Category Archives: SECRET//NOFORN

10MOSCOW53, TRANSNEFT: NO DISCOUNTED OIL TO BELARUS WITHOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW53 2010-01-12 15:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5870
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #0053/01 0121545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121545Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5893
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, 
S/EEE MORNINGSTAR 
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR MMCFAUL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL PINR RS BO
SUBJECT: TRANSNEFT:  NO DISCOUNTED OIL TO BELARUS WITHOUT 
NEW AGREEMENT 
 
REF: 09 MOSCOW 3084 
 
Classified By: Econ MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Transneft International Affairs Advisor Oleg Pilipets 
told us January 12 the oil dispute with Belarus affects only 
oil sent to, and not through, Belarus.  He said the 
expiration of a 2007 agreement prevents Transneft from 
continuing to send oil to Belarus at previous preferential 
export duties, which he said provided $3 billion per year in 
subsidies to the Belarusian economy.  While Pilipets stressed 
that this issue was at the heart of the dispute, he also 
offered that the stability of oil supplies through Belarus 
would be enhanced "if Mr. Lukashenko would stop playing 
games" by trying to pit Russia against the West.  Pilipets 
could not confirm whether oil supplies to Belarus had been 
reduced but an oil trader told us that volumes have been 
reduced to levels to meet only domestic demand.  The oil 
dispute highlights Russia's political influence over its 
weaker neighbor due to Belarus' energy and economic 
dependence.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
TRANSNEFT SAYS IT'S ABOUT MONEY AND THE LAW 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Having so far avoided a gas crisis with Ukraine this 
year, Russia has instead found itself in a fight over oil 
with Belarus.  Belarusian negotiators reportedly left Moscow 
on January 9 after failing to reach an agreement on the terms 
of oil supplies from Russia to Belarus.  Negotiators had 
arrived on January 6 to resolve a dispute that erupted when a 
2007 agreement on continued preferential oil export duties 
expired on December 31, 2009. 
 
3. (C) Transneft's longtime International Affairs Advisor, 
Oleg Pilipets, explained to us January 12 that the oil trade 
with Belarus involves two subsets of oil flows -- crude 
exports from Russia through Belarus to third countries, and 
crude from Russia to Belarus.  Oil sent to (not through) 
Belarus is used both for domestic consumption and for 
re-export.  The dispute, according to Pilipets, has not had 
and should not have any effect on Russian crude transiting 
Belarus for third countries.  Pilipets said the dispute 
involves only oil sent to Belarus for domestic consumption 
and for Belarusian refineries to process for re-export. 
 
4. (C) According to Pilipets, the total volume of oil sent to 
Belarus for domestic consumption and processing is 
approximately 21 million tons (mt) per year (approximately 
420 thousand barrels per day), and the export duty on this 
oil is one-third of the rate applied to other oil exports 
from Russia, including on crude that merely transits Belarus. 
 Of the 21 mt, he said, Belarus uses about 6 mt for its 
domestic consumption.  Pilipets said the preferential export 
duty on oil to Belarus has cost the GOR approximately $3 
billion per year and has served, in effect, as a major 
subsidy for the Belarusian economy "at the expense of Russian 
citizens." 
 
5. (C) When the agreement allowing for the preferential 
duties expired on December 31, 2009, Pilipets said, Transneft 
had no choice but to follow Russian customs laws and apply 
the full duty on oil exported to Belarus -- "Without a valid 
intergovernmental agreement, we have no legal basis to apply 
a lower export duty for oil sent to Belarus."  He added, 
however, that Russia is willing to continue to subsidize the 
6 mt used for domestic consumption in Belarus, but would no 
longer subsidize the oil used for refining and re-export. 
(Note:  According to an internal IEA report, the 6 mt for 
domestic consumption is sent to Belarus with no export duty 
at all.  Press reports indicate that Russia has offered to 
reduce the export duty for the 6 mt to zero.  End note.) 
 
