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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW2696.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09MOSCOW2696 | 2009-10-30 16:25 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHMO #2696/01 3031625 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 301625Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5241 INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5424
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002696 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC DEPT FOR T, ISN, VCI, EUR/PRA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 TAGS: KCFE KNNP KTIA PARM PREL START RS US SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP MEETING, MOSCOW, OCTOBER 12 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Russia Binational Commission's Arms Control and International Security Working Group, held October 12 in Moscow, U/S Tauscher and Russian D/FM Ryabkov reviewed Missile Defense, nonproliferation issues, CFE, and START. Lt General O'Reilly of the Missile Defense Agency provided a detailed presentation on the latest U.S. planning on Missile Defense in Europe, and U/S Tauscher pressed for Russian movement on establishment of a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), participation in the Joint Threat Assessment (JTA), and related issues. The Russians agreed in principle to a next JTA meeting in the October-November 2009 time frame but deferred movement on further cooperation until their experts had examined the details of General O'Reilly's presentation. U/S Tauscher invited Russian missile defense experts to come to Colorado Springs to visit the facility and discuss missile defense cooperation. ¶2. (C) On nonproliferation issues, the Russians: emphasized the need for P5 coordination on NPT RevCon issues but acknowledged there may be areas where P5 or bilateral agreement will not be possible; probed for details of U.S. planning for CTBT ratification; asked about U.S. strategy for moving forward with Pakistan to break the deadlock on FMCT at the CD; pressed for U.S. support on Russian positions on specific UN First Committee draft resolutions; and detailed Russian concerns relating to the Global Summit on Nuclear Security and issues discussed at the Sherpa meeting in Vienna. They also expressed concerns about lack of U.S. interest in bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540 implementation and difficulties with implementation of the 123 agreement. ¶3. (C) On CFE, both sides identified problematic areas but affirmed their continued desire to look for areas of common ground and reiterated their openness to bilateral as well as multilateral discussions. On START, both D/FM Ryabkov and Russian Ambassador Antonov expressed their intention to work hard with the U.S. side to meet the December 5, 2009 deadline; U/S Tauscher and VCI Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller echoed this view and expressed appreciation for the seriousness with which Russia was engaging in the START talks. End Summary. MISSILE DEFENSE --------------- ¶4. (SBU) After introductory remarks, MDA Director, LTG O'Reilly provided a briefing on the Administration's new Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (MD). His briefing covered: the emerging missile threats that the new approach is designed to meet and the time frames for the four phases for dealing with these threats; the lack of capability against Russian ICBMs; and potential U.S.-Russia MD cooperation. Possible cooperative areas include: sharing MD sensor data, cooperative development of optics and laser technologies, and collaborative flight testing. ¶5. (C) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia would need to review and analyze the issues raised in LTG O'Reilly's presentation. Ryabkov then turned to Amb. Antonov to provide some reactions. Antonov questioned the assumption that Iran is a threat to southern Europe. He said that the U.S. was confusing capabilities with intentions and that the July 6, 2009 Moscow Summit Joint Statement on Missile Defense Issues referenced missile challenges not missile threats. U/S Tauscher responded that the U.S. threat perception is based on Iran's belligerence, non-compliance with UNSC resolutions, and the threatening rhetoric of Iran's President. ¶6. (C) U/S Tauscher noted that the U.S. is offering a wide range of cooperation. She said that the U.S. would like to: have a Russian delegation come to the U.S. to discuss with State ISN Acting Assisting Secretary Van Diepen a Joint Threat Assessment; extend the JDEC and PLNS agreements which are both due to expire in 2010; work to get the JDEC up and running; and agree on a format for notification of Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) launches over the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link. She provided drafts of agreements to extend the JDEC and PLNS agreements, and a non-paper on notifications. ¶7. (C) DFM Ryabkov replied that there is no doubt that