06MOSCOW6843, RUSLAN KHASBULATOV ON CHECHEN DYNAMICS

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6843	2006-06-28 09:28	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO2901
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6843 1790928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280928Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8205
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSLAN KHASBULATOV ON CHECHEN DYNAMICS 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reason 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Ruslan Khasbulatov, Yeltsin's opponent in the 1993 
White House standoff and now professor of economics at the 
Plekhanov Russian Academy of Economics, gave us his 
perspective June 27 on dynamics in his native Chechnya. 
Khasbulatov was upfront about his dislikes in the current 
political alignment (virtually everyone in power in both 
Moscow and Groznyy); he did not appear to have many likes. 
He had much to say about Shamil Basayev, with whom he was 
closely linked in the early 1990s; now he was willing to 
admit he had met Basayev, no more. 
 
¶2. (C) Khasbulatov noted that the current dynamic pitted the 
extreme Basayev, disliked by the population, against Kadyrov 
-- whom Khasbulatov regarded as odious -- and his federal 
backers.  That was lucky for Kadyrov; if the populace had 
other channels to express its opposition to Kadyrov and the 
Russians, it would.  As things stood, however, anyone who 
expressed opposition could be labeled a "Basayevist" and 
arrested or worse.  So the people, intimidated, remained 
silent and passive. 
 
¶3. (C) Khasbulatov claimed that Basayev was working for the 
KGB in 1993 when he transited Russia and entered Abkhazia to 
fight the Georgians.  Khasbulatov also claimed that Basayev 
to this day had no religious convictions, and that his 
invasion of Dagestan in 1999, along with the Jordanian 
Jihadist al-Khattab, was done for a purely financial motive: 
he was paid USD 10 million.  Khasbulatov, learning of the 
plans, had sent an ex-fighter trusted by Basayev to try to 
dissuade Basayev from the disastrous move.  Khasbulatov said, 
"The man later told me that Basayev replied, 'Ruslan will 
never give bad advice, but it comes too late:  I've already 
taken the money.'" 
 
¶4. (C) Khasbulatov believed Basayev long ago gave up hope of 
achieving independence for Chechnya or a pan-Caucasian 
Islamic state.  But Basayev had no other path, and would keep 
fighting until the end.  It had become a way of life for him. 
  Therein lay the danger:  Kadyrov's forces were nothing more 
than mercenaries.  That allowed Russia to control Kadyrov, 
since Moscow could cut off Kadyrov's funding at any time, and 
his fighters would disappear.  But it also meant that the 
fighters could defect to Basayev any time he offered them 
enough money.  For that reason, Khasbulatov believed Federal 
forces would have to stay in Chechnya for a long time to come. 
 
¶5. (C) Khasbulatov repeatedly called for international 
conferences in Groznyy -- on economic reconstruction, 
education, health, and environmental rehabilitation -- to 
focus and increase international aid as part of the healing 
process.  He believed the UN was "inert" on Chechnya, and 
said he had told Kofi Annan so himself.  He believed Chechnya 
needed more international attention, despite Russian policy 
that defines the issue as internal; Russian-backed 
"reconstruction" efforts were a sham, in his view. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  Khasbulatov, slight, handsome and courtly, 
sees himself as the elder statesman of the Chechen 
intelligentsia.  He railed against the "talentless," "empty" 
people, Russians and Chechens alike, to whom Moscow has over 
the years entrusted the solution of the Chechen problem.  He 
was especially scathing about Russia's post-Soviet security 
services, whom, he said, Basayev has penetrated.  He was 
equally unsparing in his criticism of late Chechen president 
Aslan Maskhadov.  Khasbulatov clearly believes the majority 
of the Chechen population thinks as he does and has no 
sympathy for either the pro-Russians or the insurgents.  The 
conferences he proposes could potentially be useful -- but if 
Russians are afraid to go to Chechnya, it is not likely that 
foreign conference-goers will be willing to go there, either. 
 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6839, AN ARRAY OF CIVIL SOCIETY EVENTS AROUND THE G8

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6839	2006-06-27 13:44	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1898
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6839/01 1781344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271344Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8197
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 006839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR RS
SUBJECT: AN ARRAY OF CIVIL SOCIETY EVENTS AROUND THE G8 
SUMMIT 
 
REF: MOSCOW 5998 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns.  Reasons: 1.4 (B/D). 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The menu of civil society events around the 
G8 Summit has taken shape, although a few uncertainties 
remain.  The main GOR-sponsored event, the so-called Civil G8 
to be held on July 3-4, has been supplemented with a human 
rights roundtable, which some independent activists view as a 
helpful Kremlin concession.  Nonetheless, activists are 
organizing a July 5 conference focused directly on human 
rights to further supplement the Civil G8.  The main 
independent civil society event will be the "Another Russia" 
forum on July 11-12, for which organizers have high hopes but 
about which some activists continue to harbor reservations. 
Plans for a meeting of global NGO leaders seem to have gone 
by the wayside, while the GOR agreed to allow what it 
describes as an "anti-globalist event" at a St. Petersburg 
stadium in an apparent effort to control potential 
protesters.  Plans are proceeding for a religious summit in 
Moscow on July 4-5.  Differences linger among independent 
activists but many seem at least fairly satisfied that the 
events surrounding the Summit will give them sufficient 
opportunity to air their views.  END SUMMARY. 
. 
SUPPLEMENTING THE CIVIL G8 ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (C) Although Presidential Council for Civil Society 
Institutions and Human Rights Chair Ella Pamfilova told the 
DCM that pulling together all elements of the Civil G8, the 
premier GOR-sponsored event surrounding the Summit (reftel), 
is a daunting task, plans for that event are proceeding well. 
 The Civil G8 is to take place July 3-4 in Moscow, and 
President Putin is expected to speak, perhaps at its closing 
session.  Organizers had originally planned to focus the 
proceedings primarily on the main Summit agenda items, and 
those remain high on the agenda, which includes roundtables 
on education, energy security, health issues and global 
economic issues, among others.  As Pamfilova had been hinting 
to us lately, however, human rights have now become a formal 
agenda item, with one of the conference's eight working 
groups to focus on that issue. 
 
¶3. (C) The Civil G8's human rights roundtable, formally to 
discuss subjects such as "Restrictions on and Undermining of 
Human Rights under the Flag of the War Against Terror, 
Including Armed Conflict Situations," is to include a range 
of international issues, ranging from Afghanistan and Iraq to 
Northern Ireland and Turkey, with Israel/Palestine also 
likely to be addressed.  Russia/Chechnya is also on that 
agenda, however, and the roundtable includes a number of 
independent Russian activists, including Memorial's Oleg 
Orlov and Grigoriy Shvedov, Center for Extreme Journalism's 
Oleg Panfilov and Human Rights Watch's Aleksandr Petrov. 
Demos Center's Tatyana Lokshina, who will also participate, 
told us June 27 that she was hopeful the roundtable would 
provide a useful forum to highlight human rights causes, and 
felt it important that independent activists take part to 
demonstrate that they seek to play a constructive role rather 
than an exclusively oppositionist one.  Others, however, 
remain convinced the event will only serve to legitimize 
Putin administration human rights policies while skirting 
over Russia's human rights problems. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Despite her hopefulness about the Civil G8, Lokshina 
is among a large group of activists who opted to organize an 
additional conference, on "Human Rights in Russia in the Year 
of Russia's Chairmanship of the G8 and Council of Europe," to 
be held in Moscow on July 5.  Such plans resulted because of 
fears that, although Chechnya is on the Civil G8 human rights 
roundtable's agenda, it will not receive sufficient attention 
given the range of other international issues.  The 
organizers also envision the July 5 event as a bridge between 
the Civil G8 and the "Another Russia" Forum, to be held about 
a week later.  The July 5 conference is to focus on issues 
such as abuse of Russia's legal system, limiting of personal 
and political freedoms, treatment of minorities, and 
international cooperation on promoting human rights in Russia. 
. 
"ANOTHER RUSSIA" TAKES CLEARER SHAPE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) United Civil Front head Garri Kasparov told us June 27 
that he was pleased with the progress in organizing the 
"Another Russia" forum, to be held in Moscow on July 11-12. 
The forum is to have sessions devoted to civil rights, 
"internal war," violence over society and nature, and 
relations between the state and society.  Kasparov was 
enthused at the high level of planned USG participation, and 
anticipated that a high-ranking Canadian legislator would 
 
MOSCOW 00006839  002 OF 003 
 
 
attend as well.  Expressing disappointment that Western 
European governments had reacted coolly to the organizers' 
invitations to send official participants, he remained 
hopeful for more positive news
from the Europeans.  On the 
afternoon of June 27, Interfax reported that the event would 
be sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy and 
George Soros' Open Society Institute. 
 
¶6. (C) Kasparov listed a host of Russia's leading opposition 
politicians as likely to attend, ranging from Duma Deputy 
Vladimir Ryzhkov and Union of Right Forces head Nikita Belykh 
to Rodina's Mikhail Delyagin.  He doubted that Yabloko head 
Grigoriy Yavlinskiy would take part, and said the organizers 
were leaning toward asking former Rodina leader Dmitriy 
Rogozin not to attend.  Kasparov also said it was uncertain 
if the Communist Party of the Russian Federation would send 
an official delegation, although many Communist members were 
sure to come.  In sum, Kasparov said that his hopes to bring 
together opposition politicians from across the political 
spectrum would be largely fulfilled. 
 
¶7. (C) We continue to hear grumbling from some independent 
activists who remain concerned that the event is overly 
political, and that this could end up hurting the broader 
civil society community.  Lokshina told us she intended to 
steer clear of the event for that reason, and Shvedov said he 
had refused an invitation to speak at it.  Anti-Defamation 
League Moscow office chief Aleksandr Akselrod made the same 
point, telling us on June 27 that an overly politicized event 
might hinder his office's work on tolerance and that the 
presence of Rodina people, among others, also caused him 
concern. 
 