----------------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00000053  002 OF 002 
 
 
BUT IT'S ALSO POLITICAL 
----------------------- 
 
6. (S/NF) After having repeatedly stressed that money and the 
law formed the basis of Russia's position, Pilipets then 
suggested, as have many pundits, that politics is also 
central to the issue.  He offered, from his "personal 
viewpoint based on long experience outside of Transneft," 
that oil supplies to and through Belarus "would be more 
stable if Mr. Lukashenko stopped playing games" by pitting 
Russia against the West.  (Comment:  Pilipets has indicated 
to us that he used to work in intelligence, including during 
his time in the U.S.  End comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------- &
#x000A;OIL TRADER SAYS SUPPLIES TO BELARUS CUT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Pilipets said he did know whether supplies to Belarus 
had been reduced or not.  Press reports have indicated that 
flows to Belarus continue despite the lack of a new 
agreement.  An oil trader at a major international oil 
company told us January 12, however, that he had heard from 
his contacts that oil to (not through) Belarus had been 
"significantly reduced" to amounts just needed for domestic 
consumption.  According to this contact, "all negotiations 
have stopped."  He added that there have not been any 
disruptions of Russian crude to his company's Eastern 
European refineries and that he understood that Russian 
exports through Belarus were continuing normally. 
 
8. (C) Pilipets said that oil flows through Belarus should 
continue uninterrupted "unless Belarus takes some mad 
action."  Presumably, Pilipets was referring to Belarus 
taking transit oil for its own use, which was the cause of 
oil supply disruptions in Eastern Europe in 2007. 
 
------------------------------- 
CUSTOMS UNION DOESN'T COVER OIL 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) According to press reports, Belarus believes it 
should receive duty-free oil due to its Customs Union with 
Russia and Kazakhstan (reftel).  However, as Russia contends, 
the Customs Union does not yet cover oil or oil products.  An 
agreement on oil and oil products is part of the Action Plan 
for a Common Economic Space agreed to by the Customs Union 
Heads of State on December 19, 2009.  The agreement is 
expected to be completed and signed by January 1, 2011, and 
implemented by July 1, 2011. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) Russia's relationship with Belarus is complex and 
opaque.  It is difficult to know what may be driving some 
decision makers.  The oil dispute, like Russia's gas dispute 
with Ukraine, exposes the political power Russia wields over 
its weaker neighbors due to their energy and economic 
dependence.  This situation is exacerbated by Russia's 
subsidization of energy deliveries, while the neighbors 
strive for political independence.  Non-transparent energy 
subsidies not only create market distortions and 
inefficiencies, but they frequently become a source of 
political and economic discord.  As long as Russian crude 
transits Belarus without disruption and Belarus' domestic 
needs are met, there will be little pressure on Russia to be 
more flexible.  That said, the two sides will likely find 
some temporary patch to allow full flows to resume, but it is 
unlikely they will eliminate the underlying causes of the 
dispute.  End comment. 
Rubin

Wikileaks

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10MOSCOW54, TRANSNEFT: NO DISCOUNTED OIL TO BELARUS WITHOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MOSCOW54 2010-01-12 15:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO5888
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #0054/01 0121545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121545Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5895
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000054 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, 
S/EEE MORNINGSTAR 
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF 
DOC FOR JBROUGHER 
NSC FOR MMCFAUL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL PINR RS BO
SUBJECT: TRANSNEFT:  NO DISCOUNTED OIL TO BELARUS WITHOUT 
NEW AGREEMENT 
 
MOSCOW 00000054  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
//////////ZFR//////////ZFR//////////ZFR////// //// 
 