Russia views the President's September 17 decision as a step in the right direction and one which partially takes into account Russia's views of U.S. MD policy in Europe. He added that the possibility of dialogue has been extended and improved. He noted tha t the U.S. approach places a great emphasis on technology and that there are issues raised by the future strategic capabilities of the Phased Adaptive Approach's latter phases. Ryabkov added that we must move toward a common understanding of what is being developed as an alternative to the Bush Administration's program. He asked for more detail on what the U.S. was now planning to deploy in terms of ground-based systems in Europe - including in Poland. He also raised the question about the system's potential growth in the future. ¶8. (C) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia was also interested in U.S.-Japan MD cooperation, commenting that it raised concern that the Missile Technology control Regime (MTCR) should be abided by. Col. Il'in of the Russian MoD said that the U.S. had provided clear numbers on interceptors to be deployed in Europe during the Bush Administration. He asked whether the U.S. could say how many, and what types of, interceptors would be deployed during each phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach. LTG O'Reilly responded that the SM-3 interceptors were in canisters that would be easy to count but that the absolute number of interceptors would be based on military commanders' assessments of the threat. He added that the Joint Threat Assessment could assist us in understanding the numbers of interceptors that would be needed. ¶9. (C) With respect to missile threats, Ryabkov said that Russia has its own view of "real" Iranian achievements vs. "hypotheses." He added that there are many other missile threats to be considered apart from Iran. He noted, however, that there is now a better basis to move forward on a Joint Threat Assessment than in July. Highlighting the importance of a mutually agreed foundation, he also stressed the importance of work in the NATO-Russia Council, specifically the good work that has already been done on theater missile defense (TMD). ¶10. (C) U/S Tauscher proposed that there be a second Joint Threat Assessment meeting in October or November in Washington. She also again raised the need to move on the JDEC and PLNS agreements and cited reference in the July 6 Moscow Summit's Joint Statement on Missile Defense Issues to the fact that our two countries are intensifying their dialogue on JDEC. Ryabkov responded that Russia could agree to a Joint Threat Assessment meeting in Washington in October but that prior experience does not indicate that our estimates will reach the same view. U/S Tauscher accepted this offer to send a threat assessment team to Washington and again emphasized the need to move forward on resolving JDEC issues and the Direct Communications Link format for GBI launches. Ryabkov responded that on JDEC we had gone through different stages but that Russia perceived a more deep-rooted problem than resolving specific unresolved JDEC issues. He added that resolving the problems of assessing missile threats would allow us to move forward with JDEC. NONPROLIFERATION ---------------- ¶11. (C) NPT RevCon: Turning to nonproliferation issues, Ryabkov emphasized that a successful Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) in May 2010 would be one of the major challenges ahead. The September 24, 2009 U.S.-chaired UN Security Council Summit and its unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1887 had been a complex undertaking that exceeded expectations and opened the way for progress on a balanced approach on all three "pillars" of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses. Also, the events at the UN and the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington were generating great expectations for U.S.-Russia bilateral cooperation on nonproliferation and disarmament issues. Ryabkov stressed the importance of working with a number of countries, and not just in the NAM, to highlight U.S. and Russia progress on disarmament issues. Recalling the London P5 meeting on September 4, 2009, and the bilateral meeting on its margins, Ryabkov noted the importance of transparency in nuclear policy and that it was desirable for the P5 to develop a unified position to this effect. The question now was how to move other P5 participants to concrete action in this area. Ambassador Antonov suggested that the U.S. and Russia chair a joint briefing on nuclear disarmament at the RevCon. He noted good experiences with such briefings in past RevCons, including in 2000. ¶12. (SBU) U/S Tauscher concurred in Ryabkov's assessments of the recent P5 consultations in London and events at the UN, which should provide a strong foundation on which to build. She advocated a robust P5 statement on the RevCon covering all three "pillars," noting that the U.S. and Russia did not receive enough credit for their work on disarmament as well