¶8. (SBU) National Democratic Institute Russia Chief of Party 
Mary O'Hagan told us that in addition to attending, she was 
organizing training sessions for some participants, in order 
to take advantage of their presence in Moscow for the forum. 
The sessions, to be held both before and after the forum, 
would focus on NDI Russia's research and analysis of public 
attitudes toward politics, as well as discussion of how those 
attitudes affected political activism in Russia. 
. 
THE FATE OF OTHER OPPOSITION EVENTS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), in conjunction with 
other organizations, had hoped to hold a meeting of the heads 
of some thirty top international NGOs on the margins of the 
Summit.  WWF Russia head Igor Chestin told us June 26 that 
such an event was unlikely to take place because the GOR 
strongly opposed it.  We understand from our British contacts 
that plans are in the works for UK PM Blair's spouse to meet 
with some international NGO leaders, possibly from WWF and 
Human Rights Watch, on the margins of the Summit, with former 
British politician Paddy Ashdown also in attendance.  Our 
British interlocutors stressed that the British First Lady 
would attend only in an informal capacity, as a human rights 
activist, rather than in any formal role. 
 
¶10. (C) In a surprise move, the GOR approved the plans of For 
Human Rights NGO head Lev Ponomarev to hold a "Russian Social 
Forum 2006" in St. Petersburg on July 14-15.  The event is to 
draw together those who describe themselves as taking an 
uncompromising stance toward the Putin administration and who 
refuse to take part in other of the Summit-related civil 
society activities.  Ponomarev, who had previously held out 
little hope of getting GOR approval for his Social Forum, 
told us June 27 that he was amazed at the decision, which he 
only came to believe when he heard St. Petersburg Governor 
Valentina Matviyenko announce it publicly.  Matviyenko 
described it as the "anti-globalist event," Ponomarev told us 
wryly, and he speculated that the GOR had approved it to 
better control potentially disruptive elements, who could be 
kept contained at the Kirov Stadium in St. Petersburg where 
the Forum is to take place. 
. 
RELIGIOUS SUMMIT MOVES AHEAD 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In addition to the civil society activities, plans 
are in the works for other events.  Most prominent among 
these is a World Summit of Religious Leaders, to be convened 
by Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Patriarch Aleksey II and 
held in Moscow on July 3-5.  President Putin reportedly will 
address the conference.  Over one hundred representatives of 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism 
will attend, and will draw up a statement to present to the 
G8 heads of state.  Neither the Pope nor the Dalai Lama were 
invited.  Four cardinals are expected, including Cardinal 
McCarrick of Washington, D.C.  Rabbi Arthur Schneier is also 
among those coming from the U.S.  Christian Orthodoxy's four 
 
MOSCOW 00006839  003 OF 003 
 
 
Apostolic Patriarchies (Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople 
and Jerusalem) will send low level representatives because 
they see the event as a public relations exercise designed to 
promote the ROC's claim to leadership of world Orthodoxy, 
according to resident Bishop of Antioch Niphon.  While the 
Russian organizers had hoped the Archbishop of Canterbury 
would attend, our UK Embassy interlocutor told us that was 
not likely.  Protestant Bishop Sergey Ryakhovskiy, head of 
the Russian Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, told us 
June 27 that by all indications, participation among leading 
U.S. Protestant figures would be disappointing. 
. 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Differences continue to linger within the independent 
civil society community about how to proceed, notably whether 
to take part in the Civil G8 and the "Another Russia" forum. 
Our general sense, though, is that many activists would 
acknowledge that the range of events surrounding the Summit 
offer at least a reasonable opportunity to express their 
views.  Much will now depend on whether the activists emerge 
having reinforced their image as a divided camp or as a 
vibrant and positive force. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6820, DFM YAKOVENKO SAYS MOSCOW WELCOMES FRANK

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6820	2006-06-27 13:05	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1856
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6820/01 1781305
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271305Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8169
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006820 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL RS
SUBJECT: DFM YAKOVENKO SAYS MOSCOW WELCOMES FRANK 
DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 
 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
 Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a meeting with a visiting delegation 
from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
June 24, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Yakovenko: 
 
-- Welcomed frank discussion of Russia's human rights record, 
emphasizing that his ministry routinely facilitated visits by 
foreign delegations and special rapporteurs; 
 
-- Said he was personally pleased that Russians were winning 
cases (and monetary settlements) at the European Court of 
Human Rights, as that would force correction of weaknesses in 
the domestic Russian system; 
 
-- Asserted that the number of "hate crimes" against ethnic 
and religious minorities had not increased in Russia in 
recent years, despite media reports that suggested the 
contrary; 
 
-- Said the MFA had taken a lead role within the GOR in 
ensuring that the recently enacted law governing NGO activity 
met international standards; and 
 
-- Supported creation of the UN Human Rights Council but 
hoped it could avoid becoming politicized or engaged in 
"double standards."  END SUMMARY. 
. 
============================ 
RUSSIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 
============================ 
 
¶2.  (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Yakovenko told a 
visiting delegation from the U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom (USCIRF) June 24 that Russia welcomed frank 
discussion on its human rights record.  (NOTE:  Septel 
discusses the Commission's meeting with Federal Registration 
Service head Sergey Movchan.)  Yakovenko, whose duties 
include oversight of Russia's relations with the UN and 
humanitarian affairs, including coordination with NGOs 
involved in promoting human rights and civil society 
development, assured the USCIRF delegation that human rights 
and religious freedom were top GOR priorities.  He said the 
MFA, in collaboration with the office of Human Rights 
Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, routinely coordinated visits to 
Russia by officials like Doudou Diene, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Racism, who had just concluded a visit last 
week.  The Ministry also worked closely with the Council of 
Europe (COE) and regularly hosted briefings for NGO 
representatives (approximately every 1-2 months) to explain 
official policies or discuss specific issues like the 
recently enacted law governing NGO activity. 
 
¶3.  (C) Yakovenko's personal view was that the number of 
cases involving abuse of ethnic or religious minorities has 
remained fairly constant in recent years, despite several 
disturbing incidents in Moscow and other large cities.  In 
his view, increased media coverage -- which was a "good 
thing" -- had led to the perception that attacks against 
minorities had increased.  Yakovenko insisted that animosity 
against ethnic and religious minorities was not a strong 
sentiment in Russian society, although he acknowledged that 
attitudes differed in some regions of the country.  In any 
case, it was a situation that the GOR could not allow to get 
out of hand because it could affect the peace and stability 
of Russia's multi-ethnic society.  President Putin had 
addressed the issue on several occasions.  Yakovenko said he 
was confident that with the help of the Duma (many of whose 
deputies were members of ethnic and religious minorities), 
along with the monitoring roles of the Public Chamber, human 
rights NGOs, and the media, the situation would remain under 
control and gradually improve.  He added that the 
government's institutional response to incidents of abuse had 
become more efficient.  In this respect, Yakovenko said he 
was pleased personally to see that many Russians, including 
Chechens, had won decisions against the GOR in the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR).  The Government was being 
ordered to pay compensation to some claimants, which he 
thought would encourage better performance on human rights 
issues by governmental organizations.  Yakovenko noted that 
the number of cases involving Russia before the ECHR was 
currently around 6000. 
. 
======= 
NGO LAW 
======= 
 
¶4.  (C) With respect to the NGO law that went into effect in 
April, Yakovenko asserted that the MFA had taken a lead role 
in ensuring that it met international standards.  Among other 
 
MOSCOW 00006820  002 OF 002 
 
 
things, the Ministry had voiced its concern that the law be 
applied fairly and objectively.  The MFA had also arranged 
for officials from the Ministry of Justice and other GOR 
agencies involved in the law's implementation to consult with 
COE experts in Strasbourg.  Yakovenko added that a Russian 
NGO had been commissioned to draft a report comparing 
provisions of the new law with those of other European 
countries, which he promised to make available to the USCIRF. 
 He also maintained that the Public Chamber would monitor the 
law's implementation.  Ultimately, he said, individual NGOs 
could appeal negative decisions by the GOR's Federal 
Registration Service (FRS) in court, and potentially to the 
E
CHR.  Yakovenko acknowledged, however, that the GOR, and the 
FRS in particular, could have clarified prospective 
procedures earlier and more transparently to lessen anxiety 
among NGOs. 
. 
======================= 
UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
======================= 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 
Yakovenko said Russia welcomed the creation of the new body 
but was disappointed that the U.S. was not currently 
represented.  He thought the U.S. approach in not immediately 
seeking election to the body was wrong, since the UNHRC was a 
"serious organization that would deal with serious issues." 
It needed the U.S. voice.  Yakovenko said the GOR hoped the 
new body would avoid becoming politicized and refrain from 
engaging in "double standards."  He added that the UNHRC 
should retain some of the procedures of the former 
Commission, including welcoming NGO participation in some of 
the Council's activities.  Referring to the first session of 
the UNHRC in Geneva, Yakovenko observed that the Non-Aligned 
Movement had already sought -- as it had often tried with the 
Commission -- to focus the Council's attention on economic 
and social rights, partly to deflect attention from 
traditional human rights.  He was optimistic that the 
Council's members would establish a solid structure and 
direction for the new organization prior to the close of the 
first session on June 30. 
. 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶6.  (C) Yakovenko went out of his way to meet with the USCIRF 
delegation on a Saturday in a darkened MFA building, and 
devoted over an hour to the meeting.  He was upbeat 
throughout the meeting and eager to present the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs -- and Russia -- in a positive light. 
Although we have little doubt that the Ministry did what it 
could to ensure that the NGO law met basic international 
standards, the chief concern pertains to how fairly and 
impartially the law will be applied, especially with regard 
to politically sensitive organizations.  Moreover, the 
reality is that the MFA carries relatively little weight in 
Russia's domestic policy establishment, where the extent and 
nature of the NGO law's implementation will be determined. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6815, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RUSSIA: WHICH WAY TO THE MIDDLE

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6815	2006-06-27 11:10	2011-08-30 01:44	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY	Embassy Moscow

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RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3147
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RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 006815 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR GRAHAM, MCKIBBEN 
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/MACK/RISD/JBROUGHER/MEDWARDS 
TREASURY FOR LEE, COX, BAKER 
STATE FOR EB/SULLIVAN, EUR/KRAMER,WARLICK,HOLMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON SOCI EINV ELAB EFIN PGOV RS
SUBJECT: SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RUSSIA: WHICH WAY TO THE MIDDLE 
CLASS? 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 2655 
     ¶B. 05 MOSCOW 13444 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 6334 
     ¶D. 05 MOSCOW 5252 
     ¶E. MOSCOW 1082 
     ¶F. MOSCOW 3356 
 
MOSCOW 00006815  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE 
USG CHANNELS. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: With real average incomes up 66 percent 
over the past five years, Russia's middle class has begun to 
emerge from the shadows -- after all, someone other than the 
mega rich has to be buying all those TV sets, cars and cell 
phones.  Understanding that the movement is now well 
underway, we asked ourselves two questions.  For those not 
yet firmly rooted in the economic middle of the country, what 
might we expect looking forward?  The path up the economic 
ladder may be barred for many -- low-wage civil servants, the 
geographically isolated, and those trapped in a dependency 
mindset.  Some observers worry that the economy is not 
creating enough new professional jobs or providing sufficient 
space for entrepreneurial activity to allow real social 
mobility out of the lower-middle class.  Nonetheless, there 
is clear evidence that the benefits of Russian growth are 
spreading, and intergenerational mindset changes appear to be 
setting a positive trend line for the future. 
 