DUPLICATE CABLE PLEASE DELETED 
 
//////////ZFR//////////ZFR//////////ZFR////// /// 
 
 
MOSCOW 00000054  002 OF 002 
 
 
BUT IT'S ALSO POLITICAL 
----------------------- 
 
6. (S/NF) After having repeatedly stressed that money and the 
law formed the basis of Russia's position, Pilipets then 
suggested, as have many pundits, that politics is also 
central to the issue.  He offered, from his "personal 
viewpoint based on long experience outside of Transneft," 
that oil supplies to and through Belarus "would be more 
stable if Mr. Lukashenko stopped playing games" by pitting 
Russia against the West.  (Comment:  Pilipets has indicated 
to us that he used to work in intelligence, including during 
his time in the U.S.  End comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
OIL TRADER SAYS SUPPLIES TO BELARUS CUT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Pilipets said he did know whether supplies to Belarus 
had been reduced or not.  Press reports have indicated that 
flows to Belarus continue despite the lack of a new 
agreement.  An oil trader at a major international oil 
company told us January 12, however, that he had heard from 
his contacts that oil to (not through) Belarus had been 
"significantly reduced" to amounts just needed for domestic 
consumption.  According to this contact, "all negotiations 
have stopped."  He added that there have not been any 
disruptions of Russian crude to his company's Eastern 
European refineries and that he understood that Russian 
exports through Belarus were continuing normally. 
 
8. (C) Pilipets said that oil flows through Belarus should 
continue uninterrupted "unless Belarus takes some mad 
action."  Presumably, Pilipets was referring to Belarus 
taking transit oil for its own use, which was the cause of 
oil supply disruptions in Eastern Europe in 2007. 
 
------------------------------- 
CUSTOMS UNION DOESN'T COVER OIL 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) According to press reports, Belarus believes it 
should receive duty-free oil due to its Customs Union with 
Russia and Kazakhstan (reftel).  However, as Russia contends, 
the Customs Union does not yet cover oil or oil products.  An 
agreement on oil and oil products is part of the Action Plan 
for a Common Economic Space agreed to by the Customs Union 
Heads of State on December 19, 2009.  The agreement is 
expected to be completed and signed by January 1, 2011, and 
implemented by July 1, 2011. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) Russia's relationship with Belarus is complex and 
opaque.  It is difficult to know what may be driving some 
decision makers.  The oil dispute, like Russia's gas dispute 
with Ukraine, exposes the political power Russia wields over 
its weaker neighbors due to their energy and economic 
dependence.  This situation is exacerbated by Russia's 
subsidization of energy deliveries, while the neighbors 
strive for political independence.  Non-transparent energy 
subsidies not only create market distortions and 
inefficiencies, but they frequently become a source of 
political and economic discord.  As long as Russian crude 
transits Belarus without disruption and Belarus' domestic 
needs are met, there will be little pressure on Russia to be 
more flexible.  That said, the two sides will likely find 
some temporary patch to allow full flows to resume, but it is 
unlikely they will eliminate the underlying causes of the 
dispute.  End comment. 
Rubin

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW2747, RUSSIA: POLISH PM SIKORSKI REOPENS OLD FIGHTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2747 2009-11-06 14:36 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO1348
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #2747 3101436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061436Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5331
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002747

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA:  POLISH PM SIKORSKI REOPENS OLD FIGHTS

REF: A. MOSCOW 1397
B. MOSCOW 2240
C. MOSCOW 642
D. WARSAW 1122

Classified By: Political MC Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

1.  (SBU) Russian media and officials are concerned with
Polish FM Radoslaw Sikorski's November 4 comments to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
In particular, they noted Sikorski's request for U.S. forces
on the ground in Poland to "protect against Russian
aggression" and his characterization that the recent
"Zapad-2009" exercises were directed against Poland.  Some
Russian officials were quick to point out that Sikorski's
comments undermined not only improved Polish relations (Ref A
and B), but harmed Russian-U.S. and Russian-NATO relations as
well.

