. (U) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) personnel enforce 
laws and regulations prohibiting child trafficking, but the 
MIA does not have a special department dedicated to the 
prevention of child trafficking. 
 
2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding child 
trafficking is not available. 
 
3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 
 
4-12. (U) Official data on the number of investigations, 
number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of 
cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case 
length, and training regarding child trafficking is not 
available. 
 
13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed 
conflict in Russia. 
 
2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. 
Section II: Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 
1. (U) MIA personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting 
child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special 
department dedicated to the prevention of the commercial 
 
MOSCOW 00000224  003 OF 004 
 
 
sexual exploitation of children. 
 
2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding the 
commercial sexual exploitation of children is not available. 
 
3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 
 
4. (U) MIA reported 223 violations regarding the production 
and distribution of pornography depicting a minor in 2008, 
opened 159 investigations, and issued 157 indictments.  MIA 
registered 159 crimes for the production and distribution of 
child pornography in the first half of 2009. 
 
5-12. (U) Official data on the number of children rescued, 
number of arrests, number of cases closed, number of 
convictions, sentences imposed, case length, and training 
regarding the commercial sexual exploitation of children is 
not available. 
 
13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed 
conflict in Russia. 
 
2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. 
Section III: Use of Children in Illicit Activities 
1. (U) MIA personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting 
child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special 
department dedicated to the prevention of child trafficking. 
 
2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding the 
use of children in illicit activities is not available. 
 
3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 
 
4-12. (U) Official data on the number of investigations, 
number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of 
cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case 
length, and training regarding the use of children in illicit 
activities is not available. 
 
13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed 
conflict in Russia. 
 
2E. Government Policies on Child Labor 
1. (U) The GOR does not have a policy or plan that 
specifically addresses child labor. 
 
2. (U) The GOR did not incorporate exploitive child labor 
specifically as an issue to be addressed in other social 
policies. 
 
3-5. (U) Not applicable 
 
6. (U) The Bilateral Presidential Commission's Civil Society 
working group will address exploitive child labor as part of 
the children's issues on its agenda. 
 
7. (U) The GOR did not sign a bilateral, regional, or 
international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. 
However, in September, the GOR and other CIS countries agreed 
to a set of recommendations on the modernization of 
international cooperation in the fight against human 
trafficking, which will be a part of the CIS 2010-2014 
program to combat trafficking. 
 
2F. Social Programs to Eliminate or Prevent Child Labor 
1. (U) CSF is developing a program for 2010 that will target 
violence against children, including sexual exploitation. 
The program will focus on raising public awareness of the 
problem, increasing parental responsibility, and treating 
victims. 
 
2. (U) The GOR did not incorporate child labor specifically 
as an issue to be addressed through its social programs. 
 
3. (U) CSF will devote 120 million rubles (USD 4 million) of 
its own funds to the new program in 2010. 
 
4-5. (U) Not applicable 
 
6. (U) The GOR did not sign a bilater
al, regional, or 
international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. 
However, in September, the GOR and other CIS countries agreed 
to a set of recommendations on the modernization of 
international cooperation in the fight against human 
trafficking, which will be a part of the CIS 2010-2014 
 
MOSCOW 00000224  004 OF 004 
 
 
program to combat trafficking. 
 
2G. Continual Progress 
1. (U) Although exploitive child labor continues to be a 
problem in Russia, the GOR has taken significant steps to 
give higher priority to child welfare issues at the federal 
level, increase penalties for violations of laws and 
regulations relating to child labor and exploitation, and 
expand its child welfare programs.  In 2008, the number of 
reported violations of child labor laws and the total fines 
for those violations increased in comparison with previous 
years. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW218, INQUIRY DELIVERED: QUARTERLY STRATEGIC DATA (SDX)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW218 2010-01-29 11:52 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0218 0291152
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291152Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6089
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0015

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000218 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR VCI 
GENEVA FOR SFO DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START US RS
SUBJECT: INQUIRY DELIVERED: QUARTERLY STRATEGIC DATA (SDX) 
NOTIFICATION 
 
