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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW227 | 2010-01-29 16:10 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO1639 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #0227/01 0291610 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 291610Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6114 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0027 RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
10MOSCOW226, SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 4 U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW226 | 2010-01-29 15:33 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO1600 PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHMO #0226/01 0291533 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 291533Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6110 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000226 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE FROM AMB. BEYRLE EUR-RS FOR CAROLINE SAVAGE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM RS AF SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 4 U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL DRUG TRAFFICKING WORKING GROUP MEETING This information is Sensitive But Unclassified. Do Not Release to Public Internet. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. and Russia have powerful reasons to work together to combat illicit trafficking of narcotics. As you heard in September from your counterpart on the working group, Viktor Ivanov, Director of Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN), his priority is engaging you on Afghanistan and specifically suppressing the flow into Russia of Afghan-origin heroin. Heroin from Afghanistan floods Russia leading to high rates of addiction; money from the heroin trade finances terrorist organizations fiercely hostile to the U.S. and Russia. Ivanov and others in the Russian government take issue with the new U.S. whole-of-government approach which emphasizes interdiction over eradication of poppy fields to reduce the production and distribution of Afghan heroin. The U.S. and Russia also have different approaches on how to best reduce demand for heroin within Russia. Although our principal policies on combating the Afghan narcotics trade differ, however, the establishment of this inter-agency working group has provided new opportunities to discuss counternarcotics cooperation in Afghanistan as well as prevention and treatment of substance abuse, financial controls, and international best practices. In addition, the working group has paved a political opening for increased peer-to-peer exchanges and cooperation on the enforcement front. The adverse consequences of inaction or non-cooperation are too severe, particularly for Russia. End Summary. ------------------------------ Heroin Trafficking into Russia ------------------------------ ¶2. (SBU) Trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan (primarily opium and heroin) and their abuse are major problems facing Russian law enforcement and public health agencies. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in October 2009 that Russia has become the largest single market for Afghan-origin heroin, consuming approximately 75,000-80,000 kilograms per year (20 percent of the annual production of Afghan heroin). Russia has one of the highest rates of opiate abuse in the world. Opiates (and hashish to a lesser degree) from Afghanistan are smuggled into Russia through the Central Asian states along the "Northern Route." Russians at all levels routinely blame the U.S. for its failure to curb opium production in Afghanistan, some even seeing in this failure a plot to undermine Russia. FSKN Director Ivanov has repeatedly and publicly called on the U.S. to carry out broad eradication of poppy fields in Afghanistan. --------------------------------------------- --------------- Scope of Drug Addiction Problem and the Treatment of Drug Offenders --------------------------------------------- --------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Russian Ministry of Health estimates that up to six million people (4.2 percent of the population) take drugs on a regular basis in Russia; according to official estimates, 30,000-40,000 people die annually of drug overdoses and another 70,000 deaths are considered drug-related. Health experts estimate that nearly 65 percent of newly detected HIV cases can be attributed to drug use and that, among HIV-positive injecting drug users, about 85-90 percent are Hepatitis C positive. The FSKN reports that there are 400,000 officially registered drug addicts in Russia's treatment centers. A Human Rights Watch study concluded, however, that the effectiveness of treatment offered at state drug treatment clinics "is so low as to be negligible" and constitutes a "violation of the right to health." New models of cognitive therapy are being implemented in treatment centers in St. Petersburg, but substitution therapy (such as programs using methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone) has not been fully explored. Methadone remains illegal and politically sensitive. ¶4. (SBU) Director Ivanov has expressed interest in studying the drug court systems used in the U.S. to divert non-violent, substance abusing offenders from prison and jail MOSCOW 00000226 002 OF 004 into treatment. A decade of research indicates that drug courts reduce crime by lowering re-arrest and conviction rates, improving substance abuse treatment outcomes, and reuniting families, and also produces measurable cost benefits. Court reform is an extremely complex subject, and Russia lacks the social service infrastructure that supports drug courts in the U.S. However, Ivanov's interest in drug courts is encouraging, and your working group can foster cooperation and information exch anges between judges, lawyers, public health experts and social service professionals to assist Russia in moving towards alternatives to the criminal prosecution of drug addicts and substance abusers. --------------------------------------------- --------------- Domestic and International Drug Enforcement Policy and Activities --------------------------------------------- --------------- ¶5. (SBU) The State Anti-Narcotics Committee is a governmental steering body for developing proposals for the President on national anti-narcotics policy, coordinating the activities of various government agencies, and participating in international drug enforcement cooperation efforts. The Committee is chaired by Director Ivanov and comprises seven federal ministers, 14 heads of federal services, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, members of the Duma and the Federation Council, and other officials. The State Anti-Narcotics Committee was tasked with developing a new national drug control strategy by President Medvedev in 2009. A draft of a ten-year strategy was recently released; once finalized and adopted, it will be in force through 2020. The strategy takes its own whole of government approach as it calls on regional anti-narcotQ commissions, local governmenQ community organizations, and religious associations to be involved. Its objectives: reduce the supply of illegal Qugs, develop and strengthen intQational cooperation in counternarcotics, create and implement nationwide measures to curb the illegal distribution of narcotics, develop effective measures to counter drug trafficking, ensure reliable state control over the illicit movement of drugs and their precursors, and drug abuse prevention. ¶6. (SBU) The FSKN is Russia's only law enforcement agency dedicated solely to enforcing the narcotics laws. The FSKN, which has approximately 35,000 employees and branch offices in every region of Russia, has the responsibility of coordinating the narcotics enforcement activities of other Russian law enforcement agencies. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has a working relationship with the FSKN, but cooperation on cases and sharing information is sporadic and needs to be improved. Despite FSKN's size and coordinating authority over other police agencies, it has not conducted significant cases of heroin distribution organizations within Russia. In addition, although FSKN has publicly stressed the importance of addressing money laundering and other financial aspects of the drug trade, its relationship with Rosfinmonitoring has not been productive. Seizures and forfeitures of drug proceeds are insignificant compared to the volume of heroin sales within Russia. However, FSKN's participation in December in the Illicit Finance Working Group, whose work compliments that of the Drug Trafficking Working Group, is a positive development which may lead to more effective financial investigations of drug trafficking organizations. The FSKN has made efforts to implement effective monitoring of the chemical industry. Prior to the creation of the FSKN, precursor chemicals and pharmaceuticals were governed by a patchwork of regulations enforced by different agencies. Production, transportation, distribution, and import/export of controlled substances now require licensing from the FSKN. ¶7. (SBU) The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), based in Almaty, serves as a regional focal point for communication, analysis, and exchange of operational information in "real time" on cross-border crime, as well as a center for the organization and coordination of joint operations. In September 2009, President Medvedev agreed to Russian participation at CARICC, MOSCOW 00000226 003 OF 004 which may encourage greater commitment from Central Asian nations. However, Russia sees the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), comprising Russia and Central Asian countries as an alternative to CARICC and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), and has spoken of establishing a coordination center like CARICC within CSTO. Twice per year, the CSTO conducts operation "Canal", a week-long interdiction blitz on the Northern route based on shared intelligence among member states. The effectiveness of this approach is questionable. The U.S. believes that multilateral efforts through the NATO-Russia Council and CARICC should be the primary means for advancing our shared goals though we are willing to consider proposals made by the CSTO. ¶8. (SBU) In 2006, then-President Putin authorized the FSKN to station 50 officers in foreign states to facilitate information sharing and joint investigations. The FSKN has opened, or plans to open, liaison offices in at least ten countries, including four of the five Central Asian republics. Russia has indicated that its drug liaison officer in Kazakhstan will also work with CARICC. ¶9. (SBU) Since 2006, roughly 1,000 officials from Central Asia and Afghanistan have been trained on various aspects of counternarcotics work through the NRC. While Russia has been reluctant to pursue practical cooperation with NATO in many areas, this program has consistently stood out as an area where NATO and Russia can work together to achieve common objectives. This joint training initiative is one of the most practical and useful of the Council's various activities. The Russian training center at Domodedovo Airport is an important, but not principal, forum for providing training. Russia has asked the U.S. to encourage Afghan drug enforcement personnel to train at Domodedovo. While the U.S. is supportive of the training, whether to send Afghan Police agents for counternarcotics training at Domodedovo is a decision for the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior. --------------------------------------------- ------ U.S. Support for Russia's Anti-narcotics Activities --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶10. (SBU) The U.S. government provides foreign assistance to expand Russia's ability to combat narcotics trafficking, especially along Afghan drug routes, reduce drug abuse, and increase access to drug prevention and treatment facilities for those at risk of or infected by HIV/AIDS, the majority of whom are injecting drug users. The U.S. has contributed at least $100,000 for several years for direct participation of DEA trainers at the Domodedovo training center and $2.8 million to support CARICC. Programs like those of the Healthy Russia Foundation, a Russian NGO funded by State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and USAID, contribute to preventing drug abuse by Russian youth, by raising awareness, knowledge, and understanding on drug use prevention and mitigating risks of contracting HIV/AIDS. With support from USAID, the Healthy Russia Foundation is also working to help expand the spectrum of drug treatment services available and to improve the treatment outcomes in select facilities in St. Petersburg and Orenburg. ------- Comment ------- ¶11. (SBU) The Drug Trafficking Working Group provides an opportunity to establish constructive relationships leading to real cooperation and information exchanges to further the interests of the U.S. and Russia in fighting the Afghan heroin trade and the scourge of drug addiction in Russia. Director Ivanov, as the head of FSKN and the State Anti-narcotics Committee, has broad authority over Russia's domestic drug treatment and demand reduction policies and its drug enforcement operations domestically and internationally. While he appears open to discussing drug courts and other approaches to dealing with the problems of drug addiction in Russia, it is not yet clear whether he is prepared to offer significant operational and intelligence cooperation to the U.S. for combating the Afghan heroin trade. Progress toward MOSCOW 00000226 004 OF 004 this objective would be a significant outcome of your visit. I look forward to welcoming you to Moscow February 3. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW225, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW225 | 2010-01-29 15:23 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | SECRET | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0003 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #0225/01 0291523 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 291523Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6099 INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0400 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0413 RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0016 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 6888
S E C R E T MOSCOW 000225 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): (U) PLENARY SESSIONS AND WORKING GROUPS, JANUARY 22, 2010 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d), and (h ). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-007. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: January 22, 2010 Times: 10:00 A.M. - 5:30 P.M. Place: MOD, Moscow ------------ Participants ------------ ¶3. (U) Russian Federation ------------------ --General of the Army Nikolai Yegorevich Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of Defense --Major General Alexey Petrovich Sukhov, Acting Director of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense --Major General Sergey Petrovich Orlov, Deputy Director of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Ministry of Defense --Major General Viktor Viktorovich Poznikhir, Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Ministry of Defense --Colonel Yevgeniy Yuryevich Ilyin, Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense --Colonel Aleksandr Alekseyevich Novikov, Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense --Mr. Anatoliy Ivanovich Antonov, Director of the Department for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs --Mr. Sergey Mikhailovich Koshelev, Deputy Director for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs --Col. Sergei Ryzhkov, Ministry of Defense --Ms. Violetta Evarovskaya, MFA, Translator --Mr. Vladmir Alexandrovich Gaiduk, Translator --Dmitry Nikolayevich Gusev, Translator --Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Translator United States ------------- --Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff --General (ret.) James Jones, National Security Advisor --Ambassador John Beyrle, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation --Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Department of State --Mr. Gary Samore, Coordinator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, National Security Council --Mr. Michael McFaul, Senior Director, National Security Council --Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, Department of State --Deputy Assistant Secretary Marcie Ries, Department of State --Colonel (USA) Kenneth Chance, Acting Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Moscow --Vice Admiral James Winnefeld, Director J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff --Dr. Ted Warner, Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the START Follow-on Negotiations --Mr. Michael Elliott, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's Representative, START Follow-On Negotiations --Mr. Kurt Siemon, Director for Dismantlement and Transparency, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy --Mr. Richard Trout, Department of Defense --Dr. Lani Kass, Department of Defense --Dr. Susan Elliott, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy Moscow --Dr. James Timbie, Senior Advisor, Department of State --Captain (USN) Michael Gilday, Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff --Ms. Leslie Hayden, Director, National Security Council --Mr. Nickolas Katsakis, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow --Mr. Matthew Eussen, notetaker, U.S. Embassy Moscow --Mr. Nikolai Sorokin, translator, Department of State --Ms. Marina Gross, translator, Department of State ------- Summary ------- ¶4. (S) Draft protocol language on telemetry that the U.S. conveyed to the Russian side on January 18 was agreed, with some Russian-proposed changes. Russia will propose additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on telemetry in Geneva when the new round opens. The U.S. and Russia agreed to a limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers, on the condition that deployed and non-deployed nuclear-equipped heavy bombers would be included in the total. The two sides also agreed to count one nuclear warhead for each nuclear-equipped heavy bomber. The U.S. and Russia agreed to a central limit of 1550 warheads. In a side meeting, CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen reached agreement on Unique Identifiers (UID) in principle, with the understanding that the details in the Treaty and Protocol will be negotiated and agreed in Geneva. (Note: U.S. agreement to counting bombers in the launcher limit and the 1550 limit on warheads is linked to the agreement in principle on UIDs.) The U.S. and Russia agreed to a total of 18 inspections: 10 Type 1 inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections. Inspections on monitoring el imination will be included in Type 2 inspections with the condition that Russia will accumulate a substantial number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a six-month period. These eliminated items would have large holes cut in them to confirm elimination. They would be sent to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of them. ¶5. (S) Subject Summary: Telemetry, Unique Identifiers, Monitoring/Elimination of Systems, Separate Limit on Launchers, Total Limit on Warheads. End summary. ------- Plenary ------- ¶6. (S) Russian CHOD Makarov welcomed the delegation by recognizing that much had been done already to move the agreement forward and that he looked forward to the consultations to resolve the outstanding issues. He noted, however, that while the U.S. side had raised issues regarding Senate ratification, he believed he would face similar issues with the State Duma. ¶7. (S) National Security Advisor Jones said that the President had asked the U.S. delegation to come to Moscow to resolve the core remaining issues of the START Follow-on Treaty. He commented that in his meetings with Presidential Advisor Prikhodko and National Security Advisor Patrushev, as well as a brief opportunity to talk with President Medvedev on the evening of January 21, he had underlined that President Obama had listened to Medvedev's comments in Copenhagen on December 18. The President had instructed the U.S. delegation to "act accordingly," with our latest proposals taking into account those Russian concerns. ¶8. (S) NSA Jones noted that these important but discrete issues, and what we do with them, reflect a pivot point in U.S.-Russian relations. He continued that as the negotiations proceed, we should consider the vast strategic potential of the relationship in positive terms. The START Follow-on treaty opens the door to a path where the U.S. and Russia can positively address other issues. For this to be possible, NSA Jones asked that both sides show flexibility and make some trades, affirming that the U.S. side was prepared to do that and noting that Medvedev had said that the Russian side was equally prepared. ¶9. (S) NSA Jones outlined five principle issues on the agenda: telemetry; unique identifiers; monitoring of the elimination of systems; a separate limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers; and the limit on warheads. ¶10. (S) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, underlined that the approach should be one that reflected a U.S.-Russian twenty-first century partnership: the agreement should be fair, meet each side's interests, and reflect our global security responsibilities. He offered that a finalized treaty would be received by the international community as a demonstration of real progress in arms control. CJCS Mullen highlighted the agreed language in the draft agreement's preamble stating that the Treaty "builds on mutual trust." This statement recognizes that both sides must face difficult strategic circumstances. ------------------------------ Telemetry Deal All But Reached ------------------------------ Plenary Discussions ------------------- ¶11. (S) CJCS Mullen opened the telemetry discussion by saying the U.S. and GOR were close to an agreement, especially after POTUS and Medvedev discussed the issue in Copenhagen on December 18. He said the USG had made modest, but important changes to the GOR's December 12 proposals, and asked if the GOR had any reactions to them. ¶12. (S) CHOD Makarov reminded the U.S. side that at the start of SFO negotiations, Russia had completely rejected the idea of telemetry data exchanges. He said he understood the U.S. Senate would not ratify SFO if there was no mention of telemetry. He added, however, that the Russian State Duma was opposed to exchanging telemetry data, and anyone who agreed to this would be branded a criminal and traitor. Regardless, the Russian side was ready to exchange telemetry data with the United States. He then turned to General Pozhikhir to make the Russian presentation. ¶13. (S) General Poznikhir started out by stating that the U.S. wanted an exchange of telemetry information in order to obtain Russian missile data for perfecting its missile defense (MD) systems. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation was prepared to proceed with a telemetry exchange. He said it would involve exchanging telemetry data on no more than five launches per year, as proposed by Medvedev. He continued that while the U.S. proposal of January 15 was a big step forward, it was problematic because the U.S. still insisted on changing Medvedev's proposals. ¶14. (S) Gen. Poznikhir said that ambiguities arose from the U.S. proposal to exchange telemetry data on "a variety of" ICBM and SLMB launches, and wanted to delete this language from the treaty text. He stated that telemetry data could be exchanged on "no more than five" ICBM and SLBM launches each year, but clarified this point as follows: These exchanges would be done on a parity basis, meaning that the GOR would share telemetry data with the U.S. on the same number of launches as the U.S. shared with Russia, but no more than five launches in a year. If the U.S. conducted only four test launches and shared telemetry data on these launches with Russia, then Russia would provide telemetry data on four of its launches that year as well. ¶15. (S) The Russian side also agreed to review the telemetry data exchange every year in the BCC for the life of the treaty. Any changes made to the telemetry sharing regime would have to be agreed by both sides; no one side could unilaterally make any changes. If the U.S. and Russia could not agree to changes, then data exchanges would continue as before. ¶16. (S) The GOR also dropped its insistence that telemetry data from UK Trident SLBM launches be reported by the United States. The GOR also agreed to a treaty Annex on telemetry, and to providing additional language on telemetry for the Protocol, which would become Part Seven of the Protocol. Gen. Poznikhir also said the translation of their telemetry "answers to questions" done by the Russian embassy in Washington had misrepresented several items, including the matter of transmitting data only through the reentry vehicle. He said that the Russian side had done more complete answers to the "questions on telemetry," which they would be willing to discuss in the next negotiating session in Geneva. Working Group ------------- ¶17. (S) At this point CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mul len asked General Poznikhir and Mr. Siemon to lead a small group to discuss the Russian telemetry proposal in more detail. The conclusions of their discussion are summarized below. Conclusions ----------- ¶18. (S) The GOR agreed to the following language for the Telemetry Protocol: --From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs. --The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by the sides, and in an agreed amount. --On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions and method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Additional details on the telemetry exchange are contained in the Annex on Telemetry Exchange Procedures. ¶19. (S) The Russian side indicated it intends to table additional Telemetry Protocol language in Geneva, and discussed the following elements from their current working draft: --The side conducting the test launch would determine the five telemetric exchanges on a parity