as on nonproliferation and peaceful uses. Tauscher encouraged Russian participation in the scheduled October 14 P5 lunch hosted by U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Burk in New York to discuss some of these NPT RevCon issues in more depth (Note: Russian representatives did participate. End note.) and supported holding another P5 meeting to assess milestones completed and future work in advance of the RevCon. ¶13. (SBU) CTBT: Ryabkov noted the importance Russia and others attached to the Secretary's participation in the CTBT Article XIV Conference on September 24, after a ten-year absence. He sought details of U.S. ratification planning, asking whether CTBT ratification before the NPT RevCon was still an option, or would it be postponed until later? ¶14. (C) U/S Tauscher reiterated the President's commitment to seek ratification and emphasized that timing would depend in large part on the START ratification process. The Senate schedule was often unpredictable, but the Administration would need to have a very significant conversation with Senate members before proceeding on CTBT. Tauscher said she had discussed with CTBT colleagues on the margins of the Article XIV conference how to encourage others among the nine outstanding Annex 2 countries to ratify. She noted Indonesia's positive statement of intention to ratify when the U.S. ratifies and said China seemed serious about CTBT ratification at the London meeting. She welcomed Russia's thoughts on how to encourage countries with more complicated ratification scenarios such as Egypt, Pakistan, and India to move forward in this area. She also encouraged Russian statements promoting ratification of CTBT and noted the important role for scientists on both the U.S. and Russian sides in this discussion. ¶15. (C) Ryabkov opined that ratification by one or two of the outstanding Annex 2 countries could result in a "wave" of ratifiers among the outstanding nine countries. He noted that in the Asia/Pacific region, Russia did not see the possibility of some (presumably DPRK) acceding to CTBT, but that the P5 could discuss this in more detail. ¶16. (C) FMCT: Ryabkov also sought details of U.S. steps being taken with Pakistan to resolve Islamabad's opposition to starting substantive negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Ryabakov noted Russia was working with Pakistan in both Geneva and Moscow; he had met several times with Pakistan's ambassador in Moscow. U/S Tauscher confirmed that FMCT was a priority for the U.S., which was committed to making sure the CD's Program of Work, which includes FMCT negotiations, can go forward. She had met several times with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington but was not sure their discussion had moved the issue very far. She recalled that at the September 4 London P5 meeting, participants had agreed to make separate demarches to Pakistan and had also discussed a joint demarche, agreeing to revisit the issue in mid-October. Tauscher said the P5 needed to work further on this, although China had seemed unsure. She thought a P5 joint statement could move things forward and put the five on record. Even if China demurred, a joint demarche or statement among the four would be useful. ¶17. (C) Ryabkov said that with regard to a P5 demarche, China was on the fence. He warned that if not resolved, the issue would become "very topical" in the context of the NPT and events planned for 2010. He underlined the need to get rid of this obstacle and reiterated the importance of U.S. pressure. ¶18. (C) Regarding the IAEA, Ryabkov thought very good groundwork already had been laid but that UNSCR 1887 had shown the need for more intensive bilateral and P5 discussion on issues such as universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP). There was also the question of how to tackle Negative Security Assurances (NSA), where Russia supported creation of an international convention, which was, however, not acceptable to all. The P5 needed to be prepared on issues such as these before the NPT Rev Con, although full agreement might not be achievable. Nevertheless, the P5 should try to find some common ground. U/S Tauscher noted the ongoing work of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which would affect the U.S. position on NSA. ¶19. (C) Middle East Resolution: On the NPT RevCon Resolution on the Middle East, Ryabkov said it would be destructive to the Treaty regime if there was no resolution of this issue and suggested holding another P5 discussion on this if needed. All states in the region should be in compliance with the NPT, all states should accede to the NPT, and all nuclear facilities should be under safeguards. He conceded that finding common ground in this area might not be possible. U/S Tauscher said the U.S. was working closely with Egypt to find a way forward. The U.S. would support approaches in the RevCon that were consultative, positive, and which did not cause participants to take sides. ¶20. (SBU) UN General Assembly First Committee (UNFC): Ryabkov highlighted the importance of close bilateral cooperation in the UNGA First Committee (UNFC). In particular, he asked for U.S. support for Russian opposition to a Kazakhstan draft resolution proposing establishment of a UN International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons; and U.S. support for a Russian draft resolution on "Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions and the New Strategic Framework." On the first issue, Ryabkov claimed the Kazakhstan initiative would become entangled in some of the work of the NPT RevCon and pit Nuclear Weapons States against Non-Nuclear Weapons States; he sought U.S. support in opposing discussions or a vote on such a resolution although he indicated Russia might be prepared to agree to a resolution with a different name and identifying a date other than August 29, offering several alternative dates. (Note: August 29, 1949 is the date of the first Soviet atomic bomb test. End note.) ¶21. (SBU) Ambassador Antonov noted that the U.S. had reservations about the Russian draft resolution on START since the Treaty was not yet completed, but Antonov underlined that such a resolution would be helpful to the RevCon. He noted Russian readiness to engage in discussing a compromise text, which could be adjusted in December once the Treaty was agreed. He claimed NAM as well as European support for such a resolution and asked for Washington to review the issue. U/S Tauscher emphasized the overall importance of building consensus in the UN First Committee, and that the Russian proposal would seem not to meet the end dates of the UNFC. She noted generally that any resolution should be timed to support START completion by December 5 and also to build greater support within the P5 and among other NPT members for a strong and productive RevCon. She noted that Russia and the U.S. shared the same overall goals and agreed to work with Russia to look for possible areas of commonality with regard to these issues. ¶22. (SBU) On the Nuclear Security Summit, Ryabkov described the Vienna meeting of sherpas, which had addressed issues including: a brief joint communique; a plan of action to annex to the communique; and preliminary Russian comments conveyed in Vienna. Ryabkov emphasized also the need to address now the question of participants; e.g., why had Georgia, which has no nuclear reactors, been invited while Armenia, which does, was not? U/S Tauscher noted support for a joint communique and plan of action, and said Georgia had successfully interdicted a nuclear smuggling operation on its territory. Ryabkov countered by asserting the Russian understanding that the Summit would not address contraband/smuggling issues. U/S Tauscher undertook to communicate these Russian concerns to White House planners and get back to Ryabkov. ¶23. (SBU) UNSCR 1540: Ryabkov recalled that in March 2009 FM Lavrov had proposed to the Secretary to have greater bilateral cooperation on 1540, including through a Clinton-Lavrov joint statement and a dedicated UNSC meeting. The U.S. response had seemed to reject this proposal, focusing instead on a more practical approach involving meeting with various organizations to discuss issues such as establishment of a 1540 trust fund and other topics. Russia understood this might not have been a fully coordinated U.S. position, however, and wished to reiterate that it remained prepared to act on its proposal and engage foreign ministers. Russia was concerned about a decrease in interest in 1540; during the recently completed Comprehensive Review, only three capitals (Vienna, Tokyo, and Moscow) had sent experts, and there were no representativ es from international agencies. Ministerial involvement seemed required to increase attention, such as had been done in the OSCE and G8. U/S Tauscher agreed on the general importance of engaging senior levels and publics on these important nonproliferation issues, which, although very technical, nevertheless require strong political will and support. Antonov also noted differences in focus, with the U.S. preferring lower level engagement through working groups to discuss nonproliferation problems such as working with industry to establish and enforce export controls. In this context he also opined that the U.S. view of "strategic goods" did not necessarily conform to others' views; for example, Russia saw the term as encompassing items such as grain, petroleum, wood, and gas, which should also be dealt with effectively through implementation of 1540. ¶24. (SBU) Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Ryabkov sought to confirm U.S. interest in bringing into force the bilateral treaty on civil nuclear cooperation ("123 agreement") as soon as possible. Recalling the recent visit of ROSATOM Director Kiriyenko and his meeting with Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman, Ryabkov expressed surprise that there were difficulties relating to the 123 agreement, in developing the Action Plan that outlines specific projects that meet the