2, (SBU) The second, and no less important question, is what 
can we expect from this group in political terms?  Right now, 
Russia's emerging middle class is hardly a coherent political 
force -- and what politics they do espouse cannot be called 
uniformly progressive (from a social perspective) or liberal 
(from an economic view).  But, while there is deep apathy 
about electoral democracy, observers here do note a budding 
political consciousness.  Attitudes within the middle class 
about the rights of citizens relative to the government are 
evolving, and people are increasingly willing to assert their 
interests and to push back against abuses of the state.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Much ink has been spilled on the size and 
characteristics of Russia's middle class.  A wide menu of 
definitions are available, with an equally wide divergence in 
assessments of middle class strength, most now solidly 
ranging from one-fifth to one-third of the population.  As 
Tatyana Maleva, Director of the Independent Institute for 
Social Policy, has said, "The phenomenon is multifaceted, 
contradictory, and complex."  Questions of definition or size 
aside, the economic and political forces at play help us to 
discern the trends in the middle class's development going 
forward. 
. 
========================= 
A) THE ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE 
========================= 
 
¶4. (SBU) Growing prosperity in Russia is bringing expansion 
of economic freedom, the alleviation of poverty, and an 
attendant growth in markets for U.S. goods and services.  A 
middle class worthy of the name, of course, should be more 
than formerly poor people with more cash and goods in their 
pockets -- it should display certain economic values, such as 
faith that investment now, e.g., in their own or their 
child's education or health, will yield a better future for 
themselves and their progeny.  From an economic point of 
view, we want to see more Russians given more opportunities 
to realize their economic dreams, in the hope that this will 
translate into accelerated investment in human capital and a 
cycle of continued growth and prosperity. 
 
¶5. (SBU) From that perspective, what are the trends?  Russian 
GDP has grown at an average rate of around seven percent the 
last seven years.  Poverty continues to decline: while most 
statistics suggest poverty has dropped to 15-20% of the 
populace, it is worth noting that the best household survey 
 
MOSCOW 00006815  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
available on Russia (the formerly USG-funded University of 
North Carolina's Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS)) places 2005 poverty levels at 7.8 percent, down from 
38.1 percent in 1998.  Real average incomes have gone up 66 
percent from 2000 to 2005.  Purchasing power, especially 
given real ruble appreciation, has surged as well.  According 
to RLMS, Russians spent 43 percent more on electronics and 
durables in 2005 vs. 2000, and 36 percent more on services 
and recreation over that time.  Twenty-one percent of 
households now own a computer, up
from four percent in 2000. 
According to Levada Center polling, forty-five percent of 
Russians now own cellular phones, up from 2 percent in 2001 
(and most that own one actually own two, given the near 100% 
cell-phone penetration rates found in Russia).  Car sales, 
considered by many to be a good proxy for middle class 
growth, jumped 106% in dollar terms from 2002 to 2005, 
according to PricewaterhouseCoopers (ref A). 
. 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR STILL 
A DRAG ON UPWARD MOBILITY 
========================= 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite this strong prima facie evidence of growing 
wealth, some observers worry that this rising tide is not 
lifting all boats.  They argue that the majority of Russians 
-- the 50 to 70 percent of the population who are not poor 
yet not quite middle class (referred to by many as the "lower 
middle class" for lack of a better term) -- have seen too 
little benefit.  Poverty levels are down, they say, largely 
because of increased state transfer payments to Russia's 
poorest, while those in the middle class -- the entrepreneurs 
and professionals already plugged into the modern economy -- 
are becoming better and better off as the economy expands. 
But those in between may face constraints that will keep them 
from climbing easily into the middle class, several contacts 
told us. 
. 
¶7. (SBU) Low-paid government workers constitute a big chunk 
of this immobile lower middle class.  According to Mikhail 
Chernysh of the Institute of Sociology, approximately 20 
percent of the Russian population falls into this category. 
In fact, many teachers and health care workers, part of the 
bedrock of the middle class in the west, only recently 
climbed out of poverty when the state began raising public 
sector wages in 1999 (ref B). 
 
¶8. (SBU) What are the prospects for low-wage civil servants 
taking the next step into the middle class?  According to 
Ksenia Yudayeva of the Center for Economic and Fiscal 
Research, a fair number already have: "Everybody knows 
government workers get private payments.  Teachers get money 
for tutoring and people normally give doctors extra cash." 
Those with skills in demand have found a growing market for 
their services.  "The best doctors live well here," Natalia 
Tikhonova of the Higher School of Economics, told us. 
Unfortunately, she said, too many state employees "have not 
received retraining in 20 years."  According to a Ministry of 
Health study, 60 percent of doctors only prescribe from a 
limited set of 40 medicines.  As they cannot be considered 
highly qualified, their skills are simply not in demand, and 
their wages reflect this. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Still, with President Putin's new spending focus on 
health care and education as National Priority Projects, 
formal salaries in these sectors may be rising regardless of 
the quality of services provided.  Our contacts expressed 
doubts that such increases would be widespread and 
significant enough to lift very many into the middle class. 
Maleva worries that increased salaries without meaningful 
health care or education reform will only serve to stoke 
inflation.  Nonetheless, she acknowledged that in a year it 
could be the case that wage hikes for some of these workers, 
who already display many typical middle class values, will 
raise their incomes to middle class levels as well. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) It would be more encouraging if there were 
 
MOSCOW 00006815  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
significant numbers of civil servants leaving for 
opportunities in the private sector, where the path to the 
middle class may be less obstructed.  Unfortunately, the 
trends seem to be going in the opposite direction.  According 
to Yevgeniy Gavrilenkov, Chief Economist at Troika Dialogue, 
over the past three years the number of Russian bureaucrats 
has risen 17 percent, while labor productivity in the 
government sector continued to fall.  In effect, the 
government has been employing more people in positions with 
limited upward mobility rather than promoting their entry 
into the more dynamic private sector labor market. 
 
LABOR MOBILITY LESS AND LESS A CONSTRAINT 
========================================= 
 
¶11. (SBU) Limited geographic mobility is often mentioned as a 
constraint on social mobility.  "Russians aren't like 
Americans -- we don't like to move all the time," Maleva told 
us, reflecting a widely held belief.  A lack of information 
about job markets and housing (and a lack of affordable 
housing itself) make Russians less likely to take their labor 
to where the jobs are, we heard.  However, according to 
Rostislav Kapelyusnikov, Deputy Director of the Center for 
Labor Studies at the Higher School of Economics, that 
constraint has been overblown.  He argues that, once 
distances between migration points are accounted for, 
Russians actually are as geographically mobile as western 
Europeans.  According to Tikhonova, although individual 
Russians do face challenges in relocating, it is clear at a 
macro level that people are moving -- only about one-third of 
Russians are still living where they were born, she told us. 
"If a labor market develops, people will move there as if 
sucked by a vacuum." 
 
¶12. (SBU) Unquestionably, however, some people are still 
being left behind, many of them in depressed, remote rural 
areas.  According to Yudayeva, it is not simply that they 
face migration constraints.  "There are entire rural 
populations suffering from chronic alcoholism.  Many of these 
people may have turned to alcohol due to economic hardship, 
but that does not mean they will then turn away from it when 
there is economic recovery.  It's a one-way street."  For 
many members of the lower middle class, their own dependency 
mindset remained the most significant obstacle.  As Tikhonova 
put it, "They just haven't adapted, and don't believe they 
can do anything with their lives." 
 
¶13. (SBU) No one should be surprised if growth is somewhat 
unevenly distributed and some demographic segments benefit 
less.  "Clearly there will be some who can't integrate -- 
just like in the west," Yudayeva told us.  However, she does 
believe that the benefits of economic expansion have been 
broadly dispersed.  The latest RLMS results support that 
conclusion.  From 2004 to 2005, real income grew by 12 to 18 
percent for each of the lowest four household income 
quintiles. 
. 
GROWING THE MIDDLE CLASS 
======================== 
 
¶14. (SBU) So, what will determine the prospects for continued 
growth of this middle class?  Our contacts site three key 
predictors: education, economic growth, and the changing 
mindset of young people.  Maleva believes that one half of 
the 50-70 percent of the population in between the poor and 
the middle class is close enough to the middle class in 
attitudes, attributes and assets that it could join its ranks 
in the coming decade, under the right co
nditions.  Of 
particular importance, she believes, would be reforms to 
improve the quality and market-relevance of higher education. 
 Gavrilenkov agreed: "The best thing they could do would be 
to boost education spending from the current three to four 
percent to around eight percent, like Denmark and Sweden did 
in the 1970s.  They need to prepare a new generation." 
 