2.  (SBU) While the Russian MFA has not yet issued a formal
statement, FM Sergey Lavrov told the press that he did not
believe that Sikorski had actually made the remarks.  Lavrov
commented, however, that if proved true, "it throws me into
deep astonishment because we had talked in a detailed manner
about the problems that needed to be addressed in the context
of European security."  Russian Permanent Representative to
NATO Dmitry Rogozin called Sikorski's remarks "absurd" and a
u-turn in Polish policy toward Russia and its engagement with
NATO and Europe.  Duma International Relations Committee
Chair Konstantin Kosachev told the press that Sikorski's
statements "directly contradicted" the improvement in
Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO relations.

3.  (S/NF) Unfortunately, the Polish government had seeded
some of this Russian response through their sponsorship of
and statements in support of the EU's Eastern Partnership
Initiative (Ref C) and show of support to Georgia during the
2008 Russia-Georgia War.  Further, the Polish MFA has
established a Bureau of European Security, which Polish
diplomats jokingly refer to as the "Office of Threats from
the East."  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX diplomat XXXXXXXXXXXX
(PROTECT), who was recruited to work in this bureau while
serving in Moscow, the Russian MFA threw this new moniker
back at him during a meeting.  XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to us that the
only way the MFA could have known about the reference was to
have been listening in on his phone conversations with Warsaw
while he was interviewing for the job.

4.  (C) Comment:  The GOR will take some time to digest
Sikorski's comments, and evaluate whether or not to alter the
current positive trend in bilateral relations.  Russia has
many levers, including delaying the approval of a pending gas
deal (Ref D).  Sikorski has given anti-western elements in
Russia ammunition against improved Russian relations with
NATO and even with the U.S.
Beyrle

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW1732,

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1732.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1732 2009-07-02 05:00 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4507
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHMO #1732/01 1830500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 020500Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4117
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0032
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001732 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2034 TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV CU RS

1. (S/NF) Summary: GOR officials and outside experts told us the Cuba-Russia relationship had not significantly changed since Raul Castro became president, but that Cuba-Russia ties are strengthening. Russia does not think it is harder or easier to work with Raul Castro than it was with Fidel Castro. MFA officials declined to prioritize the bilateral relationships with Cuba and Venezuela. GOR officials told us there were no plans to establish military bases in Cuba and that Russia was unlikely to deploy any long-range aviation assets to Cuba. End summary. 
-------------------------------------- 
No Strong Preference for Raul or Fidel 
-------------------------------------- 

2. (S/NF) The MFA's Cuba desk told us June 23, and outside experts subsequently confirmed, that Russia did not have a preference for working with Raul or Fidel Castro. As a general trend, the MFA said that Cuba-Russia ties were becoming stronger, but that the relationship had not changed significantly since Raul Castro came to power in 2008. 

3. (S/NF) Vladimir Davydov, Director of the Latin American Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences, said that Russia perceived a difference between the two Castro brothers in how they viewed the Cuba-Russia relationship. Davydov told us that Raul spent more time in the Soviet Union and Russia than Fidel and understood Russia better. Russia believed Raul to be the more pragmatic brother, according to Davydov, and that he did more to encourage outside investment in Cuba from a number of sources, including Russia. The MFA confirmed that Russia and Cuba were looking for mutually beneficial investment opportunities in Cuba. 

--------------------------------------- 
Russian Priorities: Cuba or Venezuela?
 --------------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) Both MFA officials and outside experts declined to prioritize Russia's relations with Cuba and Venezuela. Russia has a longer history of working with Cuba than with Venezuela, but this relationship suffered after the end of the Cold War. In addition, Russia has recently sought closer ties with the Chavez regime. XXXXXXXXXXXXX, an expert on Latin America-Russia relations, said Russia's main intention in improving ties with Cuba and Venezuela was not to aggravate the U.S., rather to gain access to new markets in the region. 

5. (S/NF) Leaders of Cuba and Venezuela have participated in high-profile visits with Russia officials, including President Medvedev. Palacio said that Russia's primary purpose from these engagements was access to the Cuban and Venezuelan markets. Russian MFA officials emphasized that there was currently no ideological component to either the Cuba-Russia or the Venezuela-Russia relationship, stating that the main basis of both relationships was economic. 