presidential understandings of April and July 2009. Ryabkov asked the U.S. to put additional effort into bringing into force this important element of the bilateral relationship. U/S Tauscher noted she had accompanied Director Kiriyenko to Oak Ridge and was scheduled to meet with ROSATOM Deputy Director Spasskiy the following day. She cited many political issues relating to U.S. 123 agreements generally, not just with Russia. She promised to consult with Deputy Secretary Poneman in Washington and relay further information to Deputy ROSATOM Director Spasskiy. Tauscher also expressed U.S. support for the Russian proposal for a fuel reserve at Angarsk and hoped that Russia would make the final details available soon to enable us to help build support for approval at the IAEA's November Board of Governors meeting. She also shared the draft of a joint op-ed piece as discussed in London to express U.S.-Russia mutual support for fuel assurances and the Angarsk proposal, and welcomed Russian suggestions and edits. ¶25. (C) U/S Tauscher also noted that FBI Director Moeller would be bringing a sample of the smuggled HEU that was seized in Georgia in 2006 during his visit in mid-November. (Note: The material has remained in U.S. custody because we conducted the forensic analysis at the request of the Georgian Government. The Russians had requested a sample for analysis, but would not come to the U.S. to retrieve it. End note.) The fact that Director Moeller is bringing the sample to the Russians demonstrates U.S. commitment to working collaboratively with the Russians to investigate nuclear smuggling events. Ryabkov noted the logistical problems of the transportation of such items, but these were close to being decided. (Note: The transfer has been attempted and canceled twice before due to scheduling conflicts. End note.) Russia would be ready to discuss this with Moeller when he arrived. Ryabkov noted this was a difficult issue for Russia since there was no Russian translation for the term, "nuclear forensics." This was also an area that required further work with the IAEA to resolve its role and function in such cases. CFE ----- ¶26. (C) Recalling bilateral meetings on May 5 among many CFE participants and the June 10 Berlin Conference, Ryabkov noted that on many issues there had been no rapprochement; instead there was a fixation on what was not agreed. The Russian Federation was pushing for a package solution. Noting that the flank limits posed a major problem for the Russian side, he raised the possibility that Russia could move off the moratorium on implementation of the Treaty if some new agreements were achieved. He mentioned agreement on a definition for substantial combat forces and, linked with it, lower quota numbers for countries around the periphery of the CFE zone of implementation as being one way to proceed. He reiterated that the flank issue is major for Russia, but Russia does not want to find a solution at the expense of the NATO Allies. He said it was important to develop agreements which avoided delays and ambiguous interpretation. In Ryabkov's view, there should be lower levels of arms for NATO countries, which had received a "bonus" through enlargement. There should be an understanding of what was allowable in stationing forces. The flank restrictions were a problem. The unanticipated participation of new NATO members such as the Baltics and others was making the situation very difficult. The entry into force of the Adapted Treaty was a temporary solution or basis for further discussion, not a final resolution of the issue. ¶27. (C) State VCI Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said the sides had had many creative discussions and had found some common ground. It was notable that the parallel actions package remained the agreed basis for discussions between Russia and NATO, but serious problems remained: 1) continuing Russian failure to implement the CFE Treaty, which causes both political and legal difficulties for NATO countries, and 2) Russian insistence on changing the Adapted Treaty before it is ratified (i.e., discarding the so-called flank regime). Gottemoeller commented that in recent bilateral discussions Russia and the United States had described some ideas that had common conceptual elements to them, such as trial implementation and provisional application. Therefore, she judged that there was some basis to develop common ground between the two sides, as long as Russia was not insisting on conditions that the NATO Allies cannot agree to. Ryabkov said Russia did not start out against the Treaty, but CFE was becoming increasingly unmanageable, especially because of NATO enlargement. Russia's proposed moratorium was a way not to torpedo CFE but a mechanism to resolve this in a mutually acceptable way. Russia wanted continued bilateral dialogue on this, as well as with other NATO Allies. ¶28. (C) Ryabkov emphasized that Russia supported a solution to the CFE impasse based on parallel actions, but that Russia would no longer accept delays