basis. --Each party would have the right to raise concerns about the exchanged telemetric information. --The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches with an agreed volume of information. Both the volume and type of exchanged information would be agreed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). --A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be exchanged within the first 65 days of each calendar year. --The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to review the conditions for the exchange of telemetric information. --A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric information exchange agreement. --The exchange of telemetric information would include all information broadcast during flight tests and from encapsulated information. Data denial techniques would be banned. Recording and broadcasting data on the functioning of the stages and self-contained dispensing mechanism from a reentry vehicle would also be banned. --Interpretative data would be provided by the testing party and would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the identification number, the date of launch, recording frequencies, and modulation methods. --The party conducting the test launch would determine the method for recording telemetric information. --Each party would provide the means to acquire playback equipment to reproduce telemetric information from recorded media. ------------------------- Unique Identifiers (UIDs) ------------------------- Plenary Discussions ------------------- ¶20. (S) CJCS Mullen stressed President Obama's comments in Copenhagen on the importance of UIDs and noted that President Medvedev had accepted this concept in principle. He said that the U.S. side had provided a non-paper earlier in the week that proposed assigning unique numbers and identifiers for each strategic delivery vehicle or heavy bomber for the purposes of the treaty. He stressed that the use of UIDs, as demonstrated by fifteen years of practice, could be done with no operational impact and would provide confidence in the data. ¶21. (S) The GOR lead on UIDs, Air Force Major General Orlov, said that in negotiations, the Russian side was instructed to remove any discriminatory language, particularly regarding monitoring of mobile ICBMs. The use of UIDs was directly related to monitoring mobile ICBMs, and Gen. Orlov said the GOR opposed it. He complimented the latest U.S. proposal, and called it "revealing" in how it specifically identified locations on various systems to place UIDs and also allowed for placement on silo doors if no appropriate location on the missile could be found. However, he said that the GOR would have to carefully study the proposal, including the necessity of UIDs. In closing, Gen. Orlov commented that the state of improved relations made UIDs unnecessary. ¶22. (S) CHOD Makarov emphasized that in his careful study of the discussions of the presidents, they had stressed that relations should be based on confidence and trust. He promised that the GOR would look into the U.S. proposal but countered, "we don't see the necessity for the use of UIDs." He said that all these points reflected a lack of confidence held by military staff and civilians, which could serve as an obstacle. "If we don't learn to trust one another, we won't be able to move forward," CHOD Makarov said. He attempted to defer the issue, saying that he was not in a position to give a decision today. However, given U.S. insistence, he promised that the GOR would review the proposal, although the U.S. should clarify the need. ¶23. (S) CJCS Mullen emphasized the importance that President Obama placed on UIDs and that President Medvedev had already agreed in principle to the concept in Copenhagen. CJCS Mullen underlined that the purpose was to verify based on the concept and history of START, "trust but verify." ¶24. (S) Mike Elliott briefly outlined the U.S. concept to utilize the existing serial numbers on the missiles or bombers, to track the systems over their lifetime. If the serial number would not be readily visible to inspectors, then the U.S. proposed the existing serial number be replicated in a place on the missile or launcher where it would be readily visible. Elliott highlighted the benefits that such a procedure would give the GOR in tracking the Trident II and Minuteman III missiles systems, as the stages are assembled and mixed over time. He emphasized that the use of UIDs would allow the GOR to track stages from production or storage to launch tube or silo to elimination, an important consideration, as the treaty will account for the status of deployed and non-deployed systems over their lifetime. He added that UIDs would be part of the treaty database and simplify the work of inspectors over the life of the treaty. ¶25. (S) NSA Jones added that the use of UIDs will be an important factor for the U.S. Senate when it considers ratification of the treaty, as it was a minimum requirement for many of the members. ¶26. (S) CHOD Makarov responded by saying "very interesting, but not very convincing." He said that there were many measures the sides can take regarding control and inspection, including UIDs, but that they related to the central issue, the lack of trust. He said that he could not agree in principle on UIDs, and he again told the delegation that he was not prepared to reso lve this today, but said that the GOR was ready to discuss all but the political decision regarding UIDs at a lower level. CHOD Makarov underlined that the GOR wanted to avoid the use of UIDs in the text of the treaty and that it was necessary for the parties to discuss the issue and the need for such a measure. ¶27. (S) CJCS Mullen again underscored the importance of this issue to President Obama and that President Medvedev had already agreed in principle, with the hope of being able to move forward on this issue today. CJCS Mullen said that the U.S. had already accepted the Russian position that all systems, not just mobiles, have UIDs and that tracking was part of openness and trust. He also reminded CHOD Makarov that the U.S. had dropped its insistence on continuous monitoring at Votkinsk, "a major concession," when the GOR had agreed to notification of movement of missiles from missile production facilities and the use of UIDs on each missile. CJCS Mullen commented that in the totality of the treaty, UIDs were not a major issue. CHOD Makarov took the opening on Votkinsk to ask why it was necessary to have UIDs when the U.S. knew all solid fuel systems were produced in one plant? ¶28. (S) NSC Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Michael McFaul asserted that the use of UIDs did not threaten the national security interests of Russia, and was simply an accounting device. He said that it was the responsibility of the U.S. intelligence community to verify the treaty before Congress, and that this provision would help them do their job with no cost to Russia "with the exception of the price of the paint." He emphasized that the U.S. also wanted to build trust, not just assume that that it was there. Drawing on his experience in the country, McFaul said that he knew there were doubters in Russia that were suspicious of the U.S., as there were those in the U.S. suspicious of Russia. He said that the painted numbers would increase transparency, thereby building trust. ¶29. (S) CHOD Makarov concurred that mutual suspicion existed but as our presidents have said, we should not miss the opportunity to build trust. While the GOR did not see UIDs as a threat, CHOD Makarov did not see their necessity. He also countered that this could become an issue for the Duma, if UIDs were not seen as applying equally. Having raised the Duma, however, he dismissed the concerns of legislators, saying that while many of the members may object, they cannot say why. ¶30. (S) In leaving the issue, the delegations agreed to a break-out session to discuss UIDs. Working Group/Principals Discussions ------------------------------------ ¶31. (S) Mike Elliott met with his Russian counterpart following the plenary. The Russian participants dug in on the issue, saying they could not understand why UIDs were needed, and commenting that, once again, it seemed to be a way for the U.S. side to try to get at Russian mobile ICBMs. However, while the Russian side identified some technical challenges, these were not a roadblock to an agreement. CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen met separately on the matter in the afternoon, and CJCS Mullen eventually broke the log-jam by agreeing to 1550 nuclear warheads as the central limit of the treaty, and including bombers in the deployed and non-deployed launcher limit. In return, CHOD Makarov agreed in principle to UIDs, leaving it to the negotiators in Geneva to finalize the details. Conclusions ----------- ¶32. (S) The parties agreed in principle to pursue text for UIDs in the Treaty and Protocol, which would be negotiated and agreed in Geneva. The U.S. agreement to count bombers under the launcher limit and acceptance of the 1550 limit on warheads was explicitly linked to the agreement in principle on UIDs. --------------------------------- Monitoring/Elimination of Systems --------------------------------- Plenary Discussions ------------------- ¶33. (S) CJCS Mullen said the best solution to monitor the elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers was the U.S. proposal for an agreed statement that was proposed in December. The U.S. was prepared to use terms such as "demonstration" or "exhibition" rather than "inspection" to describe the process. It was important to meet the need adequately to monitor the elimination process without being intrusive. He pointed out that the draft agreed statement suggested two demonstrations at each elimination site each year. The draft agreed statement did not, however, mention mobile missile launchers, but the U.S. believed two demonstrations per year would be a good idea. ¶34. (S) Colonel Ilyin agreed that there should be an inspection regime in the treaty. The GOR agreed during talks in Geneva to increase the number of annual inspections from 10 to 18. The GOR also agreed to ten Type 1 and eight Type 2 inspections per year. The GOR also increased the number of inspection team members permitted to ten. Eliminated items should be left out to be monitored by national technical means for a period of at least 60 days, he said. ¶35. (S) CHOD Makarov encouraged the U.S. side to accept the GOR offer, as Russia (or the Soviet Union) had not violated arms control treaties, and now the U.S. wanted to conduct even more inspections than during the Cold War. ¶36. (S) When CJCS Mullen said he thought on December 18 in Copenhagen that POTUS and Medvedev agreed that both sides could conduct 12 Type 1 inspections and six Type 2 inspections (for a total of 18 inspections), Col. Ilyin replied this was never agreed. He said the number of inspections originally discussed in Geneva was 16, with eight Type 1 and eight Type 2 inspections. Col. Ilyin said that Medvedev agreed to raise the limit to 18 inspections, and the U.S. could decide if it wanted two more Type 1 or Type 2 inspections. In the end, Russia agreed to permit 10 Type 1 inspections and 8 Type 2 inspections. ¶37. (S) Ted Warner countered that the U.S. did not have a sufficient number of type 2 inspections at its disposal to inspect non-deployed weapons observe the results of elimination. He pointed out that, under START, there were separate elimination inspections, allowing the two sides to observe the whole process of elimination. He admitted that START procedures were lengthy and intrusive, but the U.S. and Russia had informally worked out ways to simplify the inspections and limit the number of inspectors. The current negotiations were preparing procedures that would also be simplified, he argued. ¶38. (S) Warner continued, saying that the Russian side had talked about burni ng out the solid rocket fuel and cutting holes in the rocket motors, which would be visible from space and thus could not be re-used. While satellites cannot tell if an engine has been burned out, they can tell if holes have been drilled in them. The U.S. now wanted to augment these procedures with inspections. An inspection team of five people could conduct such an inspection in one day, and the U.S. side would be prepared to pay for the expenses on the ground of its inspectors. CHOD Makarov and CJCS Mullen agreed that this issue would be discussed further in a small group meeting to be chaired by Mr. Warner and Col. Ilyin in the afternoon. Conclusions ----------- ¶39. (S) After extensive discussions in a small group led by Ted Warner on the U.S. side, the Russians agreed to accumulate a substantial number of eliminated solid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs over a six-month period; they would have large holes cut in them to confirm that they had been eliminated. This would be done in exchange for the right to conduct 10 Type 1 inspections and eight Type 2 inspections, for a total of 18 inspections. ¶40. (S) These accumulated eliminated items would be sent from the rocket motor elimination facilities at Perm or Krasnoarmeysk to Votkinsk, and the U.S. side would have the option of conducting a Type 2 inspection of them at Votkinsk. The U.S. side would also have the option of conducting a separate inspection of eliminated transporter erector launchers (TEL), which would be accumulated in large batches periodically at Pibanshur. For each of these facilities, the U.S. would be able to conduct two inspections per year, for a total of four. The details of these arrangements will have to be negotiated, and will be recorded in section 7 of the Inspection Protocol. --------------------------- Separate Limit on Launchers --------------------------- Plenary Discussions ------------------- ¶41. (S) CJCS Mullen began the discussion on the separate limit for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, stating that the U.S. had agreed with the Russian proposal that a launcher was only considered as "deployed" when it carried a missile. However, this counting measure created the potential for the unlimited possession of launchers. CJCS Mullen asserted that without a treaty-imposed limit, there would be no requirement to eliminate launchers and no urgency to do so. He tabled the U.S. proposal to impose a limit of 800 on deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. He underscored that this limit would mostly affect the U.S., forcing elimination of a number of launchers; it could also address Russian concerns on the potential of converting silos for missile defense purposes. CJCS Mullen highlighted that this would enhance the international assessment of the treaty and the prospects for ratification in the U.S. Senate. ¶42. (S) CHOD Makarov countered that the GOR had originally proposed a combined launcher limit of 500. He asked how the U.S. proposed allocating the total of 800 among different types of launchers. CJCS Mullen assured him that each side would be able to allocate according to their own priorities. CHOD Makarov agreed to the launcher limit, but Gen. Orlov, Gen. Poznikhir and Col. Ilyin quickly interjected to clarify that the 800 would include all bombers, deployed and non-deployed in the 800 limit. Ted Warner clarified that this would be a new GOR position, as talks in Geneva had only touched on incorporating ICBMs, SLBMs, and non-deployed heavy bombers within the 800 limit. ¶43. (S) CJCS Mullen asked CHOD Makarov to confirm whether the heavy bombers would be counted for one or three warheads against the aggregate warhead ceiling. CHOD Makarov stated the Russian position, one warhead, which CJCS Mullen accepted. CJCS Mullen stated that the U.S. side would need time to confer on whether to accept incorporating all bombers into the 800 limit on launchers. CHOD Makarov assented. ¶44. (S) In transitioning to the issue of the limit on total warheads, CJCS Mullen predicted that there would be intense international scrutiny of the total number of deployed warheads permitted under the new treaty. CJCS Mullen proposed that the limit be 1500, arguing it was a nice round number and represented a seventy-five percent reduction from the original START warhead limit of 6000. ¶45. (S) CHOD Makarov replied that the GOR had originally proposed 1675, while the U.S. had proposed 1500. He argued that 1550 was a huge step toward the U.S. position and absolutely as far as the Russian Federation could go. He stressed that it was a good number for the GOR as it sought to reconfigure its nuclear forces. (Comment: In side conversations during the afternoon, several of the Russian military representatives claimed that 1550 was an important number for the Russian missile forces because of the particular nature of their planned MIRV deployments. End comment.) CHOD Makarov expressed skepticism that 1500 was a critical figure for the U.S. and argued that 1550 was also a round number and very close to 1500. CHOD Makarov said that he would have to ask for U.S. assistance in justifying the lower number to his State Duma, to which CJCS Mullen replied that he would also request CHOD Makarov's help before the Senate. ¶46. (S) In summing up the results of the overall negotiations over the morning, CHOD Makarov concluded that Russia had given quite a bit of ground to the U.S. He said that on the issues of telemetry, inspections and the separate launcher limit, the GOR had moved toward the U.S. position; on UIDs that the GOR had reversed its position and that there was now an understanding to study the matter; and on the total number of deployed warheads that the