6. (S/NF) Russia's bilateral trade with Venezuela totals more than USD 700 million, while trade with Cuba totals about USD 280 million. Davydov told us that Russia's most important partner in Latin America was Brazil, which has the largest economy in the region. Russian-Brazilian bilateral trade totaled more than USD 5 billion in 2007. 

----------------------------------- 
Russian Military Operations in Cuba 
----------------------------------- 

7. (S/NF) GOR officials told us there were no plans to establish military bases in Cuba. They added that the GOR was unlikely to deploy any long-range aviation assets to Cuba. Russia's military relationship with Cuba would most likely be limited to upgrading Soviet-era equipment. The MFA's Cuba desk and Latin America experts here told us that Russia was looking for very little militarily from Cuba, emphasizing that the main basis of their bilateral 

MOSCOW 00001732 002.3 OF 002 

relationship was economic.

 ---------------------------- 
Working with Cuban Officials 
----------------------------

8. (S/NF) When asked about their working relationship with their Cuban counterparts, GOR officials declined to comment. BEYRLE

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09MOSCOW1730,

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW1730.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1730 2009-07-01 16:09 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO3906
RR RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #1730/01 1821609
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011609Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4114
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0030
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001730 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2034 TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV CU RS


REF: STATE 40419 

Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4 (b) , (c), and (d). 

1. (S/NF) Summary: GOR officials and outside experts told us the Cuba-Russia relationship had not significantly changed since Raul Castro became president, but that Cuba-Russia ties are strengthening. Russia does not think it is harder or easier to work with Raul Castro than it was with Fidel Castro. MFA officials declined to prioritize the bilateral relationships with Cuba and Venezuela. GOR officials told us there were no plans to establish military bases in Cuba and that Russia was unlikely to deploy any long-range aviation assets to Cuba. End summary. 
-------------------------------------- 
No Strong Preference for Raul or Fidel 
-------------------------------------- 

2. (S/NF) The MFA's Cuba desk told us June 23, and outside experts subsequently confirmed, that Russia did not have a preference for working with Raul or Fidel Castro. As a general trend, the MFA said that Cuba-Russia ties were becoming stronger, but that the relationship had not changed significantly since Raul Castro came to power in 2008. 3. (S/NF) Vladimir Davydov, Director of the Latin American Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences, said that Russia perceived a difference between the two Castro brothers in how they viewed the Cuba-Russia relationship. Davydov told us that Raul spent more time in the Soviet Union and Russia than Fidel and understood Russia better. Russia believed Raul to be the more pragmatic brother, according to Davydov, and that he did more to encourage outside investment in Cuba from a number of sources, including Russia. The MFA confirmed that Russia and Cuba were looking for mutually beneficial investment opportunities in Cuba. 

--------------------------------------- 
Russian Priorities: Cuba or Venezuela? 
--------------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) Both MFA officials and outside experts declined to prioritize Russia's relations with Cuba and Venezuela. Russia has a longer history of working with Cuba than with Venezuela, but this relationship suffered after the end of the Cold War. In addition, Russia has recently sought closer ties with the Chavez regime. XXXXXXXXXXXXX, an expert on Latin America-Russia relations, said Russia's main intention in improving ties with Cuba and Venezuela was not to aggravate the U.S., rather to gain access to new markets in the region. 

5. (S/NF) Leaders of Cuba and Venezuela have participated in high-profile visits with Russia officials, including President Medvedev. Palacio said that Russia's primary purpose from these engagements was access to the Cuban and Venezuelan markets. Russian MFA officials emphasized that there was currently no ideological component to either the Cuba-Russia or the Venezuela-Russia relationship, stating that the main basis of both relationships was economic. 

6. (S/NF) Russia's bilateral trade with Venezuela totals more than USD 700 million, while trade with Cuba totals about USD 280 million. Davydov told us that Russia's most important partner in Latin America was Brazil, which has the largest economy in the region. Russian-Brazilian bilateral trade totaled more than USD 5 billion in 2007. 

