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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW53.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10MOSCOW53 | 2010-01-12 15:45 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO5870 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHMO #0053/01 0121545 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 121545Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5893 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000053 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, S/EEE MORNINGSTAR DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR JBROUGHER NSC FOR MMCFAUL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020 TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL PINR RS BO SUBJECT: TRANSNEFT: NO DISCOUNTED OIL TO BELARUS WITHOUT NEW AGREEMENT REF: 09 MOSCOW 3084 Classified By: Econ MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶1. (C) Transneft International Affairs Advisor Oleg Pilipets told us January 12 the oil dispute with Belarus affects only oil sent to, and not through, Belarus. He said the expiration of a 2007 agreement prevents Transneft from continuing to send oil to Belarus at previous preferential export duties, which he said provided $3 billion per year in subsidies to the Belarusian economy. While Pilipets stressed that this issue was at the heart of the dispute, he also offered that the stability of oil supplies through Belarus would be enhanced "if Mr. Lukashenko would stop playing games" by trying to pit Russia against the West. Pilipets could not confirm whether oil supplies to Belarus had been reduced but an oil trader told us that volumes have been reduced to levels to meet only domestic demand. The oil dispute highlights Russia's political influence over its weaker neighbor due to Belarus' energy and economic dependence. End summary. ------------------------------------------- TRANSNEFT SAYS IT'S ABOUT MONEY AND THE LAW ------------------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) Having so far avoided a gas crisis with Ukraine this year, Russia has instead found itself in a fight over oil with Belarus. Belarusian negotiators reportedly left Moscow on January 9 after failing to reach an agreement on the terms of oil supplies from Russia to Belarus. Negotiators had arrived on January 6 to resolve a dispute that erupted when a 2007 agreement on continued preferential oil export duties expired on December 31, 2009. ¶3. (C) Transneft's longtime International Affairs Advisor, Oleg Pilipets, explained to us January 12 that the oil trade with Belarus involves two subsets of oil flows -- crude exports from Russia through Belarus to third countries, and crude from Russia to Belarus. Oil sent to (not through) Belarus is used both for domestic consumption and for re-export. The dispute, according to Pilipets, has not had and should not have any effect on Russian crude transiting Belarus for third countries. Pilipets said the dispute involves only oil sent to Belarus for domestic consumption and for Belarusian refineries to process for re-export. ¶4. (C) According to Pilipets, the total volume of oil sent to Belarus for domestic consumption and processing is approximately 21 million tons (mt) per year (approximately 420 thousand barrels per day), and the export duty on this oil is one-third of the rate applied to other oil exports from Russia, including on crude that merely transits Belarus. Of the 21 mt, he said, Belarus uses about 6 mt for its domestic consumption. Pilipets said the preferential export duty on oil to Belarus has cost the GOR approximately $3 billion per year and has served, in effect, as a major subsidy for the Belarusian economy "at the expense of Russian citizens." ¶5. (C) When the agreement allowing for the preferential duties expired on December 31, 2009, Pilipets said, Transneft had no choice but to follow Russian customs laws and apply the full duty on oil exported to Belarus -- "Without a valid intergovernmental agreement, we have no legal basis to apply a lower export duty for oil sent to Belarus." He added, however, that Russia is willing to continue to subsidize the 6 mt used for domestic consumption in Belarus, but would no longer subsidize the oil used for refining and re-export. (Note: According to an internal IEA report, the 6 mt for domestic consumption is sent to Belarus with no export duty at all. Press reports indicate that Russia has offered to reduce the export duty for the 6 mt to zero. End note.) ----------------------- MOSCOW 00000053 002 OF 002 BUT IT'S ALSO POLITICAL ----------------------- ¶6. (S/NF) After having repeatedly stressed that money and the law formed the basis of Russia's position, Pilipets then suggested, as have many pundits, that politics is also central to the issue. He offered, from his "personal viewpoint based on long experience outside of Transneft," that oil supplies to and through Belarus "would be more stable if Mr. Lukashenko stopped playing games" by pitting Russia against the West. (Comment: Pilipets has indicated to us that he used to work in intelligence, including during his time in the U.S. End comment.) --------------------------------------- & #x000A;OIL TRADER SAYS SUPPLIES TO BELARUS CUT --------------------------------------- ¶7. (C) Pilipets said he did know whether supplies to Belarus had been reduced or not. Press reports have indicated that flows to Belarus continue despite the lack of a new agreement. An oil trader at a major international oil company told us January 12, however, that he had heard from his contacts that oil to (not through) Belarus had been "significantly reduced" to amounts just needed for domestic consumption. According to this contact, "all negotiations have stopped." He added that there have not been any disruptions of Russian crude to his company's Eastern European refineries and that he understood that Russian exports through Belarus were continuing normally. ¶8. (C) Pilipets said that oil flows through Belarus should continue uninterrupted "unless Belarus takes some mad action." Presumably, Pilipets was referring to Belarus taking transit oil for its own use, which was the cause of oil supply disruptions in Eastern Europe in 2007. ------------------------------- CUSTOMS UNION DOESN'T COVER OIL ------------------------------- ¶9. (SBU) According to press reports, Belarus believes it should receive duty-free oil due to its Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan (reftel). However, as Russia contends, the Customs Union does not yet cover oil or oil products. An agreement on oil and oil products is part of the Action Plan for a Common Economic Space agreed to by the Customs Union Heads of State on December 19, 2009. The agreement is expected to be completed and signed by January 1, 2011, and implemented by July 1, 2011. ------- COMMENT ------- ¶10. (C) Russia's relationship with Belarus is complex and opaque. It is difficult to know what may be driving some decision makers. The oil dispute, like Russia's gas dispute with Ukraine, exposes the political power Russia wields over its weaker neighbors due to their energy and economic dependence. This situation is exacerbated by Russia's subsidization of energy deliveries, while the neighbors strive for political independence. Non-transparent energy subsidies not only create market distortions and inefficiencies, but they frequently become a source of political and economic discord. As long as Russian crude transits Belarus without disruption and Belarus' domestic needs are met, there will be little pressure on Russia to be more flexible. That said, the two sides will likely find some temporary patch to allow full flows to resume, but it is unlikely they will eliminate the underlying causes of the dispute. End comment. Rubin
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Russia 