GOR had reduced the number but that the U.S. had not budged from 1500. CHOD Makarov claimed that the GOR had given more and that he had nothing with which to defend himself from critics. He offered to split the difference between the sides' opening proposals limiting the number of deployed warheads to 1588. CJCS Mullen countered offering 1525, but the two agreed to return to the issue, and to the issues of UIDs and monitoring elimination, in the afternoon. Conclusions ----------- ¶47. (S) After expert discussions in the afternoon, and a one-on-one discussion between CJCS Mullen and CHOD Makarov, CHOD Makarov accepted CJCS Mullen's proposal that in exchange for an agreement in principle on UIDs, the U.S. would accept counting deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers within the separate launcher limit of 800. The parties also agreed to set the total limit of deployed warheads at 1550. However, the total limit of 1550 deployed warheads, as well as the incl usion of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers under the separate launcher limit of 800, was explicitly packaged in exchange for the inclusion of UIDs in the treaty and protocol. --------------- Closing Plenary --------------- ¶48. (S) CHOD Makarov thanked the delegations for their efforts and for the negotiating stances of the U.S. He said that he was "fully convinced that we will conclude, sign, and ratify the START Follow-on treaty, which would play a role in global security and stability." CHOD Makarov said that he expected that following the new treaty's signature, the U.S. and Russia would move on to solving the problems of the CFE Treaty, and "all the problems of the countries that want to join the nuclear club." He also remarked, "the next time we meet, we will already be moving on to a new negotiating process, based on the issues that we have solved today." ¶49. (S) CJCS Mullen thanked CHOD Makarov for his hospitality, and he agreed that concluding this treaty opened the door to more opportunities. CJCS Mullen said he looked forward to a bright partnership between our two countries, as evidenced by the signing of the joint work plan for military-to-military cooperation (signed immediately prior to the closing plenary). He concluded that as two global powers with global responsibilities, there are special aspects of openness and fairness and that the U.S. and Russia had moved forward on the basis of trust. ¶50. (S) NSA Jones joined CJCS Mullen in thanking CHOD Makarov for his hospitality. He said "what happened today demonstrated that we can talk to one another but also listen to one another." NSA Jones summed up that the sides had achieved a general agreement on the START Follow-on Treaty, which would serve as a "harbinger of good things to come in bilateral relations in a world looking to challenge us in the coming months." ¶51. (S) CHOD Makarov finished the session, "we will conclude this treaty between our two sides, but neighboring countries which are successfully developing these weapons should also be bound by limits." CHOD Makarov deferred on agreeing to travel to the U.S. in the spring, but said he would discuss it with CJCS Mullen in Brussels next week. ¶52. (U) A/S Gottemoeller and NSC Senior Director Mike McFaul cleared this message. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW224, INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW224 | 2010-01-29 14:38 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO1517 PP RUEHDBU RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHMO #0224/01 0291438 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 291438Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6095 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXI/LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000224 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RUS, DRL/ILCSR FOR SMORGAN, G/TIP FOR LCDEBACA DOL/ILAB FOR LSTROTKAMP, RRIGBY, TMCCARTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PGOV SOCI RS SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS REF: SECSTATE 131995 ------------ Task 1/TVPRA ------------ ¶1. (U) Post does not have information on additional goods for the Russia TVPRA list. ---------- Task 2/TDA ---------- 2A. Prevalence and Sectoral Distribution of Exploitive Child Labor ¶1. (U) Child labor in Russia encompasses not only Russian children, but often children from neighboring countries. Some children are brought to Russia for the purpose of exploitation, while others come with migrant worker parents. In urban areas, children can be found working primarily in the informal sector in retail services, street hawking, washing cars, repairing automobiles, making deliveries, collecting trash, and begging. In rural areas, children are more commonly involved in agricultural work. Among street children, boys are usually involved in hard, physical labor, while girls are more likely to work in trade and prostitution. However, child prostitution involving boys does exist in Russia, particularly among homeless and orphaned children. Homeless and orphaned children on the streets are engaged in prostitution as a means to survive. Child sex tourism and commercial sexual exploitation remain a concern, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also for other large Russian cities. Domestic trafficking of children from rural areas to urban centers and between regions also occurs. (Note: Information gathered from public documents and statements by the GOR Children's Ombudsman, UNICEF, and child protection NGOs. End Note.) ¶2. (U) In 2008, the Federal Labor and Employment Service (FLES) reported 10,000 violations of child labor laws, noting that the victims often received little pay and suffered from unsafe working conditions. FLES found the largest incidence of exploitive child labor in the industrial, trade, and agricultural sectors. Employers paid 1.5 million rubles (USD 52,000) in administrative fines for violations of child labor laws. In addition, labor inspectors corrected more than 300 labor agreements for minors encumbering positions legal for workers of their age and restored to work more than 250 minors who had been illegally terminated. 2B. Laws and Regulations ¶1. (U) In December 2008, the GOR created a Child Support Fund (CSF) to protect the social welfare of children, providing specific assistance to orphans and disabled children. The Fund also develops programs for the social rehabilitation of children (e.g. finding homes for orphaned children and treating victims of abuse) and the prevention of child homelessness. In 2009, the Fund implemented 58 regional programs with 630 million rubles (USD 21 million) in its own financing, 4.5 billion rubles (USD 152 million) in regional government funds, and 362 million rubles (USD 12 million) in donations from businesses and NGOs. In July 2009, the GOR strengthened the Criminal Code for crimes against the life, health, and sexual inviolability of minors. Criminals guilty of sexual assault on a minor are now subject to sentences of 8-15 years, as opposed to 4-10 previously. If the victim is under the age of 16, the range of possible sentences increases to 12-20 years. Previously, the age at which the range of possible sentences increased was 14, but possible sentences ranged from only 8-15 years. In addition, criminals guilty of engaging in sexual intercourse with a minor may be prohibited from working in certain professions for a period of up to 20 years. After receiving such a sentence, the guilty person would not be eligible to appeal for parole until he or she had served at least three-fourths of his or her sentence. In addition, the GOR increased the range of possible sentences from up to six years to up to eight years for criminals found guilty of disseminating pornography that depicts minors. If the minor involved is under the age of 14, the sentencing range increased from up to eight years, to a minimum of three and a maximum of ten years. MOSCOW 00000224 002 OF 004 In September 2009, the GOR created the office of the Children's Ombudsman at the federal level. The Children's Ombudsman will serve as an information clearinghouse at the federal level for activities that promote and protect children's rights. Regional affiliates of the federal Children's Ombudsman already exist in 28 regions of the Russian Federation. The GOR hopes to establish similar offices in the remaining regions in the near future. In addition, the Children's Ombudsman will create a national center for missing children which, among other functions, will serve as a resource center for parents, law enforcement officials, and members o f the public seeking information on the sexual exploitation of children. ¶2. (U) The legal and regulatory framework of the Russian Federation is adequate for addressing exploitive child labor. However, it is worth noting that Russia still has not ratified the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement. Section I: Hazardous Child Labor. ¶1. (U) FLES and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child labor. ¶2. (U) Official data on information exchange mechanisms is not available. ¶3. (U) Workers, employers, and labor inspectors are able to issue complaints about hazardous child labor violations. Official data is not available. 