REF: STATE 9093 
 
(U) On January 29 we delivered reftel inquiry to MFA DVBR 
Second Secretary Andrey Malugin, who said he would pass this 
to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW206, ELEVATING REQUEST FOR PACE ELECTION OBSERVERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW206 2010-01-29 06:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0981
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHMO #0206 0290632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290632Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6077
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000206 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PREL COE RS
SUBJECT: ELEVATING REQUEST FOR PACE ELECTION OBSERVERS 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 205 
     B. SECSTATE 7158 
 
(SBU)  In addition to REF A, post delivered REF B request to 
State Duma International Relations Committee Chairman and 
Russian PACE delegation head Konstantin Kosachev and to 
Russian MFA Director for General European Cooperation 
Vladimir Voronkov.  While the GOR will give the request 
serious consideration, both of these offices were skeptical 
that they could meet the January 30 deadline. 
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10MOSCOW205, RUSSIA CONSIDERS SENDING ELECTION OBSERVERS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW205 2010-01-28 14:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0451
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #0205 0281434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281434Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6076
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0271

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA-I-POL FOR JUSTIN REYNOLDS AND DRL/NESCA FOR MARY KAREN 
WALKER. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM RS AZ
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONSIDERS SENDING ELECTION OBSERVERS TO 
BAGHDAD 
 
REF: STATE 07719 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) We delivered reftel points to Iliya Morgounov, 
Section Chief of the MFA's Iraq Desk.  Morgounov was grateful 
for the information and said the U.S. offer to provide 
assistance with security and ground transportation would be 
especially helpful.  He remarked that, although the Russian 
Central Elections Committee had originally expressed interest 
in observing the elections, FM Lavrov and DFM Saltanov would 
make the ultimate decision about sending a delegation. 
Morgounov noted the deadline for responding and said that he 
was unsure the GOR would be able to commit to send a 
delegation by January 30 as requested. 
 
2.  (C) Morgounov also commented on the outstanding case of 
four Russian diplomats who were murdered in Iraq in 2004.  He 
said that, as he understood the situation, we remained at an 
impasse.  According to Morgounov, a recent meeting in Baghdad 
involving the Russian Embassy had failed to produce any 
results.  He said the MFA remained ready to assist in any 
way, although he acknowledged that the issue belonged to 
other ministries of the Russian government. 
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10MOSCOW204, MOSCOW “DISMAYED” BY POLITICAL SITUATION IN BAGHDAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW204 2010-01-28 14:01 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0407
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0204 0281401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281401Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0554

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000204 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA-I/POL FOR WILLIAM CAVNESS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IZ
SUBJECT: MOSCOW "DISMAYED" BY POLITICAL SITUATION IN BAGHDAD 
 
REF: STATE 05980 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) We delivered reftel points to Iraq Section Chief 
Iliya Morgounov of the MFA's Middle East and North Africa 
Department.  Characterizing the current political situation 
in Baghdad as strange, Morgounov noted that the GOR was 
surprised and disappointed by events in Baghdad leading up to 
the March elections.  He claimed that neither the Embassy in 
Baghdad nor the MFA was able to understand what was behind 
the attempt to prohibit participation of more than 500 
candidates.  Morgounov said Moscow was especially dismayed 
because he thought the Iraqi government had "moved beyond" 
the historical Shia and Sunni conflicts and found a way to 
work together.  He inquired about Vice President Biden's 
recent visit to Baghdad and asked if the U.S. had been 
successful in "teaching the Iraqis democracy again." 
 
2.  (C) Morgounov said DFM Saltanov himself would consider 
reftel request and develop a response.  He said the MFA would 
inform the Russian Embassy in Baghdad of their strategy, and 
would instruct them to contact the U.S. Embassy and UNAMI as 
necessary.  In response to a question about the possibility 
of joint P5 demarches to the Iraqi government, we advised 
that our goal at this time was instead for each capital to 
consider appropriate ways to express their concerns about the 
situation and suggested private discussions or public 
statements from capitals as preferred methods. 
Beyrle

Wikileaks

10MOSCOW203, TRANSNEFT CONFIRMS OIL DEAL WITH BELARUS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW203 2010-01-28 13:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0385
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0203 0281329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281329Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000203 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, 
S/EEE MORNINGSTAR 
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR MMCFAUL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS BO
SUBJECT: TRANSNEFT CONFIRMS OIL DEAL WITH BELARUS 
 