----------------------------------- 
Russian Military Operations in Cuba
 ----------------------------------- 

7. (S/NF) GOR officials told us there were no plans to establish military bases in Cuba. They added that the GOR was unlikely to deploy any long-range aviation assets to Cuba. Russia's military relationship with Cuba would most likely be limited to upgrading Soviet-era equipment. The MFA's Cuba desk and Latin America experts here told us that Russia was looking for very little militarily from Cuba, emphasizing that the main basis of their bilateral relationship was economic. 
MOSCOW 00001730 002 OF 002 
---------------------------- 
Working with Cuban Officials 
---------------------------- 
8. (S/NF) When asked about their working relationship with their Cuban counterparts, GOR officials declined to comment. BEYRLE

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW1273, ITALIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (C-RE8-02675)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1273 2009-05-20 05:30 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO8610
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #1273/01 1400530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200530Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3335
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001273 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR INR/I 

EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2019 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ENRG, EPET, IT, RS 
SUBJECT: ITALIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (C-RE8-02675) 

REF: A. 08 STATE 134386  
B. MOSCOW 572

Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
------- 

1. (S/NF) Economic ties, especially long-term gas contracts, are a pillar of Russia-Italy relations and affect Italy’s policies toward Russia. Italian gas company ENI and Russian Gazprom have supply commitments in place until 2035, as well as a joint-construction agreement for the South Stream pipeline. ENI’s company representative is often called Italy’s second ambassador to Russia. The personal relationship between Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin and Silvio Berlusconi is the other key element of Russia-Italy relations, with Putin’s family spending long visits at the Berlusconi family mansion in Sardinia at Berlusconi’s expense. Italian diplomats enjoy excellent access to Russian officials. Should Italy stop seeking to moderate European states’ Russian policies, the GOR would likely need to alter its political calculus. End Summary.

Economics affects politics
-------------------------- 

2. (C) Russia obtains significant economic benefits from Italy, gaining access to its equipment and technology, its stable market for gas and oil, and its highly desired consumer goods. In return, Russia provides Italy good offices for access to Central Asian supplies of gas and consumer markets. Italian companies have also looked to invest in Russia’s aviation sector and electricity generation, although the economic crisis put many of these efforts on hold.

3. (C) However, the economic interdependency does not come without other costs. Italian Embassy First Secretary Lorenzo Fanara told us that the countries’ economic ties were strong enough to affect Italy’s political stance toward Russia. He said Italian leaders, politicians, and businessmen would always be “careful” in dealing with Russia, as Italy exported to Russia over 10 billion Euros worth of goods annually, most of it produced by small and medium-sized companies. “Russia is simply too important of an economic partner for us,” Fanara explained. While the GOI understood the shortcomings of the Russian government (read: adherence to democratic values and freedoms), it could not afford to be too harsh in its criticism.

Deep ties on gas
---------------- 

4. (C) The crown jewels of Italy’s business interests with Russia are ENI’s gas contracts with Gazprom through 2035 and its 50-50 partnership with Gazprom in the South Stream pipeline project. The mo~97@Q5OQg

Wikileaks

09MOSCOW467, UPDATE ON RUSSIA’S POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF IGLA-S

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW467 2009-02-25 15:09 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

O 251509Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2128
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000467 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EUR/PRA YOUNG, ISN/CATR GANEM, WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC MCAP MARR MOPS PARM PINR PTER
RS 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON RUSSIA'S POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF IGLA-S 
(SA-24) MANPADS TO VENEZUELA 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 406 
     B. STATE 14070 
     C. MOSCOW 405 
 
Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
(S/NF) DCM reiterated Amb. Beyrle's strong demarche (ref A) 
on the possible transfer by Russia of Igla-S (SA-24) Manpads 
to Venezuela to MFA North America Director Igor Neverov on 
February 25.  In accordance with DFM Ryabkov's request in 
response to Amb. Beyrle's demarche, DCM delivered open-source 
material detailing information obtained from the FARC hard 
drives and press articles reporting the diversion of 
Venezuelan weapons to the FARC.  Neverov responded "your 
signal has been heard," and said that because of U.S. concern 
in this case, the MFA had sent out the information the U.S. 
had provided previously to all relevant agencies and would 
reply once it received all the responses and reactions.  He 
reiterated oft-heard GOR arguments that Russia has very 
strict end user requirements and guarantees.  In response to 
the DCM's noting that concern over this matter was coming 
from very high levels in Washington, Neverov asked whether 
the issue would be on the agenda for the Secretary and FM 
Lavrov's meeting in Geneva on March 6. 
 
 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW3011, S-300 DEMARCHE DELIVERED; RUSSIA PROMISES TO

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW3011.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3011 2008-10-09 14:58 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

O 091458Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0322

S E C R E T MOSCOW 003011 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2018 
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PGOV MASS IR RS
 
SUBJECT: S-300 DEMARCHE DELIVERED; RUSSIA PROMISES TO 
INVESTIGATE 
 
REF: A. STATE 108136 
     B. MOSCOW 2635 
     C. MOSCOW 2044 
     D. MOSCOW 1586 
     E. MOSCOW 1254 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political MC Alice G. Wells for reasons 
1.4(b), (c), and (d). 
 
1. (S) Charge delivered ref A demarche on the possible 
transfer to Iran of an S-300 anti-missile system and Igla-S 
MANPADs to MFA Director for North America Igor Neverov on 
October 9.  Neverov said the MFA would disseminate the 
information and convey the USG's concern through the 
appropriate channels.  He noted that the possible S-300 
transfer was a long-standing issue and had been raised at the 
highest levels, with Putin having said in the past that there 
was a contract, it was still in force, but Russia was in no 
hurry to implement it.  On MANPADs, Neverov said Russia had 
been very transparent about their position and discussed the 
issue with the U.S. many times (reftels).  Neverov said the 
GOR would take the demarche "very seriously" and prepare a 
response following review of the information. 
 
2. (S) Noting that the U.S. and Russia had sent the "right 
message" to Iran with adoption of the recent UN Security 
Council resolution, he said Iran was "well aware" of the 
consolidated position of the P5 1 and Russia continued to 
insist Iran fulfill all the obligations under the UNSCR's and 
"do what was expected of it." 
 
3. (SBU) Also on October 9, in response to press speculation 
during Israeli PM Olmert's visit to Moscow on a possible 
S-300 deal (septel), MFA spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said 
that Russia would not supply an S-300 system to Iran.  "Our 
high-ranking politicians have declared many times that we 
will not supply such weapons to countries located in what we 
call perturbed regions.  This does not meet the interests of 
regional stability," he said. 
RUBIN 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text

Wikileaks

08MOSCOW2472, RUSSIA’S DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION ON OUTER SPACE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2472 2008-08-20 11:15 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

VZCZCXRO4703
OO RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2472 2331115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201115Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9576
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0441

UNCLAS MOSCOW 002472 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL TSPA UN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION ON OUTER SPACE 
TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
 
1. (U) On August 19 MFA Department of International Security 
and Disarmament (DVBR) passed Embassy Moscow English and 
Russian versions of a draft UN General Assembly resolution on 
transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in 
outer space activities.  DVBR told us they would like to 
submit the draft resolution before the 63rd UNGA session as a 
joint U.S.-Russian-Chinese product.  Russia and China have 
been working on the language bilaterally, but DVBR assured us 
that Russia took into account U.S. input provided in 2006. 
 
2. (U) Russia would like Washington's reaction to the draft 
and thoughts on a joint submission by September 15.  We have 
e-mailed the English and Russian versions to EUR/PRA and 
EUR/RUS.  The Russian Embassy will also pass the documents to 
Department. 
BEYRLE

Wikileaks