4-14. (U) Official data on funding for inspections, staffing levels, the number of inspections, the number of children involved, the number of prosecutions, the number of cases closed, the number of convictions, case length, penalties, and trainings regarding hazardous child labor is not available. 2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement. Section II: Forced Child Labor. ¶1. (U) FLES and the Public Prosecutor are responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to forced child labor. ¶2. (U) Official data on information exchange mechanisms is not available. ¶3. (U) Workers, employers, and labor inspectors are able to issue complaints about forced child labor violations. Official data is not available. 4-14. (U) Official data on funding for inspections, staffing levels, the number of inspections, the number of children involved, the number of prosecutions, the number of cases closed, the number of convictions, case length, penalties, and trainings regarding forced child labor is not available. 2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. Section I: Child Trafficking ¶1. (U) Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special department dedicated to the prevention of child trafficking. ¶2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding child trafficking is not available. ¶3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 4-12. (U) Official data on the number of investigations, number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case length, and training regarding child trafficking is not available. ¶13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed conflict in Russia. 2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. Section II: Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children ¶1. (U) MIA personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special department dedicated to the prevention of the commercial MOSCOW 00000224 003 OF 004 sexual exploitation of children. ¶2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding the commercial sexual exploitation of children is not available. ¶3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. ¶4. (U) MIA reported 223 violations regarding the production and distribution of pornography depicting a minor in 2008, opened 159 investigations, and issued 157 indictments. MIA registered 159 crimes for the production and distribution of child pornography in the first half of 2009. 5-12. (U) Official data on the number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case length, and training regarding the commercial sexual exploitation of children is not available. ¶13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed conflict in Russia. 2D. Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement. Section III: Use of Children in Illicit Activities ¶1. (U) MIA personnel enforce laws and regulations prohibiting child trafficking, but the MIA does not have a special department dedicated to the prevention of child trafficking. ¶2. (U) Official data on agency funding levels regarding the use of children in illicit activities is not available. ¶3. (U) A hotline is planned but not yet operational. 4-12. (U) Official data on the number of investigations, number of children rescued, number of arrests, number of cases closed, number of convictions, sentences imposed, case length, and training regarding the use of children in illicit activities is not available. ¶13. (U) In general, children are not involved in armed conflict in Russia. 2E. Government Policies on Child Labor ¶1. (U) The GOR does not have a policy or plan that specifically addresses child labor. ¶2. (U) The GOR did not incorporate exploitive child labor specifically as an issue to be addressed in other social policies. 3-5. (U) Not applicable ¶6. (U) The Bilateral Presidential Commission's Civil Society working group will address exploitive child labor as part of the children's issues on its agenda. ¶7. (U) The GOR did not sign a bilateral, regional, or international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. However, in September, the GOR and other CIS countries agreed to a set of recommendations on the modernization of international cooperation in the fight against human trafficking, which will be a part of the CIS 2010-2014 program to combat trafficking. 2F. Social Programs to Eliminate or Prevent Child Labor ¶1. (U) CSF is developing a program for 2010 that will target violence against children, including sexual exploitation. The program will focus on raising public awareness of the problem, increasing parental responsibility, and treating victims. ¶2. (U) The GOR did not incorporate child labor specifically as an issue to be addressed through its social programs. ¶3. (U) CSF will devote 120 million rubles (USD 4 million) of its own funds to the new program in 2010. 4-5. (U) Not applicable ¶6. (U) The GOR did not sign a bilater al, regional, or international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009. However, in September, the GOR and other CIS countries agreed to a set of recommendations on the modernization of international cooperation in the fight against human trafficking, which will be a part of the CIS 2010-2014 MOSCOW 00000224 004 OF 004 program to combat trafficking. 2G. Continual Progress ¶1. (U) Although exploitive child labor continues to be a problem in Russia, the GOR has taken significant steps to give higher priority to child welfare issues at the federal level, increase penalties for violations of laws and regulations relating to child labor and exploitation, and expand its child welfare programs. In 2008, the number of reported violations of child labor laws and the total fines for those violations increased in comparison with previous years. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW218, INQUIRY DELIVERED: QUARTERLY STRATEGIC DATA (SDX)
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW218 | 2010-01-29 11:52 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0011 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #0218 0291152 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 291152Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6089 INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0015
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000218 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR VCI GENEVA FOR SFO DELEGATION E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START US RS SUBJECT: INQUIRY DELIVERED: QUARTERLY STRATEGIC DATA (SDX) NOTIFICATION REF: STATE 9093 (U) On January 29 we delivered reftel inquiry to MFA DVBR Second Secretary Andrey Malugin, who said he would pass this to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy Antonov. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW206, ELEVATING REQUEST FOR PACE ELECTION OBSERVERS
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW206 | 2010-01-29 06:32 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO0981 PP RUEHIK DE RUEHMO #0206 0290632 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 290632Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6077 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000206 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PREL COE RS SUBJECT: ELEVATING REQUEST FOR PACE ELECTION OBSERVERS REF: A. MOSCOW 205 ¶B. SECSTATE 7158 (SBU) In addition to REF A, post delivered REF B request to State Duma International Relations Committee Chairman and Russian PACE delegation head Konstantin Kosachev and to Russian MFA Director for General European Cooperation Vladimir Voronkov. While the GOR will give the request serious consideration, both of these offices were skeptical that they could meet the January 30 deadline. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW205, RUSSIA CONSIDERS SENDING ELECTION OBSERVERS TO
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW205 | 2010-01-28 14:34 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO0451 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHMO #0205 0281434 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281434Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6076 INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0271