¶15. (SBU) Tikhonova, who currently places the size of the 
 
MOSCOW 00006815  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
middle class between 20 and 33 percent, believes its ranks 
could swell to 40% in 10 or 15 years if economic growth 
generates enough professional-level jobs and creates a 
favorable climate for entrepreneurs.  Those near the top of 
the lower middle class will climb up into the spaces 
provided.  (The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 
in fact, predicts that 60 percent of the population could be 
middle class over that time frame.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) Longer term, changes in mindset will likely raise 
that 40 percent ceiling, Tikhonova said.  "Younger people are 
very different, more adaptable."  As Yudayeva sees it, 
adaptability is largely generational, and those least 
adaptable will gradually disappear, to be replaced by that 
younger crowd without the same dependency mindset.  If the 
economy continues to grow, she was "very optimistic" that the 
middle class would grow with it.  The pace of that expansion 
may slow if, as Gavrilenkov said, "the period of 'easy' 
growth in Russia is coming to an end," (now that spare 
capacities have been utilized, and oil price growth may 
decelerate or even reverse course in the coming years). 
Thus, restructuring and reform will become increasingly 
important to sustain high growth.  But what growth there is 
should open the way for more Russians to move up a rung or 
two on the economic ladder. 
. 
========================== 
B) THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
========================== 
 
¶17. (SBU) The long-term expectation among most liberal 
observers is that a thriving Russian middle class will become 
a progressive political force as well -- one that eschews the 
extremes of the right and left, advocating for rule of law, 
property rights and predictability to secure its gains. 
Here, though, the picture is still mixed at present.  As 
Maleva explained, "the Russian middle class is progressive 
only in terms of economic behavior, not political 
preferences."  Right now, their preferences are as diverse as 
the general population, and, if anything, they are more 
nationalistic than most, Chernysh notes. 
 
¶18. (SBU) They Russian middle class has also proven prone to 
populism.  Svetlana Misikhina of the World Bank told us, 
"Everybody is interested in taking money from the oligarchs 
and putting them in prison.  Everyone favors redistributing 
the stabilization fund to all.  These are not middle class 
ideas."  Mikhail Dmitriyev, head of the Gref Center, says 
such attitudes have been on the increase in recent years. 
"Five years ago, public opinion polls and focus groups showed 
that 22 to 25 percent of the population wanted continued 
market reforms.  But this group has disappeared into 
insignificance.  Now a consensus has formed in favor of 
large-scale renationalization.  Any campaign for reform would 
fall on deaf ears," he told us. 
. 
¶19. (SBU) However, such swings in middle class opinion may 
have more to do with a tendency to agree with the position of 
the government than with emerging core values.  Five years 
ago, the propaganda extolled the virtues of reform.  Now, the 
government wants to separate itself from the Yeltsin years, 
the propaganda is all about reestablishing Russia as a great 
power, and the electorate has fallen in line.  "The group 
that wanted reforms for its own reasons has always been 
smaller," according to Yudayeva. 
. 
A BUDDING LIBERAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
=============================== 
 
¶20. (SBU) Of the small group that might genuinely be 
interested in reform, perhaps even fewer are interested in 
traditional political activism to meet those ends. 
Nonetheless, contacts did believe that some form of political 
consciousness is growing within the middle class ranks. 
According to Tikhonova, Russians are developing an 
appreciation for rights, "but not in the western sense." 
 
MOSCOW 00006815  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
Rather, they increasingly feel they have a right "to indicate 
their interests, and to protect those interests against 
bureaucrats."  This tracks with our own findings in regional 
capitals (ref C). 
 
¶21. (SBU) Yudayeva also believes that a form of political 
liberalism is growing.  For example, she recalled the 
reaction to the military hazing case of Andrey Sychev, in 
which the young soldier was brutalized in a hazing incident 
(ref E).  "In the Soviet Union we never would have learned 
about this.  There has been a change in mentality about the 
balance of rights between people and the government," she 
said.  In March, this changing dynamic was on display again, 
when motorists' protests across Russia helped overturn the 
conviction and prison sentence of a driver whose only crime 
was being sideswiped by a speeding black Mercedes containing 
a regional governor (who died in the crash) (ref F). 
 
¶22. (SBU) As American Bernard Sucher, Chairman of Alfa 
Capital and long time Russia-watcher, sees it, the expansion 
of the Russian middle class is slowly and steadily altering 
the dynamic between the government and the governed.  "With 
each day, more and more people in Russia are gaining an 
economic stake in the system, and long-term, they'll force it 
to respond to their needs.  Democrats are being created every 
day," he believes.  It may be some way from Jeffersonian 
democracy, but Sucher suggested that many observers lack 
perspective about how far Russia has come.  "The genie's out 
of the bottle -- the Russian government can't go back to 
restricting property, or travel....  The powers that be are 
scared of crossing these lines." 
. 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶23. (SBU) Russia's rising tide may not be lifting all boats, 
but it is lifting the boats of those who have chosen to adapt 
to modern economic realities.  It is no surprise that some 
are adapting better than others, but time is on the side of 
Russia's youth.  But while "Russians Slowly And Steadily Join 
The Middle Class" may seem an uncompelling headline, it does 
capture the central trend at play here.  Political 
consciousness of the sort typically associated in the west 
with a middle class has undeniably taken root, but expecting 
it to blossom into political activism at this point, in this 
political environment, may be too much to ask.  Nonetheless, 
the trend is clear, and it is hard to imagine that the haves 
in this country will ultimately behave any differently than 
their counterparts in other modernizing so
cieties.  They will 
eventually want a voice and vote in how their country is run 
and their tax dollars spent. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6812, U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

WikiLeaks Link

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6812	2006-06-27 07:05	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1288
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6812/01 1780705
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270705Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8148
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 006812 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL RS
SUBJECT: U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
MEETS WITH FEDERAL REGISTRATION SERVICE DIRECTOR 
 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine 
for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 23 the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) met with Federal 
Registration Service (FRS) Director Sergey Movchan to discuss 
the expected impact of the recently adopted and not yet 
implemented NGO law on religious organizations.  Movchan 
upheld the GOR's right to conduct inspections and even ban 
programs and transfers of money to religious organizations, 
but insisted that the FRS would follow strict and 
non-discriminatory procedures in implementing the law.  He 
asserted that concerns over the amount of paperwork for 
annual reports were unfounded and that small organizations 
would not need additional personnel or expertise to complete 
the requirements.  He proposed that the Embassy and FRS work 
together, holding roundtables or seminars with NGOs and 
religious organizations to review the law in detail to 
address questions and misunderstandings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) USCIRF Chairman Michael Cromartie, Commissioner 
Richard Land, Executive Director Joseph Crapa, and staff 
members Tad Stahnke, David Dettoni, and Robert Blitt met June 
23 with Sergey Movchan, Director of the Federal Registration 
Service; Viktor Korolev, head of the Department for 
Registration of Religious Organizations; and Aleksey 
Zhafyarov, head of the Department for Political Party, 
Public, Religious, and Other Organizations. 
. 
LAYING OUT THE FEDERAL REGISTRATION SERVICE ROLE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (C) President Putin created the FRS by decree on October 
13, 2004, and it became operational on January 1, 2005.  All 
central and regional registration functions that belonged to 
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) now belong to the FRS, Movchan 
said, although organizationally it remains under the umbrella 
of the MOJ.  Movchan said the FRS complement of 30,000 
employees work in departments ranging from registering 
property to providing notary services.  The FRS plans to 
expand by 12,000 employees across all departments in 
2007-2008.  The department that registers public 
organizations, including NGOs and religious and political 
organizations, currently employs about 2000 people, but in 
October 2006 it will add 1750 workers.  Employees working on 
registering public organizations are located throughout 
Russia, but Movchan noted that some regions are more active 
and have more FRS workers than others.  He cited FRS weekly 
monitoring reports showing that since the new NGO law came 
into force, the FRS had received "only" 3000 new registration 
applications for all categories of public organizations, 
approximately ten percent of which were rejected. 
 
¶4. (C) Stahnke mentioned that even with an additional 1750 
workers, 3750 seemed like a low number to monitor an 
estimated 500,000 registered public organizations, especially 
taking into account the new requirement that foreign NGOs 
would have to submit reports every quarter.  Movchan 
responded that many public organizations were not "live," and 
only an estimated 100,000 were actually active.  He believed 
the FRS could handle the increased reporting requirements for 
foreign NGOs, but would re-examine staffing needs next year 
to see if another increase might be necessary.  In terms of 
religious organizations, Movchan said that approximately 
22,500 were registered, fifty-five percent of which belonged 
to the Russian Orthodox Church, twenty percent were 
associated with Protestant denominations, and a little less 
than twenty percent were Islamic.  Every day the FRS went 
through its list and found two or three "dead" organizations 
for removal.  Next year, Movchan added, the FRS would be able 
to see more clearly how many public organizations were really 
active when they submit their annual reports pursuant to the 
new regulations.  Saying that the government did not intend 
to impose overly strict control, Movchan claimed that the FRS 
would not read every annual report from cover to cover 
because it expected the reports to be fair and truthful. 
Instead, it would randomly select ones to be read. 
 
¶5. (C) Asked if the FRS departments for property or legal 
registration assisted religious groups that were having 
problems with obtaining worship space, Movchan explained that 
when it came it to providing land or restituting property, 
roadblocks mainly lay with municipal governments; the FRS 
could support religious groups and assist them once they 
obtained property, but in general the FRS did not have 
jurisdiction to become involved in anything other than 
registration.  He said the FRS was often in contact with 
Protestant Bishop Sergey Ryakhovskiy, head of the Russian 
Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith, and that 
registration issues with Protestant groups were improving. 
. 
 
MOSCOW 00006812  002 OF 003 
 
 
THE FRS AND THE NGO LAW 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.
 (C) On the controversial NGO law, Movchan emphasized that 
every government had the right to regulate NGOs in its own 
way, and the West was applying a double-standard to Russia. 
He noted that before the new NGO law was passed, there were 
two categories of public organizations -- non-commercial 
organizations, over which there had been practically no 
control, and public organizations, including religious 
groups, which had over ten years of experience with 
monitoring by authorities.  This uneven situation had been 
corrected by the new law so that now all public organizations 
would be monitored.  He added that the primary law for 
religious organizations remained the 1997 law on such 
organizations.  Only a few provisions of the new NGO law 
applied to religious organization, and the FRS was limited to 
conducting inspections only in so far as they pertained to an 
organization's activities as stated in its charter. 
 