REF: MOSCOW 53 
 
Classified By: ECON MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
ALL OIL OVER 6.3 MT SUBJECT TO FULL DUTY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
1. (C) Oleg Pilipets, long-time International Affairs Advisor 
in the Office of the President of Transneft, Russia's oil 
pipeline monopoly, confirmed to us January 28 that Moscow and 
Minsk signed a deal to end the dispute on oil shipments 
(reftel).  Pilipets said approximately 6.3 million tons (mt) 
of Russian oil would be provided to Belarus in 2010 
duty-free.  The amount was agreed to based on Belarus's 
domestic needs.  According to Pilipets, Belarus is "free to 
do whatever it wants" with the duty-free oil.  He said the 
agreement is effective immediately, but did not know how long 
it would be in effect, only saying that such agreements are 
typically applicable for one year. 
 
2. (C) Pilipets added that the inter-governmental agreement 
did not specify any amounts of oil to be purchased by Belarus 
beyond the 6.3 mt.  He explained that any additional oil that 
Belarusian consumers would like to purchase from Russian 
suppliers would be subject to the full export duty "according 
to Russian law" with "no exemptions and no favors."  (Note: 
Belarus reportedly had bought an additional 15 mt of oil per 
year that it processed and re-exported.  End note.)  Pilipets 
said he did not know what DPM Sechin meant by remarks, as 
quoted in the press, indicating that Russia had "compromised" 
to make the deal happen.  Pilipets noted, however, that under 
the new deal, Belarus would still be receiving a subsidy of 
about $1 billion per year -- his estimate of the foregone 
duties on the amount of oil in the agreement. 
 
3. (C) According to press reports, the deal included an 11% 
raise increase tariffs on Russian crude transiting Belarus, 
based on projected Belarusian GDP growth.  Pilipets could not 
confirm that detail, saying that Transneft "has nothing to do 
with" Belarus's transit charges.  He said Belarusian 
authorities are free to charge what they want, keeping in 
mind "market realities" that could cause consumers to 
purchase oil from elsewhere if it is too expensive through 
Belarus.  Pilipets reiterated that the flow of Russian oil 
solely transiting Belarus en-route to third countries was 
never affected by the dispute. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
4. (C) We had expected a resolution to emerge before the 
dispute caused any major disruptions in oil flows to Europe. 
While the core issue primarily reflected the GOR's subsidy 
mechanism to Belarus, the incident again called into question 
Russia's reputation as a reliable energy supplier.  Although 
we may never know exactly what "compromises" were made by 
either side, it is unlikely that the resolution was purely 
commercial, with DPM Sechin quoted as "taking into 
consideration the special relations with our brotherly 
republic."  Unfortunately, the agreement leaves room for 
continued politicization of the oil trade with Belarus, as 
the duty issue likely will emerge again as part of the 
process of harmonizing tariff schedules among the 
Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan customs union.  End comment. 
Beyrle

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10MOSCOW200, DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO GOR ON HELIUM-3 SHORTAGE FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW200 2010-01-28 11:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0200 0281138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281138Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6072
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000200 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/MNSA FOR JSANBORN, ISN/NESS FOR BPLAPP AND ZNAZARIO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP PARM RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO GOR ON HELIUM-3 SHORTAGE FOR 
IAEA SAFEGUARDS 
 
REF: A. A. SECSTATE 3312 
     B. B. YOUNG-LOCHBRYN EMAIL 1/16/10 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
1. (SBU) Post delivered reftel demarche orally to Aleksey 
Ubeyev, Deputy Director of International Cooperation 
Department, at Rosatom on January 14. After consulting with 
the Department (ref B), post delivered slightly abridged 
written talking points also to Ubeyev on Jan 19.  As Ubeyev 
is currently out of the country, post followed up with 
Rosatom contact Aleksandr Zhgutov, Director of Office of 
Relations with International Organizations, (one level below 
Ubeyev) on January 22.  Zhgutov informed us that Rosatom is 
"working on the issue".  He noted that Olli Heinonen, Deputy 
Director General of IAEA, visited Rosatom in mid-January and 
raised the Helium-3 shortage issue. Post will continue to 
follow up. 
Beyrle

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