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000205 SIPDIS NEA-I-POL FOR JUSTIN REYNOLDS AND DRL/NESCA FOR MARY KAREN WALKER. E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM RS AZ SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONSIDERS SENDING ELECTION OBSERVERS TO BAGHDAD REF: STATE 07719 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) We delivered reftel points to Iliya Morgounov, Section Chief of the MFA's Iraq Desk. Morgounov was grateful for the information and said the U.S. offer to provide assistance with security and ground transportation would be especially helpful. He remarked that, although the Russian Central Elections Committee had originally expressed interest in observing the elections, FM Lavrov and DFM Saltanov would make the ultimate decision about sending a delegation. Morgounov noted the deadline for responding and said that he was unsure the GOR would be able to commit to send a delegation by January 30 as requested. ¶2. (C) Morgounov also commented on the outstanding case of four Russian diplomats who were murdered in Iraq in 2004. He said that, as he understood the situation, we remained at an impasse. According to Morgounov, a recent meeting in Baghdad involving the Russian Embassy had failed to produce any results. He said the MFA remained ready to assist in any way, although he acknowledged that the issue belonged to other ministries of the Russian government. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW204, MOSCOW “DISMAYED” BY POLITICAL SITUATION IN BAGHDAD
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW204 | 2010-01-28 14:01 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO0407 PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #0204 0281401 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281401Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0554
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000204 SIPDIS NEA-I/POL FOR WILLIAM CAVNESS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IZ SUBJECT: MOSCOW "DISMAYED" BY POLITICAL SITUATION IN BAGHDAD REF: STATE 05980 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) We delivered reftel points to Iraq Section Chief Iliya Morgounov of the MFA's Middle East and North Africa Department. Characterizing the current political situation in Baghdad as strange, Morgounov noted that the GOR was surprised and disappointed by events in Baghdad leading up to the March elections. He claimed that neither the Embassy in Baghdad nor the MFA was able to understand what was behind the attempt to prohibit participation of more than 500 candidates. Morgounov said Moscow was especially dismayed because he thought the Iraqi government had "moved beyond" the historical Shia and Sunni conflicts and found a way to work together. He inquired about Vice President Biden's recent visit to Baghdad and asked if the U.S. had been successful in "teaching the Iraqis democracy again." ¶2. (C) Morgounov said DFM Saltanov himself would consider reftel request and develop a response. He said the MFA would inform the Russian Embassy in Baghdad of their strategy, and would instruct them to contact the U.S. Embassy and UNAMI as necessary. In response to a question about the possibility of joint P5 demarches to the Iraqi government, we advised that our goal at this time was instead for each capital to consider appropriate ways to express their concerns about the situation and suggested private discussions or public statements from capitals as preferred methods. Beyrle
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10MOSCOW203, TRANSNEFT CONFIRMS OIL DEAL WITH BELARUS
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW203 | 2010-01-28 13:29 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO0385 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #0203 0281329 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281329Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6074 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000203 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, S/EEE MORNINGSTAR DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR JBROUGHER NSC FOR MMCFAUL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL RS BO SUBJECT: TRANSNEFT CONFIRMS OIL DEAL WITH BELARUS REF: MOSCOW 53 Classified By: ECON MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ---------------------------------------- ALL OIL OVER 6.3 MT SUBJECT TO FULL DUTY ---------------------------------------- ¶1. (C) Oleg Pilipets, long-time International Affairs Advisor in the Office of the President of Transneft, Russia's oil pipeline monopoly, confirmed to us January 28 that Moscow and Minsk signed a deal to end the dispute on oil shipments (reftel). Pilipets said approximately 6.3 million tons (mt) of Russian oil would be provided to Belarus in 2010 duty-free. The amount was agreed to based on Belarus's domestic needs. According to Pilipets, Belarus is "free to do whatever it wants" with the duty-free oil. He said the agreement is effective immediately, but did not know how long it would be in effect, only saying that such agreements are typically applicable for one year. ¶2. (C) Pilipets added that the inter-governmental agreement did not specify any amounts of oil to be purchased by Belarus beyond the 6.3 mt. He explained that any additional oil that Belarusian consumers would like to purchase from Russian suppliers would be subject to the full export duty "according to Russian law" with "no exemptions and no favors." (Note: Belarus reportedly had bought an additional 15 mt of oil per year that it processed and re-exported. End note.) Pilipets said he did not know what DPM Sechin meant by remarks, as quoted in the press, indicating that Russia had "compromised" to make the deal happen. Pilipets noted, however, that under the new deal, Belarus would still be receiving a subsidy of about $1 billion per year -- his estimate of the foregone duties on the amount of oil in the agreement. ¶3. (C) According to press reports, the deal included an 11% raise increase tariffs on Russian crude transiting Belarus, based on projected Belarusian GDP growth. Pilipets could not confirm that detail, saying that Transneft "has nothing to do with" Belarus's transit charges. He said Belarusian authorities are free to charge what they want, keeping in mind "market realities" that could cause consumers to purchase oil from elsewhere if it is too expensive through Belarus. Pilipets reiterated that the flow of Russian oil solely transiting Belarus en-route to third countries was never affected by the dispute. ------- COMMENT ------- ¶4. (C) We had expected a resolution to emerge before the dispute caused any major disruptions in oil flows to Europe. While the core issue primarily reflected the GOR's subsidy mechanism to Belarus, the incident again called into question Russia's reputation as a reliable energy supplier. Although we may never know exactly what "compromises" were made by either side, it is unlikely that the resolution was purely commercial, with DPM Sechin quoted as "taking into consideration the special relations with our brotherly republic." Unfortunately, the agreement leaves room for continued politicization of the oil trade with Belarus, as the duty issue likely will emerge again as part of the process of harmonizing tariff schedules among the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan customs union. End comment. Beyrle
Wikileaks
10MOSCOW200, DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO GOR ON HELIUM-3 SHORTAGE FOR
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW200 | 2010-01-28 11:38 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #0200 0281138 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 281138Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6072 INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000200 SENSITIVE SIPDIS ISN/MNSA FOR JSANBORN, ISN/NESS FOR BPLAPP AND ZNAZARIO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP PARM RS SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO GOR ON HELIUM-3 SHORTAGE FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS REF: A. A. SECSTATE 3312 ¶B. B. YOUNG-LOCHBRYN EMAIL 1/16/10 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED ¶1. (SBU) Post delivered reftel demarche orally to Aleksey Ubeyev, Deputy Director of International Cooperation Department, at Rosatom on January 14. After consulting with the Department (ref B), post delivered slightly abridged written talking points also to Ubeyev on Jan 19. As Ubeyev is currently out of the country, post followed up with Rosatom contact Aleksandr Zhgutov, Director of Office of Relations with International Organizations, (one level below Ubeyev) on January 22. Zhgutov informed us that Rosatom is "working on the issue". He noted that Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General of IAEA, visited Rosatom in mid-January and raised the Helium-3 shortage issue. Post will continue to follow up. Beyrle
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Russia 