¶7. (C) Movchan stressed that under the new NGO law, the FRS 
had the right to attend a public organization's events as an 
observer, but only "when the topic was common to all legal 
entities, for example, meetings dealing with the budget, 
obtaining property, or other operational matters."  If the 
event concerned internal issues such as the goals, mission, 
or charter of the organization, the FRS could attend only if 
invited. (NOTE: Movchan had trouble explaining the 
distinction between the two when pressed for more details.) 
He observed that even ROC Metropolitans Kirill and Klement 
had expressed concern that the FRS would be able to 
participate in meetings of the Holy Synod and had needed 
reassurance that the FRS would not attend such events without 
an invitation. 
 
¶8. (C) Movchan insisted that the implementing instructions 
governing the FRS's inspection procedures had been written 
but not yet approved by the MOJ or published in the official 
Rossisskaya Gazeta.  According to the current draft of the 
implementing instructions, the Public Organization Department 
would be required to inform the FRS director in writing that 
an organization would be inspected, outlining which documents 
the inspection team wanted to examine and what events it 
planned to attend.  The FRS would then send written 
notification at least one week prior to the visit to the 
designated organization.  Movchan said the organization had 
the right to negotiate the dates of the visit if, for 
example, its leader was not in town or the documents were not 
available.  When conducting an inspection, FRS 
representatives would be required to follow the Criminal and 
Administrative Codes and could not violate the rights of 
believers or religious services.  Movchan said the FRS would 
write a report after the visit and send three copies to the 
head of the organization.  If the organization did not agree 
with the inspection results, it could specify its objections 
on one of the copies and send it back to the FRS.  The FRS 
would consider the objections, but if it still found 
violations, the organization would receive a written warning 
and be given three months to fix the problem.  If the 
organization did not agree with the results of the inspection 
or the inspectors' behavior, they could write a complaint or 
initiate a law suit.  Movchan gave the example of an FRS 
employee who violated the rights of believers during an 
inspection, was found culpable, and had his yearly bonus 
revoked as a result. 
. 
HANDLING OF FOREIGN-FUNDED NGOS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) When Stahnke asked about the article in the law 
regarding the FRS's right to ban programs and transfers of 
money to NGOs that received funding from foreign sources, 
Movchan responded that this particular article was aimed at 
protecting Russia's national interests and that the wording 
was taken almost directly from the 1981 U.N. resolution on 
how to combat the export of revolutions.  Movchan said there 
were currently no implementing guidelines planned for 
handling the banning of programs or transfer of money; 
decisions would be based on court decisions and legal 
precedents.  He added that once the FRS gained more 
experience with implementing this part of the NGO law, 
perhaps it would reconsider and develop normative acts to 
regulate banning.  When deciding to ban a program or transfer 
of money, the FRS would have to give a specific reason for 
the ban, which the organization could appeal in the courts. 
Blitt mentioned that a court case might be prohibitively 
expensive for a small organization.  Movchan responded that 
if the defendant was the government, there would be no cost 
to the organization, since regardless of the decision, there 
was no cost involved in suing the government. 
. 
 
MOSCOW 00006812  003 OF 003 
 
 
CONCERNS OVER PAPERWORK EXAGGERATED 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Blitt mentioned that officials of some small 
religious organizations with whom the Commission had met had 
expressed concern over the amount of reporting they would be 
required to do under the new law.  Many organizations thought 
that they could not afford lawyers and accountants to assist 
with the paperwork.  Movchan responded that he did not think 
additional assistance was needed to fill out the forms.  The 
FRS had not received any complaints from organizations that 
had registered since the law came into force in April.  He 
mentioned that the FRS was cooperating with the Public 
Chamber to publish recommendations on how to fill out these 
forms.  If there was a minor mistake or omission in the 
paperwork, Movchan continued, the FRS would not go after the 
organization.  The law was new and daunting for both 
organizations and the FRS, so the FRS would not be 
particularly strict concerning the first annual report under 
the new regulations (in April 2007).  Movchan said the goal 
was to force public organizations into financial 
transparency, and that those NGOs that were complaining about 
the amount of paperwork likely had something to hide.  In 
particular, he said that foreign-funded NGOs would have to 
show how their grants were spent, and that since some 
foreign-funded NGOs were using their grants for salaries, 
rather than for the programs the grants were intended to 
subsidize, they did not like the idea of a more detailed 
report. 
 
¶11. (C) Movchan concluded by proposing to continue the 
dialogue with the Embassy, NGOs, and religious organizations 
concerning details of the law's provisions and its 
implementation.  He said he was willing to hold seminars or 
roundtables at the Embassy or another venue. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6762, OUT AS PROCURATOR GENERAL, USTINOV RETURNS AS

WikiLeaks Link

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Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW6762.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6762	2006-06-26 13:12	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO0568
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6762/01 1771312
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261312Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8099
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014 
TAGS: PGOV RS
SUBJECT: OUT AS PROCURATOR GENERAL, USTINOV RETURNS AS 
JUSTICE MINISTER 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 6547 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 6268 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 5934 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine, 
 for reasons 1.4 (B & D) 
 
¶1. (U)  On June 23 President Putin nominated Vladimir Ustinov 
-- who on June 2 had been removed from his prior position as 
Procurator General -- to be Minister of Justice.  In his new 
position Ustinov succeeds former Justice Minister Yuriy 
Chayka, who on June 19 was named as Ustinov's successor as 
Procurator General.  In effect, Ustinov and Chayka have 
simply exchanged jobs, and some journalists have concluded 
that the changes carry less political significance than had 
initially been believed at the time of Ustinov's removal as 
Procurator General. 
 
¶2. (C)  Most Russian analysts do not share that conclusion. 
While commentators here are continuing publicly and privately 
to mine the appointments for insights into the succession 
process, the primary conclusions currently being drawn here 
include that: 
 
-  The changes reemphasize that at least at the current phase 
of the succession process, Putin retains his role as (in the 
words of the Center for Political Technologies) "the demiurge 
of Russian politics."  None of Putin's three decisions -- to 
remove Ustinov as Procurator General, to appoint Chayka in 
his place, and to appoint Ustinov as Justice Minister -- was 
widely expected, and Putin has not felt constrained to 
provide even post-factum explanations for any of the moves. 
Some speculate that as the succession process moves forward 
and its uncertainties drive increasingly sharp competition 
among members of Putin's entourage, he will repeatedly need 
to act in a similar fashion to discipline "competitive 
excesses" and restore the balance he wants to maintain. 
 
-  The job of Minister of Justice is a reponsible and 
respected position, but in terms of power it is a clear step 
down in the Russian system from the Procurator General, who 
has traditionally had far more levers at his disposal (as 
figures from Gusinskiy and Berezovskiy to Khodorkovskiy can 
confirm from their personal experience).  Almost no one here 
would dispute that Ustinov has been taken down a peg by 
Putin, and that by extension the "siloviki" group of which 
Ustinov has been a leading figure has also taken a hit.  That 
impression is only strengthened by the two-week delay during 
which Putin kept Ustinov twisting slowly, slowly in the wind 
before announcing his new assignment.  It is not clear 
whether Putin's failure to immediately announce Ustinov's 
follow-on assignment was part of a disciplining process, or 
whether internal forces within the leadership group had any 
influence on Ustinov's eventual nomination as Justice 
Minister. 
 
-  By concluding the episode with the naming of Ustinov as 
Minister of Justice (rather than as a Presidential 
Representative in some remote area of Russia or as a diplomat 
abroad), Putin has sent the message that Ustinov had not 
irreparably blotted his copybook.  While taken down a peg, he 
remains a member of Putin's team.  Some commentators regard 
this as confirmation (a) that Putin tends to display loyalty 
to his team and is loathe to fire any team member outright, 
(b) that the balance that Putin wanted to restore among the 
competing groups required only a measured take-down of a 
silovik, not an outright purge, and/or (c) that Putin's team 
in fact has a very thin bench, with few quality replacements 
available to step up into major assignments, forcing Putin 
periodically to recycle familiar faces into new positions, 
rather than bring in fresh blood. 
 
-  Russia is a country of weak institutions, and the key 
relationships are personal, not institutional.  It is not 
inevitable that the Justice Ministry under Ustinov will be as 
peripheral an institution as it was under Chayka, or that the 
Procuracy General under Chayka will be as strong as it was 
under Ustinov.  It will be at least initially assumed, 
however, that any politically relevant assertiveness of the 
Procuracy under Chayka will be steered directly by Putin, 
whereas many believed that Ustinov was at times pursuing his 
own agenda or that of the "siloviki" corporately in his 
actions as Procurator General. 
 
-  How vigorously Ustinov may try to remain a leading 
political figure and to expand the influence of his new 
Ministry will depend in part on how he has read the meaning 
of Putin's action.  If he understands that he has in essence 
been told to lower his profile and look more directly to 
Putin for instructions, he may remain for some time in the 
background.  The commentator Aleskey Zudin remarked that "if 
 
MOSCOW 00006762  002 OF 002 
 
 
Ustinov doesn't lower his level of political activity, that 
will mean that Putin is losing political strength." 
 
-  Since the Justice Minstry has responsibilities, inter 
alia, for the registration of political parties -- a 
significant area of influence as Russia approaches the 2007 
Duma elections and 2008 succession -- as well as of NGOs and 
religious organizations, many are already concerned that he 
may impose his own views on those new responsibilities. 
Independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov commented, h
owever, 
that the Justice Ministry under Chayka was already 
politicized, and Ustinov's appointment would likely bring few 
changes.   A Kommersant article reported that a source close 
to the Kremlin did not rule out that Ustinov's new 
responsibilities related to political parties might lead to 
increased tensions between two Presidential Administration 
deputy heads:  Vladislav Surkov, who takes the lead on most 
issues relating to political parties, and Igor Sechin, who is 
generally seen as the leader of the "silovik" faction and who 
has close personal and political ties to Ustinov. 
 
-  Some will be looking for changes in the economic as well 
as the political sphere.  Commentator Stanislav Belkovskiy, 
for instance, stressed that the removal of Ustinov from the 
Procuracy General means that "Sechin has lost the ability to 
use the Procuracy to resolve commercial conflicts."  That 
could potentially have significant consequences as the 
competing groups around Putin fight for property and 
financial advantage before the end of his Presidency. 
 