in ratification or double interpretations of commitments. He outlined Russia's five areas of greatest concern that needed to be addressed in order to lift Russia's suspension and resume implementation: -- A lower level of armament limits for NATO countries to compensate for NATO enlargement. -- Stationing of troops in foreign countries. -- Abolition of the Flank restrictions. -- Participation of new NATO countries including the Baltic states. -- Entry into force of ACFE. ¶29. (C) Ryabkov stressed that Russia would not consider individual elements of the treaty separately, or consider a trial entry into force of ACFE on this basis. The solution was in parallel actions and Russia wanted an agreement with the United States on this, as well as with other NATO Allies. ¶30. (C) A/S Gottemoeller confirmed U.S. willingness to continue bilateral dialogue and also to discuss CFE in a small group format when appropriate, to address both timing and substance. She emphasized there was no attempt to limit discussions to bilateral format. START ----- ¶31. (C) Ryabkov said Russia was satisfied with the progress and dynamics of the negotiating process and noted work was progressing from discussion of the outlines of the follow-on Treaty to actual drafting. Russia would try to have a fully formulated document by December 5. The main provisions had been agreed but some difficulties on principles prevented resolution. Ryabkov urged that at this point the parties should not simply take the easiest route and also should not try to put aside the most difficult issues until the final stages. Time was short, and the future Treaty would require provisions on the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. This was currently in the preamble but should be addressed in the body of the Treaty. Second, there was a U.S. effort to exclude conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs from the limitations of the Treaty, which, he claimed contravened the July 6 Joint Understanding signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. In addition, Ryabkov noted attempts to limit or place restrictions on mobile ICBMs produced in Russia; and imposition of a very rigid START-like monitoring system for Russian production facilities for new types of missiles. Ryabkov argued that the sides could not delay resolution of these issues. The delegations should discuss these issues in detail and resolve them. Ambassador Antonov concurred, noting the delegations were well-qualified to engage in such discussions and under clear presidential orders to try to conclude a Treaty by December 5. Antonov pledged that his team would do all it could to work productively with the American side. ¶32. (C) U/S Tauscher underlined the impressive qualifications of the team members on both sides. A/S Gottemoeller cited good working group dynamics among the negotiators but noted the need to accelerate the pace of work to reach agreement by December 5. The U.S. has agreed to accept Russia's more streamlined approach for a treaty with three tiers (the main treaty, protocol, and a detailed annex with procedures for inspectors or "inspection manual"). The Russian side has agreed to additional measures on verification and elimination measures proposed by the U.S. ¶33. (C) A/S Gottemoeller then noted that there were important areas that remained problematic. At the end of the last Geneva round both sides developed an agreed list of the ten outstanding priority issues for resolution. These included agreement on counting rules and on verification, where Russia proposed significantly lowering the number of inspections. Another fundamental issue was exclusion of several important prohibitions, including the ban on telemetry encryption - first agreed in the SALT II Treaty in the late 1970s - an important part of U.S.-Russian mutual legacy on arms control. Omission of such prohibitions could call into question whether the new treaty was, in fact, effective. A/S Gottemoeller said the sides agreed that the next round would be decisive and should include a stocktaking which would determine whether talks were in the endgame or whether more time would be needed. She noted that the U.S. team was now in place in Geneva for the duration of the negotiations. ¶34. (C) U/S Tauscher said that following the stock-taking, the sides should compare notes about what more is needed. She recommended aiming for agreement on the main Treaty elements by mid-November, to allow time for completion of drafting by December 5. She also recommended starting to consider options for a signing ceremony, such as venue, timing, and format. ¶35. (C) Ryabkov thanked the U.S. side for its very clear and precise ideas, which were useful and constructive. Russia was ready to be flexible, and Ryabkov suggested another meeting before December 5. Speaking personally since there had been no consideration yet in Moscow of signing details, Ryabkov thought a signing ceremony in Geneva as the negotiating venue might be most appropriate. Beyrle
Wikileaks
Wikileaks: Russia 