-  One apparent loser in the Ustinov/Chayka shuffle is 
Presidential Representative to the South District of Russia 
Dmitriy Kozak, who many had expected to return to the capital 
as Procurator General (and as such become a potential 
candidate for the presidential succession) or at least as 
Minister of Justice.  Kozak may yet return to Moscow in a 
responsible position, but Putin clearly passed over an 
opportunity to bring him back now in a position for which he 
had obvious qualifications. 
 
-  Initial expectations or at least hopes that Ustinov's 
removal from the Procuracy -- and his speculative replacement 
by Kozak -- might mean an intensification of anti-corruption 
activities and/or a reform of the Procuracy have been 
deflated.  There is a sense that, whatver the changes may 
mean in terms of intra-leadership competition for power, they 
probably will mean very little for anti-corruption or 
government reform efforts. 
 
¶3. (C)  The Embassy had only very limited cooperation with 
the Ministry of Justice under Yuriy Chayka's leadership, and 
we therefore expect Ustinov's appointment to have little 
impact in that regard.  Most USAID programs in the area of 
rule of law are handled directly with the Russian judiciary, 
and there too we anticipate little change.  Ustinov's 
appointment could potentially have an impact on USAID 
programs in the area of democratization and support for civil 
society if it affected the registration of NGOs, since most 
USAID funding in that area is channeled through NGOs.  At 
this point, however, the NGO community is waiting to see how 
implementation of the new NGO law will proceed, and it is not 
clear that Ustinov's role in the Ministry will bring 
significant changes in that regard. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6608, G-8 POLITICAL DIRECTORS/SENIOR GROUP JUNE 14

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6608	2006-06-22 09:36	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO8819
PP RUEHAG
DE RUEHMO #6608/01 1730936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220936Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8023
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1798
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1778
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1975
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2654
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3991
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1600
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0242

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 006608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016 
TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM RS
SUBJECT: G-8 POLITICAL DIRECTORS/SENIOR GROUP JUNE 14 
MEETING IN MOSCOW 
 
REF: MOSCOW 6342 
 
MOSCOW 00006608  001.4 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine. 
  Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Meeting in Moscow June 14, G-8 Political 
Directors/Senior Group Members discussed outstanding issues 
relating to the St. Petersburg Summit statement on 
nonproliferation, including sensitive technology transfers, 
the U.S.-India agreement, and how to deal with the DPRK and 
Iran.  U/S Robert Joseph briefed on the USG's Stabilization 
and Reconstruction initiative, on which the others urged the 
U.S. to brief the UN fully, and on BMENA.  With the explicit 
exception of Russia, political directors urged that the 
frozen conflicts (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh)and Belarus be taken up by at the 
Ministerial on June 29.  Disagreement between Russia and the 
others extended to the discussion on Kosovo, with Russia 
arguing that a precedent for resolving separatist conflicts 
would be set.  Additional issues discussed included African 
peacekeeping, Northern Uganda, East Timor, the Middle East, 
and Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
Nonproliferation 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  The Russian chair of the G-8 Nonproliferation 
Directors Group (NPDG), Anatoliy Antonov, briefed on the 
status of the NPDG's work.  He highlighted the principal 
elements of the draft leaders' statement: reaffirmation of 
the importance of IAEA Safeguards and the Additional 
Protocol, President Putin,s proposal for nuclear fuel 
services centers, the U.S. President,s proposal for a Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership, and fuel supply assurances to 
encourage states not to develop sensitive aspects of the fuel 
cycle.  Antonov said the G-8 had reached consensus that it 
was preferable for India to be drawn into the IAEA framework. 
 He expressed Russia's displeasure at being excluded from the 
Australia Group. 
 
¶3. (C)  U/S Joseph, representing the U.S. along with EUR DAS 
David Kramer, strongly advocated calling for the complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible elimination of the DPRK,s 
nuclear programs.  He cautioned the G-8 leaders would need to 
say more if the DPRK goes ahead by the time of the St. 
Petersburg Summit with the provocative step of a long-range 
missile launch.  DFM Kislyak said he understood the G-8 
expected a reference to North Korea.  Japan said the G-8 
should strongly urge North Korea to return to the Six Party 
Talks without preconditions.  Canada said it was shoulder to 
shoulder on the DPRK, as well as Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and 
others.  U/S Joseph urged a forward-looking statement on PSI 
given the success in expanding PSI in Central Asia and the 
Gulf to deal with North Korea and Iran. 
 
¶4. (C)  U/S Joseph argued that the language on transfers of 
enrichment and reprocessing technology in the current draft 
statement does not go beyond the existing NSG policy of 
restraint, and urged that the prudent policy of refraining 
from such transfers adopted at Sea Island and Gleneagles be 
extended for another year.  Canada reiterated its strong 
interest in a criteria-based approach to sensitive nuclear 
transfers; restrictions should not apply to transfers among 
G-8 members.  Italy supported that approach, and said it 
could live with language in the draft statement supporting a 
one-year moratorium on technology transfers.  France 
supported the criteria-based approach, cautioning that the 
language in the statement on sensitive technology would be 
watched carefully; it was important to avoid the impression 
that there are two classes of countries in the world. 
 
¶5. (C)  U/S Joseph briefed on the status of Congressional 
consideration of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation, and 
proposed that the St. Petersburg statement welcome the 
nonproliferation commitments India has undertaken, encourage 
their implementation, and call on India to negotiate with the 
IAEA.  Kislyak noted that varying approaches to India would 
make it an issue for the G-8 beyond the Russian presidency. 
Japan said it had proposed alternate language for the 
leaders' statement to take into account concerns about India 
raised at the last NSG meeting, and fully supported 
integrating India into the NPT.  Italy called the U.S.-India 
agreement "welcome," and Germany noted that moving India 
toward the NPT would be "a process."  Canada said it would 
 
MOSCOW 00006608  002.7 OF 005 
 
 
take a "constructive approach" to dealing with India. 
 
Stabilization and Reconstruction 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  In his opening presentation on the U.S. initiative 
for Stabilization and Reconstruction and in response to 
questions, U/S Joseph emphasized that no new funding 
requirements were envisioned a
nd that the UN would remain the 
primary actor in peacekeeping operations, though he added 
that we want to include regional organizations as well.  The 
U.S. was not proposing to change or dilute the authority of 
the UN, nor to create new supranational structures.  The S&R 
initiative was more about strengthening existing 
organizations and improving interoperability. He also noted 
U.S. hope to see implementation of the Transportation and 
Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA).  He also proposed a 
meeting of experts within two months of the Summit as the 
next step. 
 
¶7. (C)  Italy, noting its support for the initiative, 
reiterated the view that the UN must have the primary role in 
responding to crises and post-crisis situations.  It also 
called for more attention to early warning mechanisms. 
Germany advocated key countries, such as the G-8, using their 
political influence to ensure the UN Peacebuilding Commission 
(PCB) would work and that devolving authority to regional 
organizations be bolstered.  It pointed to the problem of 
lack of early action, not early warning.  Canada said it 
supports the S&R initiative, after having some questions 
answered by U/S Burns, emphasizing the value in helping 
coordinate national activities.  Canada stressed the primacy 
of the UN and the PCB, as did the UK, lent its support for 
the initiative and added that the lessons from the past 10 
years ought to be more effectively marshaled.  The EU Council 
argued G-8 states can help bolster the UN by providing the 
better communications and intelligence the DPKO is always 
asking for.  Japan, France, and the European Commission 
echoed support for UN primacy.  Japan inquired about how to 
launch the process. 
 
¶8. (C)  Kislyak summed up by noting the consensus on UN 
primacy and bolstering the UN Peacebuilding Commission.  He 
said the intent not to create a new structure or new funding 
requirements were welcome, but more specifics needed to be 
addressed before a G-8 Ministers' statement would be 
warranted.  U/S Joseph responded that the G-8 leaders' 
backing would give the initiative a strong start and noted 
the experts meeting.  The Commission advised consulting with 
India,  China, and other countries whose support would be 
important, as well as with the UN.  Kislyak agreed that the 
initiative should not come as a surprise to the UN and asked 
the USG to consult on the matter before the ministerial. 
 
African Peacekeeping/Security 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  The UK stressed that PM Blair would want to see 
follow up on the British presidency's focus on Africa, and 
argued for the G-8 Summit to highlight successes in the past 
year, such as international backing for the AU's Darfur 
mission and the Abuja peace agreement.  Canada added that the 
government of Sudan is engaged in foot-dragging regarding 
Darfur, and that G8 members should actively engage Sudan on 
this.  The UK added that the international community ought to 
more systematically engage with China on its activities in 
Africa, lest they run at cross-purposes to efforts to build 
good governments. 
 
Northern Uganda 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Canada gave a briefing on its efforts to resolve the 
situation: the scale of fighting has been reduced but 
abductions are still occurring; the GOU is not showing enough 
leadership on ensuring IDPs can return home.  It was crucial 
for the G-8 to get involved to keep the GOU's attention. 
Germany agreed with Canada's assessment, noting more pressure 
could also be put on the LRA, perhaps by international 
prosecutions.  Kislyak said the Russian MFA had sent a team, 
led by the Director of its Sub-Saharan Africa Department, to 
assess the situation.  They concurred with Canada's 
assessment, adding only that the GOU needs more funding to 
address humanitarian concerns.  U/S Joseph agreed, saying the 
 
MOSCOW 00006608  003.9 OF 005 
 
 
USG has been providing humanitarian assistance and working to 
pressure the GOU.  Kislyak said the issue would be on the 
ministerial agenda. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶11. (C)  All the delegations expressed disappointment over 
the refusal of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents to 
accept the Minsk Group's modest draft agreement.  Germany 
noted that there is still a window of opportunity to push for 
progress before the election cycles of 2007-2008.  The 
Russian MFA's Andrey Kelin saw the window of opportunity 
already closed, but thought the conflict would remain 
manageable; other delegations were more pessimistic, with the 
Japanese, Italians, and Germans noting the potential for 
further deterioration and renewal of fighting. 
 
¶12. (C)  The UK and U/S Joseph both thought that the issue 
needed to be at the attention now of the G-8 leaders. 
Kislyak argued pressure on the Azeris and Armenians would be 
ineffective and require the leaders to "escalate" the 
pressure next year if there was no result.  Germany said the 
German presidency next year would have no problem continuing 
to focus on the issue.  Germany thought that the leaders 
might not in fact force Aliyev and Korcharian to agree, but 
political will was what the two presidents lacked most now 
and a statement from the combined G-8 leaders would be a 
powerful motivator.  There was no alternative to a peaceful 
resolution, all agreed. 
 
Georgia-Belarus 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (C)  Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova were not formally on 
the agenda for the meeting (contrary to agreement from the 
Russians at the April 19 meeting that they would be) and 
instead were raised under the "Any Other Business" listing on 
the agenda.  Canada led off the discussion on Belarus by 
noting the Ministers will want to discuss it -- not to 
highlight and provoke differences but to focus on the fact 
that the regime in Minsk clearly stands in contrast to the 
fundamental values of the G-8.  The UK seconded inclusion of 
Belarus and the South Caucasus on the ministerial agenda, 
arguing that Europe has an immediate concern with security in 
its neighborhood and differences can be narrowed through 
dialogue, as they had been in the Balkans.  Germany and the 
Commission echoed the neighborhood security concerns, with 
the Germans arguing that the G-8 cannot simply discuss 
problems in Africa and other places and ignore them "next 
door."  The Austrian Presidency noted Moscow's possible 
moderating influence on Belarus in the days following the 
election as a sign that we could discuss these issues.  DAS 
Kramer pressed for a constructive approach to dealing with 
these issues, avoiding confrontation, and argued for using 
the G-8 to highlight Belarus' Helsinki Final Act and OSCE 
commitments, and the territorial integrity or Georgia and 
Moldova. 
 
¶14. (C)  Kislyak recited familiar Russian points: Putin and 
Lukashenko discuss Russia's problems with Belarus, but the &#
x000A;situation there is far from "fascist" as some have described 
it.  He drew attention to Russia's problems with Georgia's 
human rights record and argued for preserving the mechanisms 
that exist to deal with the frozen conflicts.  Kramer pushed 
back on Kislyak,s claim that the human rights record in 
Georgia was no better than that in Belarus.  Kislyak added 
that Russia takes seriously the calls for the Ministers to 
discuss these issues and "you can rest assured that Sergey 
Lavrov does not shy away from serious issues." 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶15. (C) Germany said G-8 foreign ministers should make a 
public statement in support for UN Special Envoy for the 
Kosovo Status talks Martti Ahtisaari.  Kosovo is now at a 
crucial stage; decisions made now will determine the outcome 
of relations between Albanians and Serbs for decades to come. 
 He said more had to be done in terms of outreach to Kosovo's 
Serbs.  Though both sides had not gotten beyond merely 
stating their positions, Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica 
appeared willing to engage the Kosovar Albanians at the 
highest level.  This initiative should be helped along as a 
 
MOSCOW 00006608  004.6 OF 005 
 
 
starting point for negotiations, he said. 
 
¶16. (C) Kislyak highlighted the difficult political position 
Serbia is in, with the recent "loss" of Montenegro.  He 
argued for slowing the pace of negotiations, and not 
insisting talks be completed by November.  Kislyak also 
warned that the final status of Kosovo could become a 
precedent for resolving other frozen conflicts, and that an 
independent Kosovo could result in independence for other 
breakaway republics.  To this, the German asked Kislyak to 
elaborate as to which breakaway republics he was referring: 
"Are you talking about Chechnya?"  Kislyak responded that 
Chechnya was being resolved "through a different process," 
and that he was referring to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria. 
 
¶17. (C) DAS Kramer responded that Kosovo is unique and 
offered no precedent.  He added that the dissolution of 
Serbia-Montenegro followed a mutually agreed upon 
constitutional process.  Kramer noted that the situation in 
Kosovo emanated from Milosevic,s policy of ethnic Cleansing, 
NATO actions, and UN administration.  He warned against using 
either as a precedent and going down the "slippery slope" of 
promoting secession. 
 
Middle East Peace Plan 
---------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) Kislyak stated the need to maintain financial 
assistance to the PA.  He said that the recent deaths of 
several Palestinian family members on a beach in the Gaza 
Strip, followed by Hamas' militant response, did not bode 
well for maintaining stability in the area.  He emphasized 
that Hamas officials were legitimately elected and that they 
are now as responsible for the peace process as the Israelis 
or Fatah.  France stressed the need for Hamas to fulfill the 
three Quartet principles and added that a mechanism should be 
constructed to allow social assistance and for PA employees 
to be paid.  The EU urged the ministerial publicly support 
the TIM, which would be providing 105 million Euros for these 
purposes in the coming weeks, and did not provide legitimacy 
for Hamas.  The UK echoed this view. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶19. (C) The UK urged greater G-8 support for rebuilding Iraq, 
suggesting the G-8 develop an "Iraq Compact," similar to the 
one for Afghanistan, with G-8 members pledging assistance for 
the achievement of specific goals.  Japan agreed, but said an 
Iraq Compact would have to be tailor made, and not mirror the 
Afghan Compact, as the situation in Iraq is much different. 
The EU said it plans establish a 20 million euro assistance 
program to help provide basic services and assistance for 
democratic development. 
 
Haiti 
----- 
 
¶20. (C) Canada said there is room for optimism in Haiti but 
cautioned that the international community must maintain its 
engagement.  He stated that the international community left 
Haiti too soon in the 1990s, and that this mistake should not 
be repeated.  He pointed out that the current United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti will expire in August, and G-8 
members and the UN must decide whether it should be renewed. 
 
Broader Middle East and North Africa 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶21. (C) U/S Joseph said that the G-8 must continue to promote 
broader freedom in the Middle East and North Africa.  He said 
the U.S. was looking forward to the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa (BMENA) Forum for the Future, to be held 
December 2-3 in Jordan and co-hosted by Russia.  He added 
that the U.S. was also looking forward to providing 
assistance for democratic development, and the Forum will be 
an excellent opportunity to evaluate progress.  He praised 
efforts of other members, including the UK, Italy and the 
European Commission.  He also highlighted the progress made 
on establishing the Foundation for the Future, as well as the 
Democracy Assistance Dialogue meetings.  The Germans said 
that while Germany supports the goals of the BMENA forum, it 
believed that these goals should be discussed within the 
 
MOSCOW 00006608  005.7 OF 005 
 
 
framework of the Forum for the Future, rather than the G-8 
summit.  Japan voiced strong support for BMENA. 
 
East Timor 
---------- 
 
¶22. (C) The Japanese said the situation is now critical, and 
that Prime Minister Koizumi planned to raise the issue when 
foreign ministers meet. 
 
Draft Agenda for Ministerial 
---------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Kislyak said Russia will begin drafting an agenda for 
the ministerial based on the day's discussions.  While 
suggesting that political directors prepare their ministers 
to focus on the main issues -- which he identified as Iran 
and the Middle East first and foremost followed by North 
Korea and regional crises -- he also noted that there would 
be opportunity to raise other issues. 
 
¶24. (U)  This cable was cleared by U/S Joseph's office and 
EUR DAS Kramer. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6575, NEW TRIAL ORDERED FOR SYNAGOGUE ATTACKER

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MOSCOW6575.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6575	2006-06-21 14:43	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO6329
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6575 1721443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211443Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7896
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006575 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KCRM RS
SUBJECT: NEW TRIAL ORDERED FOR SYNAGOGUE ATTACKER 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 152 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 262 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 4624 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kirk Augustine.  Reason 1.4 
 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) On June 20 the Russian Supreme Court ordered a new 
trial for Aleksandr Koptsev, who on March 27 had been 
convicted of knifing nine people in the Chabad synagogue in 
Moscow on January 11.  The trial court had sentenced Koptsev 
to thirteen years in prison on several counts of attempted 
murder motivated by national or religious hatred. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Both the prosecution and the defense appealed the 
verdict.  The defense sought to have Koptsev's sentence 
reduced based on his mental and physical condition, and 
because the sentence was longer than that received by other 
criminals who actually killed, and not only wounded, their 
victims.  The prosecution, backed by lawyers representing 
victims, wanted to have charges of inciting national or 
religious enmity (Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code) 
also brought against Koptsev.  The judge in the original 
trial had dismissed the Article 282 charges against Koptsev, 
but its June 20 decision the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
the prosecution and the victims and ordered a new trial. 
 
¶3. (C) Many members of Jewish community and some in the human 
rights community had told us about their dismay at the March 
27 decision.  However, some experts on hate crimes believe 
that too much emphasis is placed on Article 282.  It is 
intended to fight racist propaganda while other articles of 
Russian law specifically address violence based on national 
or religious hatred (ref C). 
 
¶4. (C) Nevertheless some observers believe that the Supreme 
Court's decision to allow the Article 282 charges is an 
important step in fighting hate crimes.  In a June 21 meeting 
Rabbi Adolf Shayevich, Chief Rabbi of Russia, told visiting 
members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom that it was important that Koptsev be convicted on 
the right charges, including Article 282, even if he is 
sentenced to less time than in his original conviction. 
Earlier in the day, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security 
Council Nikolay Spasskiy told members of the Commission, that 
the Supreme Court's decision demonstrated that Russia is 
serious about combating hate crimes. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: It remains to be seen whether this latest 
move is a sign of increasing government willingness to 
seriously address the problem of hate crimes, or just an 
isolated development in a high-profile case.  Obviously the 
ordering of a re-trial opens up the possibility of a shorter 
sentence, or conceivably even an acquittal.  Koptsev's 
lawyers have indicated that they may press in the new 
proceedings for a trail by jury, with the hope that it might 
return a "softer" verdict. 
BURNS

Wikileaks

06MOSCOW6563, RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT

WikiLeaks Link

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6563	2006-06-21 10:39	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #6563/01 1721039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211039Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7885
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1049
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0411
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1794
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0214

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER RS IR AF CN KZ
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 5413 
 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 5483 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs 
Kirk Augustine.   Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov 
gave us a readout June 20 of the June 15 SCO Summit.  He 
encouraged the United States to have more dialogue with the 
SCO to avoid misunderstandings, perhaps as a formal "dialogue 
partner" to the organization.  He said Russia and the SCO 
have their own misgivings about U.S. intentions in the 
region, and acknowledged that more dialogue would be 
warranted on that subject as well.  Vorobiyov recounted 
dissatisfaction expressed by all SCO members, except for 
Russia and China, with the performance of the Afghan 
government and admitted that no efforts to combat drug flows 
from Afghanistan had been particularly successful.  Vorobiyov 
characterized the summit tasking to develop guidelines for 
the admission of new members as a way to appease the current 
observers; he thought the guidelines would take years to work 
out.  He also offered views on Ahmadi-Nejad's performance at 
the summit as well as on SCO component organizations.  End 
summary. 
 
The U.S. Presence 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov discussed 
the June 15 Shanghai Summit and SCO developments with us on 
June 20.  The USG's repeated demarches in the lead-up and the 
Secretary's phone call to Chinese FM Li hours before the 
 
SIPDIS 
summit gave Vorobiyov the impression throughout the event 
that the United States was a silent "eleventh participant," 
he told us only half in jest.  He said the U.S. ought to find 
 ways to talk with the SCO directly as an organization.  He 
understood that the USG would not be seeking observer status 
in the organization at this time, but thought that the 
concept of a "dialogue partner" might be developed and might 
be appropriate for the U.S.  He said that SCO members were 
eager for more dialogue with the U.S., and a report that SCO 
SYG Zhang distributed on his recent meeting with Ambassador 
Randt in Beijing had been very well received.  Vorobiyov was 
pleased that Zhang and Amb. Randt had agreed to continue 
talking. 
 
Strengthening the Secretariat 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Vorobiyov thought that the decision taken at the 
summit to strengthen the authority of the Secretariat would 
make interlocutors take it more seriously.  He showed us the 
resume of incoming SYG Bolat Nurgaliyev, the current Kazakh 
Ambassador to Japan, whose election to the post had been 
approved at the summit.  Vorobiyov said he did not know 
Nurgaliyev, but his past posts as ambassador to both the 
United States and to various East and South Asian countries 
made him a well-qualified choice. 
 
Misunderstandings 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Vorobiyov was concerned that there was still much 
misunderstanding in the U.S. about the SCO's intentions, and 
cited reports he had seen in the Western press of U.S. 
lawmakers giving voice to those misunderstandings (he was not 
specific about which lawmakers or which comments).  He 
emphasized that the SCO is and will remain a transparent 
organization, eager for dialogue. 
 
¶5. (C)  We pointed out the emphasis of Russian press reports 
about the summit on its alleged anti-American character, 
including Putin's comments that Russia opposed "the 
duplication of organizations, unnecessary competition, and 
establishment of closed clubs" in the region.  Vorobiyov said 
the idea had taken hold in circles within the Russian and 
other SCO member governments that the U.S. remained intent on 
establishing new regional organizations that were intended to 
exclude Russia and China.  He said Putin had raised these 
concerns with both the President and Secretary.  The concerns 
had been around for several years, but only now did some 
believe that the alleged U.S. plans had become official USG 
policy and had begun to be operationalized.  He cited the 
"Greater Central Asia Initiative" as an attempt to "mix the 
problems of Central Asia with those of Afghanistan and South 
Asia."  Vorobiyov said the concerns were shared by the SCO as 
an organization, so it had to react by opposing them in the 
summit declaration.  He stressed that the declaration 
reference had been indirect, in order that it not be viewed 
as confrontational 
 
¶6. (C)  We told Vorobiyov that the U.S. had no plans to 
establish duplicative or exclusionary structures in Central 
Asia.  Our efforts, for instance, to combat narco
tics 
trafficking through the region were inclusive and focused on 
a widely shared goal.  Vorobiyov agreed that fighting drugs 
traffic was a "tremendously difficult" endeavor, and that no 
one may even sufficiently understand how to go about it, much 
less be able to reduce the flow.  We told him that the "Paris 
2 Moscow 1" conference, to be convened later this month in 
Moscow under G-8 auspices, would be useful for coordinating 
efforts and deconflicting.  Vorobiyov did not argue with U.S. 
plans for economic development ideas in Central Asia, saying 
each country could make up its own mind about its interests. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Vorobiyov was not specific about when the SCO's 
long-planned Afghanistan Contact Group would be on the 
ground.  He said its mandate would be to involve itself with 
"all forces" in the country.  Vorobiyov noted that President 
Karzai had drawn open criticism at the summit from all SCO 
members -- except for Russia and China -- for the failures of 
Afghan authorities to maintain control.  Karzai had "said 
words in defense, maybe defensively" about his government's 
efforts.  Vorobiyov thought the criticism would persist. 
 
New Members 
----------- 
 
¶8. (C)  Commenting on the leaders' tasking to ministers 
during the summit to develop guidelines and procedures for 
the admittance of new members to the organization, Vorobiyov 
said that it was simply a bureaucratic exercise to show that 
it was taking requests for new members seriously.  Among the 
current observers, only Pakistan had formally requested 
admission, but Vorobiyov doubted the Pakistanis had a clear 
idea of what membership meant.  He related that President 
Musharraf had cited only three of the SCO Charter's numerous 
paragraphs before pronouncing that the organizations terms 
were acceptable.  While the other observers had not filed 
formal membership applications, Vorobiyov reported that Iran 
was "actively sounding out" the possibility, and there had 
been "heavy hints" from India.  Despite the new tasking, he 
said the membership admission guidelines would take years to 
develop.  In the meantime, the SCO was looking for ways to 
involve the observers more deeply in the organization. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶9. (C)  Vorobiyov provided his impressions of Ahmadi-Nejad's 
summit appearance.  He was not surprised that the Iranian 
chose not to use strong or inflammatory rhetoric at either 
the summit plenary of in his press appearance.  What did 
surprise Vorobiyov, he related, was that Ahmadi-Nejad spoke 
so "smoothly," as though he were signaling that he could be 
"constructive," and not always "narrow-minded."  An 
unidentified Central Asian friend pointed out to Vorobiyov 
that Ahmadi-Nejad was using "strange literary language" and 
that the "Shiite influence on his mentality" was obvious.  He 
did not discount that the Iranian's choice of language may 
have been intended to show that he was not speaking for 
domestic consumption. 
 
SCO-Affiliated Bodies 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Vorobiyov touched briefly on the SCO Business 
Council and Interbank Union -- both formally inaugurated at 
the Shanghai summit -- and the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS).  The Business Council and Interbank Union 
were both intended to be nongovernmental bodies that followed 
only general official guidelines.  The "Scientific-Expert 
Forum" launched in Moscow in May (ref B) was meant to operate 
the same way.  The SCO hoped that the Council and Union would 
consult with and make recommendations to member governments 
and the Secretariat to fulfill the SCO's 2020 goal of free 
movement of capital and technology within the SCO space. 
Vorobiyov added that bringing together businessmen and 
bankers in an informal but structured format would spur 
concrete cooperative projects.  He said the Council was 
modeled on a similar forum within APEC. 
 
¶11. (C)  Vorobiyov said the summit-approved changes to the 
SCO Charter on the role of the Secretariat would affect the 
operations of the RATS.  Whereas before, the RATS was an 
autonomous body, now its overall budget would be approved by 
the Secretariat.  The RATS Executive will retain authority 
for now on how its funds get spent, but the SCO is also 
considering making the Executive formally subordinate to the 
SYG.  Vorobiyov said RATS members have not all agreed on a 
common list of terrorists. 
BURNS

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06MOSCOW6547, YURIY CHAYKA NOMINATED AS RUSSIA’S PROCURATOR

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MOSCOW6547	2006-06-20 15:19	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5136
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6547 1711519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201519Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7862
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006547 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/PRAHAR 
DOJ FOR OPDAT (LEHMANN) AND OIA (BURKE) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KCRM RS
SUBJECT: YURIY CHAYKA NOMINATED AS RUSSIA'S PROCURATOR 
GENERAL 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 6268 
 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 5934 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) President Putin nominated current Minister of 
Justice, Yuriy Chayka, as the next Procurator General to 
replace Vladimir Ustinov, who resigned June 2.  The 
Federation Council's Committee on Legal and Judicial Affairs 
supported the nomination June 19; it will go before the full 
Federation Council June 23, where it is expected to win 
approval, and Chayka can then legally assume his duties.  In 
his first public statement after his nomination, Chayka noted 
that the office of the Procurator General could be effective 
in fighting corruption, but he spoke against setting up 
special offices within the Procurator General to address 
corruption among senior officials.  Instead, he hinted that 
pressing for revision of the legal education system in Russia 
might be among his early priorities. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A professional lawyer by training, Chayka has 
worked as a prosecutor since his graduation from the 
Sverdlovsk Juridical Institute in 1976.  He is one of the few 
senior holdovers from the Yeltsin era where, among other 
positions, he served as the acting Procurator General in 
¶1999.  Appointed Minister of Justice in 2000, Chayka has 
cultivated a reputation as being among the relatively few 
cabinet officers who have made themselves accessible to the 
public, including human rights organizations that have worked 
with him and other officials in the Justice Ministry to 
improve conditions in the country's prison system.  Lyudmila 
Alekseyeva, head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, was among 
those who reportedly characterized Chayka's nomination as a 
good choice. 
 
¶3.  (C) COMMENT:  Although Chayka had been mentioned as one 
of the candidates for Ustinov's job (ref A), his nomination 
still came somewhat as a surprise.  While Chayka has built a 
solid reputation as a professional prosecutor and effective 
manager, his unquestioned loyalty to Putin was probably the 
most important factor in his choice.  Under Ustinov, the 
procuracy had become a stronghold for the "siloviki" wing of 
the Kremlin.  Observers claim Chayka's appointment should be 
seen as a reflection of Putin's desire to maintain a balance 
of power between competing Kremlin factions in important 
government posts.  Attention will now turn to Chayka's 
replacement at the Justice Ministry.  PolPred Dmitiry Kozak 
is being mentioned as one of the top candidates.  Kozak's 
appointment as Justice Minister would bring him back to the 
capital, but it is unclear how he -- or anybody as Justice 
Minister -- could advance his political fortunes in that 
traditionally weak position. 
